N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * * ( 2 ) THE first question to be decided is whether such separate applications by different claimants Were tenable or not. The learned Tribunal in this contention has inter alia observed as under:now it need not be stated that such petition for compensation is instituted under sec. 110 A Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and its clause (b) of sub sec (1) lays down that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub sec. (1) of sec. 110 may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased while proviso to this sub section provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined any such application for compensation the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. Thus by virtue of this proviso to sub sec. (1) of sec. 110 only one application by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased person is contemplated and that application would be deemed to have been made in a representative character on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Thus separate applications by different legal representatives of the deceased would not be maintainable under sec. 110 A Motor Vehicles Act. The application filed by one of the legal representatives would be deemed to have been made in a representative character on behalf of or for the benefit of all the representatives. Therefore in view of this clear provisions under the Act itself only one out of these five applications instituted separately by the widow of the deceased would be maintainable and it would be deemed to have been filed in a representative character on behalf of or for the benefit of other legal representatives of the deceased and other four petitions would be liable to be dismissed. As stated earlier petitioner Ramaben of MACP 29/74 is the widow of deceased Vallabhdas Pragji while the petitioners of MACPs 30 31 and 32 of 19 4 are the minor children and petitioner of MACP 33/74 is the mother of deceased Vallabhdas Pragji. As stated earlier petitioner Ramaben of MACP 29/74 is the widow of deceased Vallabhdas Pragji while the petitioners of MACPs 30 31 and 32 of 19 4 are the minor children and petitioner of MACP 33/74 is the mother of deceased Vallabhdas Pragji. So Ramaben being the mother and natural guardian of her minor children would be entitled to institute a petition for and on behalf of them all. Similarly she would be entitled to institute a petition on behalf of her mother in law also. Of course these other legal representatives of the deceased are not joined as party or impleaded as respondents to the petition instituted by petitioner Ramaben or MACP 29/74 but that is not fatal because she can institute her petition not only on behalf of herself but also for and on behalf of other legal representatives also as she is the guardian of her minor children and she can also represent on behalf of her mother in law. So in view of this legal position separate petitions instituted by other legal representatives of deceased Vallabhdas Pragji would not be maintainable at law and they are liable to be dismissed outright However petitioner Ramaben would be entitled to a compensation for herself as well as for her minor children and her mother in law in the petition instituted by her and as she has in all claimed Rs. 9 990 she would be entitled to that much of compensation in MACP no. 29/74. THE learned Tribunal unfortunately has mis construed the benign provisions of sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In other words the enabling provisions of the said section are treated by the learned Tribunal as importing a sort of a disability. This sort of rigid attitude while interpre ting the salutary provisions of a piece of social legislation is really unfortunate. When the learned Tribunal consolidated all the applications with the consent of the concerned parties and when in each of these five petitions all other heirs were impleaded as parties the learned Tribunal should have treated the consolidated proceedings before him as one application or should have awarded the full amount of compensation in the petition No. 29/74 to Ramaben for and on her behalf of her five minor children and her mother in law. The learned Tribunal unfortunately did neither of the things and thinking itself helpless awarded the maximum claim in that application No. 29/74. ( 3 ) IF any authority is needed for the proposition that sec. 110a is an enabling provision and not a disabling one the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Pitiush Santi Ghosh v. Sm. Maya Rani Chatterjee and Others A. I. R. 1971 Calcutta 229 is the one readily available. It has been observed there that an application made by one or more heirs of the deceased is maintainable even if other heirs are not impleaded and that even in such a case the power of the Tribunal is not limited to awarding compensation in favour of applicants or to the extent of their shares and that a legal representative of the deceased applying for compensation and getting the same will hold it not only on his own behalf but also as a trustee for other legal representatives entitled to a share in the compensation. The obvious error committed by the Tribunal therefore deserves to be rectified and adequate compensation deserves to be given to the heirs who are here before me in these three appeals represented by their natural guardian their mother. ( 4 ) THE next question is what should be the total amount of compensation that is worthy to be awarded to these unfortunate dependents of a man who was cut off in the prime of his life at the age of 45. It really pains me to note that even on this question the approach of the learned Tribunal is too rigid and narrow. In the family of the deceased who was the only earning member there were in all eight members including himself. He was running his sundry business in a town and was making his both ends meet. On behalf of the claimants it was alleged that the deceased was earning Rs. 500/ per month but for want of any documentary evidence the learned Tribunal put the figure of his monthly income at the minimum possible namely Rs. 200. 00 per month. As if this was not enough the learned Tribunal thought that out of this amount of Rs. 200. 00 1 of the amount if not Rs. 75. 00 must have been spent by the deceased on himself. 200. 00 per month. As if this was not enough the learned Tribunal thought that out of this amount of Rs. 200. 00 1 of the amount if not Rs. 75. 00 must have been spent by the deceased on himself. In other words the conclusion of the Tribunal is that the wife of the deceased his mother and five children were allowed to keep their bodies and soul together in the meager amount of Rs. 140. 00 at the most. This does not sound in any way reasonable. A man having as many as eight mouths to feed would forsake the personal requirements in order to see that other members of his family get the bare minimum necessities of their life. However as the learned Tribunal has taken that particular view. I would not disturb it. The second surprising aspect of the conclusion of the Tribunal is the taking of only 10 years purchase. The deceased was only 45 years of age and as the learned Tribunal itself thinks the deceased would have produced a financial benefit for 12 to 15 years more. As a matter of fact the evidence bears out that his mother also was alive on the day the deceased expired. The father of the deceased died at the age of 82. So it can reasonably be inferred that the deceased would have at least the active and fruitful life upto 60 years in the minimum. The learned Tribunal therefore. was grossly in error in employing the multiplier of 10 years and not 15. On that basis the total amount that would come to be awarded would be Rs. 27 0 to which the conventional figure of Rs. 3 0 would be required to be added. So the total claim that was liable to be decreed was Rs. 30 0 and not Rs. 9 990 The remainder of the amount therefore that is Rs. 20 10 will be required to be given additionally and this amount will be apportioned as follows:- Rs. 2000. 00 to Pravinkumar and Rs. 4000. 00 to Arvindkumar the respective appellants of appeal no. 372 of 1977. Rs. 5000-/ each to Girdhar and Rajesh the appellants of the appeal no. 373 of 1977 and Rs. 4 10 to Rashila alias Babyben the appellant of the first appeal no. 373 of 1977. All the Respondents nos. 2000. 00 to Pravinkumar and Rs. 4000. 00 to Arvindkumar the respective appellants of appeal no. 372 of 1977. Rs. 5000-/ each to Girdhar and Rajesh the appellants of the appeal no. 373 of 1977 and Rs. 4 10 to Rashila alias Babyben the appellant of the first appeal no. 373 of 1977. All the Respondents nos. 1 to 4 shall pay these amounts jointly and severally. .