Judgment :- The earlier of the Original Petitions above mentioned is by the 3rd accused in Sessions Case No. 53 of 1968 and the other by the Ist accused in that case. They along with some others stood trial for offence punishable under S.395 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 The points raised for consideration in Ext. P1 judgment in that case were: (1) Whether P. W.1 had brought Rs 5000 with him on 21-12-1967 to Trivandrum for the purpose of purchasing black gram as alleged. (2) Did the 4th accused take P W.1 from the Sundar Tourist Home to Peroorkada on 23 121967 on the pretext that black gram was available there at cheap rate. (3) Did the accused persons commit the offence of dacoity in pursuance of a pre-prepared plan as alleged. (4) What should be the sentence to be awarded to the accused. The learned Sessions Judge in Para.38 of Ext. PI judgment said that the prosecution has not clearly proved that P W. I had brought Rs. 5000/- when he came to Trivandrum on 2112 1967 and that became to Trivandrum to purchase black gram; there is no reliable evidence to show that the 4th accused took P. W. I to Peroorkada in the noon on 23121967; the uncorroborated testimony of P. W. 1 regarding the incident is not sufficient to find the accused persons guilty of the offence. The learned Sessions Judge ultimately said that on the evidence on record and the circumstances of the case he was not satisfied that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused. He therefore, found that the accused persons have not committed the offence of dacoity as alleged. The accused were therefore acquitted. The said judgment was on 16-121968. 2. As per Ext. P4 memo of charges dated 18121969 the Superintendent of Railway Police levelled four charges against the petitioner in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974. He therefore, found that the accused persons have not committed the offence of dacoity as alleged. The accused were therefore acquitted. The said judgment was on 16-121968. 2. As per Ext. P4 memo of charges dated 18121969 the Superintendent of Railway Police levelled four charges against the petitioner in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974. According to the said charges the petitioner in that O. P. disobeyed the orders of the Security Officer of the Raj Bhavan by failure to go to the M. T. Stores attached to the Police Radio Unit for getting tyres; he unauthorisedly took the pilot van of the Raj Bhavan outside; he unauthorisedly carried certain persons in the aforesaid van; and he defaulted in writing up the daily diary relating to the said motor vehicle during the period 20121967 to 23-121967. 3. As per Ext. P6 charge memo marked in O. P. No. 3094 of 1974, the same Police Superintendent levelled against the petitioner in that O. P. the following charges: He without permission of the Security Officer attached to the Raj Bhavan who was his Superior Officer left the premises of Raj Bhavan; he connectedly with the Head Constable, H 102 Nanappan Nair, who was the driver of the pilot van of the Raj Bhavan carried certain persons in the said van unauthorisedly; when the said van was unauthorisedly being taken out of the premises of Raj Bhavan by its driver Nanappan Nair, he (the petitioner in O.P. No. 3994 of 1974) travelled in the said van unauthorisedly. 4. Pursuant to the charges aforesaid disciplinary proceedings were initiated against these petitioners. Ext. P5 in the earlier O.P. and Ext. P8 in, the other O.P. are the respective enquiry reports concerning the two petitioners. The reports are by the same officer who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer in the concerned disciplinary proceedings. The Enquiry Officer by the aforesaid reports found all the charges levelled against the respective petitioner. Ext. P7 in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974 and Ext. P12 in the other O P. are the final orders whereby both the petitioners were compulsorily re tired from service. Appeals were preferred by the petitioners but unsuccessfully. Ext. P9 in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974 and Ext P15 in the other O.P. are the appellate orders. 5. Ext. P7 in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974 and Ext. P12 in the other O P. are the final orders whereby both the petitioners were compulsorily re tired from service. Appeals were preferred by the petitioners but unsuccessfully. Ext. P9 in O.P. No. 3784 of 1974 and Ext P15 in the other O.P. are the appellate orders. 5. The substantial contention taken before me on behalf of the petitioners is that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners after the Sessions Court decided the Sessions Case earlier mentioned as per Ext. P1 judgment are without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioners sought to substantiate the above submission with reference to general principles as per which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the decision of the criminal court would operate as a bar for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioners also made reliance on R.10 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment And Appeal Rules, 1958 under which action was taken against the petitioners and particularly clause (b) (i) of that rule. 6. R.10 aforesaid by clause (a) thereof provides that if the matter is subjudice final orders in a departmental inquiry can be issued only after the matter has been disposed of by the Court. Clauses (b) deals with cases where departmental action is proposed to be taken after a criminal court has already decided a case. According to that provision and particularly sub clause (ii) thereof action by way of disciplinary proceedings can be taken with reference to such facts which call