Judgment :- 1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. R. C. P. No. 273 of 1972 was filed against him for eviction on three grounds. The petition was dismissed. In appeal, the appellate authority confirmed the order of the Rent Control Court. However, in revision the District Judge, Tellicherry, ordered eviction under S.11 (8) of the Act. This revision petition challenges the said order. 2. Counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the revisional Court had, in reversing the orders of the appellate authority and the Rent Control Court exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under S.20 of the Act. It was further contended that the order was bad since all the ingredients necessary for ordering eviction under S. H (8) were not proved by the landlord. A new contention was raised before me that the building sought to be evicted is one separate building as defined in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, in a row of 7 rooms and it cannot be said that the building in question is a part of the building occupied by the landlord. I shall examine these questions separately. 3. The first respondent is described as the "puthravakasa tavazhi karnavahi" and the 2nd respondent is her son, whose occupation is described as I"hSw The application was originally filed under S.11 (2) (a), (b) and (3) of the Act. Subsequently, as per R.C.I A. 191 of 1973, amendment of the petition was allowed and S 11 (8). was also included in the petition as one of the grounds. The amendment was carried out on 7 919731 felt it necessary to refer to this material, available from the petition, since the only surviving ground which was agitated before the revisional Court and before me is the ground under S.11(8) of the Act. 4. In Para.2 of the petition, it is stated that the building belongs to a tavazhi and the first respondent is filing the application on behalf of the tavazhi. The bona fide need is stated in Para.3 as follows: The relevant prayer is, prayer (a), which reads as follows. It is, therefore, clear that the petition was filed on behalf of the tavazhi and eviction was sought for the 2nd respondent to stock his things connected with the developing trade. The payer is eviction for the petitioners. 5. The bona fide need is stated in Para.3 as follows: The relevant prayer is, prayer (a), which reads as follows. It is, therefore, clear that the petition was filed on behalf of the tavazhi and eviction was sought for the 2nd respondent to stock his things connected with the developing trade. The payer is eviction for the petitioners. 5. The Rent Control Court held that eviction cannot be ordered under S.11 (2) (a) and (b) or under S.11 (3). Under S 11 (8) the Rent Control Court found that there was no evidence as to the quantity of cement which pw.1 was getting which would entitle him to get eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. Since there was no satisfactory evidence regarding the necessity for additional accommodation, the Rent Control Court held against the landlord under S.11 (8) also. 6. The appellate authority agreed with the Rent Control Court on all grounds and dismissed the appeal. Before the Revisional Court, the only point argued was the ground under S.11 (8). The Revisional Court held that the ingredients of S.11 (8) were made out and that the respondents were entitled to eviction. 7. The first question that has to be considered in this revision is, the scone of the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court under S 20 of the Act Conceding that the revisional jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act was wider than the revisional jurisdiction under S.115 CPC. the petitioner's counsel contended that the findings of fact entered by the authorities below could be upset by the revisional Court only if they are perverse or so shockingly unreasonable that no Tribunal would arrive at such a conclusion. Counsel for the respondent would, on the other hand, contend that the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court is so wide that even the concurrent findings of fact could be set aside by the revisional Court. 8. S.20 enables the District Court to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. The expression "legality, regularity or propriety" is wider in its ambit than the jurisdictional ambit which S.115 CPC. contemplates. While considering the legality, regularity or propriety of an order, it will be open to the District Court to consider the evidence on record also. The expression "legality, regularity or propriety" is wider in its ambit than the jurisdictional ambit which S.115 CPC. contemplates. While considering the legality, regularity or propriety of an order, it will be open to the District Court to consider the evidence on record also. If it is shown that the appellate authority had committed an error of law or an error on a question of fact or misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence, it was contended that the revisional Court can exercise its jurisdiction under S 20 of the Act. The jurisdiction under S.115 CPC. does not extend thus far. The High Court cannot, even when it is satisfied that an error of law is committed by the court below, interfere under S.115 CPC. unless it amounts to an error of jurisdiction also. The revisional Court under S 20 can in appropriate cases reappraise, re-evaluate or re-assess the evidence to decide about the propriety of the order under challenge. This jurisdiction however should be restricted to the examination of the evidence only to find out whether the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below are perverse and unreasonable S.20 does not permit the revisional Court to substitute its conclusion when the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority is reasonable. When two conclusions are possible, the revisional Court, whose jurisdiction cannot be equated with the appellate jurisdiction, should not substitute its conclusion for the conclusions arrived at by the Court or fact and evidence. 