JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. This is defendant's revision application under Section 115, C.P.C. against the order dated September 28, 1975 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Kanpur." In brief, the facts are that the plaintiff opposite party is the owner of House No. 120/316 Lajpat Nagar, Kanpur. According to him it was constructed in 1956 and was let out to the defendant revisionist on a monthly rent of Rs. 125/. The latter failed to pay rent from November 1, 1971. with the result that on March 15, 1972 a notice of demand and ejectment was sent to him. It came back with an endorsement of refusal on the ground that the addressee avoided to receive it. Ultimately the notice was served by affixation on the main door of the defendant revisionist's house on April 15, 1972, In spite of it the defendant neither paid rent nor vacated the house. Hence a suit was filed for his ejectment and for the recovery of arrears of rent and damages. The defendantrevisionist contested that suit, interalia on the grounds that the building was constructed before 1950 and was governed by the provisions of the U.P. Act XIII of 1947, that rent upto January, 1972 was paid to the plaintifflandlord and a sum of Rs. 603/was deposited in the Nagarpalika on account of house tax and water tax and this sum was liable to be adjusted towards rent, that certain amount was deposited in the court and he was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 that no notice was served on him and in any case the alleged notice was invalid. Later on benefit of Section 39 of the new Act was also claimed. The learned trial court decreed the suit for ejectment and for pendentelite and future damages from May 16, 1972 but dismissed it in respect of arrears of rent. The defendant filed a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act which was dismissed on September 28, 1976. Hence the defendant has come up in revision to this Court. The only point pressed before me is that the defendant having deposited the entire amount contemplated by Section 39 was entitled to the benefit of this provision. The defendant filed a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act which was dismissed on September 28, 1976. Hence the defendant has come up in revision to this Court. The only point pressed before me is that the defendant having deposited the entire amount contemplated by Section 39 was entitled to the benefit of this provision. Before going into the merit of this question the applicability of Section 20 (4) of the new Act may also be considered. This section provides that in any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2), i.e., at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building use from, him together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, the court may in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. Both the learned lower courts have come to the conclusion that the building in dispute was constructed in 1956 and the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947 were not applicable to it. The suit for eviction in thxs case wag filed on June 1, 1972, i.e., before the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 came into force. It was, therefore, not a suit under clause (a) of subsection (2) of Section 20 of this Act and the benefit of subsection (4) could not be claimed. The suit for eviction in thxs case wag filed on June 1, 1972, i.e., before the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 came into force. It was, therefore, not a suit under clause (a) of subsection (2) of Section 20 of this Act and the benefit of subsection (4) could not be claimed. So far as the benefit of Section 39 is concerned it lays down: "In any suit for eviction a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the court before which the suit is pending the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's full costs of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to subsection (1) or in clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20 and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary. Provided that a tenant, the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid." The defendant revisionist has filed a statement of account (Annexure II to the affidavit) showing the amount he was liable to pay under Section 39 and the amount he paid or deposited in court. According to this statement he was liable to pay Rs. 4872/ as arrears of rent, the costs of the suit, interest at nine per cent per annum and water tax etc. from July 15, 1972 to April 4, 1974. No water tax was payable prior to enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. As against it he had deposited or paid Rs. 5153/ as per details given in the account. Therefore his contention has been that he had paid or deposited Rs. 231/ in excess of the amount payable and was entitled to the benefit of Section 39. There is no controversy about the amount shown to be due in the statement of account. 