JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) RESPONDENT S. K. Chouksey has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this second appeal. I propose to deal with the preliminary objection alone. ( 2. ) THE facts may be briefly stated : Chouksey filed a suit in the Court of the VII Civil Judge Class II, Jabalpur, for eviction of his tenant K. Manekji cooper on 8-7-1971. The suit was decreed on 10-2-1976. Manekji preferred an appeal before the First Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. He died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives were brought on record. The three appellants and respondent No. 2 are the legal representatives of K. Manekji. The appeal came to be dismissed on 15-1-1977. The present second appeal has been filed on 15-2-1977 by the three out of the four legal representatives. ( 3. ) AS soon as the first appeal was dismissed on 15-1-1977, the respondent-landlord (decree-holder) sought to execute the decree for eviction. He informed the executing Court on 17-1-1977 that the appeal had been dismissed. The executing Court thought it wise to await the records. As per order sheet of the Court, the judgment-debtor had put in appearance on 17-1- 1977 through shri Rajendra Tiwari Advocate. On 20-1-1977, an application was moved under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recording an adjustment. The proceedings show that the decree-holder was present along with Shri Raj Advocate and the judgment-debtors were present along with rajendra Tiwari Advocate. The application for adjustment, however, purports to have been signed by one of the judgment-debtors S. Z. Dinshaw (respondent No. 2) and Shri Rajendra Tiwari for and on behalf of all of them. The executing Court recorded the adjustment where under the judgment-debtors had agreed to vacate the accommodation by the end of February, 1977 and to pay all arrears of rent and costs. The decree-holder was permitted to execute the decree on or after 1-3-1977 in case they did not vacate the premises. ( 4. ) AFTER the recording of the adjustment, the proceedings show that on that very day, at 4-30 P. M. , one of the judgment-debtors Roshan D. Surti filed an application under Order 41, Rule 5 (2), Civil Procedure Code for stay of the execution since an appeal was contemplated. The executing Court fixed 18-2-1977 for orders on that application. ) AFTER the recording of the adjustment, the proceedings show that on that very day, at 4-30 P. M. , one of the judgment-debtors Roshan D. Surti filed an application under Order 41, Rule 5 (2), Civil Procedure Code for stay of the execution since an appeal was contemplated. The executing Court fixed 18-2-1977 for orders on that application. That application came to be dismissed on 18-2-1977 in the absence of both the parties. ( 5. ) THE question raised is whether after the decree stood adjusted on 20-1-1977 and so long the adjustment recorded was on record and purported to bind both the parties, an appeal could be preferred against the original decree by some of the legal representatives. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the original decree got merged into the adjustment order which alone could be executed and, therefore, there could be no appeal against the original decree unless the adjustment order was first got set aside in an appropriate proceeding. The counsel submitted that the adjustment order must be accepted as perse correct and lawful, and binding on the parties. The Court must proceed, the counsel said, on the assumption as to correctness of the proceeding, that the judgment-debtors were present when the adjustment was recorded; at any rate, one of them was present who had signed the application and that Shri Rajendra Tiwari had acted on instructions from all the judgment-debtors when he signed the application for and on behalf of them all. That an advocate appearing for the judgment-debtors, possessed the requisite authority from them to enter into any adjustment which he considered beneficial to their interest. The counsel relied on Jimbai v. Ramkuwar Shriniwas, (1947 NLJ1.) for the proposition that an advocate has inherent powers to enter into any compromise even without the authority or consent of the client unless the power in that behalf had been expressly counter minded. The proposition has also been approved by the Supreme Court in jamilabai v. Shankarlal, (A IR 1975 SC 2202. ). ( 6. ) SHRI Rajendra Tiwari was the counsel for K. Manekji Cooper. He had filed the first appeal. On the death of Manekji Cooper, his legal representatives were brought on record. It appears, the legal representatives had given Vakalatnama to Shri T. C. Naik Advocate. ). ( 6. ) SHRI Rajendra Tiwari was the counsel for K. Manekji Cooper. He had filed the first appeal. On the death of Manekji Cooper, his legal representatives were brought on record. It appears, the legal representatives had given Vakalatnama to Shri T. C. Naik Advocate. But the proceedings in the first appeal Court indicate that Shri Rajendra Tiwari had not dissociated himself thereafter. He had been appearing and acting for the appellants. On 14-12-1976, he had filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code for amendment of pleadings. That was "acting" for and on behalf of the legal representatives. He was the counsel who had argued the appeal and soon after the decision, appeared before the executing Court to see that the judgment-debtors were not forthwith ousted. Shri Rajendra Tiwaris conduct indicated that he acted as on lawful authority from the legal representatives, at any rate they acquiesced in his acting and appearance on their behalf. Two things are possible. Either Shri Rajendra Tiwari held a power in writing which he omitted to file, which just amounted to an irregularity, or that Shri T. C. Naik requested him to appear on his behalf. In either event, Shri Rajendra Tiwari had an authority to enter into an adjustment binding on the legal representatives. ( 7. ) THE counsel for the appellants on the other hand argued that shri Rajendra Tiwari had on the day of adjustment obtained power from s. Z. Dinshaw alone and, therefore, was acting only on her instructions. The other legal representatives were not present, nor had they given any instructions to Shri Rajendra Tiwari. The proceeding of the Court of that day was not correctly recorded if it purports to indicate that all the judgment-debtors were present. Had they been present they would have signed Shri rajendra Tiwaris power along with S. Z. Dinshaw and would also have signed the application for recording adjustment. It was clear, the counsel said, Shri Rajendra Tiwari had acted on some misunderstanding. He probably thought that S. Z. Dinshaw had come to him to give instructions on behalf of all, when it was not a fact. S. Z. Dinshaw had colluded with the decree-holder and any adjustment between her and the decree holder would not be binding on the other judgment debtors. He probably thought that S. Z. Dinshaw had come to him to give instructions on behalf of all, when it was not a fact. S. Z. Dinshaw had colluded with the decree-holder and any adjustment between her and the decree holder would not be binding on the other judgment debtors. Firstly, therefore, shri Rajendra Tiwari was not acting on authority and secondly a fraud was practised upon him and the Court in getting the adjustment recorded. Such an adjustment was a nullity. The fact that on that very day, Roshan Surti had filed an application under Order 41, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code would go to show that an appeal was contemplated and she was no party to the adjustment. ( 8. ) THE counsel argued that under the circumstances, the second appeal might be kept pending so long an enquiry is not made into the binding nature of the adjustment. In case, the Court finds that the adjustment is binding on the appellants, the appeal be dismissed. In case the adjustment is found collusive, the appeal be heard. ( 9. ) IN answer, the counsel for the respondent submitted that a distinction had to be drawn between a compromise to which provisions of Order 23, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code applied and an adjustment recorded under order 21, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. See: M. P. Shrivattova v. Veena, (AT R 1967 S C 1193. ). It was not necessary that for getting an adjustment recorded, the whole body of the judgment-debtors ought to attend the executing Court. One of them could move an application and on decree-holder accepting the adjustment, it could be recorded without notice to other judgment debtors. There was no rule that the judgment-debtors had to be noticed. The recording of the adjustment would not bar the rights of the other judgment-debtors to move the executing Court under section 47, Civil Procedure Code on the ground of fraud and collusion. But so long that was not done, the adjustment, prima facie, having been certified, would be binding. The remedy to the judgment-debtors would be one under section 47 of the code of Civil Procedure. But so long that was not done, the adjustment, prima facie, having been certified, would be binding. The remedy to the judgment-debtors would be one under section 47 of the code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the counsel said, the judgment-debtors had not taken any steps to get the adjustment set aside though it could be safely presumed that Roshan Surti had knowledge of the certification, having attended the executing Court that very afternoon. On the one hand, the judgment-debtors took advantage of the concession given under the adjustment and thereby secured time till February end to vacate, otherwise the decree was executable forthwith, on the other hand quietly filed an appeal. The question, the counsel posed was this : Could the decree-holder execute the decree, once the adjustment was recorded, before February end? If she could not, on the ground of reciprocity, having taken advantage, the judgment-debtors should be estopped from dishonouring the adjustment. Rule of estoppel must apply. ( 10. ) I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents. The remedy of the judgment-debtors lay in an application before the executing Court under section 47, Civil Procedure Code for getting the adjustment set aside But so long that was not done, the decree in appeal having merged into an adjustment order, no appeal could be filed. An appeal or revision could be preferred against the certification of adjustment, but that has not been done. The forum for setting aside the adjustment would be the executing Court, an appeal or revision thereafter. See: Shyamlal v. Sunder Singh, (A I R 1974 Pat 138. ). The Second Appeal is incompetent so long the adjustment is not set aside. It is accordingly dismissed. Costs on appellants. Counsels fee as per certificate. Appeal dismissed.