Short Note : 1. The plaintiff-respondent has obtained a decree for the defendant-appellant's eviction on the ground that he needed the accommodation bona-fide for occupation as residence for himself and his family. 2. The following facts cannot be seriously controverted: That the plaintiff and his family had been in occupation of the first floor of the house till he shifted to Indore sometime in 1968. The plaintiff constructed his own house at Indore at an expense of Rs. 75,000/-. He opened a shop of medicines there. He is himself a Yunani Hakim. 3. While the house at Indore was completed by 1970 the plaintiff realised that there was less scope for his practice at Indore. He, therefore, wanted to come flack to Bhopal and re-establish himself there. 4. The ground floor of the house in Bhopal was in occupation of four tenants. The plaintiff sued to evict them. Four separate suits were filed. In three he succeeded from the High Court. The fourth suit is the one with which this appeal is concerned. Held : It is in evidence that the first floor of the house was vacant and available for occupation by the plaintiff when he filed the suit for eviction of the appellant, but the plaintiff did not occupy it. He instead gave that portion of the first floor on rent to tenants He intended to occupy the ground floor after the same was vacated by the four tenant against whom he had filed suits for their eviction. 5. Now it transpires that after the plaintiff obtained decrees for eviction of the three tenants, instead of occupying those rooms or keeping them vacant for occupation, he had rented them out to different persons on enhanced rent. The defendant-appellant moved an application before this Court for taking notice of subsequent events. The tenants Mohandas, Naraindas, Dharmdas and Idandas had vacated the rooms in execution of the decree against them and the plaintiff has settled the vacated accommodation with Dharamdas, Atumal, Ramesh Kumar, Lekhamal and Manoharlal. The appellant also filed rent receipt passed in favour of the new tenant Ramesh Kumar which is for Rs 67/-. when the rent earlier paid for the accommodation was only Rs. 36/-. 6. In reply, the plaintiff did not dispute that the rooms vacated by earlier tenants were now in occupation of the persons named by the appellant. The appellant also filed rent receipt passed in favour of the new tenant Ramesh Kumar which is for Rs 67/-. when the rent earlier paid for the accommodation was only Rs. 36/-. 6. In reply, the plaintiff did not dispute that the rooms vacated by earlier tenants were now in occupation of the persons named by the appellant. The plaintiff said that they were his relations and were permitted to occupy the house on an understanding that they would vacate sooner the defendant appellant was evicted. It was again true that Ramesh was paying an enhanced rent of Rs. 67/- and so were other persons. The plaintiff said that unless all the rooms were available for occupation on the ground floor, he would not shift, and sooner the defendant vacated the room, all other persons would also vacate. 7. The plaintiff further said that he needed the rooms, on the ground floor for his profession. one for use as consultation room, one for indoor patients and one for dispensary. 8. The question in this appeal is whether subsequent events could be taken notice of. If they could be, whether these events falsify the demand of the accommodation on the ground of bona fide need. 9. The authority of the Supreme Court in P. Vaykat Teshwarlu v. Motor and General Traders ( AIR 1975 SC 1409 ) answers the first question. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that provisions of Order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure are stringent and additional evidence cannot be permitted to be introduced just to fill in lacuna caused by indifference and negligence. Reliance is placed on AIR 1976 Gujrat 140; Jasubha Nanhu bhai v. Raisingh Bapubha and AIR 1975 SC 479 Soonde Ram v. Ramashwarlal. 11. In making this submission, the counsel for the respondent has to draw a distinction between evidence which existed and which was not tendered and evidence which came into existence after the trial. In the former situation, what the counsel for the respondent contends, may be true. But in the latter situation, the Court will exercise discretion guided by the observations of the Supreme Court in Vehkateswarlu's case. 12. The present case is one where subsequent events must be taken notice of. In the former situation, what the counsel for the respondent contends, may be true. But in the latter situation, the Court will exercise discretion guided by the observations of the Supreme Court in Vehkateswarlu's case. 12. The present case is one where subsequent events must be taken notice of. The plaintiff landlord's intentions to occupy the ground floor of the house do not seem honest or else he would not have rented out the rooms vacated by the tenants. It is admitted by him that he is charging almost double the rent from Ramesh Kumar. Before Ramesh Kumar was induced as a tenant, his father occupied the accommodation on rent of Rs. 36/-. The rent settled with Ramesh Kumar is Rs. 67/- per month. 13. The plaintiff's affidavit further shows that he intends using the ground floor for non-residential purposes. The ground under section 12 (i) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act was, therefore, not made out. 14. If may also be mentioned that the first floor was in occupation of the landlord without much inconvenience till 1968. His old mother and for that matter, his own fatness and gastric trouble did not create complications. If in 1970, he intended to shift from Indore, he could straight come and occupy the first floor again. That was lying vacant. And as soon as the three rooms on the ground floor fell vacant, he could shift his mother there. But all this could be possible if intentions were honest. 15. Having regard to subsequent events and reassessing evidence on that basis, I am of the view that the plaintiff had come to the Court with a pretended need rather than bona fide need. His suit for eviction, therefore, must fail. 16. I accept the appeal, set aside the decree for eviction granted by the First Additional District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Appeal No. 2-A of 1974 and instead dismiss the plaintiff's suit. Appeal allowed.