JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J.—National Insurance Company Limited in whom the General Assurance Societies Limited has merged is the Appellant against the order of the 2nd Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarding compensation to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for the death of one Bhagban Sahu in an accident caused by a motor car owned by Respondent No. 3 under the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the 'Act'). 2. Respondents No. 3 was the owner of the motor car bearing registration No. ORJ 766. On 26-2-73 it is alleged that when the said motor car was being driven in a rash and negligent manner on the road near Badambari in the city of Cuttack, it dashed against two persons, viz., Bhagban Sahu, a line man and Anant Sethi, a khalasi, under the State Electricity Board who were returning to their office at Badambari, Cuttack after performing their duty at some other place by the very same road on which the car was being driven. It is further alleged that the aforesaid two persons were on the left side of the road when the car dashed against them from behind. Of the two victims to the accident, Bhagban died as a result of the same. The parents of the deceased Bhagaban who are Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the appeal, filed a claim for Rs. 35,000/- before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Act (Vide Misc. Case No. 22 of 1973). The case being transferred to the 2nd Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was numbered as Misc. Case No. 24 of 1973. In that case, the owner of the car was opposite party No. 1 and the insurer of the car who is now Appellant was opposite party No. 2 The 2nd Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal disposed of the case by awarding Rs. 4,000/- to the claimants (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2) and by directing that the said sum shall be paid by the present Appellant with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of application till the date of payment. 3. Before the Tribunal both the owner of the car (Respondent No. 3) and the insurer the present Appellant, contested the claim of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by filing two separate written statements wherein they denied the allegations made by the claimants in their claim petition. 4. 3. Before the Tribunal both the owner of the car (Respondent No. 3) and the insurer the present Appellant, contested the claim of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by filing two separate written statements wherein they denied the allegations made by the claimants in their claim petition. 4. The Tribunal by applying the principle that in a case like the present one pecuniary loss of the claimants has to be calculated by balancing on one hand the loss to them of the future pecuniary benefits against any pecuniary advantage which irrespective of the source the claimant gets by reason of death, held that the future pecuniary loss sustained by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by reason of death of Bhagaban was Rs. 6,000/- and that the pecuniary advantage which the claimants got under the Workmen's Compensation Act was Rs. 2,000/-. Therefore, by deducting Rs. 2,000/- from Rs. 6,000/- the Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,000/-to the claimants as per its. award as mentioned above. 5. Mr. B. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the Appellant, raises only one point, viz. that in view of the provisions contained in Section 110-AA of the Act the claimant-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 having already been awarded compensation for the death of Bhagaban in the accident in question as evidenced by Ext. 2 under the Workmen's Compensation Act, no further claim by them was entertainable under the Act. It may be mentioned here that this point though was raised before the Tribunal was negatived by it and hence the appeal. The point raised by Mr. Choudhury requires careful scrutiny. The provisions u/s 110AA of the Act may be quoted below: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (Act VIII of 1923), where the death of a or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. The plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions to my mind is this: If death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation and if such claim is entertainable both under the Workmen's Compensation Act as well as under the Act, the claimant has the option to choose any one of the two forums, viz., either the forum under the Workmen's Compensation Act or the forum under the Act. The claimant by the provisions of Section 110-AA of the Act quoted above is debarred from preferring claims both under the Workmen's Compensation Act and also under the Act. The word 'claim' used in the section has no reference to the person against whom "a claim has to be made. At least, the language used in the section does not say so. That being the position, irrespective of the fact that the person against whom a claim can be entertained under the Workmen's Compensation Act is different from the person against whom a claim can be made under the Act, the bar of Section 110-AA of the Act will apply. The reason behind Section 110-AA of the Act seems to have been based on a very sound principle. Once the death of or bodily injury to a person gives rise to a cause of action for claiming damages in favour of a person, he cannot be compensated for the same cause twice. True, under the Wokmen's Compensation Act, limit of damages payable is prescribed whereas, under the Act there is no such limit. The reason is obvious. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the authority which is to decide quantum of damages is concerned with the benefit which the claimant was deriving out of the employment of the deceased person before his death under his employer whereas under the Act, the tribunal has to assess the benefit which the claimant was deriving from the person who died in a motor accident while alive irrespective of his employment under any particular master, because the tribunal does not decide the liability of the master, but the liability of the person guilty of tort. In a case before the Tribunal under the Act, the Tribunal, while assessing compensation, takes into consideration the income the deceased was having from various sources including his income in course of his employment under a particular master. In a case before the Tribunal under the Act, the Tribunal, while assessing compensation, takes into consideration the income the deceased was having from various sources including his income in course of his employment under a particular master. In a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the liability of the master is only quantified. The intention of legislature in enacting Section 110-AA of the Act is to prevent a claimant from making a claim twice on account of death of or bodily injury to any person in a motor accident. Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act also prevents a claim for damages being made twice on account of death of or bodily injury to any person in an accident. The said provision may be quoted below: 3 (5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any right to compensation on a workman in respect of any injury if he has instituted in a civil court a suit for damages in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person and no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a workman in any court of law in respect of any injury (a) if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of injury before a commissioner; or (b) if an agreement has come to between the workman and his employer providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The above provision clearly lays down that a workman has a right to compensation in respect of any injury done to him while discharging his duty as such. For the enforcement of this right he can institute a civil suit in a civil court for damages in respect of the injury either against the employer or any other person. Once he has gone to the civil court for damages, he is debarred from claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his employer. For the enforcement of this right he can institute a civil suit in a civil court for damages in respect of the injury either against the employer or any other person. Once he has gone to the civil court for damages, he is debarred from claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his employer. It has also been provided in the aforesaid provision that no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a workman in any court of law in respect of any injury if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of the said injury before a commissioner under the Act, or if by an agreement between him and his employer provision is made for payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The words 'Court of law' appearing in Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act have been interpreted by several judicial pronouncements to include a Claims Tribunal under the Act. In the decision reported in Radhabai Bhikaji Vs. Baluram Daluram, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is a civil Court for the purposes of prohibition contained in Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Justice H. R. Krishna speaking for the Court in that decision has observed as follows: I would understand by a 'Civil Court' the same as 'any court of law' used later on in the same Sub-section. The word 'Civil Court' has not been defined in Section 2 of the Act, and the entire trend of Section 3(5) is towards prohibition of duplication of proceedings not merely in a court functioning under the CPC or the local civil Courts Act but any court' competent to notice the injury and grant compensation such as any statutory tribunal, for example, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Before the commencement of the Motor Vehicles Act claim for damages in respect death of or bodily injury to any person why was a workman was entertinable both under the Workmen's Compensation 1923 and in any civil Court. To proven duplication of the claim in two forums Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act made the provision that once the claimant institutes a proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act he is debarred from instituting a suit for damages in the civil Court and vice-versa. To proven duplication of the claim in two forums Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act made the provision that once the claimant institutes a proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act he is debarred from instituting a suit for damages in the civil Court and vice-versa. After the commencement of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939) civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain claims in respect of damages for the death of or bodily injury to a person in a motor accident was ousted and Claims Tribunal was constituted under that Act to entertain such claims. The provision contained in Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act makes it abundantly clear that even where a workman has instituted a suit for damages for the injury sustained by him in course of discharging his duties under a particular master against a person other than the master, still then he is precluded from getting compensation against his own master under the Workmen's Compensation Act even though in the civil suit his claim for damages was not against his employer, but against another person. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, very clear and what is intended to be prevented is duplication of claim proceedings irrespective of whether the person against whom the claim is made is the same or different. To bring in harmony the provision contained in Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act with the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act the legislature intentionally by way of amendment introduced Section 110-AA of the Act, because unless that was done a person who has made a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act will be free to make a claim under the Act for compensation for the same accident and would defeat the very purpose of Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. At the risk of repetition I may here once again point out that the word 'claim' used in Section 110-AA of the Act does not refer to the person or persons against whom the claim has to be preferred. The bar contained in Section 110-AA of the Act is an absolute bar in respect of any claim which arises out of a motor accident under the Act irrespective of the person or persons against whom the claim is made, the reason being as has been stated earlier to prevent duplication of claim. The contention of Mr. The bar contained in Section 110-AA of the Act is an absolute bar in respect of any claim which arises out of a motor accident under the Act irrespective of the person or persons against whom the claim is made, the reason being as has been stated earlier to prevent duplication of claim. The contention of Mr. Choudhury is, therefore, bound to prevail. Mr. A.K. Mohanty, learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, however, contends that u/s 95 of the Act an insurer insures a person or class of persons against several risks named in the section. Under the said section, the liability to a third party in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place is fully covered. Similarly, liability on account of death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle is also covered. With regard to an employee of the insured, limit of liability under the said provision is fixed which is the same as per the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Mohanty, therefore, urges that u/s 110-AA of the Act where the insured incurs a liability in respect of death arising out of or in the course of employment of an employee under him as provided in Section 95 of the Act the claimant has to choose either the forum under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Act. In other words, what he means to say is this: where the motor vehicle has been insured by a person and in course of use of that vehicle in a public place the driver or the conductor in the vehicle when it is a public service vehicle meets with death while moving in the vehicle in course of employment under the insured, then only Section 110-AA of the Act will come into play and the claimant for compensation in such a case has either to go to the forum under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to the forum under the Act. He cannot at the same time initiate proceedings for claim in both the forums. Therefore, it is argued that in the present case Bhagaban Sahu, the deceased being an employee under the State Electricity Board and he having met with death in course of his employment under the Board, Respondent Nos. He cannot at the same time initiate proceedings for claim in both the forums. Therefore, it is argued that in the present case Bhagaban Sahu, the deceased being an employee under the State Electricity Board and he having met with death in course of his employment under the Board, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have a cause of action against the Board. The same Bhagaban Sahu also having met with death in course of the employment a cause of action accrues in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against the owner of the vehicle in question. There are two different causes of action and the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident being different from the employer of Bhagaban Sahu. Section 110-AA of the Act does not come into play and prevent Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 simultaneously putting forth their claims both under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the State Electricity Board and under the Act against the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. To give this meaning to Section 110-AA of the Act as urged by Mr. Mohanty will amount to stretching the language used therein and will amount to ignore a very sound principle of law as embodied in Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act as pointed out above. When a claimant suffers damages on account of death of or bodily injury to any person in a motor accident he is certainly entitled to compensation. The damage sustained by him does not get doubled, because the law provides two forums for claiming damages under two different Acts. The provision for awarding damages under the Act is, no doubt, more comprehensive than the provisions contained under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is because of this that the claimant has been given an option u/s 110-AA of the Act to choose his forum. If he chooses the forum which is more comprehensive, so far so good. But if he chooses a forum which is less comprehensive he takes the risk upon himself. The object of Section 110-AA of the Act is to avoid duplication of claims. This purpose will be defeated if the meaning as urged by Mr. Mohanty is given to the provisions of Section 110-AA of the Act. Such a meaning is not warranted by the language used in the section. The object of Section 110-AA of the Act is to avoid duplication of claims. This purpose will be defeated if the meaning as urged by Mr. Mohanty is given to the provisions of Section 110-AA of the Act. Such a meaning is not warranted by the language used in the section. The view which I have taken in the present case is, as already mentioned above, supported by the authority reported in (Supra) to a large extent in which case the claimant was not allowed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as he had already preferred a claim in the civil Court. 6. For the reasons stated above the appeal succeeds, the award of the Tribunal under appeal is set aside and the claim petition filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the tribunal u/s 110A of the Act is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order for costs.