JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a defendant's revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 3.2.1977 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Moradabad. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that the plaintiff opposite party is a registered trust and owns considerable property in Moradabid. One Sri Dcokinandan was the Secretary of the Trust but after his death Sri Kesri Nandan Kapoor became the Secretary. The plaintiff-opposite party also runs the S.S. Collage, Muradabad, in a portion of its building. The trust also possesses certain residential buildings which are attached to the College and are meant only for the principal and the teachers of the College during the terms of their employment. The defendant-revisionist was a principal of the said College and the building in dispute was let out to him as a part of contract of employment on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. Later on the rent was enhanced to Rs. 37.50. The defendant-revisionist retired on 30.6.1970. and was required to vacate the dispute house but in vain. A notice to quit was given to him on 19.7.73 which was served on him on 20.7.73 but in spite of this notice he did not vacate the house. Henze the plaintiff- opposite party filed a suit for his ejectment and for the recovery of Rs. 1162.50 on account of rent and damages. Pendente lite and future damages claimed at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. 3. The defendant-revisionist contested that suit, inter alia, on the grounds that the house was not meant for the Principal of the College nor it was let out to him as a part of contract of employment, that the notice to quit was invalid and Sri Kesrinandan Kapoor had no right to represent the plaintiff. The rate of damages was also challenged. 4. In the trial court only three issues were framed, viz : (1) Whether the premises were let out to the defendant as part of the contract of employment ? (2) Whether the notice is valid ? If so, its effect. (3) Whether the suit through the Secretary is not maintainable ? The rate of damages was also challenged. 4. In the trial court only three issues were framed, viz : (1) Whether the premises were let out to the defendant as part of the contract of employment ? (2) Whether the notice is valid ? If so, its effect. (3) Whether the suit through the Secretary is not maintainable ? The judgment of the learned trial court shows that the learned counsel for the plaintiff had given out at the very inception that the suit was not filed under the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as it was not applicable to the disputed house. He arrived at the conclusion that the house was not let out to the defendant as part of the contract of employment and the notice to quit was valid. The Secretary was held entitled to sue. Accordingly the suit was decreed but the pendente lite and future damages were awarded at the rate of Rs. 37.50 per month only. 5. The defendant filed a revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act and pressed only one point, viz., that the house is not exempt from the operation of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and as it was not let out as part of the contract of employment he is not liable to eviction under section 20(2)(g) of the said Act. 6. The learned lower revisional court came to the conclusion that the house was not within the purview of the said Act and as the notice to quit was valid the defendant was liable to eviction. The revision application was dismissed and the defendant has come up in revision to this Court. 7. The only point pressed by the learned counsel for the revisionist is that in the absence of any issue on the point whether the building is exempt from the operation of the said Act the lower courts were not competent to go into its merit. According to him, the plaintiff should have alleged and proved that the building is exempt from operation of the Act and as he did not do so he could not be permitted to fall back upon the general law. His contention is based on the ground that at fist the plaintiff opposite party had enhanced agreed rent by twenty five per cent as contemplated by section 5 of the new Act. His contention is based on the ground that at fist the plaintiff opposite party had enhanced agreed rent by twenty five per cent as contemplated by section 5 of the new Act. He filed this suit on the ground that the house was let out to the defendant as part of contract of employment. This ground falls under section 20(2)(g) of the Act. In para 7 of the counter affidavit filed in this Court the plaintiff-opposite party has himself said that the building is not beyond the purview of the Act. In the face of this material the lower courts should not have held that the building is not governed by the provisions of this Act. Before going into the merit of this contention it may be stated that section 2 of the Act lays down exemptions from the operation of the Act. Clause (f) stated :- "Any building built or held by a society registered under the societies Registration Act, 1860, or by a co-operative Society, company or firm and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants whether on rent or free of rent or as a guest house, by what ever name called, for the occupation of persons having dealing with it in the ordinary course of business." The aforesaid makes it clear that a building built and held by a registered society and intended for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers is exempt from the operation of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that the trial court committed an error by not framing an issue on this point and by not giving a finding on it carries no force. There is not a word in the plaint to the effect that the house is amenable to the provisions of this Act. There is also no mention in it that the suit was filed on the basis of section 20(2)(g) of this Act. It could not become a suit under this Act simply because it was alleged that the building was let out as a part of contract of employment. There is also no mention in it that the suit was filed on the basis of section 20(2)(g) of this Act. It could not become a suit under this Act simply because it was alleged that the building was let out as a part of contract of employment. Since the building was alleged to have been let out as part of contract of employment before the Act came into force, the plaintiff alleged that fact in the plaint simply to show that the defendant was not entitled to retain it. A plain reading of the plaint makes it clear that the suit was filed under the general law. i. e., the Transfer of Property Act. In his written statement the defendant-revisionist did not give out that the building was governed by the provision of the said Act. The plaintiff's learned counsel appears to have made it clear in the trial court that the suit was filed not under the provisions of this Act but was filed under the general law. Since there was no controversy over this point the learned trial court did not feel the necessity of framing an issue on it. It is important to state that the defendant did not choose to claim the benefit of this Act even in his statement on oath before the court. It was for the first time in the memo of revision filed under section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act that a plea was taken to the effect that section 2(f) of the Act is not applicable to this building meaning thereby that it is not exempt from the operation of the Act. Since this plea was raised in the grounds of revision the learned lower revisional court had to address itself on it. As a matter of fact, it was not at all necessary to go into its merit when the plaintiff did not file the suit on the basis of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the defendant did not claim the benefit of this Act. Both the parties appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the building is not governed by the provisions of the said Act. In such a situation it was not at all necessary for the lower courts even to consider whether the house was let out as a part of the contract of employment. Both the parties appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the building is not governed by the provisions of the said Act. In such a situation it was not at all necessary for the lower courts even to consider whether the house was let out as a part of the contract of employment. If the notice to quit was valid a decree for eviction could be passed notwithstanding whether any ground contemplated by section 20 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 existed or not. I am, therefore, of the view that in the circumstances of this case it is not at all necessary to go into the merit of the question whether the building is exempt from the operation of the Act because both the parties proceeded on the assumption that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to it. The house could not be governed by the provisions of the Act simply because the plaintiff had enhanced rent by twenty five per cent as contemplated by section 5 or because he has made an erroneous admission in his counter affidavit. Parties cannot he allowed to resile from their pleadings. At the earliest opportunity the plaintiff had given out that the suit was not filed under the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 as they were not applicable to it. The defendant revisionist did not challenge it in the trial court. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into the merit of this question nor the lower revisional court should have done so. As a valid notice to quit was given to the defendant revisionist he was liable to eviction. Damages were awarded at the same rate at which rent was payable and cannot be said to be excessive. 8. For all these reasons the revision application has no force and is dismissed with costs on parties. He is allowed three months hereby to vacate the premises.