JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BY this petition the appointment of respondent No. 2 s. K. Choudbary as City Engineer in the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, has been challenged and consequently a writ of quo warranto is prayed for. Even though in the petition certain other reliefs were also claimed but at the hearing before us, Shri Gulab Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, expressly confined the petition only to the relief of quo warranto on the ground that the appointment of respondent No. 2 as City Engineer was invalid. We shall, therefore, now deal only with the question pertaining to the validity of the appointment of respondent No. 2 as City Engineer. ( 2. ) THE material facts are not in dispute. Respondent No. 2 S: K. Choudhary made an application Annexure-E dated 9-6-1970 to the State Government offering himself as a candidate for appointment to the post of City engineer in the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur (Respondent No. 1 ). Thereafter on 10-7-1970, an advertisement was issued inviting applications from intending candidates for the post of Assistant Engineer in the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, in the grade of Rs. 200-20-300-15-375 EB-15-450. On 20-7-1970 respondent No. 2 applied for the post of Assistant Engineer. He was thereafter interviewed for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer. In the mean time one Kathuria, who was working as Executive Engineer in the corporation having come on deputation from the State Government, was called back from deputation by the State Government. On 26-8-1970 vide Annexure R-3, the Corporation recommended to the State Government that respondent No. 2 be appointed as Executive Engineer on return of Kathuria to his parent department from where he had come on deputation fo the Corporation. Thereafter, on 3-10-1970, vide order Annexure-B, the Corporation appointed the respondent No. 2 temporarily until further orders as Assistant Engineer in the grade of Rs. 250-250-275-20-375-EB-25-525. However, on the Corporations recommendation to the State Government for appointing respondent no. 2 as Executive Engineer in place of Kathuria, on 22-10-1970 the State government wrote back to the Corporation saying that the approval of the state Public Service Commission is necessary for appointing Executive Engineer. On 2-11-1970 K. athurias term on deputation to the Corporation expired and in his place the Corporation appointed respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer for a period of six months vide Annexure D dated 3-11-1970 with effect from that date. On 2-11-1970 K. athurias term on deputation to the Corporation expired and in his place the Corporation appointed respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer for a period of six months vide Annexure D dated 3-11-1970 with effect from that date. This appointment of respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer was apparently in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 58 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the act) which permits the making of such appointments for a period not exceeding six months without consultation with the State Public Service Commission. On a reference being made by the Corporation to the State Public Service Commission seeking approval for appointing respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer, by its letter dated 9-3-1971, Annexure R-2/l-4, the Commission accorded sanction for his appointment only for a period of six months. This period of six months expired on 3-5-1971. Thereafter no further order re-appointing respondent No. 2 as executive Engineer appears to have been passed because no such order has been placed before us. After some more correspondence being exchanged between the Corporation and the Commission in the matter of approval sought by the Corporation in accordance with the Second Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 58 of the Act, the Commission finally, by its communication Annexure-H dated 30-7-1971, refused approval for appointment of respondent No. 2 as executive Engineer. It was also stated in that communication while refusing the approval that the Corporation should send a requisition for open advertisement for filling the post of Executive Engineer. Obviously as a consequence of this refusal by the Commission, the Corporation made a reference to the state Government as provided by the Third Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 58 of the Act, since it did not agree with the Commissions refusal to concur in the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Executive Engineer. The state Government agreed with the Commissions refusal and directed recruitment to the post of Executive Engineer after proper advertisement and this was communicated by Annexure-I dated 13-1-1972. ( 3. The state Government agreed with the Commissions refusal and directed recruitment to the post of Executive Engineer after proper advertisement and this was communicated by Annexure-I dated 13-1-1972. ( 3. ) IN the mean time, notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid reference before the State Government after refusal of concurrence by the commission vide Annexure-H, by Annexure R-9 dated 3-1-1972, the Commission conveyed its concurrence on the subject revising its earlier refusal vide annexure-H. It has been alleged and not disputed before us that this unusual thing happened soon after one Member of the Commission Shri D. D. Kurrey had visited Jabalpur when he was met by Administrator. During the entire relevant period, the Corporation was under supersession and there was an administrator appointed under section 423 of the Act. We need not, however, say anything further in this connection because all these facts are relevant only for appointment to the post of Executive Engineer while we are in this petition concerned only with the validity of appointment of respondent No. 2 as City engineer. ( 4. ) ON 11-8-1972, the Administrator passed an order Annexure-J merely saying that Shri S. K. Choudhary respondent No. 2 shall now be called the "city Engineer" of Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur. This is how the respondent No. 2 came to be appointed as the City Engineer. In short, except for this order Annexure-J dated 11-8-1972, nothing else has been placed before us as constituting the process by which respondent No. 2 came to be appointed as the City Engineer. The facts leading to this stage are relevant only for completing the narrative and showing the background in which respondent No. 2 came to be appointed as the City Engineer abruptly in this fashion. It is this appointment of respondent No. 2 as City Engineer which is challenged before us. ( 5. ) THERE is no dispute that the Administrator (the Corporation being then under supersession) did not even care to make a reference to the State Public service Commission seeking its approval to the appointment of respondent no. 2 as City Engineer. This being so, there was no question of the Commission even considering that proposal much less according its approval. Admittedly, the State Government also did not come in the picture of this appointment. In short, by one stroke of pen as shown by Annexure -. 2 as City Engineer. This being so, there was no question of the Commission even considering that proposal much less according its approval. Admittedly, the State Government also did not come in the picture of this appointment. In short, by one stroke of pen as shown by Annexure -. T dated 11-8-1972, the Administrator appointed respondent No. 2 as the City Engineer notwithstanding the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 58 of the Act which admittedly applied to such an appointment. This is the only authority under which the respondent No. 2 has been holding the office of the City engineer ever since 11-8-1972. ( 6. ) APPARENTLY, the petitioners, who are subordinate engineers in the municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, felt aggrieved by the appointment of respondent No. 2 in this manner and they represented to the authorities against the same. No action having been taken by any one, this petition was filed on 12-12-1974 challenging the appointment of respondent No. 2 as City Engineer. ( 7. ) THE question whether an appointment to a post such as that of the city Engineer made by the Corporation without the approval of the State Public service Commission is invalid or not, was referred by us for decision by a larger Bench. The Full Bench, by its opinion dated 25-10-1977, has answered that question stating that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Narayan keshav Dandekar v. R. C. Rathi and another, (1963 M P L J 709=ai R 1963 M P 17.) was correct, with the result that any such appointment made for a period exceeding six months in the absence of consultation with the Commission was invalid. In view of this opinion of the Full Bench, which lays down that prior consultation with the State Public service Commission in such a case is mandatory, it is obvious on the admitted facts that the continuance of respondent No. 2 on the post of City Engineer after the expiry of six months from 11-8-1972 was invalid. The reasons are elaborately given in the opinion of the Full Bench and it is not necessary to reiterate the same here. ( 8. The reasons are elaborately given in the opinion of the Full Bench and it is not necessary to reiterate the same here. ( 8. ) SHRI Y. S. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has, however, urged that notwithstanding the above conclusion on merits, the petition must be dismissed because of laches and the absence of any substantial injury to the petitioners without which such a petition does not lie at their instance. So far as the argument regarding laches is concerned, it is sufficient to say that in a case of quo warranto the usurper in office continues to be an usurper each day that he remains in office and it would be inappropriate for this reason alone to dismiss the petition, assuming that there was any such delay. However, in our opinion, there is also no such delay in the present case. It was only on expiry of a period of six months from 11-8-1972, the date on which Annexure-J was passed, that the continuance of respondent No. 2 in the office of City Engineer was without any lawful authority. Admittedly, the petitioners made several representations, two of them dated 23-8-1972 and 15-11-1973. It was reasonable for them as subordinate engineers employed in the same Corporation to expect that the wrong would be undone. When that did not happen, they filed this petition on 12-12-1974. In our opinion, the time which elapsed till the filing of the petition can be called as reasonable waiting period for the petitioners to expect that they may not have to come to this Court. It is obvious that the petitioners must have come to the Court most reluctantly. Another test to be applied in such cases is whether any rights have sprung up in some persons during this period who would be adversely affected by the petition being allowed. Not even a suggestion was made that it is so. This being so, even if the delay in filing such a petition be relevant, the test to be applied in such cases for dismissing a petition on the ground of laches alone is not satisfied to enable us to uphold this objection of Shri dharmadhikari. The other objection relating to the petitioners right to bring such a petition is equally devoid of any force. The other objection relating to the petitioners right to bring such a petition is equally devoid of any force. The petitioners are admittedly not busy-bodies and as subordinate Engineers employed in the same Corporation they have obviously sufficient interest so that such a petition lies at their instance. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting both these objections of Shri Dharmadhikari. ( 9. ) SHRI Dharmadhikaris last argument was that section 58 (I) of the Act is not workable during the period that a Corporation is under supersession so that the requirement of consultation with the State Public Service Commission cannot be insisted upon during that period. We have no doubt that this argu ment also must be rejected. Sub-section (1) of section 58 provides for appointment of certain officers including the City Engineer by the Corporation. The first Proviso therein indicates that the highest paid employees of the Corporation are to be appointed by the Standing Committee and the lower ones by the Commissioner of the Corporation. The Second Proviso then lays down the mandatory requirement of prior consultation with the State Public Service commission in case of all appointments required to be made by the Standing committee. The last proviso then states that in case of difference of opinion between the Standing Committee and the Commission, if the Corporation agrees with the Commission, the appointment shall be made accordingly, but in other cases a reference is to be made by the Corporation to the State Government whose decision shall be final. The argument of Shri Dharmadhikari is that the Third Proviso contemplates two different authorities, namely Standing committee and Corporation, so that when the Corporation is superseded and the Administrator alone discharges all the functions in the Corporation, this last Proviso which is attracted in case of difference of opinion cannot be complied with. For this reason, he argues that the whole of section 58 must be treated as remaining in abeyance during the period of supersession of a Corporation. Shri Dharmadhikari is, however, not able to tell us what other law would apply to govern the appointments during that period. If Shri dharmadhikari is right, then it follows necessarily that the Administrator would have unfettered powers which mathematically stated are normally to be exercised by the Corporation plus the Commission plus the State Government. Shri Dharmadhikari is, however, not able to tell us what other law would apply to govern the appointments during that period. If Shri dharmadhikari is right, then it follows necessarily that the Administrator would have unfettered powers which mathematically stated are normally to be exercised by the Corporation plus the Commission plus the State Government. Shri dharmadhikari rightly does not dispute that this would be the result if we accept his argument. Apart from the fact that on merits such an argument cannot be accepted, it is clear to us that for the obvious absurdity of its result, we ought to reject such an argument. Sub-section (1) speaks of appointment by the Corporation and not either by the Standing Committee or the Commissioner. The First Proviso then says that the higher appointments are to be made by the Standing Committee and the lower ones by the Commissioner. The Standing Committee is one of the authorities discharging this function on behalf of the Corporation. Moreover, section 423 of the Act itself provides that on supersession of the Corporation, all powers and duties of the Corporation and the Standing Committee etc. shall be performed by the person appointed for this purpose. The appointment of the Administrator for this purpose under section 423 of the Act during the period of supersession is admitted. That being so, in section 58, the person so appointed i. e. the Administrator, is to be read in place of Corporation and Standing Committee wherever they occur. There is thus no difficulty in the implementation of section 58 during the period of Corporations supersession. ( 10. ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, this petition must be allowed. We, therefore, direct the issue of a writ of quo warranto directing respondent no. 2. S. K. Choudhary to vacate the office of the City Engineer, Municipal corporation, Jabalpur, and we further direct the respondent No. 1 Municipal corporation to remove the respondent No. 2 from the office of the City engineer. It would be open to the Corporation (Respondent No. 1) to make such consequential orders as may be necessary to implement this direction given by us. The petitioners shall get their costs from respondent No. 1 Municipal corporation. Counsels fee Rs. 200, if certified. ( 11. ) I agree with my learned brother. It would be open to the Corporation (Respondent No. 1) to make such consequential orders as may be necessary to implement this direction given by us. The petitioners shall get their costs from respondent No. 1 Municipal corporation. Counsels fee Rs. 200, if certified. ( 11. ) I agree with my learned brother. However, I would add a few words regarding Shri Dharmadhikaris objection that this petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioners have no direct interest in the office of City Engineer. Shri Dharmadhikaris preliminary objection is wholly misconceived. A proceeding for issuance of a writ of quo warranto wherein the validity of an appointment to a public office is challenged is maintainable at the instance of any private person, although he is not personally aggrieved or interested in the matter. In proceedings for a writ of quo warranto the applicant does not seek to enforce any right of his as such, nor does he complain of nonperformance of duty towards him. What is in question is the right of the non-applicant to hold the office; and an order that is passed is an order ousting him from that office. See G. P. Karkare v. T. L. Shevde, (ILR 1952 Nag. 409=air 1952 Nag. 330. ). Under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court has jurisdiction and authority to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against relevant statutory provisions. These proceedings protect the public from usurpers of public office. ( 12. ) THE only requisites