Ramaprasada Rao, J.-The defendants in O.S.No.47 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai and the appellants in A.S.No. 16 of 1969 on the file of the District Judge, Ramanathapuram at Madurai are the appellant in this second appeal. The appellants are partly successful in the Courts below. In this long-drawn litigation which is more than 25 years old, the parties have not yet seen the light of their respective rights but are still litigating over it. In the main the suit is one for accounts and the parties belong to the Nagarathar Community. The relevant facts have "been summarised in extenso by the trial Court and to some extent by the learned District Judge. We shall, however, refer to the firms in their contracted forms so as to avoid elongations and to a certain extent confusion. K.T.Rm. was a family firm and A.T.P.L. was its maraldar through whom the funds of K.T.Rm. were invested with Adathidars from time to time. There was a partnership firm S.R.M.P.C.T. which was the original Adathidar. This partnership was dissolved in 1920 and there came into existence two firms by reason of such dissolution called S.R.M. Firm and P.C.T. Firm. When instructions were sought for by the above two firms which broke up from the erstwhile joint firm, from the maraldar regarding the investment of monies of K.T.Rm., the maraldar authorised them to continue to invest the monies in the usual manner. This firm P.C.T. again got itself divided into two firms, P.C.T.P. and P.C.T.L. and it is common case that the account of K.T.Rm. continued with P.C.T.L. But in the instant case, K.T.Rm. has filed the present action for accounting as against P.C.T.P. and P.C.T.L. 2. In 1945, there was a suit in O.S.No. 88 of 1945, on the file of the Sub-Court, Devakottai, for partition in the K.T.Rm. firm in which the maraldar, A.T.P.L. was impleaded as the third defendant. P.C.T.P. and P.C.T.L. as the 7th and 8th defendants. In that suit no relief was asked as against the 7th and 8th defendants therein. An advocate - receiver was appointed in that suit. The money lending business of K.T.Rm. and incidentally the investments made by the maraldar with defendants 7 and 8 there informed a part of the subject-matter. The Advocate-Receiver gave notice on 25th May, 1950 which is marked as Ex. An advocate - receiver was appointed in that suit. The money lending business of K.T.Rm. and incidentally the investments made by the maraldar with defendants 7 and 8 there informed a part of the subject-matter. The Advocate-Receiver gave notice on 25th May, 1950 which is marked as Ex. B.3, in the present action to defendants 1 and 2 in this suit seeking for rendition of accounts and for return of the money entrusted to them. Under Ex.B.4 dated 18th June, 1950 P.C.T.P. repudiated the liability and took up the stand that P.C.T.L. only was responsible. This was not accepted by the Receiver or the K.T.Rm. firm as is seen from Ex.B.5. Thereafter the present suit O.S.No. 47 of 1951 was filed by the Receiver and the K.T.Rm. firm against P.C.T. as a whole with the result that all the members of the P.C.T.P. as well as P.C.T.L. firm were brought into the litigation. On a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the suit, the parties had to come up to the High Court in Second Appeal No. 357 of 1959. The High Court held that the suit was not barred under Order 2, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code and remanded the same for further trial. A preliminary decree for accounts was passed on 27th August, 1962. The defendants in the present suit unsuccessfully took up the matter in appeal upto the High Court stage. The preliminary decree for accounts later was the subject-matter of the present proceedings in which a final decree was passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Devakottai on 14th October, 1968. On appeal in A.S.No.16 of 1969 to the District Court, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, the final decree as passed by the learned Subordinate Judge was modified to some extent and it is as against the judgment resulting in the final decree in this marathon suit for accounts rendered by the District Judge, Ramanathapuram on 15th March, 1973’ that the present second appeal has been filed. The concurrent finding of fact that P.C.T. firm as a whole is liable to account is not in dispute before us as there cannot be any agitation over it. The two questions raised before us by Mr. The concurrent finding of fact that P.C.T. firm as a whole is liable to account is not in dispute before us as there cannot be any agitation over it. The two questions raised before us by Mr. T.R. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the appellants are (1) what is the amount for which the appellants render an account and (2) what is the rate or interest payable on the amount so ascertained. 