Order.-The Petitioner herein prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the second respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 3157, Revenue dated 4th June, 1973 rejecting his review petition and directing the land in survey No. 1|1 (Part) measuring 25-50 acres in Athaloor village be treated as forest margin. 2. Athaloor village formed part of Kannivadi Zamin which was taken over under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 on 2nd July, 1957. After the taking over of the zamin, ryotwari settlement was introduced therein in fasli 1371. The petitioner herein had obtained an assignment from the exlandholder after 1st July, 1945 on paytment of a nazar amount of Rs. 500 of ran extent of 120-68 acres.. When the settlement operations were going on, the petitioner applied for ryotwari patta for the following lands assigned to him by the landholder. S. No. 1/1 35-50 acres. S. No. 1/2 36-08 acres. S. No. 1/3 4-92 acres. S. No, 1/4 3-50 acres. S. No. 1/6 6-64 acres. S. No. 1/7 34-20 acres. S. No. 1/8 2-05 acres. S. No. 1/9 2-08 acres. 3. Since the assignment in favour of the petitioner was after 1st July, 1945 the Assistant Settlement Officer, Madurai enquired into the petitioner’s claim for patta and recommended to the Settlement Officer for ratification of the assignment made by the landholder for S. Nos. 1/35 measuring 35.60 acres and S. No. 1/36 (Part) measuring 66.23 acres, and for rejection of the claim for survey No. 1/1 (part) measuring 25.50 acres on the ground that it lies within the three chain belt area of the reserved forest on the western side. The Settlement Officer in turn submitted proposals to the Board of Revenue, the first respondent herein as the extent involved exceeded his power of ratification. The first respondent examined the proposals sent by the Settlement Officer and ultimately passed an order on 19th February, 1969 ratifying the assignment of the land of survey No. 1/35 measuring 35.60 acres and survey No. 1/36 (part) measuring 66.23 acres under the proviso to section 11 of the Act, but at the same time rejecting the petitioner’s request for patta for survey No. 1/1 (part) measuring 25.50 acres, on the ground that it is forest margin. Aggrieved by the order of the Board of Revenue the petitioner filed a revision petition to the second respondent. Aggrieved by the order of the Board of Revenue the petitioner filed a revision petition to the second respondent. After examining the facts and evidence on record the second respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 1960 Revenue dated 23rd June, 1970 rejected the same stating that there are no grounds to comply with the request of the petitioner for the issue of patta in respect of survey No. 1/1. The petitioner subsequently filed a review petition before the second respondent. That review petition was rejected by the second respondent on 4th June, 1973 holding that (1) no review petition lay to Government in the matter; and (2) even on the merits there is no case for reconsideration of the orders already issued, on 23rd June, 1970. The said order of the second respondent dated 4th June, 1973 has been challenged in this writ petition. 4. According to the petitioner, though the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act, XXVI of 1948 or the Rules framed thereunder did not specifically provide for a review to the Government in respect of orders passed under section 11, the second respondent should be taken to have an inherent power to review its own order and therefore, the impugned order so far as it proceeds on the basis that no review petition lay to the Government in this case cannot be sustained. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner refers to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Natarajan Chettiar v. State of Madras1 . It is not in dispute that neither the provisions of the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder expressly provide for a review in respect of matters arising out of applications for issue of patta under section 11. Therefore, unless the petitioner establishes that the second respondent has got an inherent power to review its own earlier decision in matters arising under section 11, the petitioner cannot sustain a review petition before the second respondent. Therefore, unless the petitioner establishes that the second respondent has got an inherent power to review its own earlier decision in matters arising under section 11, the petitioner cannot sustain a review petition before the second respondent. In the decision cited a Division Bench had taken the view that Tribunals ‘functioning under Tamil Nadu Act XXVI of 1948 and exercising quasi judicial functions and giving findings in the presence of the parties must be held to possess an inherent power to review its decision where due cause, is shown and that such a presumption of inherent power to review in the case of quasi judicial Tribunals is necessary to enable them to rectify an error apparent on the face of the record or for similar adequate reasons. The question involved in that case was as to whether a particular village did or did not fall within the ambit of the relevant provisions at Madras Act XXVI of 1948 or Madras Act XXX of 1947. The Tribunal had earlier held in the absence of the ryots that the village did not fall within the ambit of the definition of “estate” either under Act XXVI of 1948 or under Act XXX of 1947. Subsequently the Tribunal was approached for a rehearing of the appeal after making the ryots as parties. Dealing with the powers of the Tribunal to reconsider the matter once again the Court observed: “In the present case, we are concerned with a quasi judicial Tribunal giving a finding in the presence of the parties, whether a particular village