Ratnavel Pandian, J.-The petitioner, one Tmt. Kalpagam, has filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of habeas carpus directing the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras-3, to produce before this Court her husband Thiru Hariharasubramamam alias Hariharan alias Subramaniam (convict No. 4005) (hereinafter referred to as Hariharan) and ordering him to be set at liberty on the ground that he is now illegally detained in the Central Prison beyond the period of imprisonment awarded to him. 2. In support of her prayer, she has filed an affidavit with the following contentions: The petitioner’s husband Hariharan was arrested on 23rd February, 1975 by the police on the allegation that he had cheated various persons at different places promising them to get jobs. In view of the territorial jurisdictions, the different cases filed against him were tried separately by different Courts and he was convicted on plea of guilt and sentenced to various and varied terms of imprisonment. According to her, her husband was awarded imprisonment for 2 years in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Madurai, by his judgment dated 12th May, 1975 and a similar term of 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment was awarded in C.C. No. 1019 of 1975 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate No. 1, Salem, by his judgment dated 25th February, 1976. He was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry in C.C. No. 131 of 1976 on his file by his judgment dated 12th March, 1976. Again, he was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for three years in C.C. No. 191 of 1976 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Villupuram, by his judgment dated 9th July, 1976. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years by the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, which term was reduced to one year by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore in C.A. No. 31 of 1977 on his file by judgment dated 21st February, 1977. She would state that all the above sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 by the Judicial I Class Magistrate, Madurai, and therefore, in view of section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, her husband should have been released by now and the custody of her husband now in prison is illegal. 3. 3. She submits that she sent a lawyer’s letter to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Madras, who had given a reply stating that as per the Jail Current Rules her husband was not entitled to the double benefit of both the set off on the ground of detention during the trial and the imprisonment after conviction should run simultaneously and that he should be allowed set off only from the date of arrest up to the date of the first sentence imposed on him and not thereafter. This reply, according to the petitioner, is against the principles, letter and spirit of section 428 of the Code and is in violation of the Code and principles of natural justice. She submits that under the new Code, the set off period between the date of arrest and the conviction will have to be taken into consideration to compute the period of sentence in each case, which the respondent has failed to note. Coming to the case on hand, it is submitted that the sentence is deemed to have commenced from the date of arrest of her husband viz., 23rd February, 1975 in respect of each case and since all the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in C.C.No. 93 of 1975, it is sufficient if her husband undergoes the maximum imprisonment of 3 years from 23rd February, 1975. Further, it is stated that after deduction of the period of parole of 101 days, her husband had earned a remission of 163 days, which period has to be remitted, with the result that her husband should have been released on or before 10th September, 1977. 4. The respondent, viz., the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras, has filed a counter resisting the claim made by the petitioner. 4. The respondent, viz., the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras, has filed a counter resisting the claim made by the petitioner. He states that from 12th May, 1975, the petitioner’s husband is undergoing imprisonment consequent on his conviction in C.C. No. 93 of 1975, and that the prisoner was produced under production warrant before various Courts in the respective cases referred to by the petitioner in her affidavit, and consequently he cannot claim the benefit of set off under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, after 12th May, 1975 in all the subsequent cases since during the said period he was undergoing imprisonment as a convict consequent on the conviction in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 and that period of imprisonment cannot in any way be treated as a period of detention as contemplated under section 428. He further submits that he has calculated the period of remission to which the petitioner’s husband would be entitled and has arrived at the probable date of his release in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Prison and Reformatory Manual, Volume II, as 24th August, 1978, and has intimated the same to his lawyer. 5. The petitioner filed an additional affidavit contending that her husband was arrested on 23rd February, 1975 at Renigunta by the Railway Police in connection with Crime No. 4C0 of 1975 of Villupuram town police station and kept at Tirupati Sub-Jail and then produced before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Villupuram before whom the case in C.C. No. 191 of 1976 was pending, on 2nd March, 1975 and remanded. The charge-sheet (No. 5 of 1976 of the said police station) in connection with this case was filed on 30th April, 1976 and the trial of the case ended in conviction on 9th July, 1976 and therefore the whole period of his custody on remand in jail from 23rd February, 1975, viz., the date of his arrest or at least from 2nd March, 1975, the date of his production before the Magistrate at Villupuram, till 9th July, 1976 when he was actually convicted and sentenced in the said case should be treated as the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner in respect of that case and set off should be given in respect of this period as contemplated under the provisions of section 428 of the Code. 6. 