9. Counsel for the respondents relied on the decisions reported in Perumal Pillai v. Venkiteswara Iyer & Others, 1965 KLT. 476 and Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, 1969 K.LT. 348 to highlight the scope of the expression "regularity, legality or propriety" of an order. I do not think it necessary to consider these authorities in detail. In Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, 1969 KLT. 348 the Supreme Court held thus while considering S.20 of the Kerala Act, reiterating that the jurisdiction under S.20 is wider than the one under S.115 CPC. "The words of S.20 of the Act of 1965 are much wider than those in S.115 of (he Code of Civil Procedure. On the words of the section it cannot be said that a revision is limited to a mere question of jurisdiction. "The words of S.20 of the Act of 1965 are much wider than those in S.115 of (he Code of Civil Procedure. On the words of the section it cannot be said that a revision is limited to a mere question of jurisdiction. The District Judge was empowered to consider whether on the evidence the finding of the Subordinate Judge was proper." This is authority for the proposition that the propriety of the order of the appellate authority could be looked into by the District Court. The decision does not go to the extent of holding that an alternative conclusion, if possible on the evidence on record, could be substituted by the District Judge for the conclusion arrived at by the Subordinate Judge's Court, if such a conclusion is proper and a reasonable one. 10. A Division Bench of this Court had to consider the scope of S.20 of the Act in the decision reported in Perumal Pillai v. Venkiteswara Iyer & Others 1965 KLT. 476. Considering the three words "legality, regularity or propriety", this Court held that the ambit of the jurisdiction depends on the meaning of these words. An order is illegal when it is passed opposed to an enactment and an order is irregular when it is passed to rules of procedure. The word "propriety" has a wider import. This Court held that the District judge under S.20 of the Act could consider the findings of fact also under S.20 of the Act, since the propriety of the order can be considered only on examining the evidence and facts. These two authorities only lay down in wide terms the accepted and well-settled principles that the jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act is wider than the jurisdiction under S.115 CPC. The matter has been considered by Eradi J., in the decision reported in Doraswdmi Chettiar v. Nhandam-madan Kunhiraman & Others 1969 KLJ. 227. The learned judge has observed that a District Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction under S 20 of the Act will not be justified in interfering with a finding of fact recorded by the appellate authority merely because he is of the view that a different conclusion is possible. 227. The learned judge has observed that a District Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction under S 20 of the Act will not be justified in interfering with a finding of fact recorded by the appellate authority merely because he is of the view that a different conclusion is possible. The matter has been laid down, with respect, in clear terms in the following passage in the judgment: "When it thus introduced the familiar concepts of appeal and revision at the two different stages, it is, in my view, reasonable to assume that the well known distinction between these two jurisdictions was clearly in the contemplation of the Legislature. It would not, therefore, be right to regard the appellate and revisional remedies provided for under S 18 and S 20 as co-extensive The difference, according to me, consists in this, namely, that the revisional authority, while endowed no doubt with the power to examine the propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority, is not to treat the proceeding before it as in appeal and its jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact is limited to cases where such findings can be regarded as 'improper'. It is not in every instance where the revisional authority is inclined to arrive at a different conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence available on record that the finding recorded by the Subordinate Tribunal can be said to be improper I am of the view that a finding can legitimately be characterised, as 'improper' it must be so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no reasonable tribunal or authority could have come to such a conclusion on the evidence on record, or as in the case which came up for decision before the Supreme Court in Nata Ram v. Jiwan Lal (AIR. 1963 S.C. 499), the Subordinate Tribunal should have recorded its finding without adverting to a single piece of evidence.' This, according to me, with great respect, is the correct approach to be made in considering the jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act. 1963 S.C. 499), the Subordinate Tribunal should have recorded its finding without adverting to a single piece of evidence.' This, according to me, with great respect, is the correct approach to be made in considering the jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act. An interference at the hands of the revisional Court under S.20 of the Act is permissible only when the conclusions arrived at by the appellate authority could be characterised as "so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no Tribunal could arrive at such a conclusion on the evidence on record." Simply because a different conclusion is possible, the revisional Court will not be justified in upsetting the orders of the appellate authority and the Rent Control Court. Now, I will examine the correctness of the order passed by the District Judge in this case. 11. I have already extracted the relevant portions of the pleadings and also