JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - Lalta Prasad Dwivedi respondent No. 4 was employed as Pradhan Adhyapak in a Junior High School run by the Zila Parishad Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the Parishad). On 4th Oct. 1966, a charge-sheet was served on respondent No. 4 by the Adhyaksh of the Parishad containing a number of allegations. An inquiry followed thereafter resulting in the dismissal of the respondent. The order of dismissal was passed by Amarnath Dubey Up-Adhyaksh of the Parishad on 6-7-1968. The order of dismissal was challenged by the respondent by way of a suit filed in the Court of Munsif Gyanpur being Suit No. 344 of 1969. The suit was decreed on 5-1-1972 on the finding that a proper opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner in the inquiry and further on the ground that Up-Adhyaksh of the Parishad, not being the appointing authority, had no power to dismiss the respondent. After the institution of the appeal, U. P. Government passed an Ordinance on 1-8-1972 transferring supervision of educational institutions of District Boards to the Basic Shiksha Parishad and as a result, the Basic Shiksha Parishad was also impleaded as a respondent to the appeal. Thereafter, an Ordinance known as U. P. Public Service Tribunal Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor which was subsequently replaced by an Act. In view of the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act, the dispute was transferred to the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Lucknow. The Public Services Tribunal by its order dated 16-10-1976 dismissed the appeal of the Parishad and also a cross-objection filed by respondent. It held that although a proper opportunity had been afforded to the respondent at the inquiry, the Up-Adhyaksh of the Parishad had no authority to dismiss the respondent, inasmuch as the respondent having been appointed by the Adhyaksh, the Up-Adhyaksh could not pass the impugned order in view of Section 53 of the U. P. Kshetra Samiti and Zilla Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam.). 2. Before we refer to the provisions of the Adhiniyam, it will be useful to advert to few facts which are relevant for deciding the dispute. The Adhyaksh of the Parishad by an order purported to have been passed under Section 59 of the Adhiniyam delegated his "powers, duties and functions" except those specified in Section 58 (a) and (b) of the Adhiniyam to Sri Amarnath Dubey Up-Adhyaksh. The Adhyaksh of the Parishad by an order purported to have been passed under Section 59 of the Adhiniyam delegated his "powers, duties and functions" except those specified in Section 58 (a) and (b) of the Adhiniyam to Sri Amarnath Dubey Up-Adhyaksh. This order was passed in purported exercise Of powers under Section 59 of the Act. It also appears that after the Up-Adhyaksh passed the order of dismissal, he sent it to the Adhyaksh who on 3rd July 1968 approved of the order. 3. We may now extract Sections 53, 58 and 59 of the Adhiniyam on which the decision of the controversy turns: "53. Punishment of servants of Zila Parishad and Kshettra Samiti. The punishment of officers and other servants employed with the Zila Parishad or with any Kshettra Samiti including appeals from order of punishment, the power of revision, if any, of appellate orders and suspension pending enquiry shall be regulated by rules : Provided that the authority which is given the power to dismiss, remove from service or reduce in rank any officer or a servant shall not be lower in rank than the appointing authority for the post held by such officer or servant; Provided secondly, that in the case of employees whose appointment is required to be made in consultation with the State Public Service Commission, it shall be necessary for the punishing authority to consult the Commission in the manner prescribed before passing an order for the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of any such employee." "58. Duties of Adhyaksha. It shall be the duty of Adhyaksha (a) .......... (b) to watch over the financial and superintend the executive administration of the Parishad, and bring to the notice of the Parishad any defect therein; and (c) to perform such other duties as are "required of or imposed on him under this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force." 59. Delegation by Adhyaksha to Up-adhyaksha and the Mukhya Adhikari.' (1) The Adhyaksha of a Zila Parishad may, by general or special order, empower the Upadhyaksh, or the Mukhya Adhikari to exercise or perform under his general guidance, anyone or more of his powers, duties or functions except those specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 58. Delegation by Adhyaksha to Up-adhyaksha and the Mukhya Adhikari.' (1) The Adhyaksha of a Zila Parishad may, by general or special order, empower the Upadhyaksh, or the Mukhya Adhikari to exercise or perform under his general guidance, anyone or more of his powers, duties or functions except those specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 58. (2) An order by the Adhyaksha under sub-s. (1) may prescribe any condition, and impose any restriction in respect of the exercise of any power and the performance of any duty or of any function." It is not in dispute in the present case that the Adhyaksh had appointed respondent No. 4 and had also had the power to punish him. It has, however, been contended on behalf of respondent that Up-Adhyaksha is lower in rank than the Adhyaksh and as such in view of first proviso to Section 53, the respondent could not be dismissed by the Upadhyaksh. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the power of punishing servants of the Parishad is a matter which is covered by Section 58 (c) of the Adhiniyam and this power can be delegated to the Upadhyaksh under Section 59 of the Adhiniyam, and as such the Upadhyaksh could have passed the impugned order of dismissal. In the alternative, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner, that in any event inasmuch as the Upadhyaksh (Adhyaksh?) had approved of the order passed by Upadhyaksh, the final order in law was that of the Adhyaksh and as such no infirmity attaches to the impugned order. There was dispute between the parties as to whether the power of punishment fell under Section 58 (b) or Section 58 (c) of the Act, for if the power to punish employees fell under Section 58 (b) of the Act, that could not be delegated under Section 59 of the Act, as under Section 59, which has already been extracted above, powers other than those specified under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 58 alone could be delegated; that it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the controversy, for we have to interpret Section 59 of the Adhiniyam alone with Section 53 thereof. It is a settled rule of interpretation that where two provisions of the Act appear to be in conflict, a harmonious interpretation has to be adopted so as to preserve the efficacy of both the provisions. In case Section 59 is .read as empowering the Adhyaksh to delegate his power of punishment to the Up-adhyaksh (assuming that such a power falls under Section 58 (c) of the Adhiniyam), the restriction imposed by the first proviso to Section 53, which is to the effect that a servant of the parishad cannot be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank by an officer lower in rank than the appointing authority, would become delusive. Thus the proper interpretation to be put on Section 59 (1) of the Adhiniyam is to exclude the power to punish officers and servants of the parishad who have been appointed by the Adhyaksh. The interpretation would make both the provisions effective, for in cases where punishment other than those of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank are meted out to the servants concerned, the Adhyaksh would be empowered to delegate that function. We may, however, add that our decision should not be taken as an expression of opinion that the power of punishment falls under Section 58 (c) of the Adhiniyam as we have proceeded on the assumption that such matters may fall within that provision. 4. The question as to whether an Upadhyaksha has the same rank as an Adhyaksh admits of an easy answer. The word "rank" in the context connotes apart (sic) also 'status' and as the matter relates to an elective office, the relevant enquiry is as to the powers exercisable by the two functions. Thus the first proviso to Section 53 insists that the status of the officer imposing the three major punishments should be the same as that of the appointing authority. The Adhyakshya and Upadhyaksha are both elected by secret ballot by members of the Parishad under Section 19 of the Adhiniyam. Under Section 43, the Adhyaksh is empowered to appoint teachers and other servants except those covered by Section 43 (1) and (2). Section 45 of the Adhiniyam nominates the Adhyaksh as the Chairman of the Clmnao Samiti, which is a consultative body for the purposes of making appointment to certain posts of the parishad. Under Section 43, the Adhyaksh is empowered to appoint teachers and other servants except those covered by Section 43 (1) and (2). Section 45 of the Adhiniyam nominates the Adhyaksh as the Chairman of the Clmnao Samiti, which is a consultative body for the purposes of making appointment to certain posts of the parishad. Section 47 confers power on the Adhyaksh to make temporary appointment to posts mentioned in Section 43 of the Adhiniyam in respect of whom he can make a permanent appointment. Section 51 confers power on the Adhyaksh to send every year his assessment of the work and conduct of the Mukhya Adhikari to the Parishad. In exercise of the Rule making power conferred by Section 51 of the Act, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh had framed U. P. Zila Parishad (Control of Adhyaksha over Mukhya Adhikari and other Heads of Departments) Rules 1963. Under the Rules the Adhyaksha exercises control over the Mukhya Adhikari and other Heads of Department of the Zila Parishad in respect of matters relating to casual leave, tour programme, inspection of the work of these officers and has power to issue orders not inconsistent with the provisions of the Adhiniyam to these officers. Section 56 (2) confers powers on the Adhyaksh to exercise certain powers, duties and functions of the Zila Parishad, So far as Upadhyaksh is concerned, none of these powers set out above are exercisable by him. Section 58 which has already been extracted imposes certain additional duties on the Adhyaksh which consists of convening meetings, watching over the financial and executive administration of the parishad and performing such other duties as are required or imposed on him under the Adhiniyam or the Rules framed thereunder. It is only when the Adhyaksh delegates his power under Section 59 that the Upadhyaksh can perform the functions of the Adhyaksha. The very notion of delegation implies that the parent power primarily resides in the Adhyaksh, and the Upadhyaksh does not enjoy an equivalent power. This being so, the Upadhyaksha does not enjoy the same rank or status as that of an Adhyaksha. The result is that the dismissal order could not have been passed by the Upadhyaksha. The very notion of delegation implies that the parent power primarily resides in the Adhyaksh, and the Upadhyaksh does not enjoy an equivalent power. This being so, the Upadhyaksha does not enjoy the same rank or status as that of an Adhyaksha. The result is that the dismissal order could not have been passed by the Upadhyaksha. It is settled that the rank cannot be delegated and the delegatee cannot arrogate to himself the power which can be exercised only by the original authority (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Pratap Singh, AIR 1976 SC 2301 and the Management of D. T. U. v. B.B.L. Hajelay. AIR 1972 SC 2452 : (1972 Lab IC 619). Hajelay's case is also an authority for proposition that delegation of functions under regulations cannot nullify Statutory protection enjoyed by an officer to be punished only by an authority of the equal rank. In the present case, although the delegation is permissible by the statute itself, and may stand on a different footing, yet as has already been seen, we have held, applying the principle of .harmonious construction, that (S. 5.3?) does not provide delegation in cases covered by the first proviso of the Act. Thus the order of the Adhyaksh Zila Parishad delegating his powers to the Upadhyaksha did not confer any right on the Upadhyaksha to pass the impugned order. 5. The alternative contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is met by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg, ( AIR 1977 SC 747 : (1977 Lab IC 272)). In that case, it was held that the order of dismissal passed by the subordinate authority which was without jurisdiction, and as such void and inoperative, could not be supported on account of the fact that an appeal against that order was dismissed by the head of the Department who was entitled to pass the dismissal order. In view of this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to advert to various authorities referred to by counsel for the petitioner that the order can be sustained on account of the fact that the order met the approval of the Adhyaksh. 6. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.