JUDGMENT : N.D. Ojha, J. This is a Defendant's civil revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the decree passed by the IVth Addl. District Judge, Agra, sitting as Judge, Small Cause Court, whereby a suit for ejectment from a premises situate at Shivaji Marg, Firozabad, district Agra, and for arrears of rent and mesne profits etc. tiled by the opposite party was decreed. 2. The case of the opposite party was that he was the owner of an Ahata, that on 5th April, 1967, an agreement was executed by the applicant whereby the opposite party was required to make certain constructions in the said Ahata and on the completion of the constructions the applicant was to take them on rent. The case of the opposite party further was that in pursuance of that agreement the required constructions were made by him and were let out to the applicant on 6th October, 1967, for a period of five years on a rent of Rs. 300/- per month. Since after the expiry of the term of five years and even after a notice being served on him the applicant did not vacate the premises nor did he clear off the arrears of rent and the taxes which under the agreement were payable by him the necessity to file the suit arose. The suit was contested by the applicant inter alia on the ground that the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were applicable to the premises in question and that he was not under any liability to pay the taxes. His defence, however, did not find favour with the court below. The Additional District Judge recorded a finding that the premises in dispute had been constructed after 5th of April, 1967, and since the suit had been instituted on 27th May, 1974, i.e., within ten years of the construction of the premises in dispute, the Act was not applicable to it. The suit was accordingly decreed as pointed out above. 3. The Additional District Judge recorded a finding that the premises in dispute had been constructed after 5th of April, 1967, and since the suit had been instituted on 27th May, 1974, i.e., within ten years of the construction of the premises in dispute, the Act was not applicable to it. The suit was accordingly decreed as pointed out above. 3. It was urged by counsel for the applicant that the finding recorded by the court below that the premises in dispute were constructed after 5th of April, 1967, and before 6th of October, 1967, when it was let out to the applicant is not a finding in conformity with the requirements of Section 2(2) of the Act and that it was a fit case in which the matter may be remanded to the court below or in any event an issue may be remitted to it requiring it to record a finding in regard to the completion of the construction in dispute as contemplated by the Explanation to Section 2(2) of the Act. 4. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that even though it is true that the finding of the court below does not strictly conform with the requirements of the Explanation to Section 2(2) of the Act yet no useful purpose will be served either in remanding the case or remitting an issue inasmuch as on a perusal of the evidence on record produced by the parties I am satisfied that the Act is not yet applicable to the premises in dispute. 5. Before adverting to the material on record on the basis of which I have arrived at the aforesaid conclusion it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act contained in Section 2(2). It reads: (2) Except as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 24 or Sub-section (3) of Section 29 nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. It reads: (2) Except as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 24 or Sub-section (3) of Section 29 nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-section- (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment, thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely, for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time. In Shamim Ahmad Alvi v. Azizul Rahman Khan 1974 ALJ 597 it was held that the term “completed” used in Section 2(2) of the Act will have to be construed in the light of the Explanation and if so construed the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on either of the three dates, viz., either on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority, or in case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment was made and in case of difference the earliest of the said dates and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it was actually occupied for the first time. In Tilak Raj v. Divendra Singh 1977 AWC 15 it was, after referring to Section 2(2) of the Act, held: It is apparent from this provision that, for purposes of this Act a building is to be deemed to be constructed if it is subject to assessment on the date with effect from which the first assessment is made. It is immaterial whether the building was constructed actually prior to that date or it had come into occupation prior to that date. The law recognises for the purposes of this Act, the date of assessment as the date of the completion of the building. It is immaterial whether the building was constructed actually prior to that date or it had come into occupation prior to that date. The law recognises for the purposes of this Act, the date of assessment as the date of the completion of the building. Relying on these two decisions a similar view was taken in Hirday Ram v. Harbhajan Singh Kochar 1977 AWC 355. 6. Coming to the facts of the case it would be seen that the execution of the agreement dated 5th April, 1967 (Ex. 1) and the fact that the premises were actually let out to and occupied by the applicant on 6th October, 1967, are not disputed. The trial court has taken the view that the agreement dated 5th April, 1967, (Ex. 1) contained an admission of the applicant that on that date the constructions which were let out to the applicant on 6th October, 1967, were not in existence and that at that time there existed only open piece of land surrounded by boundary walls. The trial court has pointed out that the applicant did not furnish any explanation for the aforesaid admission either in his written statement or even in the examination-in-Chief of his deposition before the court. In cross-examination he stated that he made the admission referred to above in the aforesaid agreement because he was in need of an accommodation and the opposite party in order to ensure that the applicant did not get the benefit of the Act wanted him to make the aforesaid statement of fact in the said agreement. The trial court did not accept the explanation set forth in his cross-examination by the applicant and has held that it was an afterthought. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 it has been held that an admission is the best evidence that an opposite party can rely upon and though not conclusive is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 it has been held that an admission is the best evidence that an opposite party can rely upon and though not conclusive is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. In the instant case the applicant has been neither successfully able to withdraw the admission made in the aforesaid agreement nor has he succeeded in proving it to be erroneous in view of the finding recorded by the trial court and so the admission was decisive of the matter that on 5th April, 1967, the constructions which were let out to the applicant on 6th October, 1967, were not in existence. Even otherwise the finding of fact recorded on this point by the trial court cannot be challenged in a revision even u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In view of that finding it is clear that the premises in dispute were constructed after 5th April, 1967. 7. Coming to the three relevant dates mentioned in the Explanation to Section 2(2) of the Act, which, according to the cases referred to above, are relevant for determining the date on which a construction can be said to have been completed within the meaning of the said provision, it would be seen that no evidence has been led by either party as to whether the completion of the construction was ever reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction. Thus there is no evidence about the date on which the completion of the constructions may have been reported or otherwise recorded by the local authority. Paragraph 4 of the plaint, however, gives a clear indication that the premises in question were assessed to house tax and water tax in 1971. The said paragraph reads: 4. That under the terms of the tenancy the Defendant was also to pay all taxes, that may be levied on the property after the tenancy. The building was assessed to house tax and water tax in 1971. Thus house tax and water tax amounting to Rs. 1387/- is due from the Defendant w.e.f. 1-4-71. The reply to this paragraph of the plaint is contained in paragraph 4 of the written statement which reads: 4. That paragraph No. 4 of the plaint is not admitted and is denied. Thus house tax and water tax amounting to Rs. 1387/- is due from the Defendant w.e.f. 1-4-71. The reply to this paragraph of the plaint is contained in paragraph 4 of the written statement which reads: 4. That paragraph No. 4 of the plaint is not admitted and is denied. The Defendant is not liable for any taxes and the allegation to the contrary are incorrect and are strictly denied. 8. A perusal of paragraph 4 of the written statement makes it clear that even though it contained a general allegation that paragraph 4 of the plaint was not admitted and was denied the specific denial was only in respect of the applicant's liability to pay the taxes. Neither in paragraph 4 nor in any other paragraph of the written statement it has been asserted that the premises in dispute were not assessed to house tax and water tax in 1971 but were assessed on some different date. In Sheikh Abdul Sattar Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1970 SC 479 in paragraph 13 of the plaint of that case it had inter alia been specifically alleged that B.R.I.A.S.C. Eastern Command, Ranchi, was the officer, sanctioning the contract. 9. In reply in paragraph 13 of the written statement it was pleaded that paragraph 13 of the plaint as it stands is not admitted. It was held “Now according to the law of pleadings the Defendant was bound to deal specifically with each allegation of fact the truth of which was not admitted. The allegation that B.R.I.A.S.C. Eastern Command, Ranchi was the officer sanctioning the contract was not specifically dealt with and was otherwise not specifically denied. If its truth was not admitted then it should also have been stated in this paragraph as to who, according to the Defendant, was the officer, sanctioning the contract.” Not only that the applicant himself filed a certified copy of the assessment list commencing from 1st April 1971, (Ex. A-22) in column 5 whereof the applicant's business concern Jindal Traders is shown as the tenant at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month. While dealing with the applicant's liability to pay taxes the trial court has referred to this list of assessment Ex. A-22 and has held: The Defendant filed copy of assessment Ex. A-22 from which it is evident that this new building was assessed with effect from 1-4-71 at Rs. 300/- per month. While dealing with the applicant's liability to pay taxes the trial court has referred to this list of assessment Ex. A-22 and has held: The Defendant filed copy of assessment Ex. A-22 from which it is evident that this new building was assessed with effect from 1-4-71 at Rs. 225/- as water tax and Rs. 225/- as house tax, for one year. 10. In this view of the matter it is clear that it was 1st of April, 1971, on which date the first assessment of the premises in dispute was made. In view of the requirements of Section 2(2) as interpreted by the cases referred to above particularly Tilak Raj's case the building will be deemed to be constructed on 1st April, 1971. Even if the material referred to above in regard to the date of the first assessment of the premises in dispute is ignored it would in no way assist the applicant because in the absence of “any such report, record or assessment” the date on which the premises were actually occupied for the first time would be the relevant date. In the instant case the said date happens to be 6-10-1967, as already pointed out above and calculated even from this date 10 years have not elapsed so far. The applicant is consequently not entitled to the benefit of the Act. 11. No other point was pressed. 12. In the result I find no merit in this civil revision. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The applicant is, however, granted one month's time to vacate the premises in dispute.