( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners are the landlords of the schedule premises, which is a building bearing D. No. 20-458, bunder Locality, Mangalore Town. The schedule premises and the premises bearing D. Nos. 20-463, 20-464 and 20-465 are adjacent to each other. It is undisputed that there is vacant space behind the schedule premises and abutting that vacant space, a house belonging to the petitioners, is situated. ( 2 ) ORIGINALLY the schedule premises and the adjoining premises bearing D. Nos. 20-463, 20-464 and 20-465 belonged to one Mythili. The respondent had become a tenant under Mythili by executing a rent bond on 14-10-1963 (Ext. P3), the period of tenancy being reserved for eleven months. Mythili sold the properties to the petitioners on 11-9-1967. On the very day Mythili and one of the petitioners issued a joint notice as per Ext. Dl to the respondent intimating him about the transaction of sale and calling upon him to pay the future rents including the rent for the month of Sepr, 1967 to the petitioners. On 31-3-1968 the respondent sent money order for a sum of Rs. 300 to the petitioners, but the money order was returned being refused. On 15-4-1968 the petitioners issued quit notice as per Ext. P4 terminating the tenancy of the respondent and calling upon him to hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises to the petitioners, as they reasonably and bonafide required the possession of the schedule premises, because their business had increased and also on the ground that the respondent had failed to pay the rent that had accrued from the month of September 1967. ( 3 ) ULTIMATELY the petitioners filed HRC. 172 of 1968 in the Court of of Munsiff, Mangalore, Soutn Kanara, on 30-7-1968. ( 4 ) THE case put forward by the petitioners is on the very lines narrated in the preceding paragraphs. ( 5 ) THE respondent contended that the petitioners did not reasonably and bonafide require the schedule premises for personal occupation, that the respondent had, in view of the notice dt. 11-9-1967 (Ext. ( 4 ) THE case put forward by the petitioners is on the very lines narrated in the preceding paragraphs. ( 5 ) THE respondent contended that the petitioners did not reasonably and bonafide require the schedule premises for personal occupation, that the respondent had, in view of the notice dt. 11-9-1967 (Ext. Dl) paid the rent for the month of September, 1967 to petitioner-3, but petitioner-3 had not given any receipt and the same had not been asked for the respondent and that the petitioners could not, in law, claim the rent for the whole of the month of September, 1967, as they had become the owners of the schedule premises from 11-9-1967. He also contended that the petitioners were in fact, actuated with the oblique motive of securing higher rent and in fact they had demanded higher rent and he had issued notice in that behalf. He has, of course, put forth the ground of comparitive hardship in his favour. ( 6 ) THE learned Munsiff held that the sale deed having not been produced, the term pertaining to respondent being liable to pay the rent for the month of Sepr, 1967 to the petitioners, was not before the Court and as the sale deed is dt. 11-9-1967 the petitioners were not entitled to receive the rent for the month of Sepr, 1967 and as such, their case under clause (a) of the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act, was not sustainable In regard to the validity of the quit notice Ext. P4, he has found that the tenancy was from the 1st of every month till the end of the month, that the notice Ext. P4 terminated the tenancy of respondent from 13-5-1968 and therefore, the notice was bad in law. He has not accepted the case that the petitioners required the schedule premises reasonably and bonafide for personal occupation on the ground that it was available in the evidence of PW. 1, who is one of the petitioners, that during the pendency of the proceedings, negotiations had taken place between the petitioners and the respondent and they had offered to hand over a portion of other premises adjacent to their possession to the respondent on a rental of Rs. 150 per month and that showed that the petitioners did not really need the schedule premises to accommodate their expanded business. 150 per month and that showed that the petitioners did not really need the schedule premises to accommodate their expanded business. ( 7 ) THE learned Dist Judge has, on the question of notice, held that no notice was in law necessary as the respondent was a statutory tenant on the expiry of the period reserved in the rent bond Ext. P3, and in case, a notice was thought to be necessary Ext. P4, was not a valid notice as the tenancy month was the English calendar month and that the requirement for personal occupation as put forth by the petitioners was not there and lastly, that the petitioners were not entitled to receive the rent for the month of Sepr, 1967 as they had become the owners of the schedule premises from 11-9-1967. ( 8 ) IN Ganga Dutt Murnrka v. Kartik Chandra Das, AIR. 1961 SC. 1067. the Supreme Court has held that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises by virtue of statutory protection, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration of determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford a ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy. This principle has been relied upon by the learned Dist Judge while concluding that the respondent was a statutory tenant and therefore, no notice to quit was necessary in law. Sri K. Balakrishna Rao, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, urged that the material on record showed that the respondent was not a statutory tenant but a contractual tenant after the expiry