6. The respondent has filed a counter to this additional affidavit, reiterating the stand taken by him in the counter-affidavit filed earlier. 7. Before launching a discussion on the position of law in this case, we shall now set out the incontrovertible facts regarding the various cases filed against Hariharan and the convictions and substantive sentence imposed on him by the various Courts, so as to appreciate the contentions of the parties. The relevant details are given in the following table: Name of Court and the case number. Date of Judgment. Term of imprisonment awarded in the judgment. Name of appellate Court appeal No. and date of Judgment. Result in appeal. 1 2 3 4 5 Judicial I Class Magistrate, Madurai, C.C. No. 93 of 1975. 12-5-1975 Rigorous imprisonment for two years (on each of the 8 charges) all the sentences directed to run concurrently. Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai-C.A. No. 415 of 75-1st Jan. 1976. Conviction and sentence confirmed. Judicial I Class Magistrate No. 1, Salem-C.C. No. 10919 of 1975. 25-2-1976 Rigorous imprisonment for 2 years (on each of the three charges) all the sentences imposed in this case directed to run concurrently and also with the sentences imposed in C.A. No. 415 of 1975 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai (C.C. No. 93 of 1975). - - Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry-C.C. No. 131 of 1976. 12-3-1976 Rigorous imprisonment for one year (other details not known). Sub-Divisional Judl. Magistrate Villupuram-C.C. No. 191 of 1976. 9-7-1976 Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (under each of the five charges) - all sentences directed to run concurrently. C.A. No. 472 of 1976, Court of Sessions, South Arcot at Vellore-4th Dec, 1976. Convictions and sentences confirmed. (Note.-The diary extract in respect of C.C. No. 191 of 1976 shows that the sentences imposed in that case were further directed to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in C.C. No. 93 of 1975.) II Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. Date not known. Imprisonment for 2 years-other details not known. II Addl. Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Date of judgment: 21st February, 1977. Sentence reduced from 2 years to one year. Date not known. Imprisonment for 2 years-other details not known. II Addl. Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Date of judgment: 21st February, 1977. Sentence reduced from 2 years to one year. (The above particulars are given on the basis of the records summoned and received by this Court in respect of the cases mentioned in items 1, 2 and 4 in the above table, which were tried within the State of Tamil Nadu, and which are only relevant for the purpose of this judgment). Mr.G. Krishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would point out that Hariharan was arrested on 23rd February, 1975 at Renigunta by the Railway police and kept in the Sub-Jail at Tirupati and thereafter he was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Villupuram on 2nd March, 1975, on which date he was remanded in connection with Crime No. 400 of 1975 (corresponding to C.C. No. 191 of 1976) and the said case ended in his conviction on 9th July, 1975, and contend that the period from 23rd February, 1975 or at least from 2nd March, 1975 till 9th July, 1976, on which date he was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above, should be treated as a period of detention undergone by Hariharan during the investigation and trial of the same case and as such that period of detention should be set off against the substantive sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment imposed on him in the said case and the liability of the accused to undergo imprisonment consequent on such conviction and sentence would get restricted to the remainder period, though the accused was convicted and sentenced in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 on 12th May, 1975, which date admittedly fell during the abovesaid period of detention claimed. The yearned Public Prosecutor would strenuously resist the above contention of the petitioner’s Counsel and urge that as Hariharan was undergoing imprisonment from 12th May, 1975 consequent on the conviction and sentence passed in C.C. No. 93 of 1975, the period of detention as an under trial prisoner in C.C. No. 191 of 1976 came to an end on that day (12th May, 1975) and during the subsequent period he was undergoing imprisonment only as a convict in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 and therefore that period cannot be construed as period of detention relating to C.C. No. 191 of 1976. Hence, the accused would be entitled to a set off only from 2nd March, 1975 i.e., the date of remand in connection with C.C. No. 191 of 1976, till 12th May, 1975, the date when he was convicted and sentenced in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 and from which date he became a convicted prisoner, thereby putting an end to the period of remand in respect of C.C. No. 191 of 1976. 