Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This is an application for quashing an order passed under section 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and also an order under section 146 (1) of the Code. 2. It appears that on the basis of a police report a proceeding under section 144 of the Code had been drawn up. The dispute between the parties relate to certain lands in respect of which one party says that he is in exclusive possession thereof whereas the other party claims to be in joint possession along with other party. After the cause was shown by the parties concerned and they were heard the learned Magistrate converted the proceeding to one under section 145 of the Code. By the same he directed attachment of the property under section 146 (1) of the Code and further directed the parties to file their written statement, documents and evidence. Hence this application. 3. The application was, however, admitted only for the purpose of adjudicating upon the validity of the order of attachment. Hence the only question before this Court is whether the aforesaid order under section 146 (1)is legal and proper. I may add that that, part of the order by which proceeding had been drawn up under section 145 (1) of the Code has not been challenged before me apart from the order passed at the time of admission limiting the case to the order of attachment alone. 4. The order of the Magistrate under section 146 (1) of the Code has merely to be read in order to be set aside. I have gone through the order which is fairly elaborate and it appears that ultimately the Magistrate came to the conclusion that there was a serious dispute between the parties relating to land and that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace on that account. It will, however, appear that there is a significant absence of any reason to show that the case was one of emergency. 5. A reading of the provisions of section 146 (1) of the Code itself would show that one of the conditions when a Magistrate may attach the lands under the aforesaid section is that when he considers the case to be one of emergency. 5. A reading of the provisions of section 146 (1) of the Code itself would show that one of the conditions when a Magistrate may attach the lands under the aforesaid section is that when he considers the case to be one of emergency. I had an occasion to consider the connotation of the term emergency in the case of Gaya Singh V/s. Daman Singh, Cr. Misc. No.2337 of 1975 and Doman Singh V/s. Gaya Singh and others, Cr. Misc.2352 of 1973 which have been referred to larger Bench by order dated 25th of August, 1976. It is well known that in every case where proceedings are drawn up under section 145 of the Code there is an apprehension of breach of the peace. Unless there is no such apprehension the fact giving jurisdiction to the magistrate to start a proceeding under section 145 of the Code itself would be absent. Emergency does not, however, have to be equated with an apprehension of breach of the peace occurring than the word likely (to cause breach of the peace) mentioned in section 145 (1) of the Code does. This is not a new way of approach in law. We know the distinction between likely and very likely. While comparing culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder the degree of probability comes into consideration. Certain facts, therefore, give rise to the conclusion that an apprehension of breach of the peace may be likely whereas additional facts may lead to the conclusion that breach of the peace is most likely or is imminent. The term emergency indicates that breach of peace must be imminent the Magistrate is entitled to attach the subject of dispute. The reason is not far to seek. In most cases at least one of the two contending parties is actually in possession and an order of attachment has the effect of taking the property out of possession of such a person. Therefore, it has a penal effect at least as against one party. The reason is not far to seek. In most cases at least one of the two contending parties is actually in possession and an order of attachment has the effect of taking the property out of possession of such a person. Therefore, it has a penal effect at least as against one party. It is commonsinse which dictates that in such cases it must be shown that the need of society relating to peace must supersede the right of individual in respect of his property and for that reason it is with a view to avoid the breach of the peace which is so imminent that a Magistrate is entitled to attach lands which are the subject-matter of dispute. 6. In the present case it appears that the learned Magistrate has not applied his mind at all to this aspect of the matter and merely passed a mechanical order attaching the lands without giving any reason for the same. The order must be set aside and it is accordingly, so done. 7. There is another reason for coming to the conclusion that the order is bad. It does not seem to have occurred to the learned Magistrate that in view of the provisions of section 146 (1) of the Code he can attach the land but he has no power thereafter to decide as to which party was in possession and, therefore, his order asking the parties to file written statement and document would be without jurisdiction. Once a Magistrate has taken recourse to the provisions of section 146 (1) of the Code and attached the land he has nothing more to do but to wait for the decision of a competent court in regard to the person entitled to possession. For this reason then the last part of the order would have been illegal. In view, however, of the fact that the first part of the order under section 145 (1) remains intact and in view of the fact that the second part of the order attaching the land under section 145 (1) has been set aside the last part of the order calling for written statement, document and evidence need not be disturbed because the last one logically follows the first part of the order. The Magistrate will now, therefore, proceed in accordance with law.