( 1 ) THIS petition under Sec. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act as it stqod unamended is directed against the judgment dt. 18-6-1974 passed by the I Addl Dist Judge, Belgaum in HRC App. 10 of 1973 confirming the order dt. 21-11-1972 passed by the II Addl Munsiff, Belgaum, in HRC. 135 of 1970, rejecting the application filed by the petitioners under S. 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE undisputed facts are that the schedule premises belongs to the petitioners. On 23-11-1960 the petitioners leased the schedule premises to respondent-1, Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangh, represented by its partners respondents 2 to 17, by a lease deed Ext. P2. The lease was for one year. After the expiry of that period of one year, the lease continued on monthly basis. By March-April 1967 the Sangh was dissolved and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 made over their assets and liabilities to respondent-11 and respondent-11 continued to run the same business in the very premises. In 1968 the petitioners filed a case in HRC. 25 of 1968 praying for vacant possession of the premises on the ground available to them under S. 21 (1) (b) of the Act. The petition was dismissed and that decision was confirmed by the Dist Judge in appeal. The Dist Judge observed in the course of his judgment that in fact the ground relied upon by the petitioners was under S. 21 (1) (o) and they had failed to establish tha same. The petitioners filed a revision petition in CRP. 1299/70 and the same was dismissed on 21-7-1971, As in the course of the judgment th dist Judge had dealt with the ground available under S. 21 (l) (f) of the act also and by the time CRP. 1299/70 was to be disposed of, the present hrc proceeding had been instituted by the petitioners, this Court, while disposing of the revision petition, allowed liberty to the petitioners to develop the ground available to them in the present HRC. 135/70. ( 3 ) IN the Court's below the petitioners relied on grounds u/s. 21 (1) (b), (f), (o) and (h) of the Act. 135/70. ( 3 ) IN the Court's below the petitioners relied on grounds u/s. 21 (1) (b), (f), (o) and (h) of the Act. In this petition the petitioners have restricted their case only to 'the grounds available to them u/s. 21 (1) (f) and (o), they have given up their contention in regard to the grounds under Section 21 (1) (b) and (h) of the Act. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioners is that it was by 1868 the petitioners came to know that the Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha had dissolved and' discontinued and that respondent-11 was a sub-lessee of Belgaum Bidi bepari Sangha. It is nextly the case of the petitioners tha,t as premises had been leased to Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha for its use, the use of the premises by respondent-11 would be hit by S. 21 (1) (o) of the Act. Lastly, the case of 'the petitioners is that the petitioners want to run hard-ware and lathe business in the schedule premises and hence they reasonably and bonafide require the premises for their personal occupation. Respondent-11 has contended that he and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 associated themselves and formed an association called Belgaum bidi Bepari Sangha and as partners of that Sangha they took the premises on lease as per Ext. P2 and started business in bidies, matches, soaps, etc, and that by 1967 March-April, respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 dis-associated themselves from the partnership and as such the partnership business was discontinued and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 sold their assets and liabilities to him and he continued to run the very business in the very premises and therefore he is not a sub-lessee under Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha. In view of the fact that the very business that was being run by Belgaum Bidi Bepari sangha is being run by him, the provisions of S. 21 (1) (o) of the Act have not been violated. He has denied the claim of the petitioners that they require the premises reasonably and bonafide for their personal occupation. ( 5 ) THE learned Addl Munsiff has held that the petitioners have not established 'their case on any of the grounds. The same is the view expressed by the learned Additional District Judge also. He has denied the claim of the petitioners that they require the premises reasonably and bonafide for their personal occupation. ( 5 ) THE learned Addl Munsiff has held that the petitioners have not established 'their case on any of the grounds. The same is the view expressed by the learned Additional District Judge also. Sri K. I. Bhatta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, urged in regard to the case of the petitioners under S. 21 (1) (o) of the Act that as per the lease deed the purpose of the lease was for the use of Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha and when it is seen that the premises is being used for respondent-11 by respondent-11, the purpose for which the premises was leased has been changed without reasonable cause and such user has been for more than continuous period of six months and as such the petitioners have satisfactorily established the ingredients of s. 21 (1) (o) of the Act. The purpose of the lease is described in Ext. P2 as follows : exhibit P-2 has been executed by respondents 2 to 17 collectively. They have stated as aforesaid in Ext. P2. It therefore means that respondents 2 to 17 stated that they were going to use the schedule premises for Bidi sangha, Belgaum. To what use it was put for Bidi Sangha, Belgaum is an undisputed fact, i. e. , business in bidies, matches, soaps etc, was to run in the schedule premises. So the purpose for