5153/ as per details given in the account. Therefore his contention has been that he had paid or deposited Rs. 231/ in excess of the amount payable and was entitled to the benefit of Section 39. There is no controversy about the amount shown to be due in the statement of account. As regards payments and deposits the controversy is about Rs. 350/ paid to the plaintiff's son, Sri Sunil Kumar, on February 3, 1972 by meians of receipt Ex. A2. According to the defendant revisionist this amount was paid in respect of rent upto January, 1972. The plaintiff respondent on the other hand has contended that it was rent for the months of August, September and October, 72. The receipt is conspicuously silent about the period for which this payment was made. The plaintiff respondent did not chose to examine his son to prove for which months he had received this rent. The defendant revisionist had stated an oath that it covered rent upto January, 1972. Therefore, both the lower courts were right in holding that rent upto January, 1972, was July paid to the plaintiff respondent. Another contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent is that Rs. 6031 deposited by the defendant as house tax etc. could not be adjusted towards rent because the letter was not bound to pay it It is also urged that Section 39 contemplates deposit in court but the said* sum was deposited in the office of the Nagar Mahapalika. 6031 deposited by the defendant as house tax etc. could not be adjusted towards rent because the letter was not bound to pay it It is also urged that Section 39 contemplates deposit in court but the said* sum was deposited in the office of the Nagar Mahapalika. I find no force in this contention because as regards taxes Section 516 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam lays down that where a bill for any sum due on account of property tax is served upon an occupier of premises pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 504 the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may at the time of servitae or at any subsequent time cause to be served upon the occupier a notice requiring him to pay the Mahapalika any rent due or falling due from him to the person primarily liable for the payment of the said tax to the extent necessary to satisfy the said sum due subsection (2) of this section says that such notice shall operate as an attachment of the said rent until the said sum due on account of property tax shall have befen paid and satisfied and the occupier shall be entitled to credit in account with the person to whom the said rent is due for any sum paid by him to the Mahapalika in pursuance of such notice. It makes it clear that the occupier who makes payment of tax for which the lessor is primarily liable is entitled in the absence of any contracts the contrary to be reimbursed by the lessor. In his statement the plaintiff respondent did not say that the defendant had not received any notice to pay or was not permitted to do so. On the other hand he admitted that house tax and water tax used to be paid by the defendant and he used to adjust it towards rent. The receipt Ex. A13 also points to the same conclusion. On the other hand he admitted that house tax and water tax used to be paid by the defendant and he used to adjust it towards rent. The receipt Ex. A13 also points to the same conclusion. Section 7 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 also says that subject to any contract in writing to the contrary, the tenant shall be liable to pay to the landlord in addition to and as part of the rent the following taxes or proportionate part thereof, if any, payable in respect of the building or part under his tenancy, namely (a) the water (b) twenty five percent of every such enhancement in house tax made after the commencement of this Act. In the instant case there is an iota of material on the record to show that the defendant had made excess payment. It is true that according to Section 7 of Act XIII of 1972 the tenant was liable to pay to the landlord the taxes or proportionate part thereof, as part of the rent but in this case landlord appears to bava permitted the tenant to pay the taxes in the Nagar Mahapalika and deduct them from the rent. Therefore he could not be required to pay it to him or to deposit it in Court. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has further argued that the deposits were made beyond one month from the date of knowledge of the pendency of the suit and could not enure to the benefit of the defendant. In this connection a few facts may be stated. At first an ex parte decree was passed in this case on May 15, 1973. The defendant revisionist moved an application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. on November 14, 1973 alleging that he came to know of the ex parte decree on November 13, 1973. The decree was set aside on March 5, 1974. The operative part of the order said: "The application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. is allowed on payment of Rs. 20/ as casts and also on the condition that the applicant deposits the entire decreetal amount in cash in a month's time subject to adjustment of the amount already deposited by him in cash in this case and the costs be paid in a month's time positively. 