Per Lodha. J. - (agreeing with Bhachawat, J.)-Section 32 which creates a legal fiction in the matter of grant or renewal of licence occurs in Chapter VI of the Act the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading." Section 11 occurs under Chapter III the heading of which is "Constitution of Market Committees" Raina J’s view is that since section 32 occurs under the heading "Regulation of Trading" the operation of the legal fiction under section 32 (3) proviso must he limited to the purpose of regulation of trade only and should not be extended to the purpose of constitution of market committee which is dealt with under a different chapter. [Para 104 It is true that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. But it has to be determined with reference to each statute as to what is the scope of the legal fiction. [Para 108 In the present case section 32 (1) (3) proviso makes it clear that if the market committee fails to grant licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. The purpose of this statutory fiction would be completely defeated if all the privileges of a grantee of licence i.e. the holder of a licence were not extended to a person who has become a licencee by virtue of this statutory fiction The conclusion is irresistible that the object of this statutory fiction was to make the person to whom the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed entitled to all the rights and benefits of a person to whom the licence may have been granted by a specific order of a market committee. The proviso has been drafted in the widest terms and there is nothing whatsoever in its language to suggest that its operation is confined to the right of trading only and that it does not extend to other rights available to a licencee to whom a licence has been granted by the Committee. The proviso has been drafted in the widest terms and there is nothing whatsoever in its language to suggest that its operation is confined to the right of trading only and that it does not extend to other rights available to a licencee to whom a licence has been granted by the Committee. There is nothing in section 11 (1) (b) or Rule 12 or 13 to suggest that the operation of the statutory fiction is confined to trading activity only. If the legislature intended to limit the operation of the legal fiction only to the purpose of trading activity it could have said so in express terms. AIR 1959 SC 352 , AIR 1954 SC 155 . AIR 1953 SC 244 referred to. [Para 109 (6) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP)-Ss.32 (3) and 17 (2)-deemed licence holder-shall be so deemed even if no security is deposited. Per Raina and Bhachawat, JJ.-If an application for renewal of licence is not rejected within a period of six weeks, it shall he deemed to have been granted under the proviso to section 32 (3) of the Act. Even if the applicant fails to give security as required by section 17 (2) (xi) of the Act, he shall be deemed to be a licence holder. [Paras 10, 20, 60 & 61 (7) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP) – S.17 (2) (xi)-Section is valid - does not suffer from excession delegation. [Paras 15, 44 & 47 ORDER Raina J.- l. This is a petition under article 256 and 257 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner is a trader in food grains and held licence from Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Shivpuri (hereinafter referred to as the Market Committee during the year 1973-74. The year for the purposes of the licence commences from 1st of October and expires on the 30th of September of the following year. An application for the renewal of the licence has to be made within 30 day of the expiry of the licence under the byelaws of the Market Committee. The petitioner applied for renewal of his licence on 29.10.1974. An application for the renewal of the licence has to be made within 30 day of the expiry of the licence under the byelaws of the Market Committee. The petitioner applied for renewal of his licence on 29.10.1974. This application was rejected by the market committee by order dated 27.2.1975 vide Annexure IV, on the ground that he had failed to furnish security of Rs.1,000 as required by sub section (2) of section 17 of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. Later on, when the Market Committee prepared the voters' list for election to the Market Committee, the name of the petitioner was omitted. The petitioner thereupon filed objections challenging the list inter alia on the ground that a number of persons qualified to vote were omitted from the list and a number of persons not so qualified were included therein. Vide annexure III and III A. The said objections were disallowed by the Election Officer by order dated 20.10.1975. On 6.10.1975 the Collector Shivpuri, published the election programme vide Annexure V. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition praying that the electoral roll Annexure II being in contravention of the Rules should be quashed and that the election programme should also be quashed on the same ground. He also prayed that the provisions contained in sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act relating to furnishing of security by the trader as a condition for obtaining the licence should be struck down as unconstitutional. 4. The election to the Committee has already been held, but the declaration of the result has been stayed by this Court vide order dated 27.11.1975 on an application for ad interim writ filed by the petitioner. 5. The respondents 1, 3, 5 and 6 are the main contesting respondents in this case and they have filed the returns opposing the petition According to them the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not hold a licence from the Committee. They also denied that the names of a number of persons not qualified to vote have been entered in the voters list. 6. The attack of the petitioner on the electoral roll is two-fold. His first contention is that he and several others who were qualified to vote have not been included therein. They also denied that the names of a number of persons not qualified to vote have been entered in the voters list. 6. The attack of the petitioner on the electoral roll is two-fold. His first contention is that he and several others who were qualified to vote have not been included therein. His other contention is that many of the voters who were not eligible for being enrolled as voters have been included in the voters list. We shall first take up the objection of the petitioner that his name has been wrongly excluded from the electoral roll. 7. It was not disputed before us that only a trader holding a licence from the Market Committee is qualified to vote under the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gatham) Niyam. 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). It is also not in dispute that the licence of the petitioner was not renewed by the Committee for the period in question, that is 1974-75. In fact by an order dated 27-2-1975 vide Annexure IV the Committee had refused to renew the licence because the petitioner had failed to furnish security of Rs.1000/- as required by the Committee. On behalf of the contesting respondents it has been urged that since the petitioner failed to file an appeal against the said order under Section 34 of the Act the order has become final under sub-section (4) and cannot be questioned by the petitioner. 8. The petitioner. however, relied on the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the fact and his contention is that he should be deemed to be a licence-holder under the said proviso because the Market Committee failed to pass an order granting or refusing the licence-within a fortnight from the date of receipt of his application for renewal. 8. The petitioner. however, relied on the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the fact and his contention is that he should be deemed to be a licence-holder under the said proviso because the Market Committee failed to pass an order granting or refusing the licence-within a fortnight from the date of receipt of his application for renewal. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to examine the language of sub-section (3) of section 32 of the contention Act which reads as under: "(3) The market committee may grant or renew the licence or for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to grant or renew the licence: Provided that if the market committee fails to grant a licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be." It appears from the language of sub-section (3) that it has been enacted in order to enacted prompt disposal of applications for grant or renewal of the licence by the Market Committee. It" the Committee falls to pass an order either granting or refusing a licence within the period specified therein the Licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. Thus silence on the part of the Committee for the specified period is to be construed as grant or renewal of the licence by implication. 9. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 creates a legal fiction apparently for the benefit of the traders because if their application for grant or renewal remain pending with the Committee un-attended for long it is bound to cause undue hardship to them. It is clear from the proviso that in case the committee for any reason is not willing to grant or renew the licence it must pass an order rejecting the application within six weeks in the case of an application for grant of a licence and within a fortnight in the case of an application for renewal of a licence. It is clear from the proviso that in case the committee for any reason is not willing to grant or renew the licence it must pass an order rejecting the application within six weeks in the case of an application for grant of a licence and within a fortnight in the case of an application for renewal of a licence. If the aforesaid period is allowed to expire the power of the Committee to refuse the grant or renewal of the licence comes to an end because under the proviso the applicant is automatically clothed with the rights of a grantee and he has to be treated thereafter as a person whose licence has been granted or renewed by the Committee. Once the grant or renewal comes into operation by virtue of legal fiction the application must be deemed to have been automatically disposed of and thereafter the Committee is not competent to exercise its power of rejection in relation there to. It is, therefore clear that the order dated 27-2-1975 (Annexure IV) passed by the Committee was illegal and void and of no legal consequence. 10. At this stage we would examine some of the contentions raised on behalf of the contesting respondents. It has been urged that under clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act, the Committee is competent to grant licence only after obtaining the necessary security and since the petitioner had failed to furnish the security as required by the Committee he is not entitled to claim the benefit of the fiction created by the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act. It is no doubt true that under the proviso grant of a licence by the Committee cannot be implied in a case where the Committee h as no power to grant a licence. The legal fiction can operate only where there is no legal bar to the grant or renewal of the licence. To meet this contention it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that clause (xi) in so far as it relates to furnishing of security is illegal and void because it confers an unbridled power on the Committee and. Therefore, suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The said clause is reproduced below. To meet this contention it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that clause (xi) in so far as it relates to furnishing of security is illegal and void because it confers an unbridled power on the Committee and. Therefore, suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The said clause is reproduced below. " (xi) With a view to maintain stability in the market (a) take suitable measures to ensure that traders do not buy agricultural produce beyond their capacity and avoid risk to the sellers in disposing of the produce; and (b) grant licences only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of the buyers." 