JUDGMENT Muneshwari Sahay, J. These two applications (Cr. Revisions 264 and 26) of 1974) have been heard together as similar questions of law and facts arise in the same. One Jaydeo Das is the petitioner in Criminal Revision application no. 265, Sita Ram and his son Rajendra Prasad are the petitioners in the other application. Jaydeo Das is the proprietor of a shop in the Ashok Raj Path. Patna. Sita Ram and his son are partners of another shop in Muradpur known as Messrs Agrawal General Stores. The allegation against the petitioners in both the cases was that they had kept shops open on 5-9-71 which was a weekly holiday for the shops under the Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). Accordingly complaints were filed against the petitioners by the Labour and Inspecting Officer, Shri B.C.N. Verma. The complaints were received in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Patna Sadar, on 14.3.72. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate had earlier dismissed the complaints on the ground that they were barred by time. The State of Bihar, therefore, moved this Court against the orders of dismissal by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. This Court set aside the orders of dismissal and directed that a fresh investigation should be made on the question as to whether the complaints were filed within the time fixed by law. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate by his order dated 19.1173 held that the complaints were not barred by time and he took cognizance against the petitioners under section 34 of the Act. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has contened that the orders passed by the Court below taking cognizance against the petitioners were manifestly wrong as the orders themselves show that the complaints were barred by time. As pointed out earlier, the offence was alleged to have been committed on 5-9-71. Section 36 of the Act, provides inter alia. that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act, or any rule Or order wade thereunder except on a complaint in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by the Inspecting officer or any person authorised in this behalf by the State Government within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Learned Counsel points out that in view of this provision of the Act, last date on which the complaint should have been filed was the 4th of March, 1972. Courts were, however, closed from the 4th of March, 1972 till the 11th of March, 1972 on account of general election. 12th of March, 1972 was admittedly a Sunday, Learned Counsel, therefore, points out that 13th of March, 1972 was not a holiday and the complaints should have been filed latest by that date. As they were filed on the following day, i.e. on the 14th of March, 1972, it is contended. complaints were barred by time. 3. In the impugned order itself the learned Magistrate has stated that the courts were closed from t he 4th till the 11th of March, 1972 and that 12th of March, 1972 was a Sunday. He however, pointed out that counting of votes of a particular constituency was going on the 13th of March, 1972. This was mentioned in justification of the complainant's failure to file the complaint on that date. In my opinion when it was not said that 13th of March, 1972 was also closed due to ejection, the complaints had to be tiled latest on that date, even though counting of votes might be going on in respect of a certain constituency on that date. In my view, it was not competent for the learned Magistrate to have extended the period of limitation prescribed by law for filing of a complaint in respect of ail offence which was a notravention of section 12(1) of the Act. The proviso to section 36 of the Act, lays down as follows:- "Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, take cognizance of the offences for the breach of the provisions of sections 16, 16A, 26 and 28 after the expiry of the said period of six months, if it is satisfied that the complainant was prevented by sufficient cause from /1ling complaint within the said period" . It would, therefore, be noticed that the Legislature had, in express terms, restricted the right of the court to extend the period of limitation in relation to certain particular offences, namely, offences for the breach of the provisions of sections 16, 16A, 26 and 28 of the Act. It would, therefore, be noticed that the Legislature had, in express terms, restricted the right of the court to extend the period of limitation in relation to certain particular offences, namely, offences for the breach of the provisions of sections 16, 16A, 26 and 28 of the Act. Section 12 of the Act, is conspicuously absent from the offences mentioned in the proviso to section 36. It Was the case of the prosecution that the petitioners had contravened section 12 (1) of the Act, which laid down that every establishment shall remain entirely closed on one day of the week. Therefore, even if the learned Magistrate had wished to enlarge the period of limitation in favour of the complainant on the ground that on account of counting of votes which was going on the 13th of March, 1972, the complaints could not be filed on that date, he could not do so. 4. For the reasons which I have given above, I am Satisfied that the complaints were barred by time and, therefore, the learned Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance on those complaints against the petitioners. The applications are, therefore, allowed. The impugned orders passed by the learned Magistrate on 19-11-73 taking cognizance against the petitioners are hereby set aside, Application allowed.