JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J. - The petitioner, who was officiating as Assistant conservator of forests, Tendu Leaves. South Chanda Division, at Allapalli, is-challenging in this petition the order of reversion made by the Chief Conservator of Forests, Maharashtra State, Pune, on 11-5-1976, as a result of which the petitioner was reverted as Range Forest Officer. The petitioner who commenced his career in the Forest Department as a Forest Guard on 1-2-1947 had come to be confirmed as Range Forest Officer on 2-11-1971. The Chief Conservator of Forests, by his order dated 5-7-1975, provisionally promoted "'purely on temporary basis" thirty-nine Range Forest Officers to officiate as Assistant Conservators of Forests. The petitioner was the thirty-ninth Range Forest Officer to be so promoted provisionally purely on temporary basis to officiate as Assistant Conservator of Forests. The select list -of Range Forest Officers fit for promotion to the Maharashtra Forest: Service, Class II, was forwarded by the State Government to the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Commission made the following remark in connection with the promotion of the petitioner: "In the opinion of the Commission, on the basis of his confidential record, Shri S. R. Atram is not fit for inclusion in the list. They, therefore, recommend that he may be excluded from the list." Consequent on this opinion being received from the Public