3. On the first question, the principal argument runs as follows. The maraldar who is admittedly the representative of the firm K.T.Rm. was being informed from time to time that the investments made by P.C.T. firm or their branches at Penang, were in accordance with the directions of the maraldar or the firm K.T.Rm. and in any event such investments in the manner done by the P.C.T. firm having been ratified, any loss which has occasioned by reason of such investments cannot be borne by the defendants. The course of conduct between the parties before the dispute as regards the method of investment adopted by P.C.T. firm was that Penang firm should advance monies to third party traders at Penang and receive interest on such advances from time to time and when the principal is returned, they should reinvest them similarly by making further advances to the trading firms direct. Between 8th December, 1941 and 5th September, 1945 there was Japanese war. At or about the beginning of the said war, there were in the hands of the P.C.T. firm or P.C.T.L. as the case may be, large amounts belonging to K.T.Rm. which they should have reinvested. Due to the emergent situation at Penang, the case of the appellants is that they invested such amounts with banks and which due to the law prevailing in Penang then could not be realised by them and the loss, it any, which was occasioned, was not due to any misconduct on their part and that therefore they are not accountable to such portion of the monies which they have lost due to the investments made by them in the Bank. Under Ex.B.-178, it appears that P.C.T.L. invested about 50,000 dollars in a fixed deposit with the Indian Overseas Bank and another 55,045.43 dollars in the current account of the Indian Overseas Bank. It is common ground that these two amounts can be taken fairly to be disputed amounts. Under Ex.B.-178, it appears that P.C.T.L. invested about 50,000 dollars in a fixed deposit with the Indian Overseas Bank and another 55,045.43 dollars in the current account of the Indian Overseas Bank. It is common ground that these two amounts can be taken fairly to be disputed amounts. The argument, however, is that the investments were made in consultation with the maraldar and with his knowledge and implied consent and therefore K.T.Rm. cannot give the go-by to such an impression created in the minds of P.C.T.L. and set at naught the ratification given by necessary implication by their representative namely the maraldar. Their further case is that they have not either used or misused the monies of K.T.Rm. and having regard to the exigencies of the situation and the war conditions prevailing at that time, the appellants cannot be made liable for such amounts invested in banks during the period of emergency. 4. It is not in dispute before us that the amounts paid by Indians in Penang Banks during the war period could not be repatriated owing to the Ordinances that were promulgated at or about the time in Penang. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the investments were made with the express knowledge and consent of the maraldar and whether the appellants were bona fide in their acts in the matter of such investments. It is fairly clear from the earlier conduct as also the other evidence let in in this case that the business of Adathidhar consisted of advancing the funds of K.T.Rm. of Kottaiyur to various customers in Penang for thavanai rates of interest and thus improving the corpus from time to time. Exs.B.-343, 344, 345, B.-399, B-400 and B-401 are relied upon to show that the appellants were acting reasonably and that the investments they made with the Indian Overseas Bank either in fixed deposit or in the current account during the war period cannot be said to be an investment without authority or without taking proper precautions and care. One would have been tempted to consider this argument in full but for the objections rightly taken by Mr. Chellaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, who refers to the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Courts below in the matter of the impropriety of the appellants in having invested the monies of K.T.Rm. without authority in banks. One would have been tempted to consider this argument in full but for the objections rightly taken by Mr. Chellaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, who refers to the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Courts below in the matter of the impropriety of the appellants in having invested the monies of K.T.Rm. without authority in banks. Strong reliance is placed upon the observation of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra1 which prescribes the scope of interference by the High Court in a second appeal. The Supreme Court said in that case that a second appeal cannot be entertained on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however, gross the error might seem to be. The prima facie impression gained by reading the above exhibits cited by Mr. Ramachandran is that the maraldar or K.T.Rm. were not seriously objecting to the methodology adopted by the Penang P.C.T.L. firm in the matter of investment of their monies. But the Courts below did not consider this aspect in the light of the pleadings and in the light of the evidence let in before it. P.C.T.P. firm would disclaim responsibility and would say that P.C.T.L. are liable to account. P.C.T.L. firm in their written statement would say that the monies were invested according to the specific directions. They would take up the specific stand that due to world war No. 2, they could not correspond with the plaintiffs. A bare allegation was made that the surplus realised amounts would sometimes be in the current account of the Adathidar firm or invested in banks. The specific issue which was framed and which was agitated upon was whether the defendants were liable as trustees in respect of monies of K.T.Rm. family. The finding was that they were liable as trustees. There is also a finding by the trial Court that there is no positive and acceptable evidence which could be accepted