8. Mr. Krishnan would rely on a judgment rendered by the Rajasthan High Court (single Judge) in Chella v. State of Rajasthan1, wherein the Court has given the benefit of set of to the accused, treating the period of his detention during the investigation and trial in a particular case though curing the said period of detention he was convicted and sentenced in connection with some other case, in other words, though part of the said period of detention was covered by the sentence imposed on the accused in some other case. The learned Judge further observed in the said decision that the effect of the clear words used in section 428 could not be altered or cut down as to deprive the prisoner of the benefit of set off arising from their literal construction, and that the High Court has no power to read into section 428 words which it does not contain. It can be seen that the facts in the above decision are more or less similar to those in the present case. Though we cannot and do not disagree with the learned Judge in his opinion about the object and scope of section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, viz., that no person should be deprived of the benefit of set off as contemplated in that section, yet with great respect we are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge, viz., in giving set off to the accused in a particular case in respect of a period during which the said accused was undergoing imprisonment in another case. 9. Learned Counsel then brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A.V. Rao2. 9. Learned Counsel then brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A.V. Rao2. The relevant facts in the said decision were briefly as follows: One R (appellant-accused) was already under detention under the Preventive Detention Act when the first information report was lodged on 18th December, 1969 in connection with sessions cases for certain offences and some of the co-accused in those cases were arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 19th December, 1969; but R was produced before the Magistrate some time in April, 1970 after he was released from preventive detention. In another case before the Court against one K. (appellant-accused), a warrant was issued by the Sessions Judge on 1st December, 1975 on dismissal of his appeal by the High Court on 28th November, 1975, and it was served on him only on 30th December, 1975, on which date the order under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act was revoked. On the above facts, the Supreme Court held that there was no provision either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Preventive Detention Act or in the Maintenance of Internal Security Act which required that the service of warrant should be delayed until the period of preventive detention was over. As the accused were already in custody, the authorities could have easily produced R before the Magistrate when the first information report was lodged and produced K immediately on the dismissal of his appeal on 28th November, 1975. The Supreme Court also held that section 418, Criminal Procedure Code (dealing with the execution of the sentence of imprisonment) did not exclude a case where the warrant concerned an accused who was already under detention and that the position would not be anomalous if the person was in detention both under the preventive detention or as a convicted accused in a criminal case, because there could be no bar to preventive and punitive detentions continuing simultaneously. That being so, it was held, the period from 19th December, 1969 to 18th April, 1970 should be treated as part of the period during which R was under detention and K should be treated to have been serving the sentence imposed on him from 1st December, 1975. Mr. That being so, it was held, the period from 19th December, 1969 to 18th April, 1970 should be treated as part of the period during which R was under detention and K should be treated to have been serving the sentence imposed on him from 1st December, 1975. Mr. Krishnan would contend that in the above Supreme Court decision the periods during which R was not on remand in respect of the criminal case against him and K was not served with warrant, on the ground that both of them were under preventive detention, were directed to be treated as part of the period of detention or sentence, as the case may be, and that being the position, the claim made by the petitioner on behalf of her husband in the present case stands on a better footing and therefore the whole period from the time when Hariharan was remanded till he was convicted and sentenced should be treated as part of the period of detention for the purpose of set off under section 428 of the Code. The learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the interpretation of the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the above Supreme Court decision is not correct, but on the other hand, according to him, the above decision would support his contention. He would argue that the Supreme Court has given set off to R only for the period during which he should ordinarily have been under detention as an under-trial prisoner had he been produced in time before the Court for remand in respect of the case against him. He would argue that the Supreme Court has given set off to R only for the period during which he should ordinarily have been under detention as an under-trial prisoner had he been produced in time before the Court for remand in respect of the case against him. As regards K according to the learned Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Court had held that the warrant against K., could have been served immediately on the dismissal of the appeal on 28th November, 1975 and the delayed action of the authorities concerned in serving the warrant on him on 30th December, 1975 on the ground that the preventive detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act was not over till 30th December, 1975, had deprived the accused of serving the sentence against him even from 1st December, 1975, on which date the warrant was issued by the Court, and therefore had the warrant been served on him in time, he would have been undergoing the imprisonment even from 1st December, 1975 along with the period of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, for which, the Supreme Court held, there was no bar. After going through the judgment very minutely, we see much force in the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor, and agree with his contention. It may be noted here that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have observed in the said judgment as follows: "It is true that the section (section 428) speaks of the ‘period of detention’ undergone by an accused person, but it expressly says that the detention mentioned refers to the detention during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case in which the accused person has been convicted. The section makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction, must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the ‘same case’, in which he has been convicted. The section makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction, must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the ‘same case’, in which he has been convicted. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the period during which the writ petitioners were in preventive detention cannot be set off under section 428 against the term of imprisonment imposed on them." After laying down the above principles, their Lordships, having regard to the facts of the case, observed that the nonfeasance of the authorities in not taking action against the accused concerned at the earliest point of time, had deprived the accused of getting the benefit of remission which they would have been entitled to get, had the authorities in time produced R for remand or served the warrant on K and therefore the Court felt that the said periods should be treated as detention or sentence, as the case may be, and accordingly gave the benefit of set off under section 422. According to us, the principles laid down in the above Supreme Court decision are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. Section 428 of the Code is a new provision which provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Prisons Act (IX of 1894) does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers power on the State Government to make rules inter alia for rewards for good conduct. Section 401 of the old Code (corresponding to section 432 of the new Code) gave a discretionary power of the appropriate Government either to suspend the execution of a sentence passed by a Court or to remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced with or without any condition. This discretionary power was conferred on the Government to suspend or to remit only the sentences imposed by the Court. This discretionary power was conferred on the Government to suspend or to remit only the sentences imposed by the Court. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, in Saraswathi v. State of Kerala1has observed thus: "The Court is concerned only with the passing of the sentence; to carry it into effect is the function of the executive Government. It is up to them to decide whether they should invoke their powers in this case." The Supreme Court has pointed out in Gopal Vinayaka Godse v. State of Maharashtra and others2, that the question of remissions is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government. See also Alfred, J., Peries v. State3. But, there was no provision or rule either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Prisons Act, which conferred an indefeasible right on a prisoner to claim the benefit of set off of the period of detention which he underwent during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case against him. In many cases, the under-trial prisoners who were refused bail by the Court and those who were not able to come out on bail on account of various reasons were being kept in prison for a Long period irrespective of the fact whether the case ultimately ended in their acquittal or conviction carrying sentences which in some cases were for periods lesser than the periods of their detention as under-trial prisoners. This sorry state of affairs was sought to be rectified by the Parliament in their wisdom and therefore section 428 was introduced in the new Code providing for setting of the period of detention of the under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment that would be imposed by the Court after trial. The object and reasons for the enactment of section 428, as pointed out by the Joint Committee of the Parliament while recommending its introduction, are as follows: ‘The Committee has noted the distressing fact that in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as under-trial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as under-trial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases were such a person is acquitted. Indeed, there may even be cases were such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes Courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as under-trial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases, the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out off all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the over-crowded jails of today are under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The committee trusts that the provision contained in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil“. Section 428 of the Code reads thus: “Where an accused person has, on conviction been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.” This now benevolent provision has been introduced, as the Joint Committee has suggested, for the purpose of mitigating the evil that was prevailing till the enactment. But, it must be noted that this section emphatically states that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be one undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the ‘‘same case” in which he! has been convicted. 11. But, it must be noted that this section emphatically states that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be one undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the ‘‘same case” in which he! has been convicted. 11. Thus, the contentions of both parties would boil down to this question, viz., whether the detention of the petitioner in prison after 12th May, 1975, on which date he was convicted and sentenced in C.C. No. 93 of 1975, was as an under-trial prisoner in C.C. No. 191 of 1976 or as a convict in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 or in both capacities. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 3 of the Prisons Act define the words “criminal prisoner” and “convicted criminal prisoner” as follows: “In this Act- (2) ‘criminal prisoner’ means any prisoner duly committed to custody under the writ, warrant or order of any Court or authority exercising criminal jurisdiction, or by order of a Court-martial; (3) ‘convicted criminal prisoner’ means any criminal prisoner under sentence of a Court or Court-martial, and includes a person detained in prison under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, or under the Prisoners’ Act, 1871”. 12. Section 418 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding to section 383 of the old Code, which deals with the execution of sentences of imprisonment, provides that the Court passing the sentence shall forthwith forward the warrant to the jail or other place in which he is or is to be confined and unless the accused is already confined in such jail or other place, shall forward him to such jail or other place, with a warrant. It is thus clear that as soon as the sentence is pronounced, the accused is to be taken into custody on the strength of a warrant. Such a convicted person becomes a criminal prisoner within the definition of the term in sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Prisons Act. It is needless to say that where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence against any enactment and is sentenced to imprisonment, the sentence imposed by the Court takes effect from the moment at which it is imposed. It is needless to say that where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence against any enactment and is sentenced to imprisonment, the sentence imposed by the Court takes effect from the moment at which it is imposed. It is to say that the accused commences undergoing the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the judgment as soon as the accused is detained in Court custody by reason thereof: vide Bhanja Naik v. Somanath1. In the “Words and Phrases”, Permanent Edition, Volume 20, the words “conviction” and “imprisonment” are defined as follows: “In its ordinary sense, the term ‘conviction’ is used to designate that particular stage of a criminal prosecution, when a plea of guilty is entered in open Court, or a verdict of guilt is returned by a jury. But, in a strict legal sense it denotes the final judgment of the Court and imports the final consummation of the prosecution from the complaint to the judgment of the Court by sentence. ‘Imprisonment’ in its general sense is the restraint of one’s liberty. As a punishment it is a restraint by judgment of a Court or lawful Tribunal and is personal to the accused.” Therefore, when once a criminal prosecution consummates finally into a conviction, then the sentence of imprisonment imposed consequent upon this conviction takes effect from the very moment when the conviction is pronounced by the Court. The period of detention suffered by the said accused as an under-trial prisoner before such conviction ceases from the said moment of conviction in respect of the case in which he is convicted. The Supreme Court, in A.V. Rao’s case,2has pointed out that section 428 only provides for a “set off” and that it does not equate an “under-trial detention” or “remand detention” with imprisonment on conviction. 13. The Supreme Court, in A.V. Rao’s case,2has pointed out that section 428 only provides for a “set off” and that it does not equate an “under-trial detention” or “remand detention” with imprisonment on conviction. 13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that from 12th May, 1975 onwards only the sentence imposed in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 could take effect putting an end to the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner in that case, but that it would not put an end to the period of detention of the accused as an under-trial prisoner in respect of C.C. No. 191 of 1976 till he was convicted in that case on 9th July, 1976, in other words, even after 12th May, 1975 till 9th July, 1976, the accused must be considered to have been undergoing the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner while simultaneously undergoing the imprisonment as a convicted person in C.C. No. S3 of 1975. This interpretation leads to this anomaly, viz., as to whether a person can be said to have been detained in the prison as a consequence of his conviction in one case and as an untried or under-trial prisoner in another case simultaneously. An under-trial prisoner enjoys certain privileges and facilities as provided in sections 31, 33 and 40 of the Prisons Act, and under paragraphs 734, 735 and 735-A of the Madras Prison and Reformatory Manual, Volume II, to which the convicted accused is not entitled. Under section 27(3) of the Prisons Act, all the unconvicted criminal prisoners are kept apart from convicted criminal prisoners. Section 28 of this Act states that the convicted criminal prisoners may be confined either in association or individually in cells or partly in one way or partly in the other. In Chapter XVI of the Madras Prison and Reformatory Manual, dealing with the classification and separation of prisoners, it is stated that “convicts” shall be kept apart from inconvicted prisoners. After the conviction, as per the rules, the convicted prisoners are classified and graded according as they are habitual offenders or others, and they have to undergo imprisonment according to the nature of the imprisonment imposed by the Court. Thus, it is seen that the treatment meted out to the under-trial prisoners in completely different from the treatment given to the convicted prisoners. The terms “under-trial prisoner” and “convict” are not synonymous. Thus, it is seen that the treatment meted out to the under-trial prisoners in completely different