did or did not fall within the ambit of the relevant provision. As we have already stressed, there can be no doubt that an inherent power to review should be presumed in all such cases, as it cannot be just and expedient that such Tribunals rendering judicial decisions should be unable to rectify an error apparent on the face of the record, or to exercise powers of review for similar adequate causes”. As we have already stressed, there can be no doubt that an inherent power to review should be presumed in all such cases, as it cannot be just and expedient that such Tribunals rendering judicial decisions should be unable to rectify an error apparent on the face of the record, or to exercise powers of review for similar adequate causes”. The Bench considered an earlier decision of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in Balakrishnayya v. State of Andhra Pradesh2 , wherein the Inam Settlement Officer was held to have no jurisdiction to reopen an enquiry made under section 9 of Act XXVI of 1948 at the instance of persons not made parties to the proceedings and who felt aggrieved, as he became functus officio as soon as he passed an order, and distinguished the same on the ground that it was a case of Settlement Officer making some kind of an administrative enquiry under the Act and not quasi judicial enquiry. The above decision of the Bench holding that a quasi judicial authority acting under a statute should be taken to have inherent powers for reviewing its own orders cannot be taken to be good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakenshi v. Shri Pradyumansinghji1 . In that case the power of the Government to review its own orders passed under section 63 (2) of the Sourashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, was considered and the Court observed: “It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order”. 5. Following the said decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that in this case the Government had no power to review and that the petition filed by the petitioner for review was not therefore maintainable. The impugned order so far as it says that the review petition will not lie to the Government has to be upheld. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner merely filed an application before the Government and the same cannot be taken to be a review application. The impugned order so far as it says that the review petition will not lie to the Government has to be upheld. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner merely filed an application before the Government and the same cannot be taken to be a review application. But having regard to the facts, the application filed by the petitioner can only be by way of review or for reconsideration of the Government’s earlier orders. Admittedly the petitioner has already moved the Government in revision against the order of the Board of Revenue refusing to sanction ryotwari patta in relation to the extent in question and the Government rejected that revision petition. It is only thereafter the petitioner has filed the petition either for review or for reconsideration of the earlier orders. Therefore even if the petitioner has not specifically stated that the petition is one for review having regard to the facts, the petition can only be taken as one for review. 7. Since the petitioner’s review petition has been held not maintainable it is not necessary to go into the merits of the petitioner’s contentions even though the impugned order deals with the merits of the petitioner’s contention. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that though the Government has no power to review its orders, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can grant the relief to him by setting aside the earlier order passed by the Government as it is always open to this Court to mould the relief with reference to the circumstances to the case. I do not see how this Court can interfere with the earlier order of the Government in a writ petition which is directed against the order passed in the review petition by the Government. The original order passed by the Government is not the subject-matter of attack before this Court and therefore it is not possible for this Court to set aside that order. The fact that the Court is entitled to mould the relief with reference to the facts of the case before it will not enable the Court to set aside an order which has not been specifically challenged before it. The fact that the Court is entitled to mould the relief with reference to the facts of the case before it will not enable the Court to set aside an order which has not been specifically challenged before it. The learned counsel makes a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Pooran Mall &38; Sons2 , as enabling the Court to quash the original order of the Government. The said decision has absolutely no relevance and it is of no help to the petitioner. There a particular order had been challenged on the ground that it violated the principles of natural justice in that the assessee had no adequate opportunity to put forward his case before the order was passed. It was also contended that the authority who passed the order had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Accepting the contentions the Court held that the assessee is entitled to not only the relief of setting aside of the. impugned order but also a direction to the authority having jurisdiction to pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity to the assessee. I do not see how that decision will help the petitioner in his submission that this Court can set aside an order which has not been impugned before it. The writ petition therefore fails and is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.