JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE dispute in this appeal pertains to land Khasra no. 229, area 6. 08 acres situated in village Birbahi Har, Tahsil and District panna. This land originally belonged to one Bhawani Singh, who died in 1948 leaving behind his widow, two widows of two predeceased sons and a daughter Rajju Raja. Bhawani Singh had, in fact, three sons, namely, raghubir Singh, Malkhan Singh and Nanhe Raja. All the three sons died during the lifetime of Bhawani Singh. Raghubir Singh died unmarried. Malkhan Singh left his widow Majhali Dulaiya and Nanhe Raja left his widow Nanhi Dulaiya. After Bhawani Singhs death, the land in suit along with other lands and properties of Bhawani Singh was in possession of his widow. The widow of Bhawani Singh died in 1951. Rajju Raja, the daughter of Bhawani Singh, sold the suit land on 29th June 1967 in favour of one bhagwan Kunwar. The suit in which this appeal arises was then instituted by Majhali Dulaiya and Nanhi Dulaiya against Rajju Raja and Bhagwan kunwar for possession of the suit land. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit land along with other properties was inherited by them after the death of the widow of Bhawani Singh in 1951 and that Rajju Raja had no interest whatsoever in it and the sale in favour of Bhagwan Kunwar was ineffective against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed possession as, according to them, after the sale they were dispossessed by the defendants. The defendants claimed that the suit land was inherited by defendant Rajju Raja on the death of Bhawani Singh. It was also claimed in the alternative that the plaintiffs willingly relinquished this land in favour of Rajju Raja sometime in 1953. The defendants further pleaded adverse possession. Both the courts negatived the defendants claim that the suit land was relinquished by the plaintiffs in favour of Rajju Raja in 1953. The Courts also negatived, the plea of adverse possession. On the question of succession, it was held that the property was inherited by the plaintiffs after the death of the widow of Bhawani Singh in 1951 under the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. On these findings the suit was decreed. ( 2. ) IN this appeal filed by the defendant Bhagwan Kunwar, the findings negativing the pleas of relinquishment and adverse possession have not been challenged before me. On these findings the suit was decreed. ( 2. ) IN this appeal filed by the defendant Bhagwan Kunwar, the findings negativing the pleas of relinquishment and adverse possession have not been challenged before me. All that has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant is that after the death of the widow of Bhawani Singh in 1951, the suit land was inherited by Rajju Raja under the Hindu Law and that the provisions of Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, were not applicable. ( 3. ) AS earlier stated, the land with which I am concerned in this appeal is situated in Tahsil and District Panna. Tahsil Panna was formerly a part of the erstwhile Indian State of Panna. Panna and other neighbouring States merged in 1948 and formed the United State of Vihdhya Pradesh. The administration of this State was handed over to the Government of India from 1st January 1950 by an agreement executed between the Governor general of India and the Rulers of the States forming the United State of vindhya Pradesh. By the States Merger (Chief Commissioners Provinces)Order, 1950, made under section 290a of the Government of India Act, 1935, on 22nd January 1950, the State of Vindhya Pradesh was constituted the chief Commissioners Province of Vindhya Pradesh. On 26th January 1950, when the Constitution came into force, the Chief Commissioners Province of Vindhya Pradesh became the Part C State of Vindhya Pradesh under the constitution. On the reorganisation of States by the States Reorganisation act, 1956, the State of Vindhya Pradesh was included in the present State of Madhya Pradesh. ( 4. ) THE Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, which was enacted by the Central Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, did not extend to Panna. The Parliament by the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extended to the State of Vindhya Pradesh a number of Central Laws. By this Act, the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, was extended to Vindhya Pradesh from 16th April 1950. Section 3 of the Act provides that the Acts extended "shall be in force in the States of Tripura and Vindhya pradesh, as they are generally in force in territories to which they extend immediately before the commencement of this Act. " ( 5. Section 3 of the Act provides that the Acts extended "shall be in force in the States of Tripura and Vindhya pradesh, as they are generally in force in territories to which they extend immediately before the commencement of this Act. " ( 5. ) THE first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, did not apply to agricultural lands and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim benefit of that Act. The second argument of the learned counsel is that section 3 (1)of the Act, which is relied upon by the plaintiffs, is restricted to separate property and that the suit land was not separate property of Bhawani Singh. The third argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was not applicable also for the reason that Bhawani Singh died in 1948, before the Act was extended to Vindhya Pradesh. Reference in this connection was made to section 4 of the Act. ( 6. ) THE first question to be decided in this appeal is whether the Hindu womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 applied to agricultural lands in vindhya Pradesh. The topic of devolution of agricultural land under the government of India Act, 1935, was included in List II of Schedule VII, i. e. the Provincial List. The topic of succession, save as regards agricultural land, was