from the treatment given to the convicted prisoners. The terms “under-trial prisoner” and “convict” are not synonymous. Similarly, the term “imprisonment” cannot be equated with the term “detention”. Hence, there can be little justification, and as a matter of fact it would be anomalous and fallacious, to hold that a person can be an under-trial prisoner in one case and at the same time a convicted prisoner in another case. Where a person is facing trial in one criminal case and is also remanded therein while he is actually undergoing the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him in yet another case, the said remand and its periodical extensions pending the trial are only theoretical and as such, he can be called as an under-trial prisoner in respect of the case pending trial against him only theoretically. In other words, the abovesaid theoretical period of remand cannot be treated as the period of detention undergone by the said person pending a case since his confinement in the prison is wholly referable to the conviction passed against him in the other case. Such convicted prisoners are brought to the Court to take their trial only on production warrants and not by a remand warrant. In the case pending; trial, the accused is entitled to move the Court for bail irrespective of the result, but when once criminal proceedings against a person consummate finally in his conviction and imprisonment, there is no question of bail being granted to him, and the only course open to him is to move the Government for the remission of the sentence, with which we are not now concerned. 14. If the argument of the learned Counsel is accepted, then it will lead to an anomalous position that when an accused is undergoing imprisonment as a convicted prisoner in one case and during that period another criminal proceedings is instituted against him and the said subsequent case ends in his conviction after some time, then the period from the institution of the latter case till the conviction is recorded against him would be claimed as a period of detention undergone by him during the trial and that period would be claimed to be set off against his imprisonment that would be imposed in respect of the said case. It may not be out of place to mention here that as per section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a person is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, his sentence on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Thus, it can be seen that when there is no direction by a Court that the sentences shall run concurrently, it is imperative that the accused should suffer the punishments consecutively and he cannot claim that he must be deemed to be suffering the imprisonment in both the cases simultaneously. When such is the position even with regards to the actual periods of imprisonment, can the accused plead that he must be construed as an under-trial prisoner in one case and as a convict in the other simultaneously and claim the benefit of set off? Now let us visualise the effect of the conviction and sentence, according to the petitioner’s theory, in case Hariharan has been sentenced to imprisonment only for a period of say, six months or one year, in C.C. No. 191 of 1976. Hariharan was remanded on 2nd March, 1975 and convicted on 9th July, 1976 in that case. Therefore, under the above hypothesis, Hariharan would not be liable to suffer any imprisonment after he was sentenced by the Court on his conviction though at the same time he was a convicted prisoner in C.C. No. 93 of 1975 undergoing imprisonment from 12th May, 1975. In other words, the effect would be that the accused would not at all be liable to undergo imprisonment for the remainder period after deducting the actual period of his detention from 2nd March, 1975 till 12th May, 1975, and the sentence passed by the Court, to the extent of the said remainder period, would get nullified. To sum up, the contention of the learned Counsel that a person can be said to be undergoing his detention in a dual capacity, viz., as an under-trial prisoner in one case and simultaneously as convicted prisoner in another case, would only lead to an absurd result viz., the entire proceedings in the subsequently disposed case inclusive of the conviction therein becoming a mockery and the sentence therein nugatory. In our opinion, the Parliament would not have intended such a position while enacting section 428 in the new Code. The above view of ours is fortified by section 428 which is unambiguous that the period of detention, to be set off against a sentence of imprisonment, should relate to the same case in which he is convicted and sentenced. When once the period of detention does not relate to the same case, the accused is not entitled to the benefit of set off. For the above reasons, we reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and hold that the pre-conviction detention in respect of C.F. No. 191 of 1976 ceased on 12th May, 1975 and as such Hariharan would be entitled to claim the set off under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, only for the period from 2nd March, 1975 till 12th May, 1975 against the sentence of imprisonment imposed in the present case C.C. No. 191 of 1976, besides the remissions earned and likely to be earned by him in the remaining period under the relevant rules. 15. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to observe that as a matter of healthy practice, it is desirable that the Courts convicting the accused specify in their judgment the total period of pre-conviction detention undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial in the same case for the purpose of enabling the authorities concerned to give effect to the provisions of section 428 without any delay: vide Narayanan Nambeesan v. The State of Maharashtra1. Further, this practice would also help the appellate or revisional Courts in the matter of considering the question of sentence. 16. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.