JUDGMENT R. M. Sahai, J. 1. SEVENTEEN years of litigation once before the Civil Judge acting as arbitrator, once before the Tahsildar, twice before Sub-Divisional Officer and this court have not settled the dispute between the parties started on an objection filed under Section 12 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment before 1963. 2. THE question, on facts, which are more or less admitted, is whether Tahsildar and Sub-Divisional Officer by virtue of Rule 109-A of Consolidation of Holdings Rules are empowered to decide an objection regarding title, pending on the date of notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act. On 8-2-1962 the Civil Judge being of the view that he had no jurisdiction sent the records to Consolidation Officer. The village was denotified some time in 1962. The objection of the opposite party claiming to be sole sirdar was allowed exparte on 31-12-1965 by the opposite party No. 2 (Tahsildar). The appeal against this order was set aside by this court and the appellate court (Sub-Divisional Officer) was directed to decide the application under Section 5 for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. On remand the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, but the order of opposite party No. 2 was affirmed on merits. 3. A notification issued under Section 52 operated as a ceasure of consolidation operations in the village. Subsection (2) added in 1963, however, creates exception in pending proceedings and further enable implementation of order passed in writs of courts of competent jurisdiction by such authority as may be prescribed. 4. THAT the objection, appeal or proceeding pending on the date of denotification shall continue to be decided has been put beyond doubt by a series of decisions of this court-Jiwa Ram v. Deputy Director Consolidation, 1973 AWR 419, R. R. Basant Singh v. Deputy Director Consolidation, 1969 RD 42 and Om Prakash v. Saiyed Husain, 1968 RD 460. The question raised is whether opposite party No. 2 appointed under rule 109-A is an authority only to execute the orders or is an authority competent to decide the objection. The question raised is whether opposite party No. 2 appointed under rule 109-A is an authority only to execute the orders or is an authority competent to decide the objection. Sub-rule (1) of rule 109-A reads : "(1) Orders passed in cases covered by sub-section (2) of Section 52 shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities authorised in this behalf under sub-section (2) of Section 42 of the Act by the Collector of the district in his capacity as a District Deputy Director if such authorities are functioning in any part of the district at the time. In case there be no such authority the Assistant Collector, incharge of the Sub-Division, the Tehsildar, the Naib-Tahsildar, the Supervisor Kanungo and the Lekhpal of the area to which the case relates shall, respectively, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidator and the Consolidation Lekhpal respectively for the purpose of giving effect to the orders aforesaid." The rule comes into play only to give effect to orders passed in cases covered under Section 52 (2). The latter part of the sub-rule permitting certain authorities, other than consolidation authorities, to discharge the duties of Settlement Officer, Consolidation Officer has to be read along with the earlier part. 5. BY virtue of it the execution or implementation of orders may be carried by those authorities when for some reason there is no consolidation staff in the unit. This rule does not clothe Tahsildar or any authority mentioned in this rule with the power to decide an objection filed under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act. 6. RELYING on sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act it was argued for the respondent that it was open to the State Government to appoint any person to exercise the powers and perform the duty of a Consolidation Officer. Section 3 (3) reads as under : "3. DEFINITIONS-In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-(3) 'Consolidation Officer' means a person appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a consolidation Officer under this Act or the rules made there under." The section authorises the State Government to appoint any person as Consolidation Officer. The appointment may be made either by a notification or even by the rule. The appointment may be made either by a notification or even by the rule. There is no notification appointing opposite party No. 2 as Consolidation Officer. As seen above the rule permits performance and discharge of duty in a very limited sphere. It cannot be read as appointment of opposite party as Consolidation Officer to discharge the duties and function as contemplated under the Act. There is thus substance in the argument of the learned counsel for petitioner that the order passed by opposite party No. 2 on the objection of the opposite party and by opposite party No. 3 in appeal of the petitioner was without jurisdiction. 7. LEARNED counsel for respondent raised two preliminary objections ; (1) The petitioner having not raised the question of jurisdiction was debarred from raising the same as it involved investigation of facts. (2) Before the appellate court the opposite party raised an objection that no appeal was maintainable. This objection was resisted by the petitioner as such he is now estopped from challenging the order on the ground that the appellate court had no jurisdiction. 8. FROM the discussions above it is clear that the question whether opposite party had jurisdiction to decide the objection filed on behalf of the opposite party did not involve any investigation of fact. It is further clear that it was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that a question regarding inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage-see Hira Lal v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 . Whether the petitioner by filing an appeal disentitled himself from seeking quashing of the appellate order need not be gone into as he was not debarred from seeking quashing of the order passed by opposite party No. 2. Moreover there could be no estoppel where the lack of jurisdiction was patent. 9. IT was further urged that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of revision under Section 48 of Consolidation of Holdings Aot before Director Consolidation as such the Writ Petition was liable to be dismissed. 10. A revision under Section 48 lies against an order passed by a subordinate authority. The question is whether a Tahsildar or Sub-Divisional Officer while exercising power under rule 109-A is an authority subordinate to Deputy Director of Consolidation. 10. A revision under Section 48 lies against an order passed by a subordinate authority. The question is whether a Tahsildar or Sub-Divisional Officer while exercising power under rule 109-A is an authority subordinate to Deputy Director of Consolidation. As pointed out earlier they are not appointed as Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer Consolidation under Section 3 (3) or Section 3 (9) to discharge the duties and functions of a Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer Consolidation. They are authorities nominated by the State Government to implement the orders passed under the Act where there is no Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer Consolidation in a unit or village. Moreover rule 109 was added in 1964 whereas Explanation to Section 48 was added in 1968 and reads as under : "For the purposes of the section Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpal shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation." The Legislature being aware that for certain purposes the State Government has nominated certain authorities other than those mentioned in the Explanation yet while enumerating the authorities who were subordinate to the Director of Consolidation excluded those authorities. The effect of the exclusion is that those authorities shall not be deemed to be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. The argument therefore that a revision under Section 48 was maintainable has no merit. The orders passed by the subordinate authorities are being quashed, it is not necessary to consider the argument raised on behalf of the petitioner that rule 109-A deprives the petitioner of a right of filing a revision which is available to other tenure holders who file their objections under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act. 11. THE result is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. THE orders passed by the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed. A mandamus is further issued directing the Consolidation Officer of the village in dispute to decide the objection of the opposite party expeditiously. Petition allowed.