A. N. SURTI, S. OBUL REDDI, J. ( 1 ) THE applicants were defendants Nos. 1 3 and 6. They have filed an application under sec. 4 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay of 147 days in filing the First Appeal. The State Bank of Saurashtra had laid action in the Court below against the defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1 88 682 ps. and the Court below passed a decree in favour of the Bank for Rs 1 73 59 ps. with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till date of payment. It is against that decree that the present appeal is sought to be filed by making an application for condonation of delay of 147 days. Defendant No. 1 Messrs. Gujarat Machine Tools Industries is a partnership firm and applicants Nos. 2 and 3 along with some others who have since retired were its partners. The reason given by the applicants in their application for condonation of delay for not filing the appeal in time is that the Managing Partner applicant No. 2 was keeping indifferent health by the end of December 1975 and from January 1976 due to chronic anaemia and weakness and therefore he could not give instructions to his advocate in time to file the appeal. It is the case of the applicants that after the judgment and decree were ready for delivery the second appellant could not contact its local advocate to get those copies as he was confined to bed and could not move out of the house on account of chronic anaemia and weakness. When he contacted his advocate he was informed that the copies were ready for delivery long time back and therefore he immediately obtained the copies from the advocate and rushed to Ahmedabad to file the appeal which he filed on June 29 1976 It is therefore his case that the delay of 147 days is due to sufficient reasons and that delay merits to be condoned. ( 2 ) THIS application is opposed by the respondent No. 1 State Bank of Saurashtra. As the respondent No. 1 Bank did not admit the alleged illness of the applicant No. 2 the applicant examined the Private Medical Practitioner Dr. Ramakant H. Shah who had treated him during the period when he was said to be ill. ( 2 ) THIS application is opposed by the respondent No. 1 State Bank of Saurashtra. As the respondent No. 1 Bank did not admit the alleged illness of the applicant No. 2 the applicant examined the Private Medical Practitioner Dr. Ramakant H. Shah who had treated him during the period when he was said to be ill. ( 3 ) DR. Ramakant Shah as may be seen from his evidence is a General Medical Practitioner for the last thirty years and has been the family Doctor of the second applicant. He issued the following medical certificate on June 30 1976 to the second applicant stating: This is to certify that Mr. Kanjibhai v. Patel (applicant) is suffering from Fever Malaria Anaemia and weakness off and on during 25-1-76 to 28-6-76. According to the Doctor Ravjibhai used to come to him on different occa- sions between 28th January 1976 and 28th June 1976 and I had prescribed medicines to Ravjibhai for malaria and anaemia. In answer to the questions put by the Court this Doctor admitted that he does not maintain regular books of accounts though he claimed to maintain a diary. He did not maintain a receipt book on the ground that there is no practice to give receipt for the fees charged. He admitted that the applicant Ravjibhai was not bedridden and he was not suffering from fever. He was able to move about. When cross examined he admitted that he has not got a case register and no serial numbers are given to case papers. According to him Ravjibhai came to him on 4 to 5 different occasions within a period of six months from January 1976 to June 1976 His major complaint was anaemia. He had not made any diagnosis of his anaemia by blood-test or by any pathological test. According to him Malaria is generally treated with three doses unless there is relapse. Ravjibhai used to come to him personally to take treatment from him. He however made a very glaring and a very significant admission. Ravjibhai told me that he required the certificate for use in his factory and had he told me that be would require the certificate to be produced in Court I would have not issued the same. . . . I would ordinarily never give the certificate but because of my special relations with Ravjibhai I gave the certificate. Ravjibhai told me that he required the certificate for use in his factory and had he told me that be would require the certificate to be produced in Court I would have not issued the same. . . . I would ordinarily never give the certificate but because of my special relations with Ravjibhai I gave the certificate. It is manifest from the evidence of the Doctor who is said to have treated Ravjibhai that because of the false representations made by Ravjibhai viz. a certificate was needed for use in the factory that he obliged him with this medical certificate. We are inclined to hold having regard to the evidence of the Private Medical Practitioner that Ravjibhai during the period between January 25 1976 and June 28 1976 did not suffer from any illness which prevented him from contacting his advocate and obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree which his advocate had already obtained from the Court. It should be borne in mind that apart from applicant Ravjibhai Patel there were other partners and applicant No. 3 his younger brother was also living with him at the Industrial Estate. It may be that applicant No. 2 was the Managing Partner but there was his younger brother who could have attended to the work of instructing his advocate. The delay is not of a few days or a couple of weeks but 147 days which has to be satisfactorily explained. It is true that an application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has to be liberally construed but the applicant has also to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. ( 4 ) MR. Majmudar appearing for the appellants invited our attention to two decisions of this Court to contend that it is not necessary that each days delay should be meticulously explained and that the Court should not adopt the approach of a schoolmaster who uses his rod to discipline the students. ( 4 ) MR. Majmudar appearing for the appellants invited our attention to two decisions of this Court to contend that it is not necessary that each days delay should be meticulously explained and that the Court should not adopt the approach of a schoolmaster who uses his rod to discipline the students. In Karim Abdulla v. Bai Hoorbai (1975) 16 G. L. R. 835 our learned brother Thakkar J. while following the rulings of the Supreme Court in Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 61 and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator Howrah Municipality and Others A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 749 laid down certain guidelines some of which in our opinion are of wider amplitude than the guidelines indicated by the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) ANOTHER Single Judge of this Court P. D. Desai J. in Hiraben v. Ishwarbharti (1977) 18 G. L. R. 467 followed the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Trustees Bombay Port v. Premier Automobiles A. I. R 1974 S. C. 923 that public bodies should resist the temptation to take technical pleas like limitation. ( 6 ) WE are bound to follow the view expressed by the Supreme Court from time to time and the guidelines laid down by it when the question of condonation of delay comes up for consideration. The Supreme Court had occasion to review its own earlier decisions as also the decisions of High Courts while construing the expressionssufficient cause occurring in sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality (supra ). There the learned Judges quoted with approval the view of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan (1890) I. L. R. 13 Mad. 269 where the learned Judges said that sec. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. ( 7 ) IN an earlier case Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 36 which was also referred to by Thakkar J. the Supreme Court observedin construing see. ( 7 ) IN an earlier case Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 36 which was also referred to by Thakkar J. the Supreme Court observedin construing see. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations the first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a light in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The Supreme Court however made it clear in that case that other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excising delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. In Trustees Bombay port v. Premier Automobile (supra) the Supreme Court has expressed the view that public bodies should resist the temptation to take technical pleas or defeat honest claims by legally permissible but marginally unjust contentions including narrow limitation. ( 8 ) THE question here is whether a public body like the State Bank of Saurashtra had taken technical pleas to defeat an honest claim which is legally permissible. No hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords sufficient cause in a given case. Whether sufficient cause is shown or not depends upon the facts of each case. On his own showing the second applicant was not bed-ridden. His doctor said that during the period of five months between January 25 1976 and June 28 1976 he had visited him only on four or five occasions and the disease from which he was suffering was anaemia which did not prevent him from looking after his routine duties as a Managing Partner. It is not a case where a person was admitted as an inpatient in a hospital or a Nursing Home or where he had undergone an operation or where the Doctor advised bed-rest. It is not a case where a person was admitted as an inpatient in a hospital or a Nursing Home or where he had undergone an operation or where the Doctor advised bed-rest. Apart from all that the appellants conscience did not seem to prick him when he made a false statement to his Doctor that he required the certificate for use in the factory. He knew fully well that his Doctor would not give him a certificate for an illness from which he had not suffered if only he had told him that the certificate was meant to be filed in the Court. The application cannot therefore be said to be a bona fide one made to advance the cause of justice. There is also nothing on record to show that during the period between January and June 1976 anybody other than himself was discharging the functions of the Managing Partner. We are therefore unable to place any credence on the story trotted out by him that he suffered from anaemia which disabled him from even contacting his advocate No affidavit of the advocate has also been filed to show on what date he contacted him for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree. We therefore unhesitatingly hold that the delay has not been satisfactorily accounted for. Whatever liberal interpretation we mat try to put on the words sufficient cause it would be impossible for us having regard to the facts of this case to hold that there is no negligence or or want of bona fide on the part of the applicants. From the above discussion it is manifest that no sufficient cause has been shown by the applicants for condoning the delay of 147 days in this case. ( 9 ) THIS application is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs. Registration of the appeal is refused. .