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1977 DIGILAW 66 (PAT)

Banshankar Roy v. Guneshwar Roy

1977-04-13

P.S.SAHAY, R.P.SINHA

body1977
JUDGMENT R. P. Sinha, J. This is an application under section 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') by the petitioner against the order passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Saharsa, on the 10th January, 1975. 2. The petitioner had filed a petition of complaint against one Brahmadeo Roy and 11 others before the Chief Judicial magistrate, Saharsa, on the 1st May. 1974 on the allegation that Nirmala Devi was his legally married wife and they had lived as husband and wife for about 1½ years. Dhananjai Roy, one of the members of the opposite party, came to the house of the petitioner on the 14th April, 1974 and took away the wife of the petitioner Nirmala Devi who was his niece on the pretext of the illness of her mother. When the petitioner went to the house of Dhananjai Roy aforesaid on the 25th April, 1974 to bring back his wife, Dhananjai Roy postponed her Rokhsadi to the 29th April. 1974. Again on the 29th April, 1974 when the petitioner went to him he did not find his wife there and on enquiry, he learnt that his wife had been sent to the house of Brahamdeo Roy who had kept her for committing illicit inter course. The petitioner filed a petition of complaint and was examined on solemn affirmation by the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, acting under section 202 of the Code, sent the petition of complaint for enquiry to the Block; Development Officer, Kahre. While the enquiry was pending, the petitioner filed a few petitions on different dates before the Chief Judicial magistrate for recalling the enquiry from the Block Development Officer aforesaid. The learned magistrate, however, on the 19th July, 1974, dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code after considering the enquiry report received from the enquiring officer and giving reasons for having done so. 3. The petitioner thereupon filed an application under section 397 (l) of the Code in the court of session against the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate. 3. The petitioner thereupon filed an application under section 397 (l) of the Code in the court of session against the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate. That application was heard by the learned Second Additional sessions Judge who, after thoroughly considering the petition of complaint, the enquiry report and the aforesaid order of the learned magistrate, came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding in the matter and the complaint was held to have been rightly dismissed with the result that the revision application of the petitioner under section 397 (1) was dismissed on the 10th January, 1975. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the petitioner filed the present application in this court originally under section 397 and 401 of the Code but the same was subsequently amended and it was labelled as an application purporting to be one under section 398 of the Code. 5. Mr. B. K. Banerji. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present application in this court. According to him, under the pr0visions of the new Code which has come into force from 1st of April, 1974 a second revision is barred under section 399 (3) of the code. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand, very vehemently contended that an application for further enquiry under section 398 of the Code can be made in this court even though an application under the provisions of section 398 had been made unsuccessfully before the court of session. Learned counsel for the parties made their submission both on the question of maintainability as well as on merits of the application. 6. First we have to decide whether this application is maintainable. If so, then we have to see whether the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is fit to be interfered with on merits 7. Mr. Banerji, on the question of maintainability, has submitted that the petitioner had filed an application under section 397 (I) of the Code before the Sessions Judge against the order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint. The very first paragraph of the order of the learned additional Sessions Judge reads thus ;- "This is a petition in revision under section 397 (1) Cr. The very first paragraph of the order of the learned additional Sessions Judge reads thus ;- "This is a petition in revision under section 397 (1) Cr. P. C. which has been filed against an order dated 19.7.14 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa, in complaint case no. 185/74 dismissing the complain t under section 203 Cr. P. C." According to learned counsel, under section 397(3) of the Code the petitioner could not move this court again after having already proved the Sessions Judge. Section 397 (3) reads as follows -- "If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them". Further he has submitted that even for passing an order under the provisions of section 398 of the Code the High Court or the Sessions Judge has to examine the record under section 397. The relevant portion of section 398 reads as follows ;"On examining any record under section 397 or otherwise the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial magistrate by himself or by any of the magistrate subordinate to him to make further enquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203...". According to Mr. Banerji, the Additional Sessions Judge in this particular case entertained the application of the petitioner under section 397 of the Code and on being satisfied that the complaint was rightly dismissed, passed an order refusing to direct further enquiry and dismissed the application of the petitioner. The question is whether the petitioner could again file an application purporting to be one under sections 397 and 401 as it was originally labelled, or under section 398 as has been done after amending the same. Mr. Banerji has rightly submitted that the High Court and the Sessions Judge no doubt exercise concurrent powers for directing further enquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 of the Code in view of the provisions of section 398. This power can be exercised by the High Court or the Sessions Judge on the application of the person aggrieved or otherwise. In the instant case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had passed the impugned order against the petitioner on his application under section 397 (1), so according to Mr. This power can be exercised by the High Court or the Sessions Judge on the application of the person aggrieved or otherwise. In the instant case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had passed the impugned order against the petitioner on his application under section 397 (1), so according to Mr. Banerji, under section 397 (3) no further application by him shall be entertainable by this court. 8. Mr. Basudeva Prasad has very strongly contended that if an application in revision is made by a person under section 397 (1) of the Code then certainly under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 397 no further application by the same person can be entertained but according to him, if an application is made by a person to the Sessions Judge for exercising his powers under section 398 then there is nothing in the section from which it can be concluded that no further application before this court can be made by the person who has already made an application before Sessions Judge. Mr. Prasad has tried to draw a line of distinction between the revisional power of the Sessions Judge and the High Court and their powers for ordering further enquiry under section 398 of the Code. According to him, an application in revision is not the same thing as an application for ordering further enquiry. He has urged that so far as section 397 and 399 of the Code are concerned, undoubtedly, under section (3) of the aforesaid sections, another application and another revision are barred. As already stated earlier, under section 397 (3) no further application be the same person and under section 398 (3) no further proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained. According to Mr. Prasad, no such restriction has been imposed under section 398 of the Code. 9. Under chapter XXX of the code under the heading 'Reference and Revision' there are as many as 11 sections. According to Mr. Prasad, no such restriction has been imposed under section 398 of the Code. 9. Under chapter XXX of the code under the heading 'Reference and Revision' there are as many as 11 sections. Section 395 provides for making a reference to the High Court; section 396 deals with disposal of cases after decision of the High Court on reference; section 397 deals with the powers of the High Court and the Sessions Judge to call for records to exercise powers of revision; section 398 empowers the High Court and the Sessions Judge to direct further enquiry into a complaint which is dismissed under section 203 or sub-section (4) of section 204 or in the case of any person accused of an offence who has been• discharged. Under section 398 the Sessions Judge has been empowered to exercise powers of revision which the High Court under section 401 can exercise. Section 400 empowers an Additional Sessions Judge with all powers of the Sessions Judge under this Chapter. Section 401 deals with the powers of the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 402 deals with the power of the High Court to withdraw and transfer revision cases and section 403 gives the power to the court exercising revisional powers to hear the parties. Under section 404 a Metropolitan Magistrate may submit the grounds of his decision for consideration of the High Court or the Court of Session and section 405 requires the High Court or the Sessions Judge to certify that decision or order to the court whose order is revised. 10. Mr. Prasad's contention has been that the order to be passed under section 398 of the Code cannot be treated as an order passed under section 397 or section 399 of the Code as, according to him, they deal with matters in which the Sessions Judge or the High Court in exercise of their revisional powers, can pass any order except an order of the nature which can be passed under section 398 of the Code. So, according to him, although an order passed by the Sessions Judge in revision under the provisions of section 399 is not again revisable by the High Court but an order by the Sessions Judge under section 398 of the Code can be examined by the High Court as there is nothing in section 398 to indicate that after an. order has been passed by the Sessions Judge, this court is precluded from exercising its power under section 398, since there is no bar provided in that section as has been so done in sub-section (3) of both sections 397 and 399 of the Code. In my opinion, although there is no such express provision in section 398 like sub-section (3) of section 397 and 399 but from the scheme of Chapter XXX it appears that it deals with cases of reference and revision. This is clear from section 405 also the relevant portion of which reads as follows :- "When a case is revised under this Chapter by the High Court, or a Sessions Judge, it or he shall, in the manner provided by section 398, certify its decision or order to the court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed". From the above it can be safely concluded that even an order passed by the Sessions Judge or by the High Court under section 398 must be regarded as an order passed in revision. Besides that an aggrieved party has, broadly speaking a right to go in appeal against a judgment or order where appeal is specifically provided or to prefer an application in revision. There is no other provision under which the order of a subordinate court can be interfered with by the High Court or Court of Sessions at the instance of the party aggrieved except by way of appeal or revision. Undoubtedly the order passed by the High Court or by the Sessions Judge against an order of a magistrate dismissing a complaint is an order passed not in appeal but in revision under Chapter XXX of the Code and in that view of the matter, a second revision before the High Court after an order passed by the Sessions Judge in revision is not contemplated under provisions of sections 397 and 399 of the Code. 11. 11. There is yet another aspect of the matter also from which it appears that the petitioner was not entitled to make an application to this Court under section 397 read with section 401 or section 398 of the Code. Section 398 clearly provides that on examining any record under section 397 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial magistrate to make further enquiry. In this case the petitioner has undoubtedly filed an application under section 397 (1) of the Code before the Court of Session for invoking the powers under Section 398 and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, on examining the record under section 397 passed the impugned order. As already quoted above, under sub-section (3) of section 399 where an application in revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge becomes final and no further proceeding by way of revision can be entertained by the High Court or any other court. Mr. Prasad has referred to the decision in the case of the Commissioner (If Income-tax, Patiala V. M/s Shahzada Nand and sons and others with particular reference to the following excerpt from paragraph 8 of the said decision; "When the words of a section are clear, but its scope is sought to be curtailed, by construction the approach suggested by Lord Coke in, In re: Heydon's case (1584) 3 Ci rep. 7 a. yields better results : "To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim scope and object of the whole Act; to consider according to Lord Coke: 1. What was the Jaw before the Act, was passed; 2. What was the mischief or defect for which the Law had not provided; 3. What remedy parliament has appointed; and 4. The reason of the remedy". In my opinion, in Chapter XXX of the new Code, there has been provision, as already discussed above for only one application in revision to be entertained by the Sessions Judge or by the High Court and with that end in view, the provisions were suitably amended barring second revision before High Court if there has already been a revision before the Sessions Judge. 12. 12. A situation similar to one in the present case had arisen before the: Bombay High Court in the case of Babu Balgonda Patil and others V. Dhanyakumar Balasaheb Patil and others. In that case the short question of law was whether the revision petitions filed by the petitioner,-complainants in the High Court were maintainable in view of the provisions of section 397 (3) of the new Code. There It was he ld that sub-section (3) of section 397 of the new Code bars a second revision application to the High Court by the same party when the party had made a revision application to the Sessions Court. In view of the admitted position in that case that petitions by the complainant were against the orders passed by the Sessions Judge dismissing the revision petitions the bar enacted by the said provision was held to apply and hence, the revision petitions were held to be not maintainable and the High Court could not entertain them. 13. For the reasons stated above, m) concluded opinion is that the present application by the petitioner before this court against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge passed in revision on.10th January, 1975 is not maintainable and cannot be entertained. In this view of the matter, I need riot go into the merits of this application when the same is not entertainable by this court the application is accordingly dismissed. P. S. Sabay, J. I agree. Revision dismissed.