Judgment 1. This application by Mahant Dhanushdhari Das and two others under Ss. 397 and 401 of the Cr. P.C. 1973 is directed against the order dated the 20th Aug., 1975, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge setting aside the order dated the 29th Nov., 1972 passed by the Magistrate, First Class, declaring possession of the petitioners over the disputed land in a proceeding under S. 145 of the Cr. P. C., 1898. 2. The petitioners were members of the first party in the said proceeding. Opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 were members of the second party, opposite party Nos. 4 to 16 were the members of the third party and opposite party No. 17 was the member of the fourth party in the said proceeding. 3. Nobody appears on behalf of any of the opposite parties. In order to appreciate the points involved in this application, it will be necessary to state some relevant facts. The Magistrate, as mentioned above, had passed a final order in the said proceeding, on the 29th Nov. 1972, declaring the possession of the disputed property in favour of the petitioners. The disputed land measures 3 bighas, 5 kathas and 14 dhurs, comprised under various plots bearing khata No. 65 situate in village Bariarpur, Police Station Adapur in the district of East Ghamparan. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 29th Nov. 1972 the members of the second party, namely opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 and some other members of the third party, namely, opposite party Nos. 4 to 10 filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge on the 11th Dec. 1972. The learned Sessions . Judge by his judgment dated the 20th. Aug. 1975 was pleased to allow the revision applteation filed by those opposite parties and set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 29th Nov. 1972. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has assailed the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge mainly on the ground that in his Judgment the learned Sessions Judge has wrongly proceeded into the provisions of S. 399 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. According to him, in the instant case the learned Sessions Judge ought to have followed the provisions contained under the old Code, i. e. Cr. According to him, in the instant case the learned Sessions Judge ought to have followed the provisions contained under the old Code, i. e. Cr. p. C. 1898 and in the said Code under S. 438 the learned Sessions Judge could have only referred to this court and he could not have passed Judgment setting aside the final order passed by the Magistrate. Therefore, the learned counsel has urged that the. learned Sessions Judges judgement is without jurisdiction and, therefore, it has got to be set aside by this court. The relevant por-tion of S. 438 (1) of the Cr. P. C. 1898 reads thus:- "The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on examining under S. 435 or otherwise the record of any proceeding, report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination, and, when such report contains a recommendation that a sentence or an order be reversed or altered may order that the execution of such sentence or order be suspended, and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond." 5. Learned counsel further submitted that in the instant case when the new Code came into force, i.e. on the 1st April, 1974, the revision application was obviously pending before the Sessions Judge. As pointed out above, those opposite parties had filed revision application on the 11th Dec, 1972. If that was pending, the learned Sessions Judge, he contended, ought to have followed the procedure provided under the old Code of 1898 and for that there is provision under S. 484 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure under the heading "Repeal and Savings." The relevant portion of the said provision is to this effect:- "484 (1) Cr. P.C. 1898, is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal:- (a) If immediately before the date on which this code comes into force, there Is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Cr. P. C. 1898 as in force immediately before such commencement, (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code), as if this code had not come into force: Provided that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII. P. C. 1898 as in force immediately before such commencement, (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code), as if this code had not come into force: Provided that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII. of the old Code, which is pending at the commencement of this Code, shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this code: (b) all notifications published, proclamations issued, powers conferred, forms prescribed, local jurisdiction defined, sentences passed and orders, rules and appointments, not being appointments as special Magistrates, made under the Old Code and which are in force immediately before the commencement of this code, shall be deemed, respectively, to have been published, issued, conferred, prescribed, defined, passed or made under the corresponding provisions of this code; (c) any sanction accorded or consent given under the Old Code in pursuance of which no proceeding was commenced under that code, shall be deemed to have been accorded or given under the corresponding provisions of this code and proceedings may be commenced under this code in pursuance of such sanction or consent; (d) the provision of the Old Code shall continue to apply in relation to every prosecution against a Ruler within the meaning of Art. 363 of the Constitution. (3) Where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding under the old Code had expired on or before the commencement of this code nothing in this Code shall be construed as enabling any such application to be made or preceeding to be commenced under this Code by reason only of the fact that a longer period therefor is prescribed by, this code or provisions are made in this Code for the extension of time." In my opinion the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is well founded. This point was, however, raised before the learned Sessions Judge but he held that sub-cl. (2) (a) of S.484 of the new code mentions "application" and the "revision" is not mentioned. Therefore, according to him, the application would not include the revision application. In my view, this view taken by the learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be correct. The application; according to me, has a wide meaning and it would include also the revision application. 6. If we refer to the Limitation Act, 1963, we would see that various articles are divided into three divisions. In my view, this view taken by the learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be correct. The application; according to me, has a wide meaning and it would include also the revision application. 6. If we refer to the Limitation Act, 1963, we would see that various articles are divided into three divisions. Under third division the heading is simply "application." There I find Art. 131 which reads thus, and includes revision:- "131. To any court for the exercise of its powers of revision under the Civil P. C. 1908 (5 of 1908), or the Cr.P. C., 1898 (5 of 1898) Ninety days The date of the decree or order or sentence sought to be revised." The view which I have taken, also finds support from an unreported judgment in the case of Ram Sewak Rat V/s. Umesh Chandra Prasad Sinha, Cr. Misc. 2416 of 1974, decided on 5-2-1975 (Pat). 7 In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned judgment of the Third Additional Sessions Judge, dated the 20th Aug. 1975 is set aside.