Judgment :- 1. These Civil Revision Petitions arise from out of applications made for the purchase of kudikidappu under S.80A read with S.80B of the land Reforms Act. C. R. P. No. 2925 of 1976-E arises out of O. A. No. 1597 of 1971, carried up in appeal to the appellate authority in A. A No 1248 of 973; and C R. P. No. 2928 of 1976-E arises out of O. A. No. 1604 of 1971 and A A. no. 1228 of 1973. The kudikidappu covered by these and other proceedings occupies an extent of half a cent; together with the surrounding area needed for convenient enjoyment, the total extent of the kudikidappu claimed, was three cents (vide sub-sections (3) and (6) of S.80A). The property on which the kudikidappu was situate, belonged originally to one Kunhiraman who died on 18-1-1964. On his death, his rights devolved on his widow and four children. It is not disputed that they took the properties as tenants in common There was a partition among them on 9121969. The widow died in 1970 and her rights devolved on her children. There were as many as sixteen kudikidappukars in the property. Ten of them applied for purchase of kudikidappu rights. The Land Tribunal allowed all these applications. Against these orders ten appeals were filed before the appellate authority and were disposed of by a common order. Against two of them these revision petitions have been filed. Seven of the ten appeals were allowed by the Appellate Authority and the matter was remanded back to the Land Tribunal, on the finding that there was the defect of non joinder of parties and that all the co-owners interested in the extent of the kudikidappu sought to be purchased had not been joined as parties. The remaining three appeals were dismissed and these two revisions have been directed against two of such orders of dismissal. 2. Counsel for the revision petitioners raised three points First, that co-owners like the petitioners in these revision petitions would not fall within the definition of the term 'person' in S.2 (43) of the Land Reforms Act. The remaining three appeals were dismissed and these two revisions have been directed against two of such orders of dismissal. 2. Counsel for the revision petitioners raised three points First, that co-owners like the petitioners in these revision petitions would not fall within the definition of the term 'person' in S.2 (43) of the Land Reforms Act. Second, that a partition is not a 'transfer' within the meaning of S.80A, clause (12) of the Act; and third, assuming that partition is a transfer, and irrespective of whether it was a transfer or not, the application in the present case was not proper, and suffered from the defect of non joinder like the other applications which were remanded back by the appellate authority. 3. S.2 (43) of the Act reads: "2(43): "person" shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and any institution capable of holding property." Counsel for the revision petitioner placed reliance on the unreported judgment of our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. in O.P. No. 1793 of 1975 (C.R.P. No 526 of 1974 converted into O.P.). The learned judge noticed the definition of the term'Person' and held that co-owners' against whom the application for purchase was made in that case, cannot fall within the definition With respect, we are unable to share the conclusion of the learned Judge. The definition of 'person' as including'body of individuals', among other things, appears to be wide enough to cover the case of co-owners as well. Co-ownership is a common instance of land holding in this country; and in the absence of clear and positive provisions or telling circumstances, we cannot easily persuade ourselves that this important category was left outside the fold of the definition. For instance, one result of holding that co-owners are not included in the expression 'person' would be that Mohammedan co-heirs would fall outside the purview of the Act. While that by itself would not be a decisive or a conclusive circumstance, we should pause and hesitate before coming to a conclusion which would result in such a consequence. We are fortified in our conclusion that the expression body of individuals would take in, co-owners as well, by reason of the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in a series of cases, rendered with respect to certain entries in the Constitution. We are fortified in our conclusion that the expression body of individuals would take in, co-owners as well, by reason of the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in a series of cases, rendered with respect to certain entries in the Constitution. In Banarasi Dass & others v. The Wealth Tax Officer, Special Circle, Meerut and others (AIR. 1965 SC. 1387), the Supreme Court had to consider Entry 86 of List I, dealing with taxes on capital value of assets, exclusive of agricultural lands of individuals and companies and taxes on capital of companies. Construing Entry 86, the Supreme Court propounded to itself to the question whether the word 'individuals' in the context of the entry can legitimately be narrowed down to individuals as such, and not to groups of individuals. Having regard to the object of the entry, it was held that if the 'individuals' constituted themselves into a group and such group owned capital assets, that will be sufficient to attract the legislative field covered by entry 86. The same principle is also discernible in Mohamed Noorullah (Representing the Estate of the Late Khan Sahib Mohd. Oomer Sahib v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1961(42) ITR. ITR.115). It was there held that "as the business which was sought to be assessed and which was carried on originally by an individual was after his death continued without any interruption by all the heirs the co-heirs constituted an "association of persons" within S.3 of the Income-tax Act." The decisions in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Hyderabad v Raja Ratan Gopal (1966 (59) ITR. 728), N. V. Shanmugham and Co. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1971-(81 (ITR 310), and G. Murugesan & Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Madras (1973 (88) ITR. 432) were also relied on. We are aware that some of these decisions, rendered with respect to Constitutional entries and the principle of wide and liberal construction adopted in respect of such entries, may stand on a special footing. But having regard to the object and purpose of the Statute concerned, viz., the Land Reforms Act, we find it difficult to conclude that such a well-known category of persons as 'co-owners' would have been left outside the ambit of the definition in S.2 (43). 4. But having regard to the object and purpose of the Statute concerned, viz., the Land Reforms Act, we find it difficult to conclude that such a well-known category of persons as 'co-owners' would have been left outside the ambit of the definition in S.2 (43). 