JUDGMENT. — In a suit for ejectment against their tenant, the plaintiffs had asked for mesne profits from the date of the plaint till the date of actual delivery. The Court passed a preliminary decree in ejectment on 29th June, 1967. While doing so, it relegated the question of ascertainment of mesne profits to the final decree proceedings. The suit had been filed on 29th June, 1967. The actual delivery of possession of the suit property was effected by the defendant to the plaintiffs on 25th September, 1970. The plaintiffs accordingly applied for ascertainment of mesne profits for this period. The application was filed on 8th August, 1972. The defendant opposed it on the score that the very purpose of the lease by the plaintiffs in his favour was to conduct a touring cinema and that the licence for the touring cinema itself had expired long ago, in 1965. This defence was rejected as untenable as an answer to the claim for mesne profits, considering that the tenant had overstayed in possession even after the expiry of the licence. On the question of quantum of mesne profits,the Court found that while a monthly rental for running a touring cinema theatre on land would be Rs. 100 it would be reasonable to quantify the mesne profits for the period when the cinema could not be run, at a lesser sum, namely Rs. 40 per mensem, which the defendant seems to have accepted in the witness box as the proper figure. The Court accordingly gave the plaintiff a decree at the rate of Rs. 40 per month for the period from 29th June, 1967 to 25th September, 1970. This decree for mesne profits was confirmed in appeal by the learned District Judge. 2. The main criticism of Mr. Ramanathan, learned counsel for the defendant in this second appeal, is that the learned District Judge while dismissing the defendant’s appeal had not taken any trouble whatever to set down the evidence in the case and express in what manner he agreed with the conclusions of the trial Court. I do accept this criticism, having regard to the way in which the learned District Judge had given a disposal to the case before him. In one brief paragraph of four lines, he says that “the plaintiffs are entitled to the mesne profits”, and “ I see no merits in the appeal”. I do accept this criticism, having regard to the way in which the learned District Judge had given a disposal to the case before him. In one brief paragraph of four lines, he says that “the plaintiffs are entitled to the mesne profits”, and “ I see no merits in the appeal”. It would have been in consonance with accepted norms of judicial decision-making if the learned District Judge had discussed the evidence, even if he had done it ever so briefly. Nevertheless, this criticism of the learned District Judge, quite valid so far as it goes does not lead to the consequence that no mesne profits could have been awarded at all in this case or that the mesne profits actually awarded are excessive. The latter consideration would only raise questions of degree, which are questions of fact. I cannot say there is no evidence at all before the courts below to support their determination of mesne profits. The quantification of the mesne profits in this case has been made to rest on two factors:- (i) absence of cultivation of the land by the defendant; and (ii) absence of exhibition of films in the touring cinema. It seems to me that these considerations provide a reasonable basis for the determination of the mesne profits. I cannot, therefore, interfere with the decisions of the Courts below. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant raised a further question touching limitation. He said that the claim for mesne profits could not be entertained by the Court considering that the lease itself came to an end on 31st December, 1965. I do not, however think this objection is tenable. The question of applying for mesne profits had arisen in this suit in final decree proceedings, in view of the reservation made in that regard in the preliminary decree. I, therefore, felt difficulty in understanding the point raised by the learned counsel as to bar of limitation. 4. Learned counsel referred me to a decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra High Court reported in Chintalapati Varadalamma v. Gavya Nallavya1What happened in that case was this. I, therefore, felt difficulty in understanding the point raised by the learned counsel as to bar of limitation. 4. Learned counsel referred me to a decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra High Court reported in Chintalapati Varadalamma v. Gavya Nallavya1What happened in that case was this. In a suit for recovery of possession and for other reliefs including future mesne profits a preliminary decree was passed by the Court for possession, but as to the relief of future mesne profits, subsequent to the filing of the suit, the Court referred the plaintiff to an independent suit. In execution of the decree for possession, the plaintiff obtained delivery of possession and thereafter filed an independent suit for mesne profits from the date of the earlier suit till the date of possession. The defence in the subsequent suit was that it was barred by limitation This was upheld by the Division Bench on the basis of Article 109 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which corresponds to Article 51 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The article prescribed a period of three years for a suit for profits wrongfully recovered by the defendant from property belonging to the plaintiff. The starting point for the limitation was, the date when the profits were received. The Court found that more than three years had elapsed in between the delivery of possession under the former suit and the institution of the latter suit for recovery of mesne profits. It was argued before the learned Judge that the appropriate article applicable to the second suit for mesne profits was the residuary provision in Article 120 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. This argument was not accepted and it was held that the suit fell under Article 109. 5. This decision, however, is not apposite to the present case. There are no two suits here, but only one, and in that suit the plaintiffs were quite within their rights in asking for a decree for “ future” mesne profits from the date of the suit. It is not suggested that the suit in ejectment itself was barred by limitation. This being so, it is difficult to see how Article 51 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 or any article at all can have relevance to the present case. It is not suggested that the suit in ejectment itself was barred by limitation. This being so, it is difficult to see how Article 51 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 or any article at all can have relevance to the present case. It may be observed that so long as the final decree for mesne profits is not passed, the suit is still pending and alive. There seem to be two views prevalent in this country as to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act prescribing periods of limitation for applications applies to the application for mesne profits in suits pursuant to the directions in the preliminary decree. One view is that the statute applies. The better view seems to be that there is no such thing as limitation for such applications. For instance, they cannot be regarded as execution petitions, for the suits in which they are filed would still be pending at the time they are filed. Reference may be made in this connection to the following cases: Ramasubramania Pathar v. Karambil Pati1 Ramachandra Raju v. Bhujanga Rao2 Chandrakantam v. Chandramouliswara Prasad3 . Although they are not direct decisions, it seems to me that they do point to the view I have earlier expressed. 6. Even otherwise, if any article at all of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is capable of application to a case of this kind it can only be the residuary Article 137 falling under the Third Division in the Schedule relating to Applications, for there is no other specific article in that Division which deals with this subject-matter. Under Article 137, the limitation is three years for any application for which no limitation is prescribed under any other article in Part I of the Third Division in the schedule. The starting point for the three-year limitation period under Article 137 is the date when the right to apply accrues. In this case, the right to apply for mesne profits accrued to the plaintiff under the preliminary decree, but that decree was taken in appeal by the defendant and the appeal was dismissed only on 15th June, 1972. The application for mesne profits was actually filed in this case on 8th August, 1972. In this case, the right to apply for mesne profits accrued to the plaintiff under the preliminary decree, but that decree was taken in appeal by the defendant and the appeal was dismissed only on 15th June, 1972. The application for mesne profits was actually filed in this case on 8th August, 1972. In the circumstances, even on the footing that any question of limitation at all arises as respects an application for mesne profits in a suit pursuant to a preliminary decree therein, I must hold that the application in this case has been filed within time. 7. For the reasons stated above, the second appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.