of the period of lease reserved under Ext. P3 and therefore, a valid notice to quit under the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property act, was in law, necessary and as the tenancy month was the English calendar month, the notice Ext. P4 was not valid and hence, the petitioners have to fail. P3 and therefore, a valid notice to quit under the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property act, was in law, necessary and as the tenancy month was the English calendar month, the notice Ext. P4 was not valid and hence, the petitioners have to fail. He relied on the very decision of the Supreme Court that there is, however, no prohibition against the landlord entering into a fresh contract of tenancy with a tenant whose right of occupation is determined and who remains in occupation by virtue of the statutory immunity and further, that apart from an express contract, conduct of the parties may undoubtedy justify an inference that after determination of the contractual tenancy, the landlord had entered into a fresh contract with the tenant, but whether the conduct justifies such an inference must always depend upon the facts of each case. ( 9 ) THE position of law in regard to the quit notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, when a contractual tenancy is under consideration, is settled by the Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of the mysore Rent Control Act, which is the very Act in question, in Dattopant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthi Rao Janagaval, AIR 1975 SC 1111 . It is laid down therein that when there is contractual tenancy a notice terminating the tenancy as provided by S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act, is necessary. This decision is followed by this Court in mallikarjuna Veerappa v. Govinda Woman, 1976 2 Karlj 282 . ( 10 ) IN view of the above position, it is necessary to find out whether the respondent was a contractual tenant or a statutory tenant. The two courts below have not at all gone into this aspect, which is a question of fact. ( 10 ) IN view of the above position, it is necessary to find out whether the respondent was a contractual tenant or a statutory tenant. The two courts below have not at all gone into this aspect, which is a question of fact. ( 11 ) SECTION 2 (r) of the Act defines a 'tenant' as follows :"'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents of fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been formed out or leased by a local authority. "the latter part of the above provisions makes it abundantly clear a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, would become a statutory tenant. That is also how it has been held by the Supreme Court in Dattapant's case (2) referred to above. ( 12 ) IT is undisputed that the respondent became a tenant under the vendor of the petitioners by executing rent bond on 14-10-1963 (Ext. P3 ). It is also undisputed that after the expiry of the period of eleven months, i. e. , 14-9-1964 when the tenancy under Ext. P3 came to be determined dy efflux of time, the respondent continued to pay the very same rent to the petitioners' vendor and she went on accepting the rent month after month. These facts by themselves do not lead to an inference that the respondent is tenant by holding over as provided under S. 116 of the transfer of Property Act in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Gcmga Dtctfs case (1 ). But at the sametime it is to be seen whether the inference or the presumption that the respondent having remained in possession of the schedule premises after the expiry of the lease period settled under Ext. But at the sametime it is to be seen whether the inference or the presumption that the respondent having remained in possession of the schedule premises after the expiry of the lease period settled under Ext. P3, must a statutory tenant is upset, because of other facts and circumstances conclusively established in this case to show that after the expiry of the period mentioned in Ext. P3 the contract between the vendor of the petitioners and the respondent was renewed. ( 13 ) SRI K. Balakrishna Rao relied on the recitals in Exhibit D-1 the joint notice issued to the respondent by the vendor of the petitioners and one of the petitioners on 11-9-1967 and the recitals in Ext. P4. ( 14 ) EXT. D1 is of the very date on which the sale of the properties took place between the vendor of the petitioners. At that point of time neither the vendor of the Petrs nor the Petrs had any intention of terminating the tenancy of the Respt. They had also no intention of securing vacant possession of the schedule premises from the respondent. The only intention they had, as is clear from the contents of Ext. D1, was to intimate to the respondent about the sale transaction and call upon the respondent to go on paying the rental to the petitioners. In paragraph-2 of Ext. D1, it is narrated as follows:"that you are a monthly tenant under No. 1 of us as per a Rent bond executed by you in respect of the Hotel building a,t Kasha bazaar village, 20th Ward bearing Door No. 20-458. "in paragraph-3 it is narrated as follows :"you are therefore, hereby called upon to pay the future rents including the rent due for the month of Sepr, 1967 in respect of the hotel building in your possession as a monthly tenant to No. 2 of vs and obtain receipt and also to adhere strictly to his instructions from this date, viz, 11th Sepr, 1967. "the narration contained in the excerpts above and particularly the underlined portions leave no doubt in my mind that even after the expiry of the period reserved by Ex. P. 3, the respondent continued as a monthly tenant by virtue of an agreement arrived at between the vendor of the petitioners