11. It is almost settled that the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy. Vide Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 465 and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala. v. The Pratap Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 4 . The question of excessive delegation arises mainly in respect of the principal subject of legislation and not in respect of ancillary matters' which must be left to subordinate agency for carrying out the purpose of the Act. It has been held in a number of cases that it is open to the legislature to confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to such agency to work out the details within the framework of the policy. Vide Khambhalia Municipality and another V. The State of Gujrat and another AIR 1967 SC 1048 . In M/s Devidas Gopalkishan v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1895 their Lordships while dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act held section 5 to be void on the ground that it conferred an uncontrolled power on the Provincial Government to impose sales tax. Their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 15 which are pertinent: "The Constitution confers a power and impose a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. Their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 15 which are pertinent: "The Constitution confers a power and impose a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An over burdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may undaly overstep the limits of delegation It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits." 12. While taking note of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships, it would be pertinent to bear in mind that under Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, power to levy sales tax has been conferred on the legislature itself and the question arose whether the legislature could delegate this power to the State Government without laying down any guidelines. Their Lordships held that the power conferred by section 5 on the State Government was an unbridled power which virtually amounted to self effacement of the legislative power in favour of the Government either whole or in part and, therefore, the said section was struck down. In the instant case the subject matter of legislation is not the furnishing of security by the traders. The subject matter of legislation is the regulation of trade and commerce within the State under Entry 26 of the State List and of markets under Entry 28 of the said list. In the instant case the subject matter of legislation is not the furnishing of security by the traders. The subject matter of legislation is the regulation of trade and commerce within the State under Entry 26 of the State List and of markets under Entry 28 of the said list. The legislature in exercise of its powers under the said entries has made elaborate provisions for the establishment of markets, constitution of market committee and regulation of trade in market area. The provision relating to security is a matter ancillary to the main subject of the legislation and it would be too much to expect that the legislature would itself determine the amount of security which may be required from a particular trader. 13. It is also not correct to say that the legislature has not given any guidelines whatsoever. The opening words of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 indicate that the object of the provisions thereof is to maintain stability in the market and to secure agriculturists who sell their goods to the traders in the market. The adoption of suitable measures to achieve this object is left to the Committee which is itself a representative body expected to understand and appreciate the demands of the situation. 14. Further under sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) it is provided that the Committee shall grant licence only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of buyers. Thus the guideline is that the amount of security must commensurate with the capacity of the trader concerned and should not be out of all proportions to it. In our view these were sufficient guidelines for the committee while exercising powers conferred on it under clause (xi) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act. 15. In Naraindav v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 1232 their Lordships while dealing with the powers of the State Government to prescribe text books under the M.P. Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pushkon Sambandhi) Vyavastha Adhiniyam (13 of 1973) repelled the contention that it vested an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion in the State Government as the object and purpose for which the power has been conferred are specified in the Act. We do not, therefore, find any merit in the contention that the aforesaid provision amounts to excessive delegation or abdication of the legislative function by the Legislature. In our view the aforesaid provision is perfectly valid and does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. 16. The next question that arises is whether in view of the aforesaid provision the operation of legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 is automatically suspended. Clause (ii) of sub section (1) of section 80 of the Act confers on the market committee the power to make bye-laws for the conditions of trading in a market. The proper course for the committee therefore, was that in exercise of its powers under the said provision it should have framed bye-laws relating to furnishing of security by various classes of traders. This, the committee has filed to do and on account of this failure a trader is not at all aware what security he is required to furnish for obtaining or for getting his liecnce renewed. 17. It would be here pertinent to note that sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act relates only to grant of a licence. If we carefully examine the various provisions of the Act, it would appear that the grant and renewal of licence have been treated as separate and provisions for the same have been made accordingly. Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 17 reads as under: “(iii) grant or refuse licences to the market functionaries and renew, suspend or cancel such licences.” From the aforesaid clause it would appear that the renewal of a licence is distinguished from the grant of a new licence and stands on a different footing and that is why both have been mentioned separately. Similarly in sub-section (3) of section 32 the grant and renewal of a licence have been treated separately and different provisions are made therefor in the proviso to the said sub-section. It is, therefore, of great significance that in sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 there is no mention of renewal of a licence and this shows that the provision is applicable only to grant of a new licence and not to the renewal of an old licence. 18. It is, therefore, of great significance that in sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 there is no mention of renewal of a licence and this shows that the provision is applicable only to grant of a new licence and not to the renewal of an old licence. 18. If the Committee wants to obtain security from a trader who has not already furnished the security as a condition for renewal of his licence it would be necessary for it to frame bye-laws for the purpose under section 80. Clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act is not applicable to renewal of a licence and in the absence of any bye-laws it cannot be said that the committee was not competent to renew the licence merely because the petitioner had not furnished security. We, therefore, hold that the failure of the Petitioner to furnish required security was immaterial and did not affect the operation of the legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32. 19. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was brought to our notice that the Director had issued instructions in the year 1973 regarding obtaining security from the traders who wanted to operate in the market area in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(2)(xi) of the Act, but it is clear that these instructions had not the force of law. It is no doubt true that under sub-section (1) of section 81 the Director is competent to require the Market committee to make such bye-laws as it considers necessary and on its failure to do so he can make the bye-law himself in the manner laid down in sub• section (2) of section 81 but it is not disputed that the Director did not make any bye-laws in regard to security in exercise of his powers under section 81 of the Act. The administrative directions given by the Director to the Committee are, therefore, of no consequence so far as the claim of the petitioner is concerned. 20. The administrative directions given by the Director to the Committee are, therefore, of no consequence so far as the claim of the petitioner is concerned. 20. On behalf of the market committee respondent no.1, it has been stated that the committee had issued a public notice dated 13-11-1974 (Annexure-B) whereby it had called upon the traders to furnish security at the various rates specified therein according to the category to which the trader belonged by 30-11-1974 as a condition precedent to the grant or renewal of the licence. In the first place, as pointed out above, so far as renewal of a licence is concerned the demand of the security could only be made after framing bye-laws in this behalf. Apart from this since the petitioner had already made an application for renewal of licence accompanied by necessary licence fees it was necessary for the committee to intimate him within a fortnight that his application would be rejected unless he furnished the security. A general notice of this nature could not be construed as an order rejecting the application so as to exclude the operation of the legal fiction particularly because it was issued after a fortnight, that is, fourteen days. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to be grantee of the licence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act even though he did not furnish any security and an order refusing his application was passed on 27-2-1975. 21. The next point that arises for consideration is whether by virtue of his being the grantee of the licence by legal fiction the petitioner was entitled to be enrolled as a voter. In this connection it is pertinent to refer to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act, which provides for the constitution of the market committee. The clause reads as under: “(b). In this connection it is pertinent to refer to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act, which provides for the constitution of the market committee. The clause reads as under: “(b). Not more than one third of the elected members as may be fixed by the State Government in the said notification shall be representative of traders possessing such Qualification as may be prescribed and elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years as traders or owners or occupiers of processing factories under this Act: Provided that in the case of a market established for the first time under section 10, the qualifying period of continuously holding licence from such market committee shall be six months;" It is clear from the language of the aforesaid clause that only such traders as possessed the prescribed qualifications will be entitled to choose their representatives. The Act itself does not prescribe any qualifications for the voters and leaves it to the State Government to specify the qualifications by Rules. Unfortunately the Rules framed by the State Government do not clearly lay down the qualifications of a voter. Rule 12 merely lays down who shall not be entitled to vote and from the negative provisions of this rule one has to infer what are the positive qualifications of a voter. Clause (vi) of rule 12 reads as under: "12. Right to vote-No person- (vi) holding licence from the market committee as trader or owner or occupier of processing factories under the Act shall be entitled to vote as such at an election if on the date on which the poll is taken his licence has ceased to be in force and who has not attained the age of twenty one years." 