Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal with leave of a learned judge of this Court in S. A. No. 435 of 1973. The matter arose out of an application for restoration of possession under S.13B of the Kerala Laud Reforms Act Respondents 2 to 4 in that application are the appellants before us The application was originally filed with only the 10th respondent on the party array, and respondents 1 to 9 were subsequently impleaded. There is no controversy that they were impleaded beyond the period of six months from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms Act mentioned in sub-clause (2) of S.13B of the Act. The only ground now agitated before us is whether, having regard to this fact respondents 1 to 9 could be impleaded as parties to the application and whether the application should not be regarded as one beyond time as far as these respondents are concerned. The other aspects dealt with in the judgments of the Munsiff, the lower appellate court, and the learned judge of this Court have not been argued or pressed before us and we should not be understood as having dealt with any one of them. 2. The learned Single Judge dealt with the matter stating that the petition as such had been filed within the period of 6 months with the auction purchaser alone on the party array; that there was no provision as to the persons who are to join in an application under S.13B of the Act; that the court would direct notice to all persons, who would be affected by the order on the application, but that the same did not mean that the principles of S.21 of the Limitation Act could apply to such cases. The learned judge quoted S.21 of the Limitation Act and said that that section expressly deals with suits and that applications are not within the scope of the Section. For the said view reliance was placed on the decisions in Chandrika v. Ram Kuer (AIR. 1923 Patna 88), Mst Gulab Kuer v. Syed Mohamed Zaffar (AIR 1921 Patna 180) and Indubhushan v. Haricharan (AIR. 1931 Calcutta 385). The Munsiff, on this question bad decided in favour of the present appellants holding that they could not be impleaded beyond the period of six months mentioned in S. I3B of the Act. (vide Para.7 of the judgment). 1923 Patna 88), Mst Gulab Kuer v. Syed Mohamed Zaffar (AIR 1921 Patna 180) and Indubhushan v. Haricharan (AIR. 1931 Calcutta 385). The Munsiff, on this question bad decided in favour of the present appellants holding that they could not be impleaded beyond the period of six months mentioned in S. I3B of the Act. (vide Para.7 of the judgment). On appeal, the learned District Judge did not deal with this question at all. The two points posed by him for determination in the appeal were (i) whether the respondents to the appeal were bona fide purchasers for consideration and (ii) whether the appeal is belated. On the first point the District Judge held that the respondents were not bonafide purchasers; and on the second, that the appeal was maintainable. 3. S.21 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: ' 21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant: (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff." We may also refer to S.29 of the Limitation Act which is in these terms: "29. (I) Nothing in this Act shall affect S.25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (I) Nothing in this Act shall affect S.25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of S.3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule; and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in S.4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceedings under any such law. (4) S.25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in S.2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend." Between the provisions of S.21 and of S.29, we have little doubt that even proceedings by way of an application with which we are concerned in this case, are covered. The learned Single Judge unfortunately did not notice the provisions of S.29 of the Limitation Act. Having regard to the said provision we would hold that the application for restoration was beyond" time as far as respondents 1 to 9 are concerned. In reversal of the view of the learned judge, and of the lower appellate court, we restore the decree of the Munsiff dismissing the application as far as respondents 1 to 9 are concerned. The decree in so far as it relates to respondent No. 10 will remain unaffected. We make no order as to costs. We wish to record that the applicability of the proviso to S.21 (1) of the Limitation Act was debated with reference to whether the period of limitation mentioned in S.13B of the Act should not be excused on an application under S.5 of the Limitation Act. Whether it should be so excused or not, there is no application, not even an oral request to excuse delay; and we are not satisfied that any grounds exist for excusing delay under S.5 of the Act.