for departmental action but which were not relevant to the charge before the criminal court and which therefore were not placed before the criminal court. Clause (b) of R.10 read with sub-clause (i) thereof provides that if the officer had already been tried in a criminal court on the facts which form the basis of the charge against him and if the criminal court had arrived at a definite decision on a full consideration of these facts, the department shall not take any further proceedings on the basis that the proceedings in the criminal court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. This provision approximates, and perhaps embodies, the rule of evidence obtained in criminal trial: issue estoppel which does not bar the subsequent trial itself but precludes reception of evidence to disturb a finding of fact arrived at by a competent criminal court in an earlier proceeding, and which but for statutory incorporation would not, as held by this Court in Spadigam v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT.1047), be attracted to departmental proceedings. 'For issue estoppel to arise, there must have been distinctly raised and inevitably decided the same issue in the earlier proceeding between the same parties' Piara Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1969 S C 961 at 965). 7. The contention is that the factum of unauthorisedly taking out the pilot van of Raj Bhavan and the question of unauthorised carriage of certain persons including the petitioner in O.P. No. 3994 of 1974 thereon were found against the prosecution in Ext. P1 judgment. Discarding the evidence of pw 6 according to whom the said van was taken out of Raj Bhavan premises at 12.45 P.M., as also the evidence of pw. 7 according to whom it came back at 2.39 P.M. the Sessions Court said that'there was no reliable evidence to show that the 3rd accused took the van from the Raj Bhavan at 12-45 P.M. as stated by pw. 7. No distinct issue had been raised on that question of fact, nor was any definite decision arrived at as regards the same in Ext. P1 judgment. Rule (b)(i) is not attracted to the subsequent departmental proceedings. 8. Is acquittal by the criminal court a bar to the departmental proceedings, as contended, is the next point for consideration. A man shall not be put in peril for the same offence more than once, is a well established rub. This rule has given rise to the pleas, autrefois convict and autrefois acquit These plaes will be available only if the same-person is prosecuted twice for the same offence before a competent court; if the former prosecution ended in punishment the prisoner can plead autrefois convict, and, if it ended in acquittal, autrefois acquit in the subsequent prosecut on. This rule has given rise to the pleas, autrefois convict and autrefois acquit These plaes will be available only if the same-person is prosecuted twice for the same offence before a competent court; if the former prosecution ended in punishment the prisoner can plead autrefois convict, and, if it ended in acquittal, autrefois acquit in the subsequent prosecut on. If disciplinary proceeding is prosecution for an offence, one prosecuted subsequently on substantially the same facts which cor-stitute the offence, can plead autrefois convict, if he was punished in the earlier departmental proceeding, or autrefois acquit, if in the earlier proceeding in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction, he was discharged; so also an earlier prosecution will bar a subsequent departmental proceeding on the same facts, the plea available being dependant upon whether the delinquent who was in the earlier prosecution accused, was convicted or acquitted there. 9. In Moqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (AIR 1953 SC. 325) Supreme Court said: "This is the principle on which the party pursued has available to him the plea of "autrefois convict" or "autrefois acquit". "The plea of 'autrefois convict' or autrefois acquit" avers that the defendant has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned, for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials. A plea of "autrefois acquit" is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter" (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England Hailsham Edition Vol. 9, Pages 152 & 153, Para.212)". A plea of "autrefois acquit" is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter" (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England Hailsham Edition Vol. 9, Pages 152 & 153, Para.212)". And continued to say: "The word "before a Court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Art.20(2) But if regard be had to the whole background indicated above it is clear that in order that the protection of Art 20(2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a Court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oath. The very wording of Art.20 and the words used therein:-' convicted", "commission of the act charged as an offence", "be subjected to a penalty", "commission of the offence", "prosecuted and punished", accused of any offence", would indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure." 10. In Venkataraman v. Union of India (AIR 1954 SC. 375) that Court examined the matter again with reference to the question as to whether proceeding under Public Servants (Inquires) Act, 1850 against a member of Indian Civil Service culminating in his dismissal from service would bar subsequent prosecution on substantially the same facts, and said:- "As has been said already, an order of dismissal of a servant cannot be regarded as a punishment for an offence punishable under particular sections of the Indian Penal Code or of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A somewhat analogous case would be that of a member of the Bar whose name is struck oft the rolls on grounds of professional misconduct, in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the proper authority. A somewhat analogous case would be that of a member of the Bar whose name is struck oft the rolls on grounds of professional misconduct, in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the proper authority. The professional misconduct might amount to a criminal offence, but if we are to accept the petitioner's contention as correct, the man cannot be prosecuted for it, even though the authority inflicting the penalty of removal was not a competent court to investigate any criminal charge nor was the punishment imposed in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction a punishment for an offence." 