22. From the aforesaid clause it can be gathered that the essential qualification of a voter is that he must be the holder of a licence from the committee and should have attained the age of 21 years. Now the question arises whether the petitioner can be treated as the holder of a licence from the committee within the meaning of this rule. Now the question arises whether the petitioner can be treated as the holder of a licence from the committee within the meaning of this rule. The expression holder of a licence has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules and, therefore, it must necessarily be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense, The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word 'to hold' is to have in one's possession and therefore, the holder of licence means the person actually holding a licence from the Committee, that is, a person holding a licence in fact as well as in law. Although the petitioner is to be treated as a grantee of a licence by legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act, he, in our view, cannot be treated as the holder of the licence for the purpose of rule 12 of the Rules which has been enacted mainly with a view to provide the qualifications of a voter. 23. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction the Court must ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created because the fiction must be limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. 24. In Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroof AIR 1963 SC 1448 while dealing with the provisions of the Income fax Act, their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 7 which are partinent; "As was observed by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd V. The State of Bihar 1955-2 SCR 603 at P. 646: (s) AIR 1955 S.C. 661 at P.680 - legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not extend beyond that legitimate field In the present case the fiction is limited to the cases provided in the three sub-sections of section 24B and cannot be extended further than the liability for the income received in the previous year." 25. In a more recent case, namely Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat v, Vadilal Lallubhai AIR 1973 SC 1016 , their Lordships again emphasized the statutory rule of construction that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. In a more recent case, namely Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat v, Vadilal Lallubhai AIR 1973 SC 1016 , their Lordships again emphasized the statutory rule of construction that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. Vide paragraph 12 of the judgment. 26. Section 32 of the Act occurs in Chapter VI the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading" Section 32 deals with the power to grant licence. While dealing with the power to grant licence it has been provided that where an application for grant or renewal of licence is not expressly rejected within the period specified therein the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed. As pointed out above, this provision is apparently to avoid hardship to the traders because if there is delay on the part of the Committee in dealing with such application the trader may become liable for penalty under section 48. For obvious reasons it was not considered proper in the interests of trade that all traders must immediately stop their trade activities as soon as the licence expires even though they have made application for renewal along with prescribed fee unless their applications have been rejected within the specified time. 27. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 imposes a heavy restriction on the power of the Committee to reject an application for grant or renewal of a licence because it is required to act within the specified period. Thus the fiction must be limited to the object for which it is created, that is regulation of trade. A trader who is keen to be enrolled as a voter must approach the Committee for obtaining the licence and if the Committee passes an order refusing the licence he must have the order quashed either by filing an appeal or by filing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. We may here also point out that if it had been expressly provided in the Rules that the grantee of a licence by fiction under the proviso to sub section (3) of section 32 of the Act shall be deemed to be the holder of a licence for the purpose of the Act, or the rules the position would have been different; but that is not so. In fact the proviso does not use the expression "holder of a licence". It merely says that the licence shall be deemed to be granted or renewed in the circumstances specified therein. 29. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not actually hold a licence and therefore, the voters list cannot be questioned on the ground that he and other traders like him "were excluded from the list. 30. The next contention of the petitioner is that the voters' list includes several traders who held a licence for a period less than two consecutive years. According, to him such traders were not entitled to be enrolled and this contention is based on the wording of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act which had already been reproduced above. 31. On a careful examination of the language of the aforesaid clause we are of the view that the qualification, namely. "holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years" is prescribed therein for candidates and not for voters. The words "elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee" clearly indicate that the qualification laid down therein is for the persons from whom the representative is to be chosen and it is not the qualification of a voter. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. Our attention in this connection was also drawn to sub-rule (1) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "13. Voters' List-(1) The election authority shall cause to be prepared and published as soon as possible but not later than three months before the expiry of the term of market committee, separate lists of voters in Hindi eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 11 of each constituency." This sub-rule, no doubt, lays down that the list of voters shall contain the names of those who are eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of section 11 of the Act but this does not carry us any further because for determining who is entitled to vote, we must refer back to sub-section (1) of section 11 which in fact does not lay down any qualification for the voters and merely says that the qualifications of the voters shall be such as may be prescribed. Thus, in our view, it cannot be inferred from sub-rule (1) of rule 1 that a trader is not qualified to be a voter unless he is holding a licence for two consecutive years. 33. It was also urged that while rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner the authority concerned was also of the view that the holding of a licence for two consecutive years was ordinarily an essential qualification of a voter but it rejected the objection on the ground that the matter fell within the purview of the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act under the erroneous impression that this is a case of market committee being established for the first time. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. The view taken by the authority is immaterial and of no consequence. 34. Shri A.R. Naokar, learned counsel for the petitioner, also urged that voters' list must be held to be bad because it was not prepared in accordance with sub-rule (2) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "(2) The Voters' Lists shall show the serial number, full name, father's or husband's name. surname, age, residence and serial number of the voter and the nature of his qualifications." In the voters' list which has been actually filed, the serial number the name of the trader, his age and the place of residence are mentioned; but not his qualifications. The contention of Shri Naoker is that in the absence of description of the qualification of the voters, the voters' list is bad and should be struck down. We find no merit in this contention for the following reasons. The rule merely refers to the nature of qualifications which have just to be briefly indicated and this has been done by showing whether he is petty dealer retail dealer or wholesale dealer. He would be difficult to give all the qualifications of a voter in the list. In our view the list as prepared substantially complies with the requirements of the rule and is not. therefore, liable to be struck down on this ground. Per Lodha. J. - (agreeing with Bhachawat, J.)-Section 32 which creates a legal fiction in the matter of grant or renewal of licence occurs in Chapter VI of the Act the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading." Section 11 occurs under Chapter III the heading of which is "Constitution of Market Committees" Raina J’s view is that since section 32 occurs under the heading "Regulation of Trading" the operation of the legal fiction under section 32 (3) proviso must he limited to the purpose of regulation of trade only and should not be extended to the purpose of constitution of market committee which is dealt with under a different chapter. [Para 104 It is true that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. But it has to be determined with reference to each statute as to what is the scope of the legal fiction. [Para 108 In the present case section 32 (1) (3) proviso makes it clear that if the market committee fails to grant licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. The purpose of this statutory fiction would be completely defeated if all the privileges of a grantee of licence i.e. the holder of a licence were not extended to a person who has become a licencee by virtue of this statutory fiction The conclusion is irresistible that the object of this statutory fiction was to make the person to whom the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed entitled to all the rights and benefits of a person to whom the licence may have been granted by a specific order of a market committee. The proviso has been drafted in the widest terms and there is nothing whatsoever in its language to suggest that its operation is confined to the right of trading only and that it does not extend to other rights available to a licencee to whom a licence has been granted by the Committee. There is nothing in section 11 (1) (b) or Rule 12 or 13 to suggest that the operation of the statutory fiction is confined to trading activity only. If the legislature intended to limit the operation of the legal fiction only to the purpose of trading activity it could have said so in express terms. AIR 1959 SC 352 , AIR 1954 SC 155 . AIR 1953 SC 244 referred to. [Para 109 (6) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP)-Ss.32 (3) and 17 (2)-deemed licence holder-shall be so deemed even if no security is deposited. Per Raina and Bhachawat, JJ.-If an application for renewal of licence is not rejected within a period of six weeks, it shall he deemed to have been granted under the proviso to section 32 (3) of the Act. Per Raina and Bhachawat, JJ.-If an application for renewal of licence is not rejected within a period of six weeks, it shall he deemed to have been granted under the proviso to section 32 (3) of the Act. Even if the applicant fails to give security as required by section 17 (2) (xi) of the Act, he shall be deemed to be a licence holder. [Paras 10, 20, 60 & 61 (7) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP) – S.17 (2) (xi)-Section is valid - does not suffer from excession delegation. [Paras 15, 44 & 47 ORDER Raina J.- l. This is a petition under article 256 and 257 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner is a trader in food grains and held licence from Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Shivpuri (hereinafter referred to as the Market Committee during the year 1973-74. The year for the purposes of the licence commences from 1st of October and expires on the 30th of September of the following year. An application for the renewal of the licence has to be made within 30 day of the expiry of the licence under the byelaws of the Market Committee. The petitioner applied for renewal of his licence on 29.10.1974. This application was rejected by the market committee by order dated 27.2.1975 vide Annexure IV, on the ground that he had failed to furnish security of Rs.1,000 as required by sub section (2) of section 17 of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. Later on, when the Market Committee prepared the voters' list for election to the Market Committee, the name of the petitioner was omitted. The petitioner thereupon filed objections challenging the list inter alia on the ground that a number of persons qualified to vote were omitted from the list and a number of persons not so qualified were included therein. Vide annexure III and III A. The said objections were disallowed by the Election Officer by order dated 20.10.1975. On 6.10.1975 the Collector Shivpuri, published the election programme vide Annexure V. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition praying that the electoral roll Annexure II being in contravention of the Rules should be quashed and that the election programme should also be quashed on the same ground. On 6.10.1975 the Collector Shivpuri, published the election programme vide Annexure V. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition praying that the electoral roll Annexure II being in contravention of the Rules should be quashed and that the election programme should also be quashed on the same ground. He also prayed that the provisions contained in sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act relating to furnishing of security by the trader as a condition for obtaining the licence should be struck down as unconstitutional. 4. The election to the Committee has already been held, but the declaration of the result has been stayed by this Court vide order dated 27.11.1975 on an application for ad interim writ filed by the petitioner. 5. The respondents 1, 3, 5 and 6 are the main contesting respondents in this case and they have filed the returns opposing the petition According to them the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not hold a licence from the Committee. They also denied that the names of a number of persons not qualified to vote have been entered in the voters list. 6. The attack of the petitioner on the electoral roll is two-fold. His first contention is that he and several others who were qualified to vote have not been included therein. His other contention is that many of the voters who were not eligible for being enrolled as voters have been included in the voters list. We shall first take up the objection of the petitioner that his name has been wrongly excluded from the electoral roll. 7. It was not disputed before us that only a trader holding a licence from the Market Committee is qualified to vote under the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gatham) Niyam. 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). It is also not in dispute that the licence of the petitioner was not renewed by the Committee for the period in question, that is 1974-75. In fact by an order dated 27-2-1975 vide Annexure IV the Committee had refused to renew the licence because the petitioner had failed to furnish security of Rs.1000/- as required by the Committee. It is also not in dispute that the licence of the petitioner was not renewed by the Committee for the period in question, that is 1974-75. In fact by an order dated 27-2-1975 vide Annexure IV the Committee had refused to renew the licence because the petitioner had failed to furnish security of Rs.1000/- as required by the Committee. On behalf of the contesting respondents it has been urged that since the petitioner failed to file an appeal against the said order under Section 34 of the Act the order has become final under sub-section (4) and cannot be questioned by the petitioner. 8. The petitioner. however, relied on the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the fact and his contention is that he should be deemed to be a licence-holder under the said proviso because the Market Committee failed to pass an order granting or refusing the licence-within a fortnight from the date of receipt of his application for renewal. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to examine the language of sub-section (3) of section 32 of the contention Act which reads as under: "(3) The market committee may grant or renew the licence or for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to grant or renew the licence: Provided that if the market committee fails to grant a licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be." It appears from the language of sub-section (3) that it has been enacted in order to enacted prompt disposal of applications for grant or renewal of the licence by the Market Committee. It" the Committee falls to pass an order either granting or refusing a licence within the period specified therein the Licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. Thus silence on the part of the Committee for the specified period is to be construed as grant or renewal of the licence by implication. 9. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 creates a legal fiction apparently for the benefit of the traders because if their application for grant or renewal remain pending with the Committee un-attended for long it is bound to cause undue hardship to them. 9. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 creates a legal fiction apparently for the benefit of the traders because if their application for grant or renewal remain pending with the Committee un-attended for long it is bound to cause undue hardship to them. It is clear from the proviso that in case the committee for any reason is not willing to grant or renew the licence it must pass an order rejecting the application within six weeks in the case of an application for grant of a licence and within a fortnight in the case of an application for renewal of a licence. If the aforesaid period is allowed to expire the power of the Committee to refuse the grant or renewal of the licence comes to an end because under the proviso the applicant is automatically clothed with the rights of a grantee and he has to be treated thereafter as a person whose licence has been granted or renewed by the Committee. Once the grant or renewal comes into operation by virtue of legal fiction the application must be deemed to have been automatically disposed of and thereafter the Committee is not competent to exercise its power of rejection in relation there to. It is, therefore clear that the order dated 27-2-1975 (Annexure IV) passed by the Committee was illegal and void and of no legal consequence. 10. At this stage we would examine some of the contentions raised on behalf of the contesting respondents. It has been urged that under clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act, the Committee is competent to grant licence only after obtaining the necessary security and since the petitioner had failed to furnish the security as required by the Committee he is not entitled to claim the benefit of the fiction created by the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act. It is no doubt true that under the proviso grant of a licence by the Committee cannot be implied in a case where the Committee h as no power to grant a licence. The legal fiction can operate only where there is no legal bar to the grant or renewal of the licence. It is no doubt true that under the proviso grant of a licence by the Committee cannot be implied in a case where the Committee h as no power to grant a licence. The legal fiction can operate only where there is no legal bar to the grant or renewal of the licence. To meet this contention it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that clause (xi) in so far as it relates to furnishing of security is illegal and void because it confers an unbridled power on the Committee and. Therefore, suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The said clause is reproduced below. " (xi) With a view to maintain stability in the market (a) take suitable measures to ensure that traders do not buy agricultural produce beyond their capacity and avoid risk to the sellers in disposing of the produce; and (b) grant licences only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of the buyers." 11. It is almost settled that the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy. Vide Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 465 and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala. v. The Pratap Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 4 . The question of excessive delegation arises mainly in respect of the principal subject of legislation and not in respect of ancillary matters' which must be left to subordinate agency for carrying out the purpose of the Act. It has been held in a number of cases that it is open to the legislature to confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to such agency to work out the details within the framework of the policy. Vide Khambhalia Municipality and another V. The State of Gujrat and another AIR 1967 SC 1048 . In M/s Devidas Gopalkishan v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1895 their Lordships while dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act held section 5 to be void on the ground that it conferred an uncontrolled power on the Provincial Government to impose sales tax. In M/s Devidas Gopalkishan v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1895 their Lordships while dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act held section 5 to be void on the ground that it conferred an uncontrolled power on the Provincial Government to impose sales tax. Their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 15 which are pertinent: "The Constitution confers a power and impose a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An over burdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may undaly overstep the limits of delegation It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits." 12. While taking note of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships, it would be pertinent to bear in mind that under Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, power to levy sales tax has been conferred on the legislature itself and the question arose whether the legislature could delegate this power to the State Government without laying down any guidelines. Their Lordships held that the power conferred by section 5 on the State Government was an unbridled power which virtually amounted to self effacement of the legislative power in favour of the Government either whole or in part and, therefore, the said section was struck down. In the instant case the subject matter of legislation is not the furnishing of security by the traders. The subject matter of legislation is the regulation of trade and commerce within the State under Entry 26 of the State List and of markets under Entry 28 of the said list. The legislature in exercise of its powers under the said entries has made elaborate provisions for the establishment of markets, constitution of market committee and regulation of trade in market area. The provision relating to security is a matter ancillary to the main subject of the legislation and it would be too much to expect that the legislature would itself determine the amount of security which may be required from a particular trader. 13. It is also not correct to say that the legislature has not given any guidelines whatsoever. The opening words of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 indicate that the object of the provisions thereof is to maintain stability in the market and to secure agriculturists who sell their goods to the traders in the market. The adoption of suitable measures to achieve this object is left to the Committee which is itself a representative body expected to understand and appreciate the demands of the situation. 14. Further under sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) it is provided that the Committee shall grant licence only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of buyers. Thus the guideline is that the amount of security must commensurate with the capacity of the trader concerned and should not be out of all proportions to it. In our view these were sufficient guidelines for the committee while exercising powers conferred on it under clause (xi) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act. 15. Thus the guideline is that the amount of security must commensurate with the capacity of the trader concerned and should not be out of all proportions to it. In our view these were sufficient guidelines for the committee while exercising powers conferred on it under clause (xi) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act. 15. In Naraindav v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 1232 their Lordships while dealing with the powers of the State Government to prescribe text books under the M.P. Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pushkon Sambandhi) Vyavastha Adhiniyam (13 of 1973) repelled the contention that it vested an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion in the State Government as the object and purpose for which the power has been conferred are specified in the Act. We do not, therefore, find any merit in the contention that the aforesaid provision amounts to excessive delegation or abdication of the legislative function by the Legislature. In our view the aforesaid provision is perfectly valid and does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. 16. The next question that arises is whether in view of the aforesaid provision the operation of legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 is automatically suspended. Clause (ii) of sub section (1) of section 80 of the Act confers on the market committee the power to make bye-laws for the conditions of trading in a market. The proper course for the committee therefore, was that in exercise of its powers under the said provision it should have framed bye-laws relating to furnishing of security by various classes of traders. This, the committee has filed to do and on account of this failure a trader is not at all aware what security he is required to furnish for obtaining or for getting his liecnce renewed. 17. It would be here pertinent to note that sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act relates only to grant of a licence. If we carefully examine the various provisions of the Act, it would appear that the grant and renewal of licence have been treated as separate and provisions for the same have been made accordingly. If we carefully examine the various provisions of the Act, it would appear that the grant and renewal of licence have been treated as separate and provisions for the same have been made accordingly. Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 17 reads as under: “(iii) grant or refuse licences to the market functionaries and renew, suspend or cancel such licences.” From the aforesaid clause it would appear that the renewal of a licence is distinguished from the grant of a new licence and stands on a different footing and that is why both have been mentioned separately. Similarly in sub-section (3) of section 32 the grant and renewal of a licence have been treated separately and different provisions are made therefor in the proviso to the said sub-section. It is, therefore, of great significance that in sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 there is no mention of renewal of a licence and this shows that the provision is applicable only to grant of a new licence and not to the renewal of an old licence. 18. If the Committee wants to obtain security from a trader who has not already furnished the security as a condition for renewal of his licence it would be necessary for it to frame bye-laws for the purpose under section 80. Clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act is not applicable to renewal of a licence and in the absence of any bye-laws it cannot be said that the committee was not competent to renew the licence merely because the petitioner had not furnished security. We, therefore, hold that the failure of the Petitioner to furnish required security was immaterial and did not affect the operation of the legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32. 19. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was brought to our notice that the Director had issued instructions in the year 1973 regarding obtaining security from the traders who wanted to operate in the market area in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(2)(xi) of the Act, but it is clear that these instructions had not the force of law. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was brought to our notice that the Director had issued instructions in the year 1973 regarding obtaining security from the traders who wanted to operate in the market area in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(2)(xi) of the Act, but it is clear that these instructions had not the force of law. It is no doubt true that under sub-section (1) of section 81 the Director is competent to require the Market committee to make such bye-laws as it considers necessary and on its failure to do so he can make the bye-law himself in the manner laid down in sub• section (2) of section 81 but it is not disputed that the Director did not make any bye-laws in regard to security in exercise of his powers under section 81 of the Act. The administrative directions given by the Director to the Committee are, therefore, of no consequence so far as the claim of the petitioner is concerned. 20. On behalf of the market committee respondent no.1, it has been stated that the committee had issued a public notice dated 13-11-1974 (Annexure-B) whereby it had called upon the traders to furnish security at the various rates specified therein according to the category to which the trader belonged by 30-11-1974 as a condition precedent to the grant or renewal of the licence. In the first place, as pointed out above, so far as renewal of a licence is concerned the demand of the security could only be made after framing bye-laws in this behalf. Apart from this since the petitioner had already made an application for renewal of licence accompanied by necessary licence fees it was necessary for the committee to intimate him within a fortnight that his application would be rejected unless he furnished the security. A general notice of this nature could not be construed as an order rejecting the application so as to exclude the operation of the legal fiction particularly because it was issued after a fortnight, that is, fourteen days. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to be grantee of the licence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act even though he did not furnish any security and an order refusing his application was passed on 27-2-1975. 21. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to be grantee of the licence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act even though he did not furnish any security and an order refusing his application was passed on 27-2-1975. 21. The next point that arises for consideration is whether by virtue of his being the grantee of the licence by legal fiction the petitioner was entitled to be enrolled as a voter. In this connection it is pertinent to refer to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act, which provides for the constitution of the market committee. The clause reads as under: “(b). Not more than one third of the elected members as may be fixed by the State Government in the said notification shall be representative of traders possessing such Qualification as may be prescribed and elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years as traders or owners or occupiers of processing factories under this Act: Provided that in the case of a market established for the first time under section 10, the qualifying period of continuously holding licence from such market committee shall be six months;" It is clear from the language of the aforesaid clause that only such traders as possessed the prescribed qualifications will be entitled to choose their representatives. The Act itself does not prescribe any qualifications for the voters and leaves it to the State Government to specify the qualifications by Rules. Unfortunately the Rules framed by the State Government do not clearly lay down the qualifications of a voter. Rule 12 merely lays down who shall not be entitled to vote and from the negative provisions of this rule one has to infer what are the positive qualifications of a voter. Clause (vi) of rule 12 reads as under: "12. Right to vote-No person- (vi) holding licence from the market committee as trader or owner or occupier of processing factories under the Act shall be entitled to vote as such at an election if on the date on which the poll is taken his licence has ceased to be in force and who has not attained the age of twenty one years." 22. From the aforesaid clause it can be gathered that the essential qualification of a voter is that he must be the holder of a licence from the committee and should have attained the age of 21 years. Now the question arises whether the petitioner can be treated as the holder of a licence from the committee within the meaning of this rule. The expression holder of a licence has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules and, therefore, it must necessarily be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense, The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word 'to hold' is to have in one's possession and therefore, the holder of licence means the person actually holding a licence from the Committee, that is, a person holding a licence in fact as well as in law. Although the petitioner is to be treated as a grantee of a licence by legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act, he, in our view, cannot be treated as the holder of the licence for the purpose of rule 12 of the Rules which has been enacted mainly with a view to provide the qualifications of a voter. 23. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction the Court must ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created because the fiction must be limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. 24. In Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroof AIR 1963 SC 1448 while dealing with the provisions of the Income fax Act, their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 7 which are partinent; "As was observed by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd V. The State of Bihar 1955-2 SCR 603 at P. 646: (s) AIR 1955 S.C. 661 at P.680 - legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not extend beyond that legitimate field In the present case the fiction is limited to the cases provided in the three sub-sections of section 24B and cannot be extended further than the liability for the income received in the previous year." 25. In a more recent case, namely Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat v, Vadilal Lallubhai AIR 1973 SC 1016 , their Lordships again emphasized the statutory rule of construction that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. Vide paragraph 12 of the judgment. 26. Section 32 of the Act occurs in Chapter VI the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading" Section 32 deals with the power to grant licence. While dealing with the power to grant licence it has been provided that where an application for grant or renewal of licence is not expressly rejected within the period specified therein the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed. As pointed out above, this provision is apparently to avoid hardship to the traders because if there is delay on the part of the Committee in dealing with such application the trader may become liable for penalty under section 48. For obvious reasons it was not considered proper in the interests of trade that all traders must immediately stop their trade activities as soon as the licence expires even though they have made application for renewal along with prescribed fee unless their applications have been rejected within the specified time. 27. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 imposes a heavy restriction on the power of the Committee to reject an application for grant or renewal of a licence because it is required to act within the specified period. Thus the fiction must be limited to the object for which it is created, that is regulation of trade. A trader who is keen to be enrolled as a voter must approach the Committee for obtaining the licence and if the Committee passes an order refusing the licence he must have the order quashed either by filing an appeal or by filing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. We may here also point out that if it had been expressly provided in the Rules that the grantee of a licence by fiction under the proviso to sub section (3) of section 32 of the Act shall be deemed to be the holder of a licence for the purpose of the Act, or the rules the position would have been different; but that is not so. In fact the proviso does not use the expression "holder of a licence". It merely says that the licence shall be deemed to be granted or renewed in the circumstances specified therein. 29. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not actually hold a licence and therefore, the voters list cannot be questioned on the ground that he and other traders like him "were excluded from the list. 30. The next contention of the petitioner is that the voters' list includes several traders who held a licence for a period less than two consecutive years. According, to him such traders were not entitled to be enrolled and this contention is based on the wording of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act which had already been reproduced above. 