and the respondent. "the narration contained in the excerpts above and particularly the underlined portions leave no doubt in my mind that even after the expiry of the period reserved by Ex. P. 3, the respondent continued as a monthly tenant by virtue of an agreement arrived at between the vendor of the petitioners and the respondent. If that were not to be so, the portions which have been underlined by me , would not have found a place in ext. D1. On the other hand, if the respondent had continued as a statutory tenant by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the vendor of the petitioners and one of the petitioners would not have narrated as excerpted above in Ex. D. 1. This conclusion is further supported by the following recital in Ex. P. 4. "you had been giving them every hope that you would be vacating it as early as possible and in pursuance of this understanding you had been withholding payment of the rents pavable to them from 14-8-1967 onwards at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month as per terms and conditions of the rent bond executed by you in favour of my clients' predecessor in title. "in view of the above, there can be no doubt that the contract of tenancy that came into existence by Ex. P. 3 between the vendor of the petitioners and the respondent, must have been renewed on the expiry of the period of lease fixed by Ext. P3 and it was by virtue of renewal of the contract that the respondent continued to be a tenant on the schedule premises and went on paying the rental to the vendor of the petitioners and she went on accepting that rent. ( 15 ) IN Bhawanji Lakshashi v. Himtlal Jamnadas Doni, AIR. 1972 SC. 819. the Supreme Court has laid down as follows :"a distinction should, be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant at sufference in English Law and the latter a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The former is a tenant at sufference in English Law and the latter a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of possession after the determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy. "when it was argued that whenever rent is accepted by a landlord from a tenant whose tenancy has been determined, but who continues in possession, a tenancy by holding over is created and that was because the assent of the lessor alone and not that of the lessee, was material for purposes of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Supreme Court has laid down as follows :"we are not inclined to accept this contention. We have already shown that the basis of the section is a bilateral contract between the erstwhile landlord and the erstwhile tenant, if the tenant has the statutorry right to remain in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into a contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord. " ( 16 ) THE facts and circumstances satisfactorily established in this case as noted in the preceding paragraphs, call for the application of the above mentioned principles of law, and therefore, the conclusion that the contract of lease between the vendor of the petitioners and the respondent was renewed after the expiry of the period of lease settled by Ext. P3. Hence, the respondent is a contractual tenant and as such, a notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating his tenancy, is necessary in law. ( 17 ) WHETHER the lease was from the first of every month till the end of the month i. e. , English calendar month, or was from the 14th of every month to the 13th of next month, is a question of fact, which has been held against the petitioners by the two courts below. , The lease deed Ex. P. 3 is dated 14-10-1963. The date of the deed does indicate that the tenancy of the respondent had commenced from that date. , The lease deed Ex. P. 3 is dated 14-10-1963. The date of the deed does indicate that the tenancy of the respondent had commenced from that date. P. W. 1 himself has sworn in examination-in-chief that the tenancy was for the English calendar month i. e. , from 1st of every month to the end of the month. Exts. D3, d4, D5, D6 and D7 are the receipts issued by the vendor of the petitioners for having received rents from the respondent for the month of august, July. June 1967, October and September 1966. These receipts bear the dates 1-9-1967, 1-8-1967, 30-6-1967, 3-10-1966 and 6-9-1966 respectively. The dates borne by the receipts have a story to tell themselves. The dates found on the receipts clearly show that the tenancy was for the english calendar month and it cannot at all be contended that the concurrent finding of the Court below is perverse. In that view of the matter the notice Ext. P4, cannot be considered to be valid in law. ( 18 ) IT has already been pointed out that the learned Munsiff has, in regard to the arrears of rent proceeded on the basis that the petitioners were not entitled to the rent for the month of September 1967, in the absence of such a specific term in the sale deed, the sale deed not having been produced. The learned District Judge has followed similar reasoning. It is plain that the courts below have ignored the joint notice Ex. D. 1 dated 11-9-1967. Ex. D. 1 specifically called upon the respondent to pay the rent for the month of September 1967 to the petitioners. Hence, it will have to be held that the respondent was required to pay the rent for the month of September 1967 to the petitioners, and the reasoning of the two courts below cannot be countenanced. ( 19 ) THE case of the respondent is that he had paid the rent for the month of September 1967 to petitioner-3 and as he had not asked for a receipt, a receipt was not given to him. Sri. K. Balakrishna Rao learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent urged that the case of the