N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) [his Lordships after stating the facts of the case dealt with the first ground of plea regarding vagueness of the notice. His Lordship further observed :]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) THIS brings me to the second ground of vagueness. The impugned notices in each of these suits called upon the delinquent as follows : You have put up a structure in a specified plot. as shown in the sketch at the reverse by red colour without obtaining the permission as required under Rule No. 6 of Chapter 12 of the Building Regulations and the said construction is against the rule and bye-laws. EACH of the notices in these suits did not mention what rule or rules and what bye-law or bye-laws had been violated. A reply had come to be filed by each of the plaintiffs and then the order had come to be passed. In the said order the Deputy Town Development Officer concerned referred to his notice the reply and in substance concluded that as the said offending structure had been put up without municipal permission and as it was violated the building bye-laws Nos. 26 37 41 83 and 93 it was liable to be removed. The said notice then proceeded further to call upon the delinquent to remove the structure himself under the peril of the same being removed by the Corporation at the risk and costs of the concerned delinquent. This would go to show that the ultimate decision to pull down the structure in question was arrived at by the concerned officer on two grounds namely (1) non-procurement of the previous permission to construct under sec. 253 of the Act; and (2) for violation of the specified bye-laws. It is therefore manifest that the con- cerned delinquent had no opportunity to have his say against the alleged non-compliance with the requirement of the specifics bye-laws. No doubt the impugned notices did refer to be law and rule but as said above it did not specifically refer to which rule and which bye-law. Mr. It is therefore manifest that the con- cerned delinquent had no opportunity to have his say against the alleged non-compliance with the requirement of the specifics bye-laws. No doubt the impugned notices did refer to be law and rule but as said above it did not specifically refer to which rule and which bye-law. Mr. Vakil in this connection invited my attention to the fact that the initial report on the basis of which the impugned notice in each of these cases had come to be issued did mention those bye-laws. This is no doubt true but that does not in any way mend the position of the delinquent concerned who statutorily has a right to show cause against the alleged infringement. The notice therefore per se was vague and if it could be shown that this vagueness ultimately reflected in the delinquent not showing the proper cause the notice would be bad and so will be bad the final order which has got the earlier impugned notice as its substratum. Mr. Vakil at one stage had urged that this should not have caused any prejudice but it is difficult to agree. After all the bye-laws deal with various detailed require- ments to be fulfilled and if the specific attention is not invited to the alleged specific breaches or infringements a very vital principle or audi. alteram partem can be said to have been violated To this extent the learned Judge was obviously right in observing that the impugned notice under sec. 260 (1) (a) of the Act was vague and therefore invalid. ( 3 ) MR. Vakil in this connection urged that it out of the two grounds one was sufficient to sustain the ultimate decision the irrelevance or vagueness of the one ground did not matter. In this connection the Supreme Court has laid down guidelines very clearly. In the case of the State of Maharashtra v. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and Ors. A. I. R 1967 S. C. 1353 such a question had arisen and the Supreme Court in that connection has observed as follows:-WHERE an order is based on several grounds some of which are irrelevant that if there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of relevant and existing grounds that order cannot be sustained Where however. the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds and the exclusion of irrelevant and non-existing ground could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision of the authority order has to be sustained. In the case on hand there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the first ground and therefore the impug- ned order cannot be sustained. Mr. Vakil in this connection has also urged that the courts should in such cases always examine that the concerned authority would have passed the ultimate order even on the basis of the available ground and he in the present context submitted the the putting up of a construction without a municipal permission in violation of sec. 253 of the Act itself would have afforded a ground to the concerned officer to order demolition. However it is to be recalled that it is a matter of discretion on the part of the officer. If the construction is without requisite previous permission but if there is no infringement of any essential bye-law or bye-laws the Municipal Commissioner or his delegate would be competent to condone the lapses. Had the question of the respective plaintiff rested only on the non-procurement of the previous permission before construction the delegate authority for ought we know might not have been inclined to exercise its discretion against the concerned delinquent. It is also difficult to conjecture that the said officer would have necessarily passed the order of demolition under sec. 260 (2) of the Act if the case had rested only on the non-procurement of the previous permission. Mr. Vakil however urged that from the report of the Inspector which was before the Officer and which specifically referred to the infringement of the bye-laws it should be assumed that in all probabilities the concerned delegate would not have allowed the structure to stand. It is difficult to adopt this line of reasoning. We have to examine the situation on the assumption that there was no material before him about the infringement of bye-laws and decide what he would have done in these circumstances. It is difficult to adopt this line of reasoning. We have to examine the situation on the assumption that there was no material before him about the infringement of bye-laws and decide what he would have done in these circumstances. It cannot do to say that even though he had not given a hearing in respect of the alleged infringement of bye-laws his ultimate decision would have remained the same because of his having ex parte before him the allegation of infringement of bye-laws. This argument advanced by Mr. Vakil for the Corporation proceeds on an erroneous assumption of a delegates power to act despite having not given an opportunity to the other side to show cause against the alleged infringement. This is certainly not permissible. So the ultimate conclusion of the learned Judge in all these matters would be worthy to be confirmed only on the question of vagueness to the extent stated above. ( 4 ) BEFORE I close this chapter one argument advanced on behalf of the respondents deserves to be dealt with because such a plea is likely to be raised time and again on behalf of such persons. It was urged that sec. 269 (1) is confined to the cases arising under sec. 254 of the Act and not to cases under sec. 253 of the Act. For that purpose sec. 260 (1) deserves to be quoted verbatim below. 260 If the erection of any building or the execution of any such work as is described in sec. 254 is commenced or carried out contrary to the provisions of the rules or by-laws the Commissioner unless he deems it necessary to take proceedings in respect of such building or work under sec. 260 If the erection of any building or the execution of any such work as is described in sec. 254 is commenced or carried out contrary to the provisions of the rules or by-laws the Commissioner unless he deems it necessary to take proceedings in respect of such building or work under sec. 264 shall (a) by written notice require the person who is erecting such building or executing such work or has erected such building or executed such work on or before such day as shall be specified in such notice by a statement in writing subscribed by him or by an agent duly authorised by him in that behalf and addressed to the Commissioner to show sufficient cause why such building or work shall not be removed altered or pulled down or (b) shall require the said person on such day and at such time and place as shall be specified in such notice to attend personally or by an agent duly authorised by him in that behalf and show sufficient cause why such building or work shall not be removed altered or pulled down. ( 5 ) IT was urged that the adverbial clause as is described in sec. 254 not only the execution of any such work but also governs the phrase erection of any building. The argument is fallacious ex- facie. The objectival phrase beginning as is related to the formal adjective such which is occurring in the phrase execution of any such work but the earlier part is an independent part namely the erection of any building. Sec. 260 (1) therefore deals with two infringements one under sec. 253 and this is to be read with the phrase if the erection of any building and sec. 254 is to be read with phrase execution of any such work. The argument therefore that for the breach of sec. 253 action under sec. 478 alone is envisaged by the Act is absolutely ill-founded. sec. 260 (1) of the Act applies both to secs. 253 and 254. Sec. 478 of the Act is a residuary provision enabling the Commissioner or his delegate to enforce the provisions of law other than those referred to in sec. 260. 253 action under sec. 478 alone is envisaged by the Act is absolutely ill-founded. sec. 260 (1) of the Act applies both to secs. 253 and 254. Sec. 478 of the Act is a residuary provision enabling the Commissioner or his delegate to enforce the provisions of law other than those referred to in sec. 260. ( 6 ) THE result is that all the appeals fail and are dismissed but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case I order that parties should bear their own costs althroughot. .