Judgment.-The first defendant in O.S. No. 25 of 1970 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kancheepuram is the appellant. The suit was filed by one Lakshmi Devi as plaintiff impleading the first defendant, her mother and defendants 2 and 3 her brothers. The plaintiff and the defendants 2 and 3 are the issues of one Narayanasami Naidu, who died intestate on 1st November, 1966. He left behind certain properties. According to the plaintiff Narayanasami had owned ancestral properties and he built up a business as a military contractor out of his own self-acquisitions. He is said to have acquired the properties described in schedules A, B and C to the plaint out of the income from that business. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed one-fourth share in the properties. 2. The defendants filed a common written statement in which they contended that the suit properties were not the self-acquired properties of Narayanasami Naidu and that they were the properties of a joint family consisting of Naravanasami and his issues. They denied the plaintiff’s claim for one-fourth share in the suit properties. According to them Narayanasami had only l/3rd share in the properties and the plaintiff would be entitled to one-fourth share in that l/3rd share. 3. When the suit came up for trial the plaintiff and the third defendant entered into a settlement, with the other parties to the litigation signing the compromise, with the result that the plaintiff and the third defendant got one-fourth share each in the properties. This compromise was entered into on 18th January,1972. The consequence is that one half of the properties covered by the suit have already gone to the plaintiff and the third defendant. At that stage the first defendant filed an additional written statement contrary to her earlier stand, contending that the properties left by Narayanasami were the self-acquired properties and that he was entitled to one-fourth share therein. This claim was opposed by the second defendant, his contention being that the properties were only joint family properties. 4. The Court below came to the conclusion that the properties are the joint family properties of Narayanasami and others and that the first defendant is entitled to only l/12th share in all the properties and not one-fourth share as she claimed. It is this decision which is now the subject-matter of the appeal at the instance of the first defendant. 5. It is this decision which is now the subject-matter of the appeal at the instance of the first defendant. 5. On behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel contended that the Court below should have upheld the claim of the first defendant put forward in her additional written statement that the properties acquired by Narayanaswami were only his self-acquisitions and that they did not form part of any joint family property. For the respondents viz., the second defendant, the submission was that the whole properties were built up out of the joint family nucleus and that, at any rate, the first defendant has to prove her claim that these properties were the self acquired properties of Narayanasami. 6. Therefore, the main question that arises in this appeal is whether the properties left by Narayanasami and which formed part of the suit are joint family properties or his self-acquired properties. At this stage there is no dispute about a house bearing No. 129 of Sengaluneerodai Street, Big Kancheepuram, having been obtained by Narayanasami in a partition between himself and his brothers. That house was in the occupation of Narayanasami since that partition in or about 1919. That property yielded only a small income. 7. The first aspect to be examined is whether Narayanasami had started his business from any earnings he had made as an employee in the military department. The claim of the plaintiff, which is now adopted by the first defendant, was that he had brought about Rs.3,000 at the time he was discharged from the Army in or about 1918. There is absolutely no evidence of his having been employed in the military department or of his having brought the sum of Rs.3,000 as alleged. It is not, therefore, possible to accept the claim of the first defendant-appellant that he had any self-acquisitions with him earned from the military department with which he started later some business in rice mill, etc 8. It is at this stage that it is necessary to examine the question as to the extent of the burden of proof that lies on a person to prove the character of the properties in a suit for partition. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on two Bench decisions of this Court reported in Kandaswamy Chettiar and others v. Gopal Chettiar and others1and Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others2. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on two Bench decisions of this Court reported in Kandaswamy Chettiar and others v. Gopal Chettiar and others1and Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others2. It was held in the first case that if a coparcener desired to establish that a property in the name of a female member of the family or in the name of the manager himself had to be accepted and treated as property acquired from the joint family nucleus, it was absolutely essential that such a coparcener should not only barely plead the same, but also establish the existence of such a joint family fund or nucleus. In this case the earlier decision of the Supreme Court has been noted. This decision was followed in the latter case cited already. 