JUDGMENT D. M. Chandrashekhar, C. J. (for self and for K. N. Seth, J.) 1. IN these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have impugned certain bye-laws framed by different Zila Parishads. Those bye-laws seek to regulate collection of carcass of animals, storing and flaying them for extracting hides and bones. These bye-laws provide, inter alia, that the right to collect carcass of animals, storing and utilising them in rural areas, should be disposed of by auction and that the highest bidder alone should have such right to the exclusion of all others. These bye-laws also provide that unless a person obtains a licence from the Zila Parishads he cannot carry on the aforesaid activities. 2. THE aforesaid bye-laws are purported to have been made under Section 239 of the U. P. Kshettra Samiti and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sub-Section (1) of that Section empowers Zila Parishads to make bye-laws for their own purposes and for the purposes of Kshettra Samitis in respect of matters required by the Act to be governed by bye-laws and for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the rural areas and for the furtherance of the administration of the Act in the Khand and the district. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1), sub-Section (2) particularises several matters in respect of which such bye-laws can be made by Zila Parishads. The bye-laws made by several Zila Parishads regulating disposal and utilisation of carcass of animals are almost identical, presumably because they were made following the model bye-laws framed by the Government for the guidance of Zila Parishads. The validity of these bye-laws came up for consideration before a single Judge of this court in Jagat Dhari v Zila Parishad, Pratapgarh, AIR 1975 Alld. 135. His lordship held that the Zila Parishad had no right to frame a bye-law providing that the right to collect bones and hides in rural areas shall be auctioned to the highest bidder to the exclusion of all others and that the highest bidder alone shall have that right. 3. THAT decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 158 of 1976 and connected writ petitions. 3. THAT decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 158 of 1976 and connected writ petitions. After an elaborate consideration of several provisions of the Act, their Lordships held that those provisions do not confer any power on the Zila Parishad to create monopoly in respect of carcass utilisation and that the Zila Parishad cannot frame a bye-law providing that the right to deal with bones and hides shall vest only in the highest bidder. Their Lordships quashed the bye-laws framed by several Zila Parishads in so far as they provide that the right to collect bones and hides in rural areas shall be auctioned to the highest bidder to the exclusion of all others and that the highest bidder alone shall have the right to carry on such activities. Their Lordships issued a mandamus restraining the Zila Parishads from enforcing the bye-laws to the extent they were quashed. 4. THE impugned bye-laws in the present petitions are practically the same as the bye-laws which were considered by the aforesaid Division Bench and the decision of their Lordships is binding on us. But Shri S. P. Gupta and Shri B. D. Agarwal who appeared for some of the respondents Zila Parishads, urged that the aforesaid decisions require reconsideration and that hence we should refer these petitions to a Larger Bench. THEy maintained that the aforesaid two decisions had overlooked the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the State of Maharashtra v. H. N. Mao, AIR 1970 SC 1157 . In State of Maharashtra v. H, N. Rao (supra), Sections 365 to 368 and 372 and 385 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act had been impugned. Those sections provide, inter allay that no person shall deposit carcass of animal at a place not appointed in that behalf by the Corporation and that the occupier of any premises in or upon which any animal dies or in or upon which carcass of any animal is found, shall not, unless permitted by the Municipal Authorities, remove or permit to be removed such carcass. Those provisions were impugned as being violative of Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Those provisions were impugned as being violative of Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. While upholding the Constitutionality of those provisions, the Supreme Court observed thus : "A carcass being in its very nature a noxious thing, if allowed to remain on the premises of the owner or occupier, is likely to cause serious harm to the health and well-being of the residents and other persons in the neighbourhood. The law which imposes on the owner or the occupier of the place in which the carcass is found, duty to remove the carcass or to get it removed through the Municipal agency with the least practicable delay is conceived in the interests of the general public....... The Corporation has control over the contractor to whom the carcasses are entrusted for disposal. It has set apart a place for skinning and has supervision over the disposal of the products. Even by imposing stringent supervision upon persons carrying on the business of skinning carcasses protection of the community against adulteration of its food cannot be effectively secured, because it would not be difficult for a purchaser not subject to the control of the Corporation to remove the carcasses beyond the Corporation limits and then to bring contaminated meat and the fat back into the Corporation area." Relying on the aforesaid observations, it was argued that as carcass is hazardous to health, it is competent for the Zila Parishads to provide that carcasses in a particular local area shall be removed, stored and utilised only by one licensee who is the highest bidder and not by others, that where such removal and utilisation are done by one licensee, it will be easier for Zila Parishads to provide that storing and flaying of carcasses are done in places or premises outside the inhabited area and under proper sanitary conditions so as not to cause nuisance and that such regulation of removal, storage and utilisation would not be possible if they are in the hands of numerous persons even if they are licensed. 