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1977 DIGILAW 68 (KER)

ALBUTHAMMAL v. TALUK LAND BOARD, CHITTUR

1977-03-14

K.BASKARAN

body1977
Judgment :- 1. The 1st petitioner is a Vannia Tamil Christian of Chittur Taluk in Palghat District. She is the widow of one Santiagu who died in the year 1113 M. E., long before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The 2nd petitioner is the brother of the said Santiagu and the 3rd petitioner is the son of deceased Sourimuthu, another brother of Santiagu. As per the order dated 14 51976 in Ceiling Case No. 647/73, initiated on the statement filed by the 1st petitioner under S.85A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Taluk Land Board, Chittur, directed the 1st petitioner to surrender 5.48.500 acres of land determined to be the extent of land held by her as the sole surviving member of her statutory family, in excess of the ceiling area specified under the Act. 2. Though several contentions are seen to have been raised in the memorandum of civil revision petition, Sri N. Sugunapalan, the counsel for the petitioners, confined his arguments to the point which related to the nature of interest the 1st petitioner had in the lands involved in the proceeding, requesting that inasmuch as a decision on the other grounds may not be necessary for a disposal of this revision petition, they may be left open without being decided. 3. It is well settled that Vannia Tamil Christians of Chittoor Taluk are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law in regard to inheritance and succession. It is also not in dispute that Santiagu died before 1956 without issue. The Taluk Land Board took the view that the property which belonged to the said Santiagu devolved on the 1st petit oner who survived d him, as the full owner thereof. It is the correctness this view that is mainly canvassed in this revision. 4. It is also not in dispute that Santiagu died before 1956 without issue. The Taluk Land Board took the view that the property which belonged to the said Santiagu devolved on the 1st petit oner who survived d him, as the full owner thereof. It is the correctness this view that is mainly canvassed in this revision. 4. It is on an interpretation of S.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, Act 30 of 1956, which came into force on 17th June 1956, that the Taluk Land Board came to the conclusion that the 1st petitioner is the full owner of the property left behind by her husband Santiagu The material portion of S.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, relied on by the Taluk Land Board, reads as follows: "(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and Dot as a limited owner." In the opinion of the Taluk Land Board the 1st petitioner was to be treated as the full owner of the property, as she was having possession of the property. 5. The Taluk Land Board appears to have lost sight of the significance of the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu". No doubt, the 1st petitioner, as has already been stated, is governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law of inheritance and succession. All the same she is not a "female Hindu". In my view, S.14 of the Hindu. Succession Act has application only where the female who is in possession of the property is a Hindu. S.2 (1) (a) of the Hindu Succession Act lays down that the Act applies to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments. S.2 (1) (c) of the said Act lays down that the Act is applicable to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu Law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with therein (the Hindu Succession Act) if that Act had not been passed. The overriding effect of the said Act as stated in S.4 (1), reads as follows: "4. The overriding effect of the said Act as stated in S.4 (1), reads as follows: "4. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act: (b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act." (Emphasis supplied) 6. Under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law the rule is that over the property inherited from the husband the widow has only a limited (life) interest. The Taluk Land Board was clearly in error in holding that S.14 of the Hindu succession Act is attracted to the case of the 1st petitioner. 7. I am also of the opinion that the Taluk Land Board was not justified in taking the view that right to possession of the property tantamounts to ownership of the property or right to hold the property, to attract S.83 of the Act. Petitioners 2 and 3, to whom the estate is to revert, are the real owners thereof. I, therefore, hold that the liability if any, in relation to ceiling proceedings, to account for the land in the hands of the 1st petitioner who is a person having only a life interest in those lands, is on petitioners 2 and 3 who are the reversioners of the 1st petitioner. This being the position, it is not within the right of the Taluk Land Board to proceed against the 1st petitioner, or direct her to surrender the property over which she has only a limited, life, interest. For the foregoing reasons the revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside without prejudice to the right of the Taluk Land Board to proceed against petitioners 2 and 3 if they are found to be holding land in excess of the ceiling area specified under the Act. It is made clear that the other points raised in the memorandum of civil revision petition have not been considered by me, and they are left open without being decided. It is made clear that the other points raised in the memorandum of civil revision petition have not been considered by me, and they are left open without being decided. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Allowed.