to hold that the above two amounts invested with the Indian Overseas Bank only related to K. T. Rm. monies. Specifically it was found that the K.T.Rm. firm was not bound to accept the above deposits as binding on them. To this finding the learned District Judge expressed approval and thus concurred with the trial Court. In fact the appellate Court said that till 1943, there was no bank account for the monies of K.T.Rm. monies. Specifically it was found that the K.T.Rm. firm was not bound to accept the above deposits as binding on them. To this finding the learned District Judge expressed approval and thus concurred with the trial Court. In fact the appellate Court said that till 1943, there was no bank account for the monies of K.T.Rm. Such deposits with banks started only from 10th September 1943. The contention of the defendants is that they had to so deposit in banks because of the emergent Ordinances by the then Government there. While agreeing with the trial Court regarding the impropriety in the manner of the investments of the monies of the K.T.Rm. firm the appellate Court said that there is no necessity to open any bank account for K.T.Rm. monies and there is no reason shown why it was all of a sudden thought necessary to open a bank account and that there was no evidence to show that those two items of deposits with Indian Overseas Bank related to K.T.Rm. monies. 5. The next ancillary fact which was also considered by both the trial Court and the appellate Court and on which they have a concurrent finding of fact is whether the defendants are guilty of misconduct in the matter of their treatment of the monies of K.T.Rm. The trial Court found that “I find that the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendants were guilty of misconduct and breach of faith in dealing with all the monies of K.T.Rm. family during the period in question is acceptable as true”. The appellate Court while dealing with this issue observed “whatever it is, taking all the circumstances at a whole, it cannot be said that the act of P.C.T.L. was in good faith. There had not been sincere effort to salvage by applying for revaluation of the Japanese currency or collecting the amounts due on the business carried on by P.C.T.L.”. No sufficient steps were taken even after the notices passed between the parties, as ‘already seen from Ex.B-3, B-4 and B-5. In these circumstances the only possible conclusion is that the defendants were guilty of misconduct and breach of faith in dealing with all the monies of K.T.Rm. 6. Mr. No sufficient steps were taken even after the notices passed between the parties, as ‘already seen from Ex.B-3, B-4 and B-5. In these circumstances the only possible conclusion is that the defendants were guilty of misconduct and breach of faith in dealing with all the monies of K.T.Rm. 6. Mr. T.R. Ramachandran once again relying upon the above exhibits and invoking the doctrine of ratification by necessary implication, would argue that the concurrent finding of facts, as rendered by the Court below is perverse. It is no doubt true that the illegality or impropriety of an act by itself may not prevent the principal from ratifying the acts of his agents. Such ratification can be post mortem as well. It is for the principal either to own or disown the acts of his agent which were done without his knowledge or authority. But as no valid ratification could be made by a person whose knowledge of the facts of the case is materially defective, it cannot fairly be presumed in the instant case that by exchanging correspondence under the above exhibits cited before us, it can be said that all the facts about investments in banks either in fixed deposit or in current account were made available to the K.T. Rm. or maraldar and that therefore the conduct of the principal, namely K.T.Rm. by necessary implication should be taken to be as if they ratified all the acts whether legal or illegal, proper or improper of their agents or trustees namely the defendants. Further we have referred to the concurrent finding of fact. What is urged before us by Mr. Ramachandran is that the documentary evidance has not been considered in its true light and another reasonable inference is possible on a third look at them. It is by now recognised that even insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence referred to by the trial Court and the appellate Court in coming to a concurrent finding of fact concerning an issue in the case is a matter which is entirely within their scope, jurisdiction and decision and cannot even be agitated in second appeal. 7. It is by now recognised that even insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence referred to by the trial Court and the appellate Court in coming to a concurrent finding of fact concerning an issue in the case is a matter which is entirely within their scope, jurisdiction and decision and cannot even be agitated in second appeal. 7. Another accepted principle is that a re-appreciation of the evidence for a third time in second appeal would result in the introduction of a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public (Deity Pattabhiramaswami v. S. Hanyamayya1.) At one time, it was suggested that the above documents have not been even looked into by the Courts below. The challenge is not charitable. The Courts did consider the documents and decide on them. They decided concurrently on questions of fact and we are therefore unable to interfere with them. 8. On the question of rate of interest Mr. T.R. Ramachandran rightly contended that the rate of interest as fixed by the Court below is not only on the high side, but demonstrably against the contract rate as agreed to between the parties. The Courts below have directed the appellants to pay the sum of Rs. 1,87,825.29 together with interest at 6 % per annum from 27th August. 