JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This criminal revision application has been filed by the husband who was opponent in an application under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Thana. That application was filed by his wife who had been married to him in the year 1972 on ground that in August 1972 the husband had driven her away out of his house and it was not possible for her to return to his house because he was treating her in a cruel manner. In the Court below evidence was led on behalf of both the parties. In support of her application the wife examined herself. The learned trial Magistrate accepted her evidence and a come to the conclusion that the petitioner husband refused and neglected to maintain the respondent wife. He also fixed the quantum of maintenance at Rs. 100/- p.m. having regard to the salary of Rs. 455-30 p.m. which the petitioner was earning. This he did by his order dated 30th November, 1976. Against that order of maintenance the petitioner has approached this Court by this petition which has been supported before me by Mr. D.K. Ghaisas the learned Advocate. Mr. Ghaisas has criticised the judgment of the Court below on four grounds. In the first place he stated that the learned trial Magistrate was not justified in relying upon the sole testimony of the respondent relating to the ill-treatment given to her. It is impossible for me to accept this submission of Mr. Ghaisas. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to prove a case. Even in important criminal cases it has been held repeatedly by the courts that a testimony of a single witness can be made the sole basis of conviction. In matters affecting the personal lives of the parties it is hardly imaginable that the Court should insist upon the examination of two witnesses. Secondly Mr. Ghaisas contended that in the proceedings between the parties initiated by the petitioner for judicial separation the Civil Court had under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act fixed a sum of Rs. 40/- as maintenance pendente lite and this ought to have been taken into consideration by the learned trial Magistrate. I am also rejecting this contention of Mr. Ghaisas contended that in the proceedings between the parties initiated by the petitioner for judicial separation the Civil Court had under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act fixed a sum of Rs. 40/- as maintenance pendente lite and this ought to have been taken into consideration by the learned trial Magistrate. I am also rejecting this contention of Mr. Ghaisas for the simple reason that I do not find from the judgment of the Court below that this particular aspect was brought to the notice of the learned trial Magistrate. In any case the amount which is fixed under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not the amount of maintenance alone. It is also given for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the proceedings which the respondent in those proceedings was forced to face. Thirdly Mr. Ghaisas says that the quantum of maintenance of Rs. 100/- p.m. which has been fixed is high considering that the salary of the petitioner was law viz. Rs. 455-30 and after deductions it would be much lower. The conduct of the petitioner in showing gross deductions of Rs. 323.05 from his salary of Rs. 455-30 is hardly commendable. The learned trial Magistrate has examined various figures mentioned in the salary certificate and found that the amounts of deductions are only temporary and probably shown for the purpose of impressing upon the Court that he earned a meagre salary. Taking into consideration the material deductions of G.P.F., compulsory deposit and a nominal deductions of Rs. 0-75 on account of health scheme the gross salary would be still around Rs. 400/-. If that is so, I do not see how one-fourth of that income if ordered to be given as maintenance can be regarded as excessive. Mr. Ghaisas in the last place took objection to the learned trial Magistrate giving weight to the fact that there was landed property of the petitioner and his joint family. After a second reading is given to that part of the judgment of the learned trial Magistrate wherein he speaks of the landed property of the petitioner and his joint family it will be seen that he has not taken it as a factor of importance while awarding Rs. 100/- as maintenance. Assuming this part of the Magistrates judgment is exceptionable still I do not regard that the amount of Rs. 100/- as maintenance. Assuming this part of the Magistrates judgment is exceptionable still I do not regard that the amount of Rs. 100/- which he has given is in any way so excessive as to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The petition must therefore fail. The rule is discharged. -----