20/ as casts and also on the condition that the applicant deposits the entire decreetal amount in cash in a month's time subject to adjustment of the amount already deposited by him in cash in this case and the costs be paid in a month's time positively. In case of compliance of the conditions aforesaid, the ex parte decree shall stand set aside and the suit restored to its original number. In case the above conditions are not complied with the application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. shall stand rejected." The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent is that according to his own showing the defendant got knowledge of the suit on November 13, 1973 and the deposit should have been made by December 13, 1973 but Rs. 3200/ were deposited in court on April 4, 1974 and Rs. 207/ were deposited as house tax on March 4, 1974. It has also no force because on November 13, 1973 no suit was pending and the defendant cannot be said to have got knowledge of the pendency of the suit on that date. The suit was already decreed, and the ex parte decree was set aside on March 5, 1974 subjeqt I to certain conditions. Rs. 3200/ were deposited on April 4, 1974 in accordance with the order of the Court. Rs. 207/ were already deposited in the Nagar Mahapalika on March 4, 1974. It was on April 5, 1974 that the ex parte decree stood set aside and the suit became pending. Therefore the defendant revisionist will be deemed to have got knowledge of the pendency of the suit on April 5, 1974 and not before it. Even if he is deemed to have got its knowledge on March 4, 1974 the deposit was made within the time contemplated by Section 39. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has further urged that costs and interest were not deposited by the defendant and the benefit of Section 39 could not be claimed. It has also no force because the statement of account shows that full costs of the suit and interest at 9% per annum were deposited. Even if there was any deficiency it is clear from the statement of account that some money was deposited in excess and the deficiency, if any, could be made good out of it. It has also no force because the statement of account shows that full costs of the suit and interest at 9% per annum were deposited. Even if there was any deficiency it is clear from the statement of account that some money was deposited in excess and the deficiency, if any, could be made good out of it. Such an adjustment is fully warranted by law. In the case of Bansi Lal Bulaki Ram v. Sant Ram (AI.R. 1965 Puni. 375.) Rs. 35/were due as rent and less than Rs. 3/ were due as interest. The defendant tendered Rs. 36/ towards interest. The arrears of rent and Rs. 2/ towards interest. It was held that excess towards arrears comd be adjusted towards interest. The contention that court fees payable on future damages was not worked out and deposited carried on force. The expression 'full costs of the suit' used in Section 39 was interpreted in the case of Ram Bilas Rastogi v. Ram Mohan Srivastava (A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 407.) and it was held that the defendant is required to deposit the entire amount of costs which the plaintiff had actually incurred by the date on which the deposit is made and he is not required to deposit court fees due on future damages. Controversy also exists about the adjustment of Rs. 1000/ deposited by the defendant as securer under Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act on November 15, 1973. As stated above the defendant had applied on November 14, 1973 for setting aside the ex parte decree and had to deposit Rs. 1000/ in cash as security. In Bhikka Lal v. Munna Lal (1973 A.L.J. 235) the position of such a deposit was considered and it was held that amount deposited as security under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. does not lose facts without an order of court become the property of the decree holder. He can withdraw the amount only by an application to the Court for executing hisdecree by payment out of the amount in deposit in court as security. In the instant case the court setting aside the ex parte decree passed a specific order to the effect that the amount clearly deposited in cash in this case shall be adjusted towards the decreetal amount. In the instant case the court setting aside the ex parte decree passed a specific order to the effect that the amount clearly deposited in cash in this case shall be adjusted towards the decreetal amount. Therefore this amount became available to the plaintiff after the decrete was passed and the defendant revisionist was entitled to claim its benefit under Section 39. Lastly, it is arguied that on October 27, 1975 the defendant revisionist had moved an application objecting to the withdrawal of the amount deposited by him which show that the deposits made were not unconditional. It has also no force because the ex parte decree was set aside on April 5, 1974 and the suit became pending. It was pending even on October 27, 1975 when the said application was moved. The plaintiff respondent had no right at that time to withdraw the amount and were more so when some amount was deposited in exercise. He was entitled to withdraw it only after the decree was passed. Therefore, the deposit cannot be said to have been made conditionally. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the defendant revisionist is proved to have deposited the entire amount contemplated by Section 39. Therefore no decree for eviction could be passed against him except on one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to subsection (1) or clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20. In this case none of these grounds was alleged or proved. Therefore the defendant was not liable to eviction. The revision application is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower court is set aside. The plaintiff respondent's suit for ejectment of the defendant revisionist and for recovery of mesne profits shall stand dismissed. Costs on parties.