A. K. Sen, A. P. Bhattacharya ( 1 ) IN this revisional application, the twenty-one petitioners who are on trial before the Learned Sessions Judge, Midnapore on a charge under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, are praying for an order quashing the said proceedings. ( 2 ) ON June 16, 1970 one Liaquat Ali lodged an information at the Bhagwanpore Police Station to the effect that on that day the present petitioners along with others led a raid in the house of Kader Mallick at about 1 P. M. and looted away cash, ornaments, woodframes, cement, paddy and other articles. At the time of such looting Kader's wife Jayada Bibi was at home and there was no male member of the house present. ( 3 ) INVESTIGATION was taken up by the police. Such an investigation had a chequered career and it changed hands under circumstances reference to which would be wholly unnecessary for our present purposes. It is however not disputed that ultimately investigation was completed by one Sri N. L. Ghosh, a Sub-Inspector, Contai Pool (Crime) who on December 11, 1971 submitted a charge sheet under section 395/397 Indian Penal Code against the petitioners and others. ( 4 ) BY an order dated January 20, 1975 the Learned Committing Magistrate committed all the petitioners along with others to the Court of Sessions and the Learned Judge on May 8, 1975 on consideration of materials on record framed a charge under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and fixed the trial in September 1975. ( 5 ) ON September 9, 1975 the petitioners moved the aforesaid revisional application and obtained the above Rule. Though in the revisional application various grounds were raised in support of the relief claimed, Mr. Moitra appearing in support of this Rule has pressed only two. The rest he has frankly conceded cannot successfully be raised on the materials now before this Court and at this stage of the trial. The first point raised by Mr. Though in the revisional application various grounds were raised in support of the relief claimed, Mr. Moitra appearing in support of this Rule has pressed only two. The rest he has frankly conceded cannot successfully be raised on the materials now before this Court and at this stage of the trial. The first point raised by Mr. Moitra is to the effect that the charge-sheet in the present case not having been submitted by the Officer-in-charge of Bhagwanpur Police Station but by the Investigating Officer who even does not belong to that Police Station, it was not a report within the meaning of section 173 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the learned Magistrate could neither lawfully take cognizance of the offence on such a report nor could commit the petitioners to the Court of Sessions to take their trial o the basis thereof According to Mr. Moitra the order of commitment being bad in law, the consequent proceeding is liable to be quashed. Secondly it had been contended by Mr. Moitra that the Investigation Officer did not apply his mind and did not satisfy himself as to whether any offence has at all been made out as against the petitioners when he mechanically submitted the charge sheet not even setting forth the facts constituting the offence. He has therefore contended that all consequent proceedings based on such a charge sheet is not sustainable in law. ( 6 ) MR. Roy appearing on behalf of the State has contested both the points so raised by Mr. Moitra. According to Mr. Roy the report submitted by the Investigating Office on completion of an investigation under Chapter 14 of the Code is nevertheless a report under section 173 (1) (a) of the Code and the fact that it was not submitted by the Officer-in-Charge of the police station does not render it any thing other than such a report. Hence, according to Mr. Roy the Committing Magistrate could lawfully take cognizance of the offence on the basis of such a report and make the order of commitment. So far as the other point raised by Mr. Moitra is concerned, Mr. Roy contends that the facts and the report do not justify the criticism made by Mr. Moitra to the effect that the charge sheet was submitted mechanically. Mr. So far as the other point raised by Mr. Moitra is concerned, Mr. Roy contends that the facts and the report do not justify the criticism made by Mr. Moitra to the effect that the charge sheet was submitted mechanically. Mr. Roy has further contended that the belated objection raised by the petitioners is not bonafide and the only object is to delay and frustrate the trial. ( 7 ) SO far as the first point raised by Mr. Moitra is concerned it is no doubt true that on the scheme of Chapter 14 of the Code, it is for the Officer-in-charge of the police station to consider the materials which are secured in course of investigation and make a completion report in terms of section 173 of the Code. Under this Chapter an information as to commission of a cognizable case being lodged with the police station, he can himself take up the investigation or cause the investigation to be made by any of his subordinate officers. Investigation therefore, can be made by an officer other than the officer-in-charge but when such a subordinate officer makes the investigation, under section 168 he is to report the result of such investigation to the Officer-in-Charge of the police station who is then to forward to the magistrate the completion report in terms of section 173 of the Code. Mr. Moitra contends that the requirement of section 168 and section 173 in this respect is mandatory and infringement thereof would invalidate the report. It has been contended by Mr. Moitra that Supreme Court in the case of H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 196, pointed out that the last stage in the process of investigation is 'the formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under section 173' and that the Supreme Court further observed 'it is also clear that the final step in the investigation, viz. , formation of the opinion as to place the accused on trial is to be that of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station'. Reliance is also placed by Mr. , formation of the opinion as to place the accused on trial is to be that of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station'. Reliance is also placed by Mr. Moitra on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 117, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the same position in observing that on the scheme of Chapter 14 the formation of an opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial had been left to the Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station. ( 8 ) IN our view, the correctness of this part of Mr. Moitra's contention cannot be disputed. On the scheme of Chapter 14 of the Code, it is the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station who has been vested with primary responsibility of every investigation. Even where such investigation is being made by an officer subordinate to