included in List III, i. e. the Concurrent List. The distribution of legislative powers was contained in section 100 of the Act. The Central legislature had no power to legislate for a Governors Province with respect to the matters enumerated in the Provincial List. The provinces were divided into Governors Provinces and Chief Commissioners Provinces. Part III of the Act dealt with the Governors Provinces and Part IV of the Act dealt with the Chief Commissioners Provinces. The Central Legislature had power to legislate on all matters in respect of Chief Commissioners Provinces including those matters which were specified in the Provincial Legislative list. The constitutional validity of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property act, 1937, was considered by the Federal Court in re Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, (AIR 1941 P C 72.) and Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, (A I R 1945 F C 25 ). The constitutional validity of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property act, 1937, was considered by the Federal Court in re Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, (AIR 1941 P C 72.) and Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, (A I R 1945 F C 25 ). By these decisions the federal Court held the Act to be valid; but it also held that the word "property" as used in the Act should be read down not to include agricultural land in the Governors Provinces. The Federal Court applied the principle that the Legislature does not intend to exceed its constitutional powers and that the general term "property" used in the Act should, as a matter of construction, be limited to property in respect of which the Legislature had power to legislate. As a result of these decisions of the Federal court, the Act applied to all property in the Chief Commissioners Provinces, but to property other than agricultural land in the Governors Provinces. The application of the Act was as if it had contained a definition clause stating that property in the Act meant all property in respect of which the legislature was competent to legislate. This legal position is clearly brought out from the following passage taken from the judgment of Varadachariar, J. , in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (supra): "on this view, it was said that in the present case, the word "property" would mean one thing for the Governors Provinces and a different thing for the Commissioners Provinces, because in respect of the latter, the Indian Legislature enjoys the powers of the Central Legislature as well as the Provincial Legislature. This anomaly is the result of the constitution and is not due to any defect in the measure. If, for instance, the enactment had contained a definition clause stating that property" in the Act meant all property in respect of which the Legislature was competent to legislate, the result would have been the same. In the absence of such a definition, the same result is brought about by the rule of construction recognised in Macleod v. Attorney General for new South Sales, (1891 A C 455. ). " ( 7. ) PARLIAMENT under the Constitution could legislate for a Part C State with respect to any matter, notwithstanding that such matter was a matter enumerated in the State List [see Article 246 (4)]. ). " ( 7. ) PARLIAMENT under the Constitution could legislate for a Part C State with respect to any matter, notwithstanding that such matter was a matter enumerated in the State List [see Article 246 (4)]. Further, the topic of succession now wholly falls under the Concurrent List. That is to say, the states have now no exclusive power to make laws in respect of succession to agricultural land. When Parliament by Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extended the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, to the Part C state of Vindhya Pradesh, the effect was as if the latter Act was incorporated by reference in the former. In other words, the Hindu Womens Rights to property Act had effect in Vindhya Pradesh as if it had been enacted by parliament in 1950 and applied to Vindhya Pradesh: See Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi, (AIR 1958 S C 682, pp. 685, 686.) and Bhaiyalal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (A I R 1962 S C 981, p. 985. ). As Parliament had complete legislative competence to legislate for any matter so far as vindhya Pradesh was concerned, the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act applied in Vindhya Pradesh in respect of all property including agricultural land. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew my attention to section 3 of the Part C States (Laws) Act which provided that the Acts extended were to be in force in Vindhya Pradesh, as they were generally in force in the territories to which they extended before 16th April 1950. It is further argued that as the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act did not generally apply to agricultural land, therefore, it did not apply to agricultural land in Vindhya Pradesh also. In my opinion, there is no merit in this argument. As earlier pointed out, it is wrong to say that the Hindu Womens rights to Property Act, 1937, was not applicable to agricultural land. It applied to agricultural land in those territories which were the Chief Commissioners Provinces. As explained by the Federal Court in the passage extracted by me above from the Judgment of Varadachariar J. , the Act had to be read as if it contained a definition clause defining property to mean "all property in respect of which the Legislature was competent to legislate". As explained by the Federal Court in the passage extracted by me above from the Judgment of Varadachariar J. , the Act had to be read as if it contained a definition clause defining property to mean "all property in respect of which the Legislature was competent to legislate". This is how the Act was generally in force in the territories to which it extended before the commencement of the Part C States (Laws) Act. As parliament had complete jurisdiction to legislate in respect of any matter so far as Vindhya Pradesh was concerned, the word "property" as used in the act ought to be construed to include agricultural land in Vindhya Pradesh. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Hari Dass v. Hukmi, (AIR 1965 Punj. 254.), in support of his argument. In this case, it was held by the Punjab High Court that the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act did not cover agricultural lands in the State of Punjab even after the commencement of the Constitution. This ruling of the Punjab High Court is on the construction of Article 372 of the Constitution. Article 372 continued the laws as they were in force without changing their scope and applicability. The Punjab case is not relevant on the question whether the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act applied to agricultural land in Vindhya Pradesh on its extension to that State under section 3 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950. ( 8. ) THE second question to be examined in this appeal is whether the suit land constituted separate property of Bhawani Singh within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act. On this question, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that although Bhawani Singhs sons predeceased him and although he was the sole surviving coparcener at the time of his death, the property in his possession was joint family property and not his separate property. It is true that the property held by the last surviving coparcener cannot be regarded as "separate property" within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Act: [see umaval Achi v. Lakshmi Achi and Manoharlal v Bhuri Bai, (AIR 1972 S C 1369. ). It is true that the property held by the last surviving coparcener cannot be regarded as "separate property" within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Act: [see umaval Achi v. Lakshmi Achi and Manoharlal v Bhuri Bai, (AIR 1972 S C 1369. ). But the difficulty in accepting this argument is that it proceeds on the assumption that the land in suit was coparcenary property or ancestral property of Bhawani singh. The only allegation in the plaint is that the land was Bhawani Singhs property. There is neither any plea nor evidence that the land was ancestral property of Bhawani Singh or that it was acquired by him as coparcenary property. There is no presumption that joint family owns any coparcenary property. In the absence of any allegation that the suit land was Bhawani singhs ancestral or joint family property, the case must be decided on the footing that it was Bhawani Singhs separate property. It is true that had the land been ancestral property or had it been coparcenary property of bhawani Singh and his sons, it could not have been taken to be separate property on the ground that Bhawani Singh was the sole surviving coparcener at the time of his death. But as earlier pointed out, there is no foundation for the assumption that the land was ancestral property or coparcenary property at any time. It must, therefore, be held that the land was separate property of Bhawani Singh at the time of his death. ( 9. ) NOW I come to the last question argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as Bhawani Singh died in 1948, before the Hindu Womens rights to Property Act, 1937 was extended to Vindhya Pradesh, section 3 (1)of the Act was wholly inapplicable even though the widow of Bhawani Singh died in 1951, after coming into force of the Act. Sections 3 (1) and 4 of the act, which are relevant on this point, read as follows : - "3 (1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his widows together shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son : provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a sons son if there is surviving a son or sons son of such predeceased son; provided further that the same provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. " "4. Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of this Act. " ( 10. ) UNDER the Hindu Law, the widow comes as an heir after son, grand-son and great grandson. Further, under the Hindu Law, a predeceased sons widow is not an heir at all. Under section 3 (1) of the Act, the widow gets the same share as a son. Similarly, the widow of a predeceased son inherits in like manner as a son under the proviso. When bhawani Singh died in 1948, the Act was not applicable, as it was extended to the territories with which we are concerned on 16th April 1950. The widow of Bhawani Singh inherited the suit land as a limited heir under the hindu Law. The plaintiffs who are widows of predeceased sons did not, in 1948, get any interest as heirs of Bhawani Singh. The widow of Bhawani Singh died in 1951. The Act had then come into force. The widow of Bhawani Singh held the limited estate of a Hindu widow. On her death, the succession reopened to the last male holder, i. e. Bhawani Singh. The widow of Bhawani Singh died in 1951. The Act had then come into force. The widow of Bhawani Singh held the limited estate of a Hindu widow. On her death, the succession reopened to the last male holder, i. e. Bhawani Singh. The settled position under the Hindu Law is that where a limited owner succeeds to an estate the succession to the estate on her death has to be decided on the basis that the last full owner died on that date and in deciding as to who are the heirs of the last full owner, one has to see the law as applicable on the date of the death of the limited owner. Reference in this connection may be made to Daya Singh v. Dhan Kaur, (A I R 1974 S C 665. ). The following two passages from the judgment of the Supreme Court in this case fully bring out this legal position: "thus two propositions follow: (1) Succession opens on the death of the limited owner, and (2) the law then in force would govern the