JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the decree and judgment dated January 21, 1971 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, confirming the judgment and decree of the Assistant Collector, First Class, Karvi, district Banda, dated September 5, 1968 in Revenue Suit No. 14 of 1965 under Section 209 U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties, and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1, Sunder had filed the suit claiming to be the Sirdar of plot No. 457 in village Kapsethi and seeking the ejectment of the defendant appellant Ram Prasad as a trespasser. Ram Prasad contested the suit by alleging that Sunder had lost his rights in the land and that now he and one Baiju were co-Sirdars of the land. Baiju, however, filed a written statement to the effect that he had noting to do with the land in suit. Both the courts below have decreed the suit. Ram Prasad had now come up in second appeal. 4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the civil court had declared the appellant to be the Sirdar of the land in suit and the courts below did not consider this important document on record. There is on record the copy of the plaint in civil suit No. 316 of 1954 filed by Baiju and Parsadwa, sons of Panchhi against one Ram Kumar, son of Ramadhin Kurmi, and a copy of the compromised in that suit to the effect that the suit may be decreed on payment of certain sums by the plaintiffs to the defendant. There is also on record three stamped receipts dated March 13, 1956, May 20, 1956 and December 16, 1956 from Ram Kumar to the same effect. However, the appellant has failed to show that Ram Kumar was ever the tenant of the land in suit. On the other hand, Bhauram (P.W.2) son of Ram Kumar appeared as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent and deposed that his father was only the Zamindar of the land and that the land in suit had been in the cultivatory possession of Sunder but had been cultivated by Ram Prasad for the last three or four years only. On the other hand, Bhauram (P.W.2) son of Ram Kumar appeared as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent and deposed that his father was only the Zamindar of the land and that the land in suit had been in the cultivatory possession of Sunder but had been cultivated by Ram Prasad for the last three or four years only. The appellant did not produce any witness to the effect that Ram Kumar was ever the tenant of the land. In fact, the appellant both in his written statement and his oral testimony has clearly admitted that Ram Kumar was only the Zamindar of the land in suit and his name was recorded in a Farzi manner. Thus, the compromise decree of the civil court would not bind Sunder, and the courts below while considering it, have rightly not relied upon it. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the courts below have completely ignored the admission of the plaintiff-respondent in proceedings under Section 240-G of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act to the effect that the appellant was in possession and he himself had nothing to do with the land in suit. This contention is completely unfounded and there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff-respondent ever made such an admission. 6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that no acquisition of land in his favour has been proved by the plaintiff-respondent and in the absence of any evidence to that effect, the earlier entry in 1359 Fasli could not be believed. He has further contended that it is not the entry in the year 1359 Fasli shows that Nanka Kewat is recorded as the tenant-in-chief, Sunder Kewat as a Badastoor sub-tenant, while Ram Kumar Kurmi is recorded in possession in the remarks column. It is the common case of both the parties that Ram Kumar was only the Zamindar of the land in suit but was never in cultivatory possession. The Khasra entry, therefore, would be taken to mean that in 1359 Fasli Sunder was in cultivatory possession as the sub-tenant. The same entry exists in the Khasra of 1361 Fasli. In the Khasra of 1364 Fasli Sunder is recorded as the tenant-in-chief. The Khasra entry, therefore, would be taken to mean that in 1359 Fasli Sunder was in cultivatory possession as the sub-tenant. The same entry exists in the Khasra of 1361 Fasli. In the Khasra of 1364 Fasli Sunder is recorded as the tenant-in-chief. In the Khatauni of 1371 to 1371 Fasli, Sunder is recorded as the Sirdar while Ram Prasad is recorded as an occupier without title since 1359 Fasli Apart from the extracts from the revenue records, Sunder also filed the rent receipts in his favour. The appellant did not file a single rent receipt. The entries in the revenue records coupled with the rent receipts and oral evidence are in the eyes of law quite adequate to prove tenancy, and it is not necessary that in such a case the history of the acquisition of tenancy should be given along with the documents to prove the original of such acquisition. 7. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in any case the appellant's case was of rival tenancy which was neither considered nor properly discussed by the courts below. The concept of 'rival tenancy' is unknown to law. Either 'A' can be the tenant of the land of 'B', but there can be no 'rival tenants'. The courts below had to consider whether the plaintiff-respondent or the defendant-appellant was the Sirdar of the land in suit. The trial court had framed issue No. 1 to the effect, whether the plaintiff is the Sirdar of the land, in suit, and issue No. 5 to the effect, whether the defendant No. 1 was the Sirdar of the land in suit, and has recorded categorical finding to the effect that the plaintiff was the Sirdar of the land in suit and the defendant No. 1 was only a trespasser liable to ejectment. There is no error of law in this concurrent finding of the courts below. 8. A further contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the courts below erred in holding that the suit of the plaintiff was within time. This contention cannot be upheld. After a proper consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence, the trial court found that the defendant-appellant came into possession since 1370 Fasli. 