11. These decisions make it clear that the scope of the doctrine of double jeopardy enshrined in the maxim'Nemo debet bis vexari' a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence is confined to proceedings before a Court or judicial tribunal in the nature of prosecution or criminal trial for an offence, and cannot be extended to proceeding before any other body which by law is not required to decide the matter in dispute judicially on evidence on oath and which by law is not authorised to administer oath, such as tribunals entertaining a departmental or administrative enquiry even if they he statutory bodies. If so, nor can it be said that either of the pleas, autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, would be attracted to, or by reason of, proceedings before a Tribunal other than a Court or judicial tribunal. 12. Stressing the fact that the object of criminal trial is punishment for an offence, whereas that of disciplinary proceeding is, an efficient and clean public service, and drawing attention to the difference in degree and nature of proof required to bring home the guilt of an accused standing trial for an offence, and that is sufficient to establish the misconduct of a delinquent public servant before a disciplinary tribunal, Mathew J. in the Spadigam case earlier mentioned said that acquittal of the accused by a criminal court is not a bar for action against him in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction on substantially the same facts. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of A. P. v. K. H Khan (1967) II An. W. R.121 (126) also has taken the same view. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of A. P. v. K. H Khan (1967) II An. W. R.121 (126) also has taken the same view. In the light of the discussion made above, I have not been persuaded to come to a different view, or to doubt the correctness of the decision in the Spadigam case in which direction zealous arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel, relying on the decisions of the Madras, Mysore, Patna and Madhya Pradesh High Courts. 13. J. D'Silva v. R. T. A. (AIR 1952 Madras 853) which had been followed in some of the cases cited, viz., Radhakrishna Mills v. Labour Court (1160-II LLJ. 678), Shaik Kasim v. Suptdt, Post Offices (AIR 1965 Madras 502), Banta Singh v. N. C. D. Corpn (1969-IL. L J. 664) and Channappa v. Mysore R A. Tribunal (AIR 1966 Mysore 68) proceeded on the basis that a domestic forum when it exercises disciplinary jurisdiction is conducting a criminal trial for an offence. According to that decision which was prior to the Supreme Court decisions discussed earlier is this judgment: "It would indeed be a strange predicament when in respect of the same, offence, be should be punished by one tribunal on the footing that he was guilty of the offence and that he should be honourably acquitted by another Tribunal of the very same offence. As primarily the criminal courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi judicial tribunals..." (underlines by me). This statement of law, with respect, cannot be accepted as good law after the Supreme Court clarified that proceedings in any tribunal (including a quasi judicial tribunal) other than those before a'Court of law or judicial tribunal' competent to administer oath and bound to decide the controversy judicially on evidence on oath, would not attract the doctrine of double jeopardy, the pedastal on which either of the two pleas, autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, is raised. The other decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners are: P. E. Ponnu-langam v. Mysore Govt R T. Dept. (AIR. 1962 Mysore 84), Madras-Bangalore Transport Co v. M.B.T Co Workers' Union (1964-II LLJ. 614) and Qumarali v. State (AIR. 1959 M.P. 46). The other decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners are: P. E. Ponnu-langam v. Mysore Govt R T. Dept. (AIR. 1962 Mysore 84), Madras-Bangalore Transport Co v. M.B.T Co Workers' Union (1964-II LLJ. 614) and Qumarali v. State (AIR. 1959 M.P. 46). These also lay down the same principle as in D'Silva's Case. 14. Seeking support on C. L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin (AIR. 1972 SC. 2178) it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner in O. P. No. 3784 of 1974 that his request to engage a counsel in departmental proceedings was wrongly rejected. I need only notice that unlike R.15 (5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1967 considered in the Subrmoniam's case, rule, 6 (8) of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 does not vest on the disciplinary authority any discretion in the matter so that he may 'having regard to the circumstances of the case' allow or reject such a request. He can (and should) allow the request if a counsel is engaged by the department, but there is no such case. There is no merit in this contention. Dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.