the Officer-in-Charge, responsibility for taking all the necessary steps still lies with the Officer-in-Charge. Moreover it is also well established by the object and reasons of the Amending Act of 1923 that the legislature intended that functions contemplated by section 173 should be exercised by the Officer-in-Charge only. Therefore, there was definitely an irregularity when in the present case the charge sheet was not processed through the Officer-in-Charge. ( 9 ) BUT event hen we are unable to accept the further contention of Mr. Moitra that such irregularity would invalidate the cognizance, the commitment and the subsequent trial emanating therefrom two-fold reasons. Firstly, the obligation to submit the completion report, which is the last stage of investigation, had been vested in the Officer-in-Charge of the police station by section 173 because under Chapter 14 he alone has been vested with the ultimate responsibility of making the investigation. But at the same time section 156 (2) of the Code provides : ?no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. ? so that an investigation made by a police officer where there is no specific statutory bar shall not be called in question only because it was not so made at the instance of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station. ? so that an investigation made by a police officer where there is no specific statutory bar shall not be called in question only because it was not so made at the instance of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station. In the present case the Investigating Officer - who was an officer of the Contai Post conducted the investigation independently of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station and submitted the charge sheet as a part of the proceedings of investigation. The irregularity that arose due to the fact that it was not so done by or at the instance of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station is, therefore, cured by section 156 (2) of the Code. ( 10 ) SECONDLY, such an irregularity even if be taken to be an illegality is an illegality in investigation which would not affect the cognizance that was subsequently taken by the Learned Magistrate unless it can be shown that the petitioners have been materially prejudiced thereby. No such prejudice could be shown to have resulted from the irregularity complained of in the present case by the Petitioners. When investigation led to disclosure of materials on which the learned Magistrate could not only take cognizance but make a commitment and the learned Sessions Judge could frame a charge; no prejudice can be said to have resulted by the fact that the charge-sheet was not processed through the Officer-in-Charge because even if the Officer-in-Charge could have taken a different view, that would not have been binding on the courts. This Court, in Chittaranjan Das v. State A. I. R. 1963 Cal. 191 held ?a report submitted to the Magistrate by a police office having power to investigate and after investigation under Chapter 14 is not converted into something other than a police report under section 173 merely because it is not submitted by the Officer-in-Charge of police station within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. It is at the worst an irregularity, a failure to observe the strict form. ? Such was also the view taken by the Supreme Court in Rishbud's case (Supra) where it was observed: -a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. It is at the worst an irregularity, a failure to observe the strict form. ? Such was also the view taken by the Supreme Court in Rishbud's case (Supra) where it was observed: -a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report, which results from an investigation, is provided in section 190 Criminal Procedure Code as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. ? in this case the Supreme Court clearly laid down the principle that an irregularity or illegality in investigation arising out of breach of any mandatory provision relating to investigation would be curable under section 537 of the Code unless such illegality can be shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice. ( 11 ) STRONG reliance is placed by Mr. Moitra on a single Bench decision of this court in the case of gobinda Prosad Lath v. The State (Cr. Rev 123 of 1974 disposed of on 2. 4. 74) where contrary view was expressed without however, considering the Bench decision of this court and the above decision of the Supreme Court. That case again is distinguishable on facts. There, the investigating officer submitted as final report without completing the investigation and the learned Magistrate proceeded to discharge the accused person on such a report. This Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate on a view that the Magistrate could not have discharged the accused person on such a report. Here clearly the report based on an incomplete investigation resulted in serious miscarriage of justice, and as such, this court rightly held that the order of discharge based on such a report is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, another learned single Judge of this Court has on the contrary held that a report submitted by an investigating Officer would still be a report under section 173 of the Code even if it was not submitted by the Officer-in-Charge of the police station and cognizance can validly be taken thereon. See Baburam Agarwalla v. State 1976 C. H. N. 864. In this view, we find no merit in the first contention raised by Mr. See Baburam Agarwalla v. State 1976 C. H. N. 864. In this view, we find no merit in the first contention raised by Mr. Moitra and we overruled the same. ( 12 ) SO far as the second point raised by Mr. Moitra is concerned, we are of the view that there is no substance in that objection. In the charge-sheet itself the Investigating Officer has stated that the complainant lodged an information to the effect that the accused persons forcibly entered into the house and looted away cash, ornaments, wood frames, cement etc. from his house and decamped; and investigation was held over such information in course of which enquiry were made locally witness were examined and he visited the place of occurrence. He further stated that on such an investigation a charge under section 395/397. Indian Penal Code having been made out against the accused, he submitted the charge-sheet. Here the substance of the information has been clearly set out in the charge-sheet itself and there is enough material to show that in submitting the charge-sheet the Investigating Officer did so on conscious application of his mind. Mr. Moitra's objection that the charge-sheet was submitted mechanically without application of mind by the Investigating Officer, therefore, must fail and as overruled. In the result, the application fails and the Rule is discharged. We direct the trial to be expedited. A. P. Bhattacharya, J. : I agree. Application fails.