petitioners that the rental right from 11-9-1967 had not been paid is falsified by the fact that the respondent had sent a sum of Rs. Sri. K. Balakrishna Rao learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent urged that the case of the petitioners that the rental right from 11-9-1967 had not been paid is falsified by the fact that the respondent had sent a sum of Rs. 300/- by money order on 31-3-1968 and the same has been refused. He further urged that the respondent being a buisness man, would not have failed to pay the rent for the month of September 1967 amounting to Rs. 50/-, when he had all along regularly paid monthly rental to the vendor of the petitioners. He draws support from the contents of Ext. D2, a notice sent by the Respt to the petitioners on 10-4-1968 to the effect that the petitioner had attempted to extract higher rental from the respondent. I am not impressed by this reasoning of Sri. Balakrishna Rao. Apart from the say of the respondent, there is no concrete material to show that he had in fact paid the rent for the month of September 1967 to petitioner-3 as contended by the respondent. A sum of Rs. 300/- said to have been sent by money order on 31-3-1968 covers the rental up to October 1967 only. Therefore, it will have to be held that the respondent has failed to establish that he had paid the rent for the month of September 1967 to the petitioners and the petitioners have succeeded in establishing that the respondent has fallen in arrears of rent for the month of September 1967. ( 20 ) THOUGH this finding of fact goes in favour of the petitioners, they cannot succeed in obtaining vacant possession of the schedule premises because of the invalidity of the notice Ext. P4. ( 21 ) SRI. B. V. ACHARYA, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the two Courts below have recorded a perverse finding on the fact relating to the claim that the petitioners reasonably and bonafide required the schedule premises for personal occupation. He reasoned that the courts below have proceeded on the basis that when pw. ( 21 ) SRI. B. V. ACHARYA, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the two Courts below have recorded a perverse finding on the fact relating to the claim that the petitioners reasonably and bonafide required the schedule premises for personal occupation. He reasoned that the courts below have proceeded on the basis that when pw. 1 had admitted in his evidence that he was present during the negotiations that took place when the proceeding in question was pending, to give a portion of the accommodation that was in the possession of the petitioners to the Respt to run his business, if Respt was prepared to hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises. He pointed out that the courts below have pointed out that when the petitioners were prepared to hand over vacant possession of a portion of accommodation in their possession to the respondent, it goes to show that the petitioners were not really in need of vacant possession of the schedule premises. ( 22 ) IT is available in the evidence of P. W. 1 that during the said negotiations he offered vacant possession of a portion of the accommodation in their possession to the respondent on a monthly rent Rs. 150 in lieu of vacant possession of the schedule premises. The petitioners have produced documentary evidence to show that their business had, in fact, increased. But the question is whether in view of this increase the petitioners reasonably and bonafide require the schedule premises for personal occupation viz. , to run their expanded business. It is available in the evidence of PW. 1 that the vacant space behind the schedule premises and abutting the residential house acquired by the petitioners in the year 1968 could be conveniently used to connect the schedule premises to the residential building and they could very conveniently shift their office and godown to the residential building. It is to be noted that according to the petitioners, their office and godown are situated in a tenanted building bearing D. No. 20-217. It is not the case of the petitioners that the landlord of the building bearing D. No. 20-217 has demanded vacant possession of that building or has sent a notice to them under S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act. It is not the case of the petitioners that the landlord of the building bearing D. No. 20-217 has demanded vacant possession of that building or has sent a notice to them under S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act. It is under these circumstances to be seen whether the approach by the two Courts below is perverse as contended by Sri B. V. Acharya. ( 23 ) THE factor that has been taken Into consideration by the two courts below is the offer of the petitioners to hand over a portion of the accommodation in their possession to the possession of the respondent in lieu of vacant possession of the schedule premises. It cannot at all be said that this factor is irrelevant to the question on hand. One thing that is certain on the basis of this factor is that the petitioners can very well do business with the accommodation that would be lesser in area to the one that they would be having after securing vacant possession of the schedule premises. When that is so, it cannot be said that the two courts below have recorded a perverse finding on the fact whether the requirement of the petitioners is reasonable and bonafide. Hence, this court, ought not to while exercising its revisional powers under S. 50 of the act interfere with this concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below. ( 24 ) IN view of the foregoing reasons, I see no merit in this petition and dismiss it. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .s