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1977 DIGILAW 537 (MAD)

M. Mohammad v. State of Andhra Pradesh.

1977-12-09

MUKTADAR

body1977
Order.-The petitioner was convicted by the III Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, in S.T.C. No. 3365 of 1976, of the offence punishable under sections 16(1)(a)(i) read with sections 7(1) and (2)(i)(a)(d) and (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the accused runs a restaurant called Meer Cafe, located in premises bearing number 10-3-12/6, Mehdipatnam, Hyderabad. On 13th September, 1976, at about 9-30 p.m. P.W. 1 the Food Inspector of Circle Nos. 4 and 5, visited the said restaurant of the accused and purchased 1500 grams of biryani for purposes of analysis after complying with necessary formalities. He paid Rs.7-50 and obtained a receipt therefor. All these formalities were complied with in the presence of P.W. 3, who is a dealer in sweetmeats at Mehdipatnam, and one Krishnarao, a Lower Division Clerk. Thereafter P.W. 1 divided the biryani into parts, poured them into three clear, dry and empty bottles, added 40 drops of formalin in each bottle, and the bottles were corked, sealed and labelled. One specimen was sent to the Public Analyst who opined as per Exhibit P-9, that the same contained metanil yellow, a coal tar dye, use of which in food is not permitted and is, therefore, adulterated. After completion of the investigation, the prosecution was launched against the accused. Two witnesses were examined for the prosecution of whom P.W. 1, is the Food Inspector himself and P.W. 2 is the Panchayatdar. The plea of the accused was one of denial. 3. The trial Court after a scrutiny of the entire evidence found that the accused was guilty and convicted and sentenced him, as stated above. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the appellate Court. 4. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has raised several contentions in this revision. 3. The trial Court after a scrutiny of the entire evidence found that the accused was guilty and convicted and sentenced him, as stated above. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the appellate Court. 4. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has raised several contentions in this revision. His first contention is that, according to rule 20 of the Rules framed under the Act, formalin is only added to milk or some other liquids or milk products and not to biryani; that no preservative was added to the sample; that although the sample was taken on 13th September, 1976 the date of the analysis is 30th September, 1976 and that, therefore, it was possible that the sample had got spoiled due to this delay and for the reason that no preservative was added. His second contention is that having regard to the provisions of rule 28 of the Rules framed under the Act, the Public Analyst must specify the exact colour and chemical class that was used in the sample, which is not done in this case. Therefore, the report of the analysis is defective. His third and final contention is that rule 14 which is mandatory has not been complied with and, therefore, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 5. So far as the first two contentions are concerned, I may straight away state that they cannot be acceded to. It is true that as per the provisions of rule 20 of the Rules, the preservative used in the case of samples of any milk (including toned, separated and skimmed milk) standardised milk, Chhanna, skimmed milk Channa, cream, ice-cream, mixed ice-cream, ice candy, dahi, khoa and gur in liquid or semi-liquid form shall be the liquid commonly known as ‘formalin’. But the Act or the Rules are completely silent with regard to addition of preservative in biryani. Moreover, it is also true that delay to a certain extent has occurred in the analysis of the sample, but there is nothing in the report of the Analyst to show that because of such delay, due to some chemical reaction, yellow coal tar dye was formed in the sample. Therefore, it can only mean that yellow coal tar dye was positively found in the sample and that is not due to non-addition of a preservative. Therefore, it can only mean that yellow coal tar dye was positively found in the sample and that is not due to non-addition of a preservative. So far as rule 28 is concerned it, no doubt, provides that no coal tar dyes or mixtures thereof except those mentioned in the table in rule 28, shall be used in food. But rule 29, specifically provides that permitted coal tar dyes in the table mentioned under rule 28 could be used in or upon any food mentioned in clauses (a) to (o) to rule 29. Clauses (a) to (o) to rule 29, do not contain the word ‘biryani’. Therefore, it becomes evident that coal tar dye cannot be used in biryani as permitted by rule 29. Finally, the third contention of the learned Advocate is that having regard to the provisions of rule 14 the prosecution has to prove that the sample was taken, divided into three parts and poured into three clean and dry bottles, and this the prosecution has not at all established, that the sample was take and poured into clean and dry bottles. Therefore, submits the learned Advocate that the prosecution has not complied with the provisions of rule 14 and as such prejudice has caused to the petitioner; because it is possible that some coal tar dye of the previous sample might have been left in the sample bottles in which the present sample was poured by P.W. 1. On the other hand, Mr. K.F. Baba, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, vehemently contends that it is true that P.Ws. 1 and 2 have not specifically stated that samples were poured into dry and clean bottles as envisaged under rule 14, but we have it in Exhibit P-5, the statement given by the accused and signed by him, wherein he has categorically admitted that the bottles in which the sample was taken were dry and clean and, therefore, it is enough evidence to warrant conviction of the accused. It would be appropriate at this juncture to state the contents of Exhibit P-5. Exhibit P-5 appears to be the statement made by the accused. It is in a printed form with blanks wherein P.W. 1 has in his own handwriting inserted necessary particulars. It would be appropriate at this juncture to state the contents of Exhibit P-5. Exhibit P-5 appears to be the statement made by the accused. It is in a printed form with blanks wherein P.W. 1 has in his own handwriting inserted necessary particulars. It is clear from Exhibit P-5 that P.W. 1 in his own hand-writing has written “placed into three clean empty and dry bottles”, but these words are not found in the printed form. Therefore, in the light of this addition made by P.W. 1 in his own handwriting, in between the lines it cannot be said that the accused had admitted that samples were “placed into three clean empty dry bottles”. It was the duty of the prosecution to establish by leading positive evidence of P.W. 1 or P.W. 2 that the bottles were clean and dry before the sample was poured into them. This is only to safeguard the case of the accused, because it is possible that these bottles might have been containing some foreign element which is prohibited by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. I am not prepared to accede to the contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that Exhibit P-5 should be considered as enough evidence warranting conviction of the accused, because, in the first instance, rule 14 does not provide for such evidence. It specifically provides that samples of food for purposes of analysis shall be taken in clean and dry bottles or jars or any other suitable containers which shall be closed sufficiently tight to prevent leakage, evaporation, or in the case of dry substance, entrance of moisture and shall be carefully sealed. To my mind, rule 14 is mandatory and not directory. There are certain decisions on this aspect of the case where even on the basis that a single air bubble was left in the sample, the Courts have acquitted the accused and from which it could be gathered that the Courts were very strict in observing the compliance of rule 14. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy. There are certain decisions on this aspect of the case where even on the basis that a single air bubble was left in the sample, the Courts have acquitted the accused and from which it could be gathered that the Courts were very strict in observing the compliance of rule 14. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy. has brought to my notice a judgment of the Haryana High Court in Sadhu Singh (alias) Sada Singh v. State1, where a single Judge of that High Court, relying upon a decision of another single Judge of that very High Court observed: “A duty is cast upon the prosecution not only to comply with this mandatory provision of law by using clean and dry bottles for storing the sample but also leading evidence at the trial that the bottles used were clean and dry.” 6. I am in respectful agreement with the observation of the learned Judge of the Haryana High Court. Mr. Baba, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submits that that was a case in which the accused had let in evidence to show that the bottles were not clean and dry and, in the instant case, no such evidence is let in by the accused. On the other hand, Exhibit P-5 which is the statement of the accused and signed by him, would show that the bottles were dry and clean, and with this statement and signature on Exhibit P-5, the prosecution is absolved of its duty to prove that the provisions of rule 14 were complied with. I regret I cannot accede to this contention. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt, all the ingredients or provisions that are to be proved as per law and especially the provisions which are mandatory in nature have got to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot take shelter in the weakness of the case of the accused. 7. I, therefore, allow this revision and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the accused. Fine, if paid, will be refunded to the petitioner.