9. These cases have been considered by another Bench of this Court in Velayutha Koundar and others v. Mangavarathammal and others3. Referring to these two decisions this was what was observed:- “ These two decisions relate to the acquisitions in the names of the female members of the family. They are more in the nature of benami transactions. The onus of proof in such cases rests on the person alleging that the property is held benami. We do not understand these decisions as laying down any view inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council already referred to.” The legal position on this point was setout as follows:- “ The legal position is thus clear that the persons claiming a property standing in the name of any member of a joint family has to establish that the joint family had certain properties which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired. If so much is established, then the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property. Further in cases where a manager of a joint family claims that any immovable property had been acquired by him with his own separate fund and not with the help of the joint family funds, it is for him to prove by satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchases money proceeded from his separate fund. Further in cases where a manager of a joint family claims that any immovable property had been acquired by him with his own separate fund and not with the help of the joint family funds, it is for him to prove by satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchases money proceeded from his separate fund. The relative facts relating to the acquisition being within his knowledge, the provisions of section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act would apply in this connection.” 10. A suit for partition does not stand out as a different category as far as onus of proof is concerned. Even in a suit for partition the plaintiff has first to prima facie establish his or her case of the property being a joint family property or self-acquired property. In the case of a joint family property, it is enough if the plaintiff proves that the joint family had certain properties which from their nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired. If so much is established, then the burden shifts to the other side alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property. But in the case of a property which is in the nature of a business, there is no presumption in Hindu Law that the business is a joint family business even when the member carrying on the same is the manager or the father, unless it could be shown that the business in the hands of the coparcener grew up with assistance of the joint family, or the joint family funds, see Lakshmi Ammal v. Meenakshi Ammal and others4: 11. In the present case there is no dispute about the fact that the other assets than the house obtained in partition grew up from the income of a rice mill business, which was started in the year 1932. Exhibit B-2 is a hire-purchase agreement dated 25th November, 1932 entered into between Narayanasami Naidu and M/s. Grossley Brothers Limited who were the then dealers in rice mill machinery in Madras. A sum of Rs. 1,000 had been paid by Narayanasami to M/s. Grossley Brothers Limited and for the balance alone there was a hire-purchase agreement. The amount to be paid under the hire-purchase agreement came to Rs. A sum of Rs. 1,000 had been paid by Narayanasami to M/s. Grossley Brothers Limited and for the balance alone there was a hire-purchase agreement. The amount to be paid under the hire-purchase agreement came to Rs. 2,075 payable in five instalments as stated in clause 2 of that agreement. There is no evidence as to where from the sum of Rs.1,000 actually came. The contention for the respondent was that a sum of Rs.4,000 had been obtained by Narayanasami at the time of the partition. There is no contemporaneous evidence of his having obtained this sum of Rs. 4,000 on partition. Even assuming that he had obtained this sum, it is difficult to draw the inference that this sum was actually available when he started the rice mill business in 1932. As regards the balance of the five instalments, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that it was paid out of the income of the rice mill. Even here there is no direct evidence of the rice mill having yielded the income so as to enable the payment under the hire-purchase agreement. However, the probabilities are in favour of the view that the rice mill was yielding enough profits to enable Narayanasami to pay the instalments. As regards nonavailability of the sum of Rs.4,000 said to have been obtained by Narayanasami on partition, there is, at any rate, one piece of evidence which appears to support the appellant’s case. The house property was mortgaged on 24th April, 1924 under Exhibit B-14 in favour of one Krishnaswami Naidu for a sum of Rs. 1,450. At that time Narayanasami had not started the rice mill business. But it appears that he was carrying on some other business and for the business needs he mortgaged the house-property. The fact that he had mortgaged the house-property itself goes to show that he did not have enough resources in his hands and if the sum of Rs.4,000 obtained on partition were available,then there would have been no need for this mortgage. It is in these circumstances that I think it proper to proceed on the basis that even assuming Rs.4,000 was obtained on partition, still it was not available for the purpose of starting the rice mill business in 1932. 12. It is in these circumstances that I think it proper to proceed on the basis that even assuming Rs.4,000 was obtained on partition, still it was not available for the purpose of starting the rice mill business in 1932. 12. The further aspect to be examined is whether there was any detriment to the joint family properties, so that the business was either started from or financed by it. At this stage, it is necessary to mention one document on which very great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant viz., Exhibit B-15 dated 25th June, 1934. That was a mortgage deed executed by Narayanasami Naidu for himself and as guardian for defendants 2 and 3, who were then minors in favour of one Kanakavalli alias Chellammal for a sum of Rs.1,000. In this document it is stated that the amount was borrowed for the purpose of putting up some construction on the rice mill property and for improving the business in rice mill and paddy business. It is also stated therein that he started a rice mill business on 20th August, 1932 out of his own self-acquisitions. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that this document clearly showed that Narayanasami wanted to keep the rice mill as his separate or self-acquired property and did not want to mix with or treat it as a joint family property. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in a number of documents Narayanaswami, had described himself as the owner of the house property viz., 129, Sengaluneerodai Street, as if it belonged to him. The description in the document Exhibit B-14 with reference to the rice mill should not, therefore, be taken as if he intended to keep the property as his own. I am unable to accept this part of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. Exhibit B-14 proceeds on the basis of the rice mill being kept separately from the other property mortgaged. As far as the mortgaged property was concerned it was a family property and as far as the rice mill is concerned he made a specific declaration that it was started out of his self-acquisitions. Exhibit B-14 proceeds on the basis of the rice mill being kept separately from the other property mortgaged. As far as the mortgaged property was concerned it was a family property and as far as the rice mill is concerned he made a specific declaration that it was started out of his self-acquisitions. At that stage, there was no dispute between any party and it is too much to expect Narayanasami trying to create evidence making any assertion as made therein, if it was not true. I consider that the statement of Narayanasami in Exhibit B-14 cannot be dismissed lightly and it has to be considered as a self-acquired property of Narayanasami, at any rate, in the year 1934. This conclusion is consistent also with the decision in Lakshmi Ammal v. Meenakshi Ammal and others1 saying that there is no presumption that the business is a joint family business. 13. The next question that was argued was that even assuming that Narayanasami had initially started the business, as his own individual business, still by reason of his having executed several mortgages over this very property and utilised the fund for the purpose of running that business, the business had been converted into a joint family business. This aspect requires consideration in the light of certain decisions. In Sivaramakrishnan v. Kaveri Ammal2, there is an elaborate discussion on the question how far a property is to be treated as a joint family property because of its having been acquired by detriment to the joint family property. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., as he then was, set out five propositions and proposition No. 5 is the one which is relevant to the present case and it runs as follows: “5. In the present case though the money raised on the security of ancestral property was used for running a business which produced the profits out of which the acquisitions were made there was ‘no detriment to the paternal estate, ‘since long before the plaintiff was born the mortgages had been discharged so that the ancestral property was available to him when he was born. There was therefore no detriment to the interests of any coparcener, nor can the subsequent acquisitions be treated as coparcenary property by recourse to the theory of accession or accretion for no evidence of such intention can be gathered from the purchases or from their dealing.” Thus creation of a mortgage without more is no detriment to the joint family properties. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to distinguish this decision by contending that it was a case in which the mortgages had been effected at a time when the mortgagor was the sole surviving coparcener. I do not consider that that makes any difference to the principle laid down in that decision. The property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener is free from certain limitations as regards alienations, but retains the characteristic of the joint family property. Therefore, if there is a detriment to that property even at the time when the mortgagor was the sole surviving coparcener, the business or other acquisitions made in consequence of such detriment would have to be treated as joint family property. 15. What is detriment to the joint family may also be examined in the light of two later decisions of this Court. In Manicka Mudaliar v. Thangavelu and others3, Jagadisan, J., observed after referring to the text of Yajnavalkya as follows:- “This text of Hindu Law does not throw any light on the ‘degree of detriment’ necessary to attribute, to the acquisition the character of joint family property. The Court cannot undertake the impossible task of fixing the minimum standard of detriment’. It is of course clear that some detriment is necessary; this can only mean that it should not be vague or merely sentimental but should be something real. What would be the position if the ‘detriment’ were trifling and unsubstantial, we do not propose to consider as the question does not arise in this case. It seems to us that the question whether or not an acquisition was made to the detriment of the family estate is very largely one of fact.” This decision was followed in Gunna J., Krishnan and others v. G. K. Rengachari and others4. 16. It seems to us that the question whether or not an acquisition was made to the detriment of the family estate is very largely one of fact.” This decision was followed in Gunna J., Krishnan and others v. G. K. Rengachari and others4. 16. There is no case to which my attention has been drawn which has held that the mere effecting of a mortgage of a joint family property and taking a loan on its security impresses any other property acquired as a joint family property. If that were the proposition, then there would have been no need to discuss elaborately the question as has been done in Sivaramakrishnan v. Kaveri Ammal1. It supports the proposition that a mere mortgage without more cannot be construed as effecting any detriment to the joint family property. If the property is sold as a result of the mortgage not being discharged, then the position would perhaps be different. But so long as it continues intact, the mere fact that a member of a joint family mortgages property belonging to the family, so as to finance a business or acquisition it cannot, in my opinion, be treated as a detriment to the joint family property. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Kalu Babu Lal Chand2 . That was a case where a family of which one Rohatgi was the Karta promoted a company and took over a concern and financing was done with the help of the joint family funds. Rohatgi did not contribute anything out of his personal fund for the acquisition of the concern or the promotion of the company. The question that came up for consideration of the Supreme Court was whether the Managing Director’s remuneration received by Rohatgi was the income of the joint family or his individual or separate income. It was held that all the assets of the family were used for acquiring the concern and for financing it and that there was detriment to the joint family property so that the remuneration received by Rohatgi as the Managing Director was assessable in the hands of the joint family. It was held that all the assets of the family were used for acquiring the concern and for financing it and that there was detriment to the joint family property so that the remuneration received by Rohatgi as the Managing Director was assessable in the hands of the joint family. The principle laid down is that if a coparcener utilises joint family funds for contributing his share of capital in the firm or company, he must be regarded as having joined the firm or company on behalf of or representing the family. It is to be noticed that there was clear finding in that case that the business was financed out of the joint family funds. except mere effecting a mortgage over the property from time to time there has been no proof of any financing from the joint family funds. I do not think the decision of the Supreme Court is of any assistance in this case. 18. As pointed out by Jagadisan, J. in Manicka Mudaliar v. Thangavelu and others3 , the question whether the acquisition is made to the detriment of the joint family estate is one of fact. Taking into consideration the fact that the property has remained intact in the family and that the mortgages had been discharged from time to time, I do not consider it possible to hold that there has been a detriment to the joint family estate in the present case. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant was putting forward an inconsistent case in her own written statement to which she subscribed originally and that her later case as if the property was self-acquired could be not permitted to be urged at this stage. He contended that she was estopped from putting forward this inconsistent stand. It is true that in the written statement originally filed she was a party to the statement that the property was a joint family property. It is true also that she now takes the stand that the property was the self-acquired property of Narayanasami. I was not referred to any authority which has laid down that a plaintiff or defendant has to stand by the original pleadings. It would be open to a party to make a change in the stand originally taken. It is true also that she now takes the stand that the property was the self-acquired property of Narayanasami. I was not referred to any authority which has laid down that a plaintiff or defendant has to stand by the original pleadings. It would be open to a party to make a change in the stand originally taken. The question has necessarily to be considered in the light of the evidence rather than in the light of the plea that has been taken either originally or subsequently. The’ plea of estoppel would have better claims to’ succeed if any person had altered his or her stand on the basis of any such plea originally taken. There is no evidence of any person altering his or her stand on the basis of the original plea of the first defendant in the written statement. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on her own evidence as D.W.I in which she has stated that her husband has treated the properties as joint family properties. Her evidence- at best is inconsistent. Though she stated at one stage in the course of the cross-examination that her husband had treated the properties as joint family properties, still later on she claimed that she was entitled to one-fourth share therein and she produced Exhibits B-3 to B-13 to show that it was Narayanasami who had started the business on his own. I do not think it possible to take her statement as an admission. 21. Reliance was placed on the attestation of the first defendant in Exhibit B-1, which is a partition deed executed between defendants 2 and 3 on 31st May 1968. In her evidence she has accepted having attested the document and also having known about the second and third defendants effecting a partition of the suit properties as between themselves. The point to be considered is whether the attestation by the first defendant can be taken as an admission of hers that the property belonged only to defendants 2 and 3. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that Exhibit B-l has been given a go-by by all the parties at the time when they entered into the compromise arrangement, as a result of which the plaintiff and the third defendant got one half of the properties divided between them equally. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that Exhibit B-l has been given a go-by by all the parties at the time when they entered into the compromise arrangement, as a result of which the plaintiff and the third defendant got one half of the properties divided between them equally. If it did not bind the others, it could not be held to be binding on a mere attestor. If really Exhibit B-l is to hold the field, then the third defendant would be entitled to one half of the properties and the plaintiff would not have any right in any property. The document itself has not been considered to embody a proper arrangement. Further there was no issue on the question as to whether her attestation of Exhibit B-l could be taken as an admission. Though there are cases which lay down that it is the commonest thing in this country for attestation to be obtained from persons having a possible interest in the property with the object of binding them later on, still in the present case in the absence of any issue as such on this question, I do not think it possible to accept the respondent’s submission that the first defendant must "be taken as bound by her attestation. In fact if there was such an issue, then there would have been some scope for leading evidence on this point. Though she has declared that she knew what thedocument was, I do not think that she gave up her right in the property merely by making the attestation in a document. A release or abandonment would have to be a conscious act and cannot be readily inferred especially in the case of an uneducated lady who had no means of independent advise. Her own later conduct shows that she did not give up any rights by attesting Exhibit B-l. 22. In these circumstances, I am unable to agree with the submission of the respondent. The appellant will be entitled to one-fourth share in the suit properties. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.