JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE short point involved in this revision relates to the question about the commencement of limitation for an application for execution in a case where the decree directing delivery of possession to one party is conditional on payment of certain amount by the party seeking possession to the other side, who is already in possession and when the decree does not fix any time limit for making the payment. ( 2. ) IT was not disputed that the decree sought to be executed by the applicants was on the following terms: (i) That on payment of a sum of Rs. 2,000 by the applicants to the non-applicants, the applicants will be entitled to get back possession of the suit land from the non-applicants by executing the decree; (ii) No time limit was fixed for making such payment. The decree was passed on a compromise between the parties therein there was nothing in the terms so as to fix any period for making the aforesaid payment. ( 3. ) MORE than 12 years after the date of the decree, the applicants tendered and deposited the required sum of Rs. 2,000 for payment to the non-applicants and applied for being placed in possession in execution of the said decree. The executing Court earlier directed issue of warrant of possession, but later on revoked its own order by holding that since the application for execution was moved beyond the period of 12 years, it was barred by limitation and accordingly dismissed the same. The applicants preferred an appeal against the said order and the same was dismissed. The lower appellate Court upheld the order of the executing Court. The applicants have now come before this court in revision challenging the legality of the orders made by the Courts below. ( 4. ) THE main contention raised on behalf of the applicants is that since no time-limit was prescribed by the decree in question, the applicants were free to make the payment at any time. The argument was that the right to execute the decree accrued only when the payment required by the terms of compromise decree was made. According to the applicants, the decree for obtaining possession did not become enforceable unless and until the amount required to be paid to the non-applicants was tendered and deposited. The argument was that the right to execute the decree accrued only when the payment required by the terms of compromise decree was made. According to the applicants, the decree for obtaining possession did not become enforceable unless and until the amount required to be paid to the non-applicants was tendered and deposited. It was, therefore, contended that the limitation started from the date of deposit and as such the application for execution was within time. ( 5. ) NONE appeared on behalf of the non-applicants to oppose this application despite service. ( 6. ) SHRI S. C. Pandey, learned counsel for the applicants, relied on a decision of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in Lalji v. Gajadhar ( AIR 1962 All. 431 .) in support of the aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the applicants. The facts of the case before the Bench of the Allahabad High Court were substantially similar to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench was of the opinion that as the compromise decree did not provide for any period for payment of the sum specified in the decree which was the condition precedent for claiming possession of the suit property by the other side, the plaintiffs could make the aforesaid payment at any time, ft was further held that even if the plaintiffs paid the aforesaid amount after 12 years of the decree, the execution could not be held to be barred by limitation, because the same started running from the date of deposit and not from the date of the decree, because in the absence of the deposit having been so made, the decree was not enforceable. According to the Division Bench, Article 181 could come into play only after the right to apply accrued to a party. It was observed that the right to apply accrued only on the date when the decree became capable of being enforced. The Bench was also of the opinion that the continuance of the other side in possession of the property so long as the payment was not made was to be treated as permissible under the decree and could not be treated as adverse. For taking the aforesaid view, the Division Bench relied on certain observations made by the Privy Council in Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar (AIR 192tp C 3k ). For taking the aforesaid view, the Division Bench relied on certain observations made by the Privy Council in Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar (AIR 192tp C 3k ). In that case, it was held that in order to make the provisions of the Limitation act applicable, the decree sought to be enforced must be in such a form as to render it capable in the circumstances of the case of being enforced. ( 7. ) NOW it has to be seen whether the decree involved in the present case was capable of being enforced from the date it was made or it became enforceable only when the payment was made by the applicants who claim possession of the suit land in execution of the said decree. It will not be correct to say that the decree became capable of being enforced only when the applicants made the deposit, because it cannot be said that immediately after the passing of the decree, there was any obstruction in the way of the applicants to enforce the decree for execution by making the required payment, If they wanted to enforce the decree and obtain possession in execution of the same, they should have applied for execution within the prescribed period of limitation after making the necessary deposit. ( 8. ) WITH due respect to the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, i find myself in disagreement with the view taken by them in Laljis case (supra ). In my opinion, the scope to apply the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rameshwar Singh, v. Homeshwar to the facts of Laljis case or to similar facts of the present case. In the case before the Privy Council, facts were quite different. The judgment of the Privy Council laid down that limitation will not run from the date of the decree when the decree as such is incapable of being enforced. In the case before the Council, the decree in question could not be enforced until the judgment-debtor had come into possession of certain specific property and after his coming into possession, a further application in that respect was made. In the case before the Council, the decree in question could not be enforced until the judgment-debtor had come into possession of certain specific property and after his coming into possession, a further application in that respect was made. For a considerable long period, after the passing of the decree, the judgment-debtor did not come in possession of the said property and as such no further application could be made and the decree was therefore not capable of execution till then. ( 9. ) IN the present case, there was no such obstacle to the enforcement of the decree. The only condition necessary for the immediate enforcement of the decree was that the applicants should pay certain sum as stated in the decree for obtaining possession. There was nothing in the decree to prevent them from making the said payment immediately after the passing of the decree or at any time within the period of limitation. The consequence of the fact that no date was fixed for payment was that the applicants had the advantage of being able to execute the decree after paying the said amount at any time, but necessarily during the period of limitation for filing an application for execution. Had a date been fixed, the payment had to be made by the said date. This much is the difference and concession in a case where no date is fixed for payment. But such a concession cannot be construed to mean that payment could be made at any time at the will of the decree-holder or his successors even after the period of limitation. ( 10. ) SIMILAR was the view taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Baluram v. Madnabai (1971 JLJ Note 143.) after distinguishing the cases reported in rameshwar singh v. Homeshwar Singh and Lalji v. Gajadhar. ( 11. ) NO other point was pressed. ( 12. ) THIS revision, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Since the non-applicants have not appeared to oppose, there will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.