the sections under which the application was filed i do not for a moment say that a petition should be decided upon the particular section quoted in the application. The pleadings have to be looked into as a whole. I do not also say that in rent control proceedings a meticulous conformity with the rules of pleadings should be insisted upon. In this case, it was by an amendment that the petitioner included the ground under S.11(8) It was only by an additional counter that the tenant disputed the bona fide need. But the overall impact of the pleadings and the evidence has to be considered in evaluating the ground urged. Eviction is sought by the 2nd respondent for keeping his things and also to store cement, to meet the demands of his developing business. It is better to read S.11(8). S.11(8) reads: "A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use". This section speaks of a landlord who is occupying only a part of the building. The word'only' is very significant. It is in this context that one has to consider the real import of the word 'building' occurring in this section. This section speaks of a landlord who is occupying only a part of the building. The word'only' is very significant. It is in this context that one has to consider the real import of the word 'building' occurring in this section. Such a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for directing the tenant to put the remaining portion of the building, which he is occupying, into his possession. The requirement should be as additional accommodation for his personal use. 12. Who is the landlord in this case? According to the averments in the petition it is the tavazhi. It is not for the tavazhi's personal use that S.11 (8) is invoked. Tavazhi as such cannot have a personal use. A 'landlord' is defined in S.2 (3) as follows: "(3) 'landlord' includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who should so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant". This is an inclusive definition. The 2nd respondent cannot strictly be said to be a landlord within this definition. Let me for argument's sake take him to be the landlord According to him, he is occupying only a part of the building. Which is that building of which he occupies only a part. Can a row of shop rooms which can be independently let out be said to be one single building? According to the counsel for the respondents, it can be. This is controverted by counsel for the petitioner. To resolve this dispute, the best course is to refer to the definition of the word 'building' occurring in S.2 (1) (a), (b) and (c). According to the counsel for the respondents, it can be. This is controverted by counsel for the petitioner. To resolve this dispute, the best course is to refer to the definition of the word 'building' occurring in S.2 (1) (a), (b) and (c). S.2 (1) (a), (b) and (c) reads as follows: "(1) 'building' means any building or but or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes (a) the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut, or part of such building or but and let or to be let along with such building or hut; (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or but or part of a building or hut; (c) any fittings or machinery belonging to the landlord, affixed to or installed in such building, or part of such building and intended to be used by the tenant for, or in connection with the purpose for which such building or part of such building is let or to be 1st, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house " From this definition, it is apparent that one shop room in a row of shop rooms can be a 'building' for the purpose of the Act. If that be so, it cannot be justifiably contended that the 2nd respondent is occupying a part of a building or only a part of a building. The object of the Legislature in enacting the section appears to be that the Legislature had in contemplation one building, a portion of which is occupied by the landlord and the remaining portion by the tenant. Counsel for the respondents would contend that the definition clause did not always afford a guideline to find out what exactly is meant by the word 'building'. But, I am inclined to hold that the normal canons of interpretation of statutes lay down that in interpreting a particular word in a statute the best guide is the definition of that word in the concerned statute itself. Help can be had from other statutes or other authorities, only if the statute itself does not clearly indicate what is meant by the word. However, I do not wish to dilate further upon the point for two reasons. Help can be had from other statutes or other authorities, only if the statute itself does not clearly indicate what is meant by the word. However, I do not wish to dilate further upon the point for two reasons. This plea was not taken pointedly in the revision memorandum. I do not think it necessary to finally adjudicate upon this question and express an opinion for the purpose of this case since the case can be disposed of on other grounds. Hence I leave open this question in this case. 13. There is no averment in the petition that the additional accommodation is for the personal use of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent on his own admission is a rich man paying a big amount as income-tax. There is some material in this case, though not conclusive, that he is in possession of a godown just behind this row of shops where he is stocking copra and perhaps cement also. There is no conclusive evidence in this case as to what is the quantity of cement that the 2nd respondent gets and the area required for stocking it. There is also paucity of evidence in this case as to why he should choose the northernmost shop room in the possession of the petitioner while be is in possession of the southernmost shop room. One justification that was urged before me was that the petitioner before me has not been occupying the building in question