( 1 ) THESE two petitions are directed against the order dt. 18-6-1974 passed by the Principal Munsift, Belgaum, in HRC. 12 of 1971. The petitioner in CRP. 1276 of 1974 is opponent-2 and the petitioner in CRP. 1580 of 1974 is opponent-1 in the said case. Respondent-1 in both the revision petitions is petitioner-1 in the said case. In the course of this order, the parties would be referred to as petitioner-1, opponent-1 and opponent-2 as they were designated before the Munsiff. ( 2 ) THE premises in question is a shop bearing CTS. 930/2a-4 situated in the market at Belgaum. ( 3 ) THE undisputed facts are that opponent-1 Shankar Yellappa rajannavar owns the premises. Petitioner-1 was a tenant in the premises and opponent-1 filed HRC. 75 of 1967 praying for vacant possession of the premises. His application was allowed on 19-10-1968 and petitioner-1 filed HRCA. 86 of 1968, which was disposed of on 30-8-1969 against petitioner-1. He filed CRP. 2038 of 1969 and failed. Ultimately, on 20-1-1970 vacant possession of the premises was given to opponent-1. By Novr, 1970 opponent-2 has been inducted in the premises. Petitioner-1 and two others filed an application under S. 25 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 13-1-71. In the first instance the Munsiff dismissed the application by his order dt. 10-7-1972 holding that opponent-1 had succeeded on the ground available to him under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and not under S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act, and hence, the application under S. 25 of the Act, was not maintainable. Petitioner-1 filed CRP. 1900 of 1972 in this Court and this Court by its order dt. 23-7-73 held that opponent-1 had secured vacant possession on the only ground that he required it bona fide for his personal occupation under S. 21 (1), (h) of the Act and the Munsiff ought to take that into consideration and dispose of the application filed under S. 25 of the Act by petitioner-1 afresh according to law. Sri P. D. Thilave, Advocate appearing on behalf of opoonent-1 filed IA-2 on 15-10-1973 on behalf of opponent-1 praying for permission to file additional objection statement. Petitioner-1 filed his objections to IA-2. By the time IA.-2 came up for hearing the said advocate expired and the Court sent Court-notice to opponent-1 to appear in Court. Sri P. D. Thilave, Advocate appearing on behalf of opoonent-1 filed IA-2 on 15-10-1973 on behalf of opponent-1 praying for permission to file additional objection statement. Petitioner-1 filed his objections to IA-2. By the time IA.-2 came up for hearing the said advocate expired and the Court sent Court-notice to opponent-1 to appear in Court. As per the order sheet maintained by the Munsiff, it is seen that though there was sufficient service of the Court-notice on opponent-1, he remained ex-parte. IA-2 has been dismissed on the date the order in question was passed, on the ground that opponent-1 has remained ex-parte. ( 4 ) EVEN prior to the remand by this Court in CRP. 1900 of 1972, opponents 1 and 2 had been examined in trial before the Munsiff. ( 5 ) THE contentions of opponents 1 and 2 are that after opponent-1 took vacant possession of the premises viz, CTS. 930/2a-4, opponent-1 wanted to demolish the building standing thereon as it was dilapidated, and reconstruct a new building, and as such, took loan from opponent-2 and did so. On completing the new construction after the demolition of the old one, opponents 1 and 2 started a shop, in partnership dealing in biscuits, chocolates, peppermints etc. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner-1 that the opponent-1 had re-let the premises to opponent-2 is not correct. ( 6 ) BY IA-2, opponent-1 sought permission to file additional objection statement to the effect that the premises that was concerned in HRC 75/67 was not the building now in question, which is a reconstructed one, but a building standing on a smaller space and therefore, the premises that can fall within the ambit of S. 25 of the Act, would be that premises and not whole of the re-constructed building and hence, for the nonavailability of the premises concerned in HRC. 75/67, Sec. 25 of the Act cannot be applied at all. ( 7 ) IT was argued on behalf of opponent-1 that though he had remained ex-parte, a duty was cast on the Munsiff to consider 1a.-2 and decide it on merits and it was not right on the part of the Munsiff to dismiss IA-2 on the ground that opponent-1 had remained absent. This contention was supported by opponent-2 also. ( 7 ) IT was argued on behalf of opponent-1 that though he had remained ex-parte, a duty was cast on the Munsiff to consider 1a.-2 and decide it on merits and it was not right on the part of the Munsiff to dismiss IA-2 on the ground that opponent-1 had remained absent. This contention was supported by opponent-2 also. Sri W. K. Joshi learned advocate appearing on behalf of petitioner-1 urged that the prayer in ia-2 was for permission to file additional written statement and when the party who had prayed for such permission had remained absent and had chosen not to take part in the proceedings thereafter i. e. , after the filing of IA-2, the Munsiff had no other alternative but to dismiss IA-2 as being not prosecuted. I am clearly of opinion that this contention of sri W. K. Joshi is sound and the order passed by the Munsiff in dismissing IA-2 on this ground, has to be confirmed. ( 8 ) MOREOVER, even on merits of the case as made out in IA-2 by opponent-1, it is clear that that was not his objections as originally filed to the application filed by petitioner-1 under S. 25 of the Act. ( 9 ) NOW the question is whether the Munsiff was right in concluding that opponents 1 and 2 had failed to establish that the shop that was being run on the schedule premises was a partnership firm of opponents 1 and 2. Ext. P4 is admitted to be an application given by opponent-2 to the Commissioner, Belgaum City Municipality. By this application he has prayed for issue of a licence to him to run a shop in selling peppermints, chocolates, biscuits etc, in CTS. 930/2a. It further narrates that along with that application the consent letter of opponent-1 has been produced. Opponent-1 has stated that that consent letter is Ext. P3. Both these documents are dt. 3-11-1970. In Ext. P3 opponent-1 has clearly stated that he had leased out CTS. 930/2a to opponent-2 and opponent-2 was going to run a shop in selling peppermints, chocolates, biscuits, etc opponent-1 had, in his evidence, stated that Ext. P3 bears his signature, that Exts. P3 and P4 are the applications given by him and opponent-2 to the Municipality and the contents of Exts. P3 and P4 are correct. 