4. Counsel for the revision petitioners stressed that an'association of persons' must be one linked by some unity of venture as expounded in some of the judicial decisions; and that therefore the same requirement must also be implied into the notion of body of individuals on the principle of ejusdem generis. We see no scope for importing the rule of ejusdem generis in the context. The different expressions used in S.2 (43) referred to entities so distinct and dissimilar that there is no specification or indication of a genus in respect of which the enumerated ones can be regarded as mere species. We therefore hold that co-owners are within the purview of the definition of S.2 (43) of the Act. 5. That leads us to the next question whether a partition is to be regarded as a transfer or not. Our attention was drawn to the decision in Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat v. Keshavlal Lallubhn Patel (AIR. 1965 SC 866s 1965 (2) S. C. R.100) and the Controller of Estates Duty, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. Kancharla Kesava Rao (AIR 1973 SC. 2484). In the earlier of these cases, it was observed, approving the decision of the High Court of Madras in Gutta Radhakrishnayya v. Gutta Sarasamma (ILR.1951 Mad 607) that "a partition is really a process in and by which a joint enjoyment is transformed into an enjoyment in severality " Each one of the sharers had an antecedent title and therefore no conveyance is involved in the process as a conferment of a new title is not necessary." In the Controller of Estates Duty Andhra radesh, Hyderabad v. Kancharla Kesava Rao (AIR. 1973 SC. 2484), this principle was restated. Hedge, J. who delivered the judgment quoted the following from Commissioner of Gift Tax v. N. S. Getti Chettiar (AIR. 1971 SC. 2410): "Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the dictionary in the other. 1973 SC. 2484), this principle was restated. Hedge, J. who delivered the judgment quoted the following from Commissioner of Gift Tax v. N. S. Getti Chettiar (AIR. 1971 SC. 2410): "Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the dictionary in the other. In spelling out the meaning of the words in a section, one must take into consideration the setting in which those terms are used and the purpose that they are intended to serve. If so understood, it is clear that the word' disposition" in the context means giving away or giving up by a person of something which was his own, "conveyance" means transfer of ownership, "assignment" means the transfer of the claim, right or property to another,' settlement" means settling the property, right or claim conveyance or disposition of property for the benefit of another, "delivery" contemplated therein is the delivery of one's property to another for no consideration and "payment" implies gift of money by someone to another. We do not think that a partition in a H. U. F can be considered either as "disposition" or conveyance" or "assignment" or "settlement" or "delivery" or "payment" or "alienation" within the meaning of those words in S.2 (xxiv)." After this quotation, Hegde, J. observed: "We see no reason why we should not place the same interpretation on the word'disposition' in S.24 of the Act:" 6. In the light of the two pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it seems fairly clear that partition cannot be regarded as a transfer. But we were pressed by counsel appearing for the State that having regard to the provisions of S.80A (4) third proviso, and to S.84 clauses (1) and (2) the position is clear that the framers of the Act intended partition also to be comprehended within the expression 'transfer' as used in the Act. But we were pressed by counsel appearing for the State that having regard to the provisions of S.80A (4) third proviso, and to S.84 clauses (1) and (2) the position is clear that the framers of the Act intended partition also to be comprehended within the expression 'transfer' as used in the Act. The third proviso to S.80A (4) reads: "Provided also that where any person in possession of any land in which there is a kudikidappu or more than one kudikidappu, has voluntarily transferred such land on or after the 1st day of July, 1969 and before the 1st day of January, 1970 or voluntarily transfers such land on or after the 1st day of January, 1970 the kudikidappukaran or each of the kudikidappukars shall be entitled to purchase such extent of land as he would have been entitled to purchase if such transfer had not taken place." Section 84, clauses (1) and (2) read as follows: "84. Certain voluntary transfers to be null and void. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the Gazette, otherwise than? (i) by way of partition; or (ii) xx xx xx xx (iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 27th July 1960, and continued to be so till the date of transfer; (iv) xx xx xx xx shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of this Act and shall be invalid: xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected by any person (other than a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person) owning or holding, land in excess of the ceiling area after the 1st July, 1969. otherwise than (i) by way of partition; or (ii) xx xx xx xx (iii) xx xx xx xx shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provision of this Act and shall be invalid." (The rest of the Section is omitted) We are unable to understand these sections or to read them as necessarily postulating or indicating that a partition is a transfer. It is possible to understand these provisions as excluding partition, as a matter of abundant caution and not by way of definition or delineation of the frontiers of the expression transfer. 7. All things considered, we are of the opinion that partition is not a transfer and the contention in these revision petitions to this effect must succeed. 8. We are further of the opinion that the revision petitioners are well' founded in their contention that the defect of non joinder of parties was present in the two cases which have given rise to these revision petitions as much as it was present, and was found by the Appellate Authority itself, in the seven cases, where the appeals were allowed and the matter remanded back to the Land Tribunal. The facts of these cases are common. We have been taken through the order of the Appellate Authority. While that authority in Para.6 of its order (not to refer to other paragraphs) found the plea of non joinder in one of the appeals before it. it did not find one way or the other on this question in regard to the two cases with which we are concerned in these revision petitions. As the facts giving rise to these revision petitions are identical with the facts which gave rise to the seven appeals in which the matter was remanded back by the Appellate Tribunal, we are unable to find any ground Tor making a distinction in these two cases. We are therefore of the opinion that the dismissal of the appeals outright by the Appellate Authority in these two cases was not justified. 9. We allow these revision petitions, set aside the orders of the Appellate Authority and direct that O.A. No. 1597 and 1604 of 1971 would stand remanded back to the Land Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment We make no order as to costs. Allowed.