5. THE question that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the aforesaid provisions of the Bombay Corporation Act imposed reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of persons having property rights over carcasses and the fundamental right of persons to carry on their occupation of utilising carcass for extracting hides and bones. 5. THE question that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the aforesaid provisions of the Bombay Corporation Act imposed reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of persons having property rights over carcasses and the fundamental right of persons to carry on their occupation of utilising carcass for extracting hides and bones. In the present cases we are not dealing with the question of Constitutionality of certain sections of an enactment, but we are examining the question whether the impugned bye-laws are within or beyond the scope of Section 239 of the Act which empowers framing of bye-laws. Moreover, the Bombay Corporation Act governs the municipal affairs of a big metropolis with very high density of population. Restrictions which are reasonable in regard to such metropolis, may not be reasonable in regard to rural areas where there is no problem of over-crowding of people in a small area. Hence the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has no direct bearing on the question arising in these petitions. 6. LEARNED counsel for respondents Zila Parishads have not been able to show that the activities of collecting and storing carcasses, flaying them to extract hides and bones and disposing of the waste material of the carcasses, can be effectively regulated only when such activities are in the hands of a single licensee who is the highest bidder in the auction and that such regulation cannot be done effectively when several licensees are engaged in such activities. Except that the system of monopoly brings some income to the Zila Parishads, it has not been shown that any purpose of the Act like maintenance of public health and sanitation, is promoted by this system of monopoly. In A. C. S. Kandaswami Reddiar v. The Textile Commissioner, AIR 1952 Mad. 409 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while quashing a notification under the cotton control order, observed that the notification had the effect of preventing most of the merchants from carrying on any business and must result in the extinction of their trade and that all this was for no demonstrable advantage to the public. 7. 409 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while quashing a notification under the cotton control order, observed that the notification had the effect of preventing most of the merchants from carrying on any business and must result in the extinction of their trade and that all this was for no demonstrable advantage to the public. 7. IN District Collector v. M/s. Ibrahim and Co., AIR 1966 AP 310 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the Sugar Control Order which prohibited all persons from carrying on business in sugar and authorised only the Co-operative Societies to deal in sugar, was invalid on the ground that it was not competent for the Government to create monopoly in favour of one person or organisation and that the Constitution of INdia did not, as a rule, favour monopoly of an individual or organisation other than the - State or State owned or controlled corporation. 8. LEARNED counsel for respondents Zila Parishads referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in several decisions to the effect that the State has the exclusive right or privilege to manufacture, store and sell intoxicating liquors and to grant exclusive right to licence holders on payment of consideration, to manufacture, store and sell such liquors and that without such exclusive right in the State there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. It was argued that since carcass of animals is also a noxious thing, being hazardous to health of the people, no person has a right to deal in carcass or utilise it and that the State or any local authority may have the exclusive right or privilege in removing and utilising carcass and that the State or the local authority can grant such exclusive right to the highest bidder in an auction on payment of consideration. We are unable to accept the contention merely because a particular trade or occupation may cause nuisance or hazard to health, the State gets the right to grant to a licence holder the monopoly to carry on such trade or occupation on payment of consideration. We are unable to accept the contention merely because a particular trade or occupation may cause nuisance or hazard to health, the State gets the right to grant to a licence holder the monopoly to carry on such trade or occupation on payment of consideration. As observed by the Supreme Court in the State of Maharashtra v. H. N. Rao (supra) even a law designed to abate a grave nuisance and for protection of public health, must not impose arbitrary or excessive restrictions upon the right of a citizen. 9. AFTER carefully considering the arguments advanced by learned counsel for respondents Zila Parishads, we are satisfied that the aforesaid earlier decisions of this court lay down the law correctly, if we may say so with respect. 10. FOLLOWING the aforesaid decisions, we quash the bye-laws framed by the respondents Zila Parishads in so far as they (the bye-laws) provide that the right to collect carcasses and to extract hides and bones there from within any area in those Zila Parishads, shall be auctioned to the highest bidder and that such bidder alone shall have the right to carry on those activities to the exclusion of all others. We further restrain respondents Zila Parishads from enforcing so much of the bye-laws which have been quashed. However, we make it clear that the bye-laws, in so far as they provide for licensing of persons engaged in the activities of removing carcasses and flaying them, are valid. 11. IN the circumstances of these petitions, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.