31. On a careful examination of the language of the aforesaid clause we are of the view that the qualification, namely. "holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years" is prescribed therein for candidates and not for voters. The words "elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee" clearly indicate that the qualification laid down therein is for the persons from whom the representative is to be chosen and it is not the qualification of a voter. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. Our attention in this connection was also drawn to sub-rule (1) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "13. Voters' List-(1) The election authority shall cause to be prepared and published as soon as possible but not later than three months before the expiry of the term of market committee, separate lists of voters in Hindi eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 11 of each constituency." This sub-rule, no doubt, lays down that the list of voters shall contain the names of those who are eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of section 11 of the Act but this does not carry us any further because for determining who is entitled to vote, we must refer back to sub-section (1) of section 11 which in fact does not lay down any qualification for the voters and merely says that the qualifications of the voters shall be such as may be prescribed. Thus, in our view, it cannot be inferred from sub-rule (1) of rule 1 that a trader is not qualified to be a voter unless he is holding a licence for two consecutive years. 33. It was also urged that while rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner the authority concerned was also of the view that the holding of a licence for two consecutive years was ordinarily an essential qualification of a voter but it rejected the objection on the ground that the matter fell within the purview of the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act under the erroneous impression that this is a case of market committee being established for the first time. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. The view taken by the authority is immaterial and of no consequence. 34. Shri A.R. Naokar, learned counsel for the petitioner, also urged that voters' list must be held to be bad because it was not prepared in accordance with sub-rule (2) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "(2) The Voters' Lists shall show the serial number, full name, father's or husband's name. surname, age, residence and serial number of the voter and the nature of his qualifications." In the voters' list which has been actually filed, the serial number the name of the trader, his age and the place of residence are mentioned; but not his qualifications. The contention of Shri Naoker is that in the absence of description of the qualification of the voters, the voters' list is bad and should be struck down. We find no merit in this contention for the following reasons. The rule merely refers to the nature of qualifications which have just to be briefly indicated and this has been done by showing whether he is petty dealer retail dealer or wholesale dealer. He would be difficult to give all the qualifications of a voter in the list. In our view the list as prepared substantially complies with the requirements of the rule and is not. therefore, liable to be struck down on this ground. Per Lodha. J. - (agreeing with Bhachawat, J.)-Section 32 which creates a legal fiction in the matter of grant or renewal of licence occurs in Chapter VI of the Act the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading." Section 11 occurs under Chapter III the heading of which is "Constitution of Market Committees" Raina J’s view is that since section 32 occurs under the heading "Regulation of Trading" the operation of the legal fiction under section 32 (3) proviso must he limited to the purpose of regulation of trade only and should not be extended to the purpose of constitution of market committee which is dealt with under a different chapter. [Para 104 It is true that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. But it has to be determined with reference to each statute as to what is the scope of the legal fiction. [Para 108 In the present case section 32 (1) (3) proviso makes it clear that if the market committee fails to grant licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. The purpose of this statutory fiction would be completely defeated if all the privileges of a grantee of licence i.e. the holder of a licence were not extended to a person who has become a licencee by virtue of this statutory fiction The conclusion is irresistible that the object of this statutory fiction was to make the person to whom the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed entitled to all the rights and benefits of a person to whom the licence may have been granted by a specific order of a market committee. The proviso has been drafted in the widest terms and there is nothing whatsoever in its language to suggest that its operation is confined to the right of trading only and that it does not extend to other rights available to a licencee to whom a licence has been granted by the Committee. There is nothing in section 11 (1) (b) or Rule 12 or 13 to suggest that the operation of the statutory fiction is confined to trading activity only. If the legislature intended to limit the operation of the legal fiction only to the purpose of trading activity it could have said so in express terms. AIR 1959 SC 352 , AIR 1954 SC 155 . AIR 1953 SC 244 referred to. [Para 109 (6) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP)-Ss.32 (3) and 17 (2)-deemed licence holder-shall be so deemed even if no security is deposited. Per Raina and Bhachawat, JJ.-If an application for renewal of licence is not rejected within a period of six weeks, it shall he deemed to have been granted under the proviso to section 32 (3) of the Act. Per Raina and Bhachawat, JJ.-If an application for renewal of licence is not rejected within a period of six weeks, it shall he deemed to have been granted under the proviso to section 32 (3) of the Act. Even if the applicant fails to give security as required by section 17 (2) (xi) of the Act, he shall be deemed to be a licence holder. [Paras 10, 20, 60 & 61 (7) Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972 (MP) – S.17 (2) (xi)-Section is valid - does not suffer from excession delegation. [Paras 15, 44 & 47 ORDER Raina J.- l. This is a petition under article 256 and 257 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner is a trader in food grains and held licence from Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Shivpuri (hereinafter referred to as the Market Committee during the year 1973-74. The year for the purposes of the licence commences from 1st of October and expires on the 30th of September of the following year. An application for the renewal of the licence has to be made within 30 day of the expiry of the licence under the byelaws of the Market Committee. The petitioner applied for renewal of his licence on 29.10.1974. This application was rejected by the market committee by order dated 27.2.1975 vide Annexure IV, on the ground that he had failed to furnish security of Rs.1,000 as required by sub section (2) of section 17 of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. Later on, when the Market Committee prepared the voters' list for election to the Market Committee, the name of the petitioner was omitted. The petitioner thereupon filed objections challenging the list inter alia on the ground that a number of persons qualified to vote were omitted from the list and a number of persons not so qualified were included therein. Vide annexure III and III A. The said objections were disallowed by the Election Officer by order dated 20.10.1975. On 6.10.1975 the Collector Shivpuri, published the election programme vide Annexure V. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition praying that the electoral roll Annexure II being in contravention of the Rules should be quashed and that the election programme should also be quashed on the same ground. On 6.10.1975 the Collector Shivpuri, published the election programme vide Annexure V. Thereupon the petitioner filed this petition praying that the electoral roll Annexure II being in contravention of the Rules should be quashed and that the election programme should also be quashed on the same ground. He also prayed that the provisions contained in sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act relating to furnishing of security by the trader as a condition for obtaining the licence should be struck down as unconstitutional. 4. The election to the Committee has already been held, but the declaration of the result has been stayed by this Court vide order dated 27.11.1975 on an application for ad interim writ filed by the petitioner. 5. The respondents 1, 3, 5 and 6 are the main contesting respondents in this case and they have filed the returns opposing the petition According to them the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not hold a licence from the Committee. They also denied that the names of a number of persons not qualified to vote have been entered in the voters list. 6. The attack of the petitioner on the electoral roll is two-fold. His first contention is that he and several others who were qualified to vote have not been included therein. His other contention is that many of the voters who were not eligible for being enrolled as voters have been included in the voters list. We shall first take up the objection of the petitioner that his name has been wrongly excluded from the electoral roll. 7. It was not disputed before us that only a trader holding a licence from the Market Committee is qualified to vote under the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gatham) Niyam. 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). It is also not in dispute that the licence of the petitioner was not renewed by the Committee for the period in question, that is 1974-75. In fact by an order dated 27-2-1975 vide Annexure IV the Committee had refused to renew the licence because the petitioner had failed to furnish security of Rs.1000/- as required by the Committee. It is also not in dispute that the licence of the petitioner was not renewed by the Committee for the period in question, that is 1974-75. In fact by an order dated 27-2-1975 vide Annexure IV the Committee had refused to renew the licence because the petitioner had failed to furnish security of Rs.1000/- as required by the Committee. On behalf of the contesting respondents it has been urged that since the petitioner failed to file an appeal against the said order under Section 34 of the Act the order has become final under sub-section (4) and cannot be questioned by the petitioner. 8. The petitioner. however, relied on the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the fact and his contention is that he should be deemed to be a licence-holder under the said proviso because the Market Committee failed to pass an order granting or refusing the licence-within a fortnight from the date of receipt of his application for renewal. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to examine the language of sub-section (3) of section 32 of the contention Act which reads as under: "(3) The market committee may grant or renew the licence or for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to grant or renew the licence: Provided that if the market committee fails to grant a licence within a period of six weeks or renew a licence within a fortnight from the date of receipt of application therefor the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be." It appears from the language of sub-section (3) that it has been enacted in order to enacted prompt disposal of applications for grant or renewal of the licence by the Market Committee. It" the Committee falls to pass an order either granting or refusing a licence within the period specified therein the Licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed as the case may be. Thus silence on the part of the Committee for the specified period is to be construed as grant or renewal of the licence by implication. 9. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 creates a legal fiction apparently for the benefit of the traders because if their application for grant or renewal remain pending with the Committee un-attended for long it is bound to cause undue hardship to them. 9. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 creates a legal fiction apparently for the benefit of the traders because if their application for grant or renewal remain pending with the Committee un-attended for long it is bound to cause undue hardship to them. It is clear from the proviso that in case the committee for any reason is not willing to grant or renew the licence it must pass an order rejecting the application within six weeks in the case of an application for grant of a licence and within a fortnight in the case of an application for renewal of a licence. If the aforesaid period is allowed to expire the power of the Committee to refuse the grant or renewal of the licence comes to an end because under the proviso the applicant is automatically clothed with the rights of a grantee and he has to be treated thereafter as a person whose licence has been granted or renewed by the Committee. Once the grant or renewal comes into operation by virtue of legal fiction the application must be deemed to have been automatically disposed of and thereafter the Committee is not competent to exercise its power of rejection in relation there to. It is, therefore clear that the order dated 27-2-1975 (Annexure IV) passed by the Committee was illegal and void and of no legal consequence. 10. At this stage we would examine some of the contentions raised on behalf of the contesting respondents. It has been urged that under clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act, the Committee is competent to grant licence only after obtaining the necessary security and since the petitioner had failed to furnish the security as required by the Committee he is not entitled to claim the benefit of the fiction created by the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act. It is no doubt true that under the proviso grant of a licence by the Committee cannot be implied in a case where the Committee h as no power to grant a licence. The legal fiction can operate only where there is no legal bar to the grant or renewal of the licence. It is no doubt true that under the proviso grant of a licence by the Committee cannot be implied in a case where the Committee h as no power to grant a licence. The legal fiction can operate only where there is no legal bar to the grant or renewal of the licence. To meet this contention it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that clause (xi) in so far as it relates to furnishing of security is illegal and void because it confers an unbridled power on the Committee and. Therefore, suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The said clause is reproduced below. " (xi) With a view to maintain stability in the market (a) take suitable measures to ensure that traders do not buy agricultural produce beyond their capacity and avoid risk to the sellers in disposing of the produce; and (b) grant licences only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of the buyers." 11. It is almost settled that the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy. Vide Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 465 and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala. v. The Pratap Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 4 . The question of excessive delegation arises mainly in respect of the principal subject of legislation and not in respect of ancillary matters' which must be left to subordinate agency for carrying out the purpose of the Act. It has been held in a number of cases that it is open to the legislature to confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to such agency to work out the details within the framework of the policy. Vide Khambhalia Municipality and another V. The State of Gujrat and another AIR 1967 SC 1048 . In M/s Devidas Gopalkishan v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1895 their Lordships while dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act held section 5 to be void on the ground that it conferred an uncontrolled power on the Provincial Government to impose sales tax. In M/s Devidas Gopalkishan v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1895 their Lordships while dealing with the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act held section 5 to be void on the ground that it conferred an uncontrolled power on the Provincial Government to impose sales tax. Their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 15 which are pertinent: "The Constitution confers a power and impose a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An over burdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may undaly overstep the limits of delegation It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits." 12. While taking note of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships, it would be pertinent to bear in mind that under Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, power to levy sales tax has been conferred on the legislature itself and the question arose whether the legislature could delegate this power to the State Government without laying down any guidelines. Their Lordships held that the power conferred by section 5 on the State Government was an unbridled power which virtually amounted to self effacement of the legislative power in favour of the Government either whole or in part and, therefore, the said section was struck down. In the instant case the subject matter of legislation is not the furnishing of security by the traders. The subject matter of legislation is the regulation of trade and commerce within the State under Entry 26 of the State List and of markets under Entry 28 of the said list. The legislature in exercise of its powers under the said entries has made elaborate provisions for the establishment of markets, constitution of market committee and regulation of trade in market area. The provision relating to security is a matter ancillary to the main subject of the legislation and it would be too much to expect that the legislature would itself determine the amount of security which may be required from a particular trader. 13. It is also not correct to say that the legislature has not given any guidelines whatsoever. The opening words of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 indicate that the object of the provisions thereof is to maintain stability in the market and to secure agriculturists who sell their goods to the traders in the market. The adoption of suitable measures to achieve this object is left to the Committee which is itself a representative body expected to understand and appreciate the demands of the situation. 14. Further under sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) it is provided that the Committee shall grant licence only after obtaining necessary security in cash as bank guarantee according to the capacity of buyers. Thus the guideline is that the amount of security must commensurate with the capacity of the trader concerned and should not be out of all proportions to it. In our view these were sufficient guidelines for the committee while exercising powers conferred on it under clause (xi) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act. 15. Thus the guideline is that the amount of security must commensurate with the capacity of the trader concerned and should not be out of all proportions to it. In our view these were sufficient guidelines for the committee while exercising powers conferred on it under clause (xi) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act. 15. In Naraindav v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 1232 their Lordships while dealing with the powers of the State Government to prescribe text books under the M.P. Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pushkon Sambandhi) Vyavastha Adhiniyam (13 of 1973) repelled the contention that it vested an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion in the State Government as the object and purpose for which the power has been conferred are specified in the Act. We do not, therefore, find any merit in the contention that the aforesaid provision amounts to excessive delegation or abdication of the legislative function by the Legislature. In our view the aforesaid provision is perfectly valid and does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. 16. The next question that arises is whether in view of the aforesaid provision the operation of legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 is automatically suspended. Clause (ii) of sub section (1) of section 80 of the Act confers on the market committee the power to make bye-laws for the conditions of trading in a market. The proper course for the committee therefore, was that in exercise of its powers under the said provision it should have framed bye-laws relating to furnishing of security by various classes of traders. This, the committee has filed to do and on account of this failure a trader is not at all aware what security he is required to furnish for obtaining or for getting his liecnce renewed. 17. It would be here pertinent to note that sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act relates only to grant of a licence. If we carefully examine the various provisions of the Act, it would appear that the grant and renewal of licence have been treated as separate and provisions for the same have been made accordingly. If we carefully examine the various provisions of the Act, it would appear that the grant and renewal of licence have been treated as separate and provisions for the same have been made accordingly. Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 17 reads as under: “(iii) grant or refuse licences to the market functionaries and renew, suspend or cancel such licences.” From the aforesaid clause it would appear that the renewal of a licence is distinguished from the grant of a new licence and stands on a different footing and that is why both have been mentioned separately. Similarly in sub-section (3) of section 32 the grant and renewal of a licence have been treated separately and different provisions are made therefor in the proviso to the said sub-section. It is, therefore, of great significance that in sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 there is no mention of renewal of a licence and this shows that the provision is applicable only to grant of a new licence and not to the renewal of an old licence. 18. If the Committee wants to obtain security from a trader who has not already furnished the security as a condition for renewal of his licence it would be necessary for it to frame bye-laws for the purpose under section 80. Clause (xi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act is not applicable to renewal of a licence and in the absence of any bye-laws it cannot be said that the committee was not competent to renew the licence merely because the petitioner had not furnished security. We, therefore, hold that the failure of the Petitioner to furnish required security was immaterial and did not affect the operation of the legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32. 19. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was brought to our notice that the Director had issued instructions in the year 1973 regarding obtaining security from the traders who wanted to operate in the market area in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(2)(xi) of the Act, but it is clear that these instructions had not the force of law. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was brought to our notice that the Director had issued instructions in the year 1973 regarding obtaining security from the traders who wanted to operate in the market area in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(2)(xi) of the Act, but it is clear that these instructions had not the force of law. It is no doubt true that under sub-section (1) of section 81 the Director is competent to require the Market committee to make such bye-laws as it considers necessary and on its failure to do so he can make the bye-law himself in the manner laid down in sub• section (2) of section 81 but it is not disputed that the Director did not make any bye-laws in regard to security in exercise of his powers under section 81 of the Act. The administrative directions given by the Director to the Committee are, therefore, of no consequence so far as the claim of the petitioner is concerned. 