Judgment :- 1. For the fourth time a Government notification dividing a Panchayat into two is under challenge before this Court The notification is dated 4 61975 and is marked Ext. P 2 here. By that notification Kodiyathur Panchayat was bifurcated into Kodiyathur and Karassery Panchayats. The said Governmental action is now questioned by the President of the Kodiyathur Panchayat in that capacity and on behalf of that Panchayat. In his capacity as a member of that Panchayat he opposed that action without success in O. P 2842 of 1975. A Division Bench of this Court said that a member is not competent to impugn the action. That decision is Mohommud Haji V. Unni Moyi (1976 KLT. 106). He then filed O. P. 5020 of 1976 in his capacity as President. Characterising it as an abuse of process of Court, this Court dismissed it in limine. In the meanwhile without proper authority from the Panchayat the Vice-President on its behalf filed O. P. 5224 of 1975 to quash the notification This was dismissed for want of authority of the Vice-President to file the Original Petition on behalf of the Panchayat. The decision of the learned single Judge, Kodiyathur Panchayat v. Dt Panchayat Officer, (ILR. 1976 (II) Kerala 634) was confirmed on appeal by the Vice-President. The Division Bench decision is reported as Kodiyathur Panchayat v. District Panchayat Officer (1977 KLT. 80). 2. S.3 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 confers power on the Government to create Panchayats, to alter Panchayat areas and to specify the names and headquarters of such areas. S.3 (1) (a) confers on the Government the power to create Panchayats; S 3 (1) (b), invests on it the power to exclude any village or portion thereof from a Panchayat area; S.3 (1) (c), gives it the power to include any village or portion thereof in a Panchayat area; and S. (1) (d) enables the Government to cancel a notification issued under clause (a) creating a Panchayat or to alter its name and headquarters. These are to be done by Gazette notifications. Before a notification is published in Gazette under any of the clauses (b) to (d) as per the proviso to S.3 (1) the affected Panchayat or Panchayats should be given reasonable opportunity to make representations and to prefer objections. These are to be done by Gazette notifications. Before a notification is published in Gazette under any of the clauses (b) to (d) as per the proviso to S.3 (1) the affected Panchayat or Panchayats should be given reasonable opportunity to make representations and to prefer objections. This has not been done in this case, and that is the ground on which the notification was questioned in the earlier writ petitions, and is impugned now. 3. While it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that since as held in Kodiyathur Panchayat v. Dt. Panchayat Officer (ILR. 1976 (II) Kerala 634) the proviso to S 3 (1) is mandatory, Ext P2 notification in contravention of that proviso is null and void, and of no legal consequence at all, according to the respondents that notification, as held by the Division Bench in Mohammed Haji v. Unni Moyi (1976 KLT. 106), can be characterised only as voidable 'at the instance of the person against whom it was made', and, according to the learned counsel for respondents, with the person benefitted by it, namely, the Karassery Panchayat, on the party array. (That Panchayat is not a party respondent here). 4. On the aforesaid facts and the contentions raised the first question that arises for consideration is, what is the legal consequence of Ext. P2 order, if any. 5. An administrative action or proceeding cannot be treated as nugatory till a competent court says so and declares it to be so, be it that the court so declares when it is directly challenged before it, or in other proceedings, when it is collaterally impugned. It is immaterial in this regard that the action or proceeding is in violation of a mandatory provision or of rules of natural justice, in which cases the action or the proceeding is often said to be void and null, or, is in contravention of a directory provision or is otherwise vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record, in which instances the action or proceeding is usually said to be voidable; in either case till a competent court speaks on the matter, the action or proceeding cannot be ignored by any one. This principle is recognised in clauses (b) and (c) of Art.226 as obtained today. This principle is recognised in clauses (b) and (c) of Art.226 as obtained today. Under the former clause mere contravention of any of the constitutional provisions (other than those in Chapter III) or of any statutory provision, be it that the contravention is of a mandatory provision, or of a directory provision, without something more, namely, an injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention, would not entitle one to invoke Art.226. Similarly under the latter clause, mere illegality in any proceeding under the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution, or, of any statute without substantial failure of justice would not enable a person to have resort to Art.226. This accords with what Mathew J. after examining the whole extent of law bearing on this aspect, pointed out in Trades Hills Produce v. LT. Officer, Kottayam (1971 KLT. 646) at 654, which is as follows : "To say that an act is automatically null and void without more ado and that there is no need to quash it, if it means that it can be invalidated without recourse to law would conflict with what Lord norris and Hans Kelson said in the passages already quoted. All acts of public authorities are either lawful and valid or unlawful and void. That is why voidable has never played a part in administrative law, and it is erroneous to suppose that unlawful administrative act can have legal effect only if it is called voidable as opposed to void. If a void act is not challenged in law, it would have legal effect as a valid act." Therefore the court cannot begin the enquiry, whether the action or proceeding impugned before it is to be sustained or not, on the assumption that it is of no legal consequence. On the other hand it will have to start that enquiry as if the impugned action or proceeding has achieved the object intended by it and as if it has produced the result aimed by it; the enquiry will really be as to whether the action or proceeding and the object achieved by it and the results produced by it, have to be sustained, or whether these have to be set at naught as of no legal consequence. Such an enquiry can be launched only at the instance of a person aggrieved by the administrative action or proceeding, and with the person for whose benefit it was designed, and when the object of the action is creation of a legal person such as a corporation, that person, as if that object has been gained, on the party array. This is much more so now, since it is necessary for a petitioner invoking Art.226 of the Constitution to satisfy the court that the case falls within clause (b) or (c) of Art.226(1), unless be invokes that jurisdiction for enforcement of fundamental rights. 6. On 6101976 this Court by order on C. M P. 18161 of 1976 in W. A. No. 398 of 1976 directed the respondents therein to retrace their steps, if they have taken any in implementation of Ext. P-2 notification This was presumably for the reason that a President and members were nominated to the Karassery Panchayat and they had assumed charge as is seen from Exts. R-5, R-6 and R-7 series dated 4101976 and an executive officer was appointed for that Panchayat as is seen from Ext R-4, also dated 4-10-1976 There is nothing to show that the respondents retraced the steps but it is averred in their counter affidavits that because of this order the 'newly formed Panchayat did not function' and 'the Kodiyathur Panchayat virtually continued to function'. Creation of a Panchayat is one thing, and functioning of a Panchayat newly created is entirely a different matter. These facts will not in any manner affect the principles stated above or detract the efficaciousness of Ext. P-2 notification, till it is set aside. 7. The contravention of the proviso is sought to be excused by the respondents on two grounds, viz. (i) the action was taken pursuant to resolutions passed by the undivided Kodiyathur Panchayat and repeated requests made in that behalf; and (ii) the said action has not caused any injury of a substantial nature to any one and has not resulted in substantial failure of justice. (i) the action was taken pursuant to resolutions passed by the undivided Kodiyathur Panchayat and repeated requests made in that behalf; and (ii) the said action has not caused any injury of a substantial nature to any one and has not resulted in substantial failure of justice. In this connection it is pointed out that though the notification is dated 4 61975 no valid steps to impugn the same had been taken till after 4 101976 by which time the President and members of Karassery Panchayat had assumed charge and an executive officer bad been appointed for that Panchayat the resolution authorising the present petitioner to file this Original Petition was passed only on 30101976. The averments in the counter affidavits and the earlier judgments of this Court bear out the fact that the undivided Kodiyathur Panchayat itself had requested for bifurcation. In these circumstances there is much force in the contention that no injury of a substantial nature was caused to any one by Ext. P-2 notification, and that there has been no substantial failure of justice. There is no merit in this Original Petition. Dismissed. No costs.