succession. " "the accepted position under the Hindu Law is that where a limited owner succeeds to an estate the succession to the estate on her death will have to be decided on the basis that the last full owner died on that day. It would be unreasonable to hold that in such a circumstance the law as it existed at the time when the last male holder actually died should be given effect to. If the person who is likely to succeed at the time of the limited owners death is not, as happens very often, likely to be the person who would have succeeded if the limited owner had not intervened, there is nothing unreasonable in holding that the law as to the person who is entitled to succeed on the limited owners death should be the law then in force and not the law in force at the time of the last full owners death. " 10. In Daya Singhs case the Supreme Court was considering section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which opens with the words : "the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter. " 10. In Daya Singhs case the Supreme Court was considering section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which opens with the words : "the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter. " It was held that the section applied to the case where a Hindu widow holding a limited estate under the Customary Law of Punjab died after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act although her husband had died in 1933, long before the Act came into force. The succession to the estate was held to be governed by section 8 and not by the Customary law of Punjab which was in force at the time of the husbands death. In so tracing the heirs of the last male holder after the death of the limited owner, the Hindu Law applies a fiction. Because of the legal fiction, the heirs of the last male holder have to be traced as if he had died on the date when the limited owner died. It was on this rule of Hindu Law that the privy Council decided the case of Duni Chand v. Anar Kali, (A I R 1946 P C 173.), which arose under the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929. The same principle was applied by the Supreme Court in Daya Singh v. Dhan Kaur (supra ). Section 3 (1) of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act uses the words "dies intestate" which are similar to the words "dying intestate" as used in the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, and section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which were considered by the Privy council and the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. Had the matter rested with section 3 (1) alone, I would have found no difficulty in holding that after the death of the widow of Bhawani Singh in 1951 the heirs of bhawani Singh had to be traced by taking notice of the heirs mentioned in section 3 (1) on the basis of the fiction that Bhawani Singhs heirs have to be found out on the footing as if he died in 1951 when the widow died. Section 4 of the Act, however, says in clear terms that nothing in the Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the Act. Section 4 of the Act, however, says in clear terms that nothing in the Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the Act. " The clear mandate of section 4 is that nothing in the Act is to be applied to find out Bhawani Singhs heirs because he died in 1948, before the commencement of the Act in the area with which we are concerned. Section 4, therefore, destroys the fiction of Hindu Law which would have enabled me to take notice of the heirs mentioned in section 3 (1 ). It is pertinent in this connection to note that in Daya Singhs ease the Supreme court referred to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act which uses the words "when a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act" and pointed out that it was extremely significant that section 8 with which the Court was concerned did not use these words but used the words "dying intestate" (See p. 667 of the report ). It follows from these observations that had the words in section 98, been the same as used in section 6, the fiction of the hindu Law, which requires one to proceed on the footing as if the last male holder died on the date when the limited owner died, would not have enabled to bring in the heirs mentioned in section 8. The observations of the Supreme Court thus support my conclusion that in view of section 4 of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act it is not possible to apply section 3 (1) to a case where the Hindu male had died before the commencement of the Act although the limited owner died after its commencement. This view is also supported by two decisions of the Patna High Court: [see jasoda Kuer v. Phul Kuer, ( AIR 1958 Pat. 600 .) and Lakhan Lal v Richu Mian, ( AIR 1960 Pat. 181 . ). The same view has been commenced by Raghavachariar in his work on Hindu Law (6th edition p. 757 ). In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs who are widows of predeceased sons and recognised as heirs under section 3 (1) of the Act cannot succeed in preference to the daughter of the deceased as section 3 (1)cannot be applied. The same view has been commenced by Raghavachariar in his work on Hindu Law (6th edition p. 757 ). In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs who are widows of predeceased sons and recognised as heirs under section 3 (1) of the Act cannot succeed in preference to the daughter of the deceased as section 3 (1)cannot be applied. Under the Hiudu Law, the plaintiffs were not heirs at all. After the death of the widow of Bhawani Singh in 1951, the suit land vested in defendant Rajju Raja who is his daughter. She was, therefore, entitled to sell the land in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiffs having no title to the suit land, cannot challenge the alienation made by defendant Rajju Raja. ( 11. ) THE appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.