for a long time. This is not wholly true. It is true that he is not daily trading in the building. But there is evidence to show both by the petitioner and by the 2nd respondent that he is trading in milk and also in vegetables in the shop This would also indicate that the petitioner is not in affluent circumstances and is a person who ekes out his livelihood by a petty trade. While discussing the benefit of the second proviso to S.11(3), the appellate authority and the Rent Control Court had adverted to the materials available in the records to show that the petitioner is having only a small trade. But here, I am concerned with a case under S.11(8). While disposing of an application under S.11 (8), the Court that orders eviction has to record a finding under S.11 (10) that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. But here, I am concerned with a case under S.11(8). While disposing of an application under S.11 (8), the Court that orders eviction has to record a finding under S.11 (10) that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. From the materials discussed above, which have emerged from the evidence and the pleadings, in my judgment, it cannot be said that the claim of the respondents is bona fide. 14. Apart from the various infirmities attendant upon the claim, there is another important aspect that the Court has to consider while ordering eviction under S.11 (8). The Rent Control Court has to reject the application under S.11 (8) if it is satisfied that the hardship that may be caused to the tenant by ordering eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. This aspect has been considered by the appellate authority and the revisional Court. The revisional Court has found on the materials available that it cannot be said that the hardship which will be caused to the tenant will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. This finding is not on a proper appreciation of the facts of the case. The revisional Court did not consider whether the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority on this aspect was unreasonable or perverse. 15. In this connection, counsel for the respondents contended before me that the burden of proof of hardship to the tenant and advantage to the landlord is on the tenant. The tenant has to satisfy the Rent Control Court that the hardship that he will suffer will be greater than the advantage which the landlord will receive. In support of this contention he invited my attention to a decision reported in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan, 1976 KLT 1 by a Division Bench of this Court. An earlier decision of a learned single judge of this Court, which held that the burden to prove the benefit of the 2nd proviso to S.11(3) was on the landlord was dissented from by the Division Bench, which held that the burden was on the tenant. By a parity of reasoning, it was contended by the respondents' counsel that the burden in this case also is on the tenant. For a proper appreciation of this contention, it is necessary to extract the two provisos. By a parity of reasoning, it was contended by the respondents' counsel that the burden in this case also is on the tenant. For a proper appreciation of this contention, it is necessary to extract the two provisos. The second proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act reads: "Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business." It is clear from the above proviso that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession if such tenant is dependent for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the trade or business carried on in such building. From the wording of the proviso, it is clear that it is the tenant who has to prove that he is dependent mainly on the income derived from any trade or business which be carries on in the building. The wording of the first proviso to S.11(10) is different from the above proviso. The said proviso reads: "Provided that, in the case of an application made under sub-section (8) the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord." Here, it is stated that the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. It is the satisfaction of the Rent Control Court from the totality of circumstances, that is highlighted in this proviso. There is no burden cast either on the landlord or on the tenant to prove the ingredients of this proviso. Both the landlord and the tenant will have to adduce evidence. On a consideration of the entire evidence, the Rent Control Court should enter a finding as to the comparative hardship or advantage. There is no burden cast either on the landlord or on the tenant to prove the ingredients of this proviso. Both the landlord and the tenant will have to adduce evidence. On a consideration of the entire evidence, the Rent Control Court should enter a finding as to the comparative hardship or advantage. In this case, the 2nd respondent, who is admittedly rich and has a big business, is seeking to evict a person placed far lower in status than he, who is carrying on a petty trade in one room in a building having 7 rooms in a row. I have no hesitation to bold that from a conspectus of the entire facts, evidence and other circumstances of the case, there is enough material for rue to be satisfied that the hardship to the tenant in this case will far outweigh the advantage to the landlord. 16. Thus, I hold that the order of the revisional Court suffers from jurisdictional infirmities. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction under S.20 in passing the impugned order. The ingredients of S.11 (8) have not been properly considered or borne-in mind while passing the order sought to be revised. There is no finding that the claim for eviction is bonafide under S.11 (10). Under these circumstances, I hold that the court below has committed an error of jurisdiction, calling for interference at my hands. In the result, the CRP. is allowed with costs.