1962 which is the date of the preliminary decree till date of realisation. The argument is that when disputes arose between the parties in 1950, the contract rate of interest demanded was 3 annas per cent per month, which is said to be roughly 2¼% per year. Therefore it is argued that the interest rate cannot be more than that rate. The second contention is that interest has to be awarded only on the principal and not on the principal plus interest on the amount accumulating every year. Thirdly it is said that interest has to be awarded only from the date of the final decree when the amount is ascertained and not earlier. In this case, the final decree was passed by the trial Court on 14th October, 1968 and by the appellate Court on 15th March, 1973. 9. We shall first take up the question whether section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure has any application to the facts of this case. In this case, the final decree was passed by the trial Court on 14th October, 1968 and by the appellate Court on 15th March, 1973. 9. We shall first take up the question whether section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure has any application to the facts of this case. If once the request of the appellants as regards the rate of interest based on the contract is acceded, then under the contract, the principal at the beginning of each year would be the principal plus interest which accrued during the previous year. The contract between the parties has to be worked out as a whole and it cannot be interpreted in a truncated fashion. We are therefore of the view that the interest calculated on the amounts arrived at annually would be the principal for the next year. But the question is what is the rate per cent. It is said that the interest has been calculated not at the contract rate, but at a rate different from the contract rate. This cannot be done. We therefore direct that interest shall be calculated on the above basis, the principal at the exchange rate of Rs. 156 per 100 dollars, the amount shall be ascertained as on the date of the suit. Such amount shall carry interest at the contract rate of 2¼%from the date of the institution of the suit on tavanai basis till the date of the final decree. We are of the view that until the amount is ascertained by the passing of the final decree, it would not be equitable to award interest at a rate other than the contract rate. It therefore follows that interest on the amounts worked on the basis of the contract shall be arrived at till 15th March, 1973 which is the date of the final decree of the appellate Court. A memo of calculation shall be filed by the parties indicating the amounts due as per the directions as above. 10. Then the only other surviving question is as to what rate of interest, the amount so ascertained has to carry after the date of the final decree. The status of the appellants has been determined as trustees and the concurrent finding of the Courts below is that they have not satisfactorily accounted for the monies entrusted to them for investment. Then the only other surviving question is as to what rate of interest, the amount so ascertained has to carry after the date of the final decree. The status of the appellants has been determined as trustees and the concurrent finding of the Courts below is that they have not satisfactorily accounted for the monies entrusted to them for investment. While dealing with the liability of a trustee to pay interest the Supreme Court in Hukumchand v. Fulchand 2observed thus: "When a trustee in breach of his duty retains the trust money in his own hands uninvested or mixes it with his own money or property he is liable to pay interest on it. There is no fixed rate of interest which a trustee is liable to pay but in general he is charged simple interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum." Following the observation of the Supreme Court in the above case, we direct the defendants/appellants to pay interest on the amount finally ascertained on the basis indicated above together with interest at 4% per annum on the said sum from 15th March, 1973 which is the date of the modified final decree of the appellate Court till date of realisation. We are also constrained to observe that in the instant case we are unable to review the facts though a convincing appeal has been made by T.R. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the appellants that equity is in favour of the defendants and that at best the defendants as trustees could be charged with irregularities in having invested the monies in a bank which they could not thereafter withdraw or repatriate. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, the concession regarding the rate of interest has been granted by us, as in our view even on second appeal while rendering justice, it should be tempered with equity and mercy. The second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and there will be no order as to costs. The draft of the decree as per this judgment shall be made after the memo. of calculation is filed by the parties.