which the schedule premises was taken on lease was run business in bidies, matches, soaps etc, by Belgaum Bid! Bepari Sangha. The same is the business run by respondent-11 as is admitted by petitioner-1 in his evidence. Hence the premises has not been used for any purpose other than the one for which it ^ had been leased. Therefore it will have to be held that the two Courts below are right in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners have failed to establish their case under Section 21 (1) (o) of the Act. Coming to the case of the petitioners under S. 21 (l) (f) of the Act, it is seen from the judgment of the Addl Dist Judge and the order passed by the Addl Munsiff that reliance has been placed by them on the decision in K. Devaraju Naidu v. Ethirajavathi Thayaramma,. AIR. 1950 Mad. Coming to the case of the petitioners under S. 21 (l) (f) of the Act, it is seen from the judgment of the Addl Dist Judge and the order passed by the Addl Munsiff that reliance has been placed by them on the decision in K. Devaraju Naidu v. Ethirajavathi Thayaramma,. AIR. 1950 Mad. 25. ( 6 ) IT has been held that the firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm. The "same is the view expressed by the Delhi Court in saraswati Devi v. Gian Chand,. 1970 RCR 874 (Delhi), finally in Murlidhar v. Chuni Lal, 1969 RCR 563 SC, the Supreme Court has expressed the same view as follows :". . . A firm unless expressly provided for the purpose of any statute which is not the case here, is not a legal entity. The firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm. Therefore, occupation by a firm is only occupation by its partners here the firms have a common partner. Hence the occupation has been by one of the original tenants. " ( 7 ) THE facts in the case before the Supreme Court were that the premises in dispute, namely, a shop was originally let out to a firm of the name of chuni Lal, Gherulal. It consisted of three partners, namely, Chunilal, gherulal and Meghraj. The business of the partnership was closed some time before November 1955 and 'thereafter the shop was used by a new firm of the name of Meghraj Bansidhar of which the partners were Meghraj of the firm of Chunilal, Gherulal and Bansidhar. A case of sub-letting was made out and vacant possession of the premises sought. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as extracted above. ( 8 ) IN the case on hand, it is undisputed that the partners in the partnership firm were respondents 2 to 17. As held by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case, occupation of the premises by the firm, namely, belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha, is occupation by its partners, namely, respondents 2 to 17. Respondent-11 is still in occupation though respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 have walked away and the firm as it had been constituted has closed its business in favour of respondentt-11. Respondent-11 is still in occupation though respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 have walked away and the firm as it had been constituted has closed its business in favour of respondentt-11. Therefore, it will have to be held that there has been no sub-letting in favour of respondent-11 and as such the petitioner fail on the ground under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act. ( 9 ) IN regard to the case of the petitioners that they require the schedule premises reasonably and bonafide for their personal occupation, the concurrent finding of the two Courts below is against the petitioners. When succintly put the reasoning of the two Courts" below in this behalf is that the say of the petitioners in their quit notice and the application is that they wanted to start hard-ware and lathe business in the schedule premises while the say of PW. 1 in his evidence is that they wanted to shift rtheir lathe machine from a building in Talaka. wadi (taken on rent by them) to the schedule premises, and therefore there is variance in their case and that if this requirement was genuine and bonafide, the petitioners would have before installing la/the machines in the rented building in talakawadi asked for vacant possession of the suit premises from Bel- gaum Bidi Bepari Sangha and if in case the requirement was genuine and bonande, they would have put forward this ground also in HRC. 25 of 1968 and lastly that lathe machines cannot be installed in any place other than a place in industrial estate and the place where the schedule premises is situate is not an industrial estate. ( 10 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta urged that petitioner-1 who has entered the witnessbox was not asked as to why (the petitioners did not ask for installation of lathe machines when they took the building on rent in Talakawadi and as to why the petitioners did not put forward this ground also in HRC. 25 of 1968, and, therefore, the Courts below ought not to have proceeded to lay down the reasons or to put the fact that there has been a lapse on the part of the petitioners against them. The evidence of PW. 25 of 1968, and, therefore, the Courts below ought not to have proceeded to lay down the reasons or to put the fact that there has been a lapse on the part of the petitioners against them. The evidence of PW. 1 shows that he has been asked the reason as to why the petitioners did not rely on the ground available to them under Sec. 21 (1) (h) of the Act also in hrc. 25 of 1968. The answer given by PW. 1 is that he could not explain the reason. In this view of the matter I am unable to see any sufficient grounds made out by the petitioners to make this Court to interfere in the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below on this aspect of the matter. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .