Short Note : 1. According to the plaintiff, when he had entered into an agreement, there was already an earlier agreement in favour of Shrikrishna defendant No.1 with a stipulation that Dinabai will execute sale-deed in favour of the person nominated by Shrikrishna and as Shrikrishna had entered into an agreement of sale of the lands in dispute in favour of the plaintiff on 16-2-1959 and in pursuance of this, agreement plaintiff was put in possession of some of the lands the plaintiff had paid Rs.5,040/- to Shrikrishna. But thereafter Shrikrishna did not fulfil the agreement by getting sale-deed executed in favour of the plaintiff and receiving the balance of the consideration. According to the plaintiff this Shrikrishna failed, to do so in spite of the notice and on the other hand he got sale-deeds executed in favour of defendants Nos. 3 to 10 from Respondent No. 14 Dinabai. The suit for specific performance, therefore, was filed. Defendants Nos. 3 to 10 who were purchasers from the defendant 2 Dinabai (Respondent No. 14) contended in their written statement that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Shrikrishna had come to an end and they in fact had purchased the suit lands from the original owner i.e. Dinabai. The trial Court decreed the suit. Held: It is not in dispute that on 16-2-1959 when Shrikrishna entered into an agreement with the plaintiff he had no title to these lands as he himself had only an agreement in his favour and had not any sale-deed executed in his favour. It is also not in dispute that on the date the agreement was executed by Shrikrishna he has no saleable interest and it is also not disputed that if he has no saleable interest the agreement entered into by him in favour of plaintiff could not be enforced by a decree for specific performance. The contention advanced by learned counsel by respondents Nos. 1 to 12 was that in view of section 13 (1), sub-clause (b) of the Specific Relief Act, specific Relief Act, Specific performance could be ordered. It was further contended by learned counsel that although section 13 as it stands today was not on the statute book when the contract was entered. into, he attempted to contend that section 13 being a procedural matter could be considered as applicable to the present appeal. It was further contended by learned counsel that although section 13 as it stands today was not on the statute book when the contract was entered. into, he attempted to contend that section 13 being a procedural matter could be considered as applicable to the present appeal. In the alternative it was contended that if section 13 of the new Act could not be applied in the present appeal the case of the plaintiff-respondent could also be convered by section 18 of the old Act, before its amendment. Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand contended that section 13 pertains to rights of the parties as the reading of the language of this section itself indicates and, therefore, in absence of an express intention expressed by the legislature retrospective operation could not be given to the provisions of this section. Learned counsel further contended that the old section 18 also did not confer any right on the plaintiff to seek specific performance when in fact the defendant Shrikrishna himself had no saleable interest with him on the date he entered into the agreement. The sub-section (1) of section 13 clearly indicates that what this section deals with is the rights of parties to a contract to sell. Apparently therefore, it could not be contended that section 13 is a mere procedural section and, therefore, resrospective operation could be given to it. It is also not in dispute that on the date the agreement was entered into this section 13 was not on the statute book. In view of this it is not necessary for the Court to consider the implications of section 13 (1) (b) as to whether the respondent-plaintiff can get any advantage from this sub-clause. 2. This section 18 pertains to contract to sell or let certain property in case of the seller having an imperfect title thereto and sub-clause (b) indicates that in such a case if concurrence of some person is necessary to validate the title he may concur at vendor's request if he is bound to concur under the contract. It, therefore, cannot be disputed that section 18 deals with cases of imperfect title and not cases of no title at all. In fact what is enacted in section 18 is the principle of feeding of the estoppel. It, therefore, cannot be disputed that section 18 deals with cases of imperfect title and not cases of no title at all. In fact what is enacted in section 18 is the principle of feeding of the estoppel. It was contended by learned counsel for the respondents that no title also means imperfect title, But it appears that this contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted. Kalayanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1954 SC 165 , relied on. Pundlik Daryaji v. Jai Narayan Maliram Shon, 1936 MPLC 162=AIR 1949 Nag 83 dissented. 3. It is not in dispute that in the agreement Ex. P-1, certain surver numbers were agreed to be sold in full, whereas some others were described as intended to be sold only in part. What part was to be sold, although an attempt was made to describe it, was not clearly described. It is also not in dispute that the agreement contemplated that when the total land agreed to be sold is measured and demarcated its price would be fixed at the rate agreed between the parties per bigha and in fact learned counsel for the respondents himself argued in connection with the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract that the lands were not measured exactly and what was to be sold could not be demarcated and therefore, the plaintiff could not offer the balance of the consideration which he was expected to offer after the lands were measured and the total area calculated. A reading of the agreement, the plan wherein the lands are described, and the respective contentions advanced by both the learned counsel clearly goes to show that the agreement was not certain regarding the lands which were intended to be conveyed. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that partly it was certain as the whose survey numbers were agreed to be sold although partly the contract was uncertain as the portions of certain survey numbers which were agreed to be sold were not clearly indicated. He therefore, contended that specific performance could be granted pertaining to those parts of the contract which do not suffer from uncertainty. He therefore, contended that specific performance could be granted pertaining to those parts of the contract which do not suffer from uncertainty. But this contention of learned counsel could not be accepted as apparently the lands which were agreed to be sold formed one part of the land although the description of the land was not clearly stated as it appears that the land which was agreed to be sold contained certain survey numbers in full but certain survey numbers only in part. Under these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be doubted that the contract suffered from uncertainty and in view of section 29 of the Contract Act it could not be said to be a valid contract and could not therefore, be specifically enforced. Appeal allowed.