8. A further contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the courts below erred in holding that the suit of the plaintiff was within time. This contention cannot be upheld. After a proper consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence, the trial court found that the defendant-appellant came into possession since 1370 Fasli. The lower appellant court has, however, found that the trespass was committed in 1359 Fasli, while the suit was filed on November 5, 1965, i.e., 1373 Fasli, and, therefore, was within time. The lower appellate court's finding regarding the year of trespass must be upheld, as it is consistent with the oral and documentary evidence. Both the courts below are, however, right in holding that the suit was filed within time. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that no issue of estoppel was framed, though alleged in the written statement of the appellant. It is true that the trial court did not frame a specific issue on estoppel. However, the question of estoppel is covered in issues Nos. 1, 2 and 5, and it was certainly open to the appellant to produce evidence regarding estoppel. He did not, however, produce the slightest evidence to this effect. The position is well settled that where parties fully understood the nature of the case and were given due opportunity to produce evidence to support their case, non-framing of a particular issue would not be a fatal defect. 10. That the learned counsel for the appellant has cited a number of rulings. In Ram Dhari Rai v. Bans Raj, 1959 R.D. 247, it has been held that the entry in the remarks column clearly signifies possession and if certain persons are recorded in that column it means that they have actual occupation in some capacity or the other. It is they who are thus the recorded occupants and not the tenants-in-chief. In view of this it is quite clear that the person who is recorded in possession in the remarks column of the Khasra is really an occupant. As regards the claim between the tenant-in-chief and the sub-tenant, the person who is recorded in possession in the remarks column of the Khasra will be deemed to be the occupant. In view of this it is quite clear that the person who is recorded in possession in the remarks column of the Khasra is really an occupant. As regards the claim between the tenant-in-chief and the sub-tenant, the person who is recorded in possession in the remarks column of the Khasra will be deemed to be the occupant. This ruling does not help the appellant in any way, we have seen above that it is the common case of the parties that Ram Kumar who was recorded in the remarks column was never in possession, and the plaintiff-respondent was recorded as the sub-tenant in 1359 Fasli and 1361 Fasli. In Srimati Basari Wali v. Board of Revenue, 1967 R.D. 25, the effect of Section 240-J, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act has been considered. This ruling is not relevant to the present case, as nothing is on the record to show that proceedings under Section 240-J have in fact been taken. In the famous case of Smt. Sonawati and others v. Sri Ram and another, 1968 R.D. 151, it has been held that a person who has no right to occupy the land may rely upon his occupation against a third person who has no better title, but he cannot set up that right against the order of the land. Possession of a person in wrongful occupation cannot be deemed cultivatory possession. It has further been held that a conclusion arrived at only from an entry in the revenue records which does not prima facie support the case of a person, that he wrongfully trespassed upon the land and cultivated it, cannot be regarded as conclusive in second appeal. In the present case, however, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff-respondent was in wrongful occupation of the land or that the appellant has any title. Further, the findings of the courts below are not merely based on entries in the revenue records but are based on a consideration of the total oral and documentary evidence. In Sukhram Singh v. Smt. Harbeji, 1969 R.D. 165 also the effect of Section 240-G read with Section 240-H of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act has been considered. In Badri and another v. Juthan Singh and others, 1969 R.D. 247, the principle enunciated in Smt. Sonawati's case (supra) has been reaffirmed. In Sukhram Singh v. Smt. Harbeji, 1969 R.D. 165 also the effect of Section 240-G read with Section 240-H of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act has been considered. In Badri and another v. Juthan Singh and others, 1969 R.D. 247, the principle enunciated in Smt. Sonawati's case (supra) has been reaffirmed. In Ram Kumar Sharma v. Smt. Gomati, 1970 R.D. 406, it has been held that as a court of first appeal it was the duty of the Commissioner to have gone into all the evidence in detail and thereafter to record his finding and if it is established that the court of the first appeal did not care to read the evidence thoroughly and to apply its mind to it and consequently his observations regarding credibility of witnesses are based on presumptions and not on evidence before him, this would amount to misreading of evidence which would justify interference in second appeal. In the present case, however there is nothing to show that the learned Additional Commissioner has in fact not recorded his findings after going through all the evidence in detail. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 R.D. 365, in which it has been held that a suit seeking the relief of possession in respect to Bhumidhari land lay in the revenue court and the jurisdiction of a civil Court was absolutely barred. If the Civil Court entries such a suit it suffers from lack of inherent jurisdiction. In the light of the observation made in this ruling, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the civil suit No. 316 of 1954, a reference to which has been made above Moreover, as we have already seen the compromise in that suit does not bind the plaintiff-respondent at all. 12. After giving due consideration to all the points urged be the learned counsels for both the sides, I am satisfied that the judgments of the courts below are sound in law and do not suffer from any material error. The second appeal has no force and is here-by dismissed with costs.