which must be satisfied before a writ of quo warranto can be issued are (i) the office must be public; (ii) the office must be substantive in character and independent in title; (iii) the office must have been created by a statute or by Constitution; and (iv) the office is held by usurper without legal authority. An office is usurped if the respondent is not entitled to that office or if the appointment of the respondent has not been made in accordance with law. An office is usurped if the respondent is not entitled to that office or if the appointment of the respondent has not been made in accordance with law. See University of Mysore v. Govindrao, ( (1964) 4 SCR 575 = A I R 1965 SC 491.) where their Lordships have laid down thus : "broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial inquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. " It has been held in some cases that the Court would see whether the relator is a member of the public and acts bona fide or whether he is a "man of straw" set up by others as a mere pawn in the game. (See V. D. Deshpande v. Hyderabad State, (AIR 1955 Hyd. 36. ).) ( 13. ) IN England, in early times, the writ of quo warranto was in the nature of a writ of right for the king against any subject who claimed or usurped any office, franchise or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim. At a later period the Kings Coroner commenced the practice of exhibiting information of quo warranto at the instance of private persons. It is stated in "halsbury (Simond) 145- "an information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. " ( 14. ) THE case of King v. Speyer and the King v. Cassel, ( (1916) 1kb 595) is illuminating. Sir Ernest Cassel was appointed a member of the Privy Council in 1902. Sir edger Speyer was appointed a member of the Privy Council in 1909. Rules nisi calling upon them to show cause why information in the nature of quo warranto should not be exhibited against them to show by what authority they were, or claim to be members of the Privy Council. Sir edger Speyer was appointed a member of the Privy Council in 1909. Rules nisi calling upon them to show cause why information in the nature of quo warranto should not be exhibited against them to show by what authority they were, or claim to be members of the Privy Council. The rules were obtained at the instance of Sir George Makgill who had no private interest to serve in questioning the appointments. He brought the matter before the Court purely on public grounds. The grounds of the petition were that the respondents were born out of kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland and the dominions belonging to them; nor were they born of English parents, so that by the statute law they were not eligible to be members of the Privy Council. Sir Edger Speyer did not file evidence, but it was stated at the Bar at his instructions that he had published his offer of resignation and his reasons for taking that course. But his resignation was not accepted. However, Sir Edger Speyer felt it would be inconsistent for him to appear to assert a claim to a distinction which he had offered to give up. However, his counsel was there to against Court. Sir Ernest Cassel filed an affidavit resisting the objection. The Attorney-General took the preliminary objection on behalf of the Crown that the proceedings were entirely misconceived for these reasons " (1) That the wrong (if any) was an usurpation of rights by the Crown, whereas the remedy was only available for usurpation against the Crown of the rights of prerogative of the Crown. (2) that no judgment in favour of the relator could be enforced because it would be an order upon the Crown. (3) That membership of the Privy Council did not constitute the holding of an office. (4) That if it did, it was an office held at pleasure. (5) That the complaint was not a matter for a Crown Office information, but only for information by the Attorney General. The last ground was that the remedy in that case could only be sought at the instance of the Attorney General by an information ex officio, and that the order had to be discharged because it was made at the instance of a private person. The last ground was that the remedy in that case could only be sought at the instance of the Attorney General by an information ex officio, and that the order had to be discharged because it was made at the instance of a private person. Lord Reading C. J. rejected this objection as follow :- "it cannot be doubted that this application concerns public Government, and there is no ground for impugning the motive of the relator. A stranger to the suit can obtain prohibition See Broad v. Perkins, ( (1888) 21 Q B D 533.) and I see no reason why he should not in a proper case obtain an information of quo warranto. Sir George Makgill appears to have brought this matter before the Court on purely public grounds without any private interest to serve, and it is to the public advantage that the law should be declared by judicial authority. I think the Court ought to incline to the assistance, and not to the hindrance, of the applicant in such a case if the Court has the power, which I think it has. " ( 15. ) IF in England, in a monarchical system, where the first principle is that the King can do no wrong, an appointment made by the King could be questioned by any of his subjects, who had no personal interest in the matter, certainly in a democratic republican constitution, a citizen cannot be refused to move for a writ of quo warranto for testing the validity of an appointment. ( 16. ) I would say with greater emphasis that once a petition for issuance of a quo warranto writ has been admitted by the Court, it cannot be dismissed on the mere ground that the relator has no personal interest. It becomes the duty of the Court to decide it on merits, whether or not the appointment of the respondent was according to the provisions of the law.