930/2a to opponent-2 and opponent-2 was going to run a shop in selling peppermints, chocolates, biscuits, etc opponent-1 had, in his evidence, stated that Ext. P3 bears his signature, that Exts. P3 and P4 are the applications given by him and opponent-2 to the Municipality and the contents of Exts. P3 and P4 are correct. As against this evidence of opponent-1, and opponent-2 has stated that the contents of Ext. P3 are not correct. It is clear on the fact of this that opponent-1 as on 3-11-1970 itself given in writing to the Belgaum Municipality that he had let out the shop in CTS. 930/2a to opponent-2 for the purpose of business of opponent-2 in selling peppermints, chocolates, biscuits etc, and no case of partnership between opponents 1 and 2, has been made out while a positive case of opponent-1 having let out the schedule premises to opponent-2, has been made out. Both of them have stated in their evidence that they have no documents to show that the shop in question is their partnership shop. In view of this material, I hold that the conclusion of the Munsiff that opponents 1 and 2 have failed to establish their case that the shop on the schedule premises is being run on partnership basis between them, is correct. ( 10 ) G. B. RAIKAR, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of opponent-1 interpreted s. 25 (1) of the Act and argued that while passing the order in question, the Munsiff has transgressed his powers and jurisdiction. (i) Section 25 (1) of the Act reads as follows :" Where a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground specified in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-sec (1) of S. 21 and the premses are not occupied within a period of three months from the date the landlord recovers possession, or the premises are re-let within one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court may, on the application of the original tenant made within thirteen months of such date, order the landlord to place such tenant in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions, and on such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in occupation of the premises shall give vacant possession to the original tenant. " (ii) The final order in question reads as follows :" The claim of the applicants 2 and 3 is rejected without costs. The application is allowed in part holding that 1st applicant is entitled to right of entry. The opponents are directed to put the 1st applicant in possession of the premises within one month from the date of this order. They are also directed to pay the costs of the 1st applicant. "it is not contented that petitioner-1 has filed his application under S. 25 of the Act within the period prescribed by S. 25 (1) of the Act. ( 11 ) THE reasoning of Sri G. B. Raikar is that under S. 25 (1) of the act, petitioner-1 has no power to ask that he should be put in possession of the schedule premises and the Munsiff has no power to grant such a relief. A plain reading of the section makes it manifest that when the facts and circumstances contemplated by S. 25 (1) of the Act are held to be satisfactorily established the Court can 'order' the landlord to place the original tenant in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions. That shows that the Court has power to direct the landlord to place the original tenant in occupation of the premises. It is also clear that when such direction is issued the landlord and any person who happens to be in occupation of the premises have to give vacant possession of the schedule premises to the original tenant. What is further manifest is that S. 25- (1) of the Act does not make it necessary for the court to give such direction to the person who happens to be in actual occupation. It lays down that when such a direction is given to the landlord the person in occupation is bound by it and he has to obey it. In the case on hand, the person in actual possession is opponent-2 and opponent-1 is the landlord. If the Munsiff had passed such an order against opponent-1 the landlord, opponent-2, even though he had not been made a party in these proceedings, would have been by virtue of this provision bound by that order and would have been required to give vacant possession of the premises to petitioner-1. If the Munsiff had passed such an order against opponent-1 the landlord, opponent-2, even though he had not been made a party in these proceedings, would have been by virtue of this provision bound by that order and would have been required to give vacant possession of the premises to petitioner-1. When that is so, I am unable to see how the Munsiff can be said to have exercised power in excess of what is vested in him by S. 25 (1) of the Act in directing both opponent-1 and opponent-2 to give vacant possession of the premises to petitioner-1. When the Court is vested with the power to pass an order dircting the landlord and the person in occupation of the premises to give vacant possession to the original tenant, who will be the applicant under S. 25, (1) of the Act, it follows that the applicant, viz, the original tenant, under S. 25 (1) of the Act, would be within his rights in requesting the court to pass an order directing the landlord and the person in actual possession of the premises in question, to place the applicant, (the original tenant), in occupation of the same. Therefore, I see no force in the contention of Sri G. B. Raikar. ( 12 ) IN view of the foregoing reasons, I hold that there is no substance in these petitions and dismiss them with costs. --- *** --- .