20. On behalf of the market committee respondent no.1, it has been stated that the committee had issued a public notice dated 13-11-1974 (Annexure-B) whereby it had called upon the traders to furnish security at the various rates specified therein according to the category to which the trader belonged by 30-11-1974 as a condition precedent to the grant or renewal of the licence. In the first place, as pointed out above, so far as renewal of a licence is concerned the demand of the security could only be made after framing bye-laws in this behalf. Apart from this since the petitioner had already made an application for renewal of licence accompanied by necessary licence fees it was necessary for the committee to intimate him within a fortnight that his application would be rejected unless he furnished the security. A general notice of this nature could not be construed as an order rejecting the application so as to exclude the operation of the legal fiction particularly because it was issued after a fortnight, that is, fourteen days. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to be grantee of the licence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act even though he did not furnish any security and an order refusing his application was passed on 27-2-1975. 21. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to be grantee of the licence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act even though he did not furnish any security and an order refusing his application was passed on 27-2-1975. 21. The next point that arises for consideration is whether by virtue of his being the grantee of the licence by legal fiction the petitioner was entitled to be enrolled as a voter. In this connection it is pertinent to refer to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act, which provides for the constitution of the market committee. The clause reads as under: “(b). Not more than one third of the elected members as may be fixed by the State Government in the said notification shall be representative of traders possessing such Qualification as may be prescribed and elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years as traders or owners or occupiers of processing factories under this Act: Provided that in the case of a market established for the first time under section 10, the qualifying period of continuously holding licence from such market committee shall be six months;" It is clear from the language of the aforesaid clause that only such traders as possessed the prescribed qualifications will be entitled to choose their representatives. The Act itself does not prescribe any qualifications for the voters and leaves it to the State Government to specify the qualifications by Rules. Unfortunately the Rules framed by the State Government do not clearly lay down the qualifications of a voter. Rule 12 merely lays down who shall not be entitled to vote and from the negative provisions of this rule one has to infer what are the positive qualifications of a voter. Clause (vi) of rule 12 reads as under: "12. Right to vote-No person- (vi) holding licence from the market committee as trader or owner or occupier of processing factories under the Act shall be entitled to vote as such at an election if on the date on which the poll is taken his licence has ceased to be in force and who has not attained the age of twenty one years." 22. From the aforesaid clause it can be gathered that the essential qualification of a voter is that he must be the holder of a licence from the committee and should have attained the age of 21 years. Now the question arises whether the petitioner can be treated as the holder of a licence from the committee within the meaning of this rule. The expression holder of a licence has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules and, therefore, it must necessarily be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense, The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word 'to hold' is to have in one's possession and therefore, the holder of licence means the person actually holding a licence from the Committee, that is, a person holding a licence in fact as well as in law. Although the petitioner is to be treated as a grantee of a licence by legal fiction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Act, he, in our view, cannot be treated as the holder of the licence for the purpose of rule 12 of the Rules which has been enacted mainly with a view to provide the qualifications of a voter. 23. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction the Court must ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created because the fiction must be limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. 24. In Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroof AIR 1963 SC 1448 while dealing with the provisions of the Income fax Act, their Lordships made the following observations in paragraph 7 which are partinent; "As was observed by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd V. The State of Bihar 1955-2 SCR 603 at P. 646: (s) AIR 1955 S.C. 661 at P.680 - legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not extend beyond that legitimate field In the present case the fiction is limited to the cases provided in the three sub-sections of section 24B and cannot be extended further than the liability for the income received in the previous year." 25. In a more recent case, namely Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat v, Vadilal Lallubhai AIR 1973 SC 1016 , their Lordships again emphasized the statutory rule of construction that legal fictions are only for a definite purpose and they are limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. Vide paragraph 12 of the judgment. 26. Section 32 of the Act occurs in Chapter VI the heading of which is "Regulation of Trading" Section 32 deals with the power to grant licence. While dealing with the power to grant licence it has been provided that where an application for grant or renewal of licence is not expressly rejected within the period specified therein the licence shall be deemed to have been granted or renewed. As pointed out above, this provision is apparently to avoid hardship to the traders because if there is delay on the part of the Committee in dealing with such application the trader may become liable for penalty under section 48. For obvious reasons it was not considered proper in the interests of trade that all traders must immediately stop their trade activities as soon as the licence expires even though they have made application for renewal along with prescribed fee unless their applications have been rejected within the specified time. 27. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 32 imposes a heavy restriction on the power of the Committee to reject an application for grant or renewal of a licence because it is required to act within the specified period. Thus the fiction must be limited to the object for which it is created, that is regulation of trade. A trader who is keen to be enrolled as a voter must approach the Committee for obtaining the licence and if the Committee passes an order refusing the licence he must have the order quashed either by filing an appeal or by filing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. He cannot claim the right to vote even though he does not hold a licence, the Committee having refused to grant him a licence. 28. We may here also point out that if it had been expressly provided in the Rules that the grantee of a licence by fiction under the proviso to sub section (3) of section 32 of the Act shall be deemed to be the holder of a licence for the purpose of the Act, or the rules the position would have been different; but that is not so. In fact the proviso does not use the expression "holder of a licence". It merely says that the licence shall be deemed to be granted or renewed in the circumstances specified therein. 29. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner was not entitled to be enrolled as a voter because he did not actually hold a licence and therefore, the voters list cannot be questioned on the ground that he and other traders like him "were excluded from the list. 30. The next contention of the petitioner is that the voters' list includes several traders who held a licence for a period less than two consecutive years. According, to him such traders were not entitled to be enrolled and this contention is based on the wording of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act which had already been reproduced above. 31. On a careful examination of the language of the aforesaid clause we are of the view that the qualification, namely. "holding licence from the market committee for a period of two successive years" is prescribed therein for candidates and not for voters. The words "elected in the prescribed manner from amongst the persons continuously holding licence from the market committee" clearly indicate that the qualification laid down therein is for the persons from whom the representative is to be chosen and it is not the qualification of a voter. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. As for the qualifications of persons 'entitled to vote' the first part of clause (b) clearly lays down that their qualifications shall be such as may be prescribed that is prescribed by Rules. 32. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention that no person is entitled to vote unless he holds a licence for two consecutive years. Our attention in this connection was also drawn to sub-rule (1) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "13. Voters' List-(1) The election authority shall cause to be prepared and published as soon as possible but not later than three months before the expiry of the term of market committee, separate lists of voters in Hindi eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 11 of each constituency." This sub-rule, no doubt, lays down that the list of voters shall contain the names of those who are eligible to vote under clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of section 11 of the Act but this does not carry us any further because for determining who is entitled to vote, we must refer back to sub-section (1) of section 11 which in fact does not lay down any qualification for the voters and merely says that the qualifications of the voters shall be such as may be prescribed. Thus, in our view, it cannot be inferred from sub-rule (1) of rule 1 that a trader is not qualified to be a voter unless he is holding a licence for two consecutive years. 33. It was also urged that while rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner the authority concerned was also of the view that the holding of a licence for two consecutive years was ordinarily an essential qualification of a voter but it rejected the objection on the ground that the matter fell within the purview of the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act under the erroneous impression that this is a case of market committee being established for the first time. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. It appears to us that the authority was as much in error in holding that this is a case of market committee established for the first time as in holding that it was an essential qualification of a voter that he must be holding a licence for two consecutive years. The view taken by the authority is immaterial and of no consequence. 34. Shri A.R. Naokar, learned counsel for the petitioner, also urged that voters' list must be held to be bad because it was not prepared in accordance with sub-rule (2) of rule 13 which reads as follows: "(2) The Voters' Lists shall show the serial number, full name, father's or husband's name. surname, age, residence and serial number of the voter and the nature of his qualifications." In the voters' list which has been actually filed, the serial number the name of the trader, his age and the place of residence are mentioned; but not his qualifications. The contention of Shri Naoker is that in the absence of description of the qualification of the voters, the voters' list is bad and should be struck down. We find no merit in this contention for the following reasons. The rule merely refers to the nature of qualifications which have just to be briefly indicated and this has been done by showing whether he is petty dealer retail dealer or wholesale dealer. He would be difficult to give all the qualifications of a voter in the list. In our view the list as prepared substantially complies with the requirements of the rule and is not. therefore, liable to be struck down on this ground.