Judgment :- 1. Our learned brother Namboodiripad J. referred this case to a Division Bench, when it came up before him for admission. Evidently this was because it was urged before the learned judge that notwithstanding the amendment to S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976, S.100 as it stood prior to the amendment must apply in the matter of admission of second appeals arising from suits filed before the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act, 1976. The learned judge felt the question important enough to be heard by a Division Bench. Counsel Sri. Balakrishna Menon urged before us that had the case been one which had come up for admission prior to 1-2-1977 the date on which the Amendment Act came into force, this Court would have admitted the appeal and it is only because of the change in the law that the question whether a substantial question of law arises for decision is posed. Therefore, we will first consider whether the plea that to the appeal before us S.100 as it stood prior to 1-2-1977 should apply is well-founded. 2. Prior to amendment effected to the Code by the Amendment Act of 1976 S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was in force in Kerala read thus: "100. Second Appeal-(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to a High Court, on any of the following grounds, namely:- (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being is force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. (d) the finding of the lower Appellate Court on any question of fact material to the right decision of the case on the merits being in conflict with the finding of the Court of instance on such question. (d) the finding of the lower Appellate Court on any question of fact material to the right decision of the case on the merits being in conflict with the finding of the Court of instance on such question. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte." Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of S.100 was inserted by S.4 of Kerala Act 13 of 1957. The Amendment Act in sub-section (1) of S 97 repeals all amendments made and all provisions inserted in the principal Act by any State Legislature or a High Court of a State before the commencement of the Amendment Act, except in so far as such amendment or provision was consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act. Thus automatically sub-s (d) of S.100 (1) stands repealed. Notwithstanding this, according to counsel S.6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 saves the right of appeal to this Court under circumstances contemplated in S.100 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood prior to 1-2-1977 In other words, by operation of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, in adjudging the right of appeal arising from a suit instituted prior to 1-2-1977 sub-section (d) of S.100 (1) also must be taken note of. It the case fell within that sub-section the second appeal should be entertained. 3. S.6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 runs thus: "6. It the case fell within that sub-section the second appeal should be entertained. 3. S.6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 runs thus: "6. Whether this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not - (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 4. That the right of appeal is a vested right is a question well-settled. Such right of appeal may be found in the provisions of law relating to procedure but nevertheless it would be a vested right. If a law relating to procedure which confers a right of appeal is repeated unless the contrary intention appears the repeal shall not take away the vested rights, such as, the right of appeal available to the party under the law repealed That this is the position has been held by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions, vide Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry (AIR. 1957 SC. 540), State of Bombay v. M/s. S. G. Films Exchange (AIR. 1960 SC 980) and Jose Da Costa v. Bascora (AIR. 1975 SC. 1843). If the new statute does not take away the right of appeal, but impairs it by imposing onerous conditions on the right of exercise of that appeal, then again that would not be operative retrospectively unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates this. 1960 SC 980) and Jose Da Costa v. Bascora (AIR. 1975 SC. 1843). If the new statute does not take away the right of appeal, but impairs it by imposing onerous conditions on the right of exercise of that appeal, then again that would not be operative retrospectively unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates this. The question for examination in every case of repeal of an existing statute or existing provisions of the statute in this context would be whether any vested right is sought to be affected by the repealing statute and it is whether there is intention in the repealing statute to keep alive the rights under the earlier statute. 5. S.97 (3) of the Amendment Act of 1976 may be relevant in this context. That sub-section reads: "97. (3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2). the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to every suit proceeding, appeal or application, pending at the commencement of this Act or instituted or filed after such commencement notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before such commencement." This sub-section categorically provides that the principal Act as amended in 1976 applies to every suit, proceeding, appeal or application pending at the commencement of the Act as well as those instituted or filed after the commencement. That is so notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action pursuant to which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted or filed has been acquired or accrued before the commencement of the Act. The contrary intention not to keep alive the substantive or vested right under the Code of Civil Procedure as in force prior to 1-2-1977 is in unambiguous terms expressed in this sub-section. But there is a saving provision. The sub-section starts with the words 'save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)...". Therefore except in so tar as provision is made in sub-section (2) of S.97, no vested right under the Code of Civil Procedure prior to its amendment survives the amendment. Necessarily therefore an examination on the scopes of sub-section (2) of S.97 is called for. Sub-section (2) runs thus: "97. Therefore except in so tar as provision is made in sub-section (2) of S.97, no vested right under the Code of Civil Procedure prior to its amendment survives the amendment. Necessarily therefore an examination on the scopes of sub-section (2) of S.97 is called for. Sub-section (2) runs thus: "97. (2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act have come into force or the repeal under sub-section (1) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S 6 of the General Clauses Act. 1897, (a) (m) the provisions of S.100 of the principal Act, as substituted by S.37 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal from an appellate decree or order which had been admitted, before the commencement of the said S.37, after hearing under R.11 of Order XLI, and every such admitted appeal shall be dealt with as if the said S 37 had not come into force;" We are concerned only with clause (m) for the purpose of this case and that is why that clause alone is extracted here By reason of sub-section (3) the position would be that even second appeals admitted by this Court and pending disposal would have to be disposed of in the light of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. In other words, even an appeal already admitted by this Court would have to be disposed of in accordance with the amended law. Such a result is avoided by providing for exemption in the case of second appeals filed in this Court and admitted before the commencement of S.97, namely, 1-2-1977. In all those cases S.100(1) (d) would apply. The appeal would have to be disposed of as if there was no amendment by the Amendment Act. The question before us is whether appeals not yet filed on the date of the Amendment Act but filed later would also receive the same treatment. There is also the question whether appeals filed before 1-2-1977 but not admitted would also come within the exception evidently on the terms of clause (m). Reliance is placed upon the words "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. There is also the question whether appeals filed before 1-2-1977 but not admitted would also come within the exception evidently on the terms of clause (m). Reliance is placed upon the words "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This provision in the General Clauses Act, no doubt, keeps alive the rights accrued to a party and normally the right to file an appeal from the proceedings arises to a person on the date of institution of the proceedings. But S.6 of the General Clauses Act itself mentions 'unless contrary intention appears'. The contrary intention is indicated in sub-section (3) as well as in clause (m) of sub section (2). The limit to which the right survives is provided for in clause (m) and to read the words "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897" as one enabling a construction that all rights under the Act as unamended would still survive in respect of suits instituted prior to the commencement of the Act would be to nullify sub-section (3) and also to render the specific provision in clause (m) otiose and irrelevant. In other words, such a construction would annihilate sub-section (3). Sub section (2) would appear then not as exception but as general rule and that would go contra to sub-section (3). Therefore the words "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897" do not lend to the construction that all rights under the Code before amendment survive, notwithstanding the amendment. 6. The result is that while second appeals already admitted would have to be disposed of in accordance with the law prior to the amendment which came into force on 1-2-1977, appeals which have not been so admitted though filed earlier and appeals filed after 1-2-1977 would be governed by the provisions of S.100 as amended. If that be the case, the appellant cannot contenders that there is a case for admission There is no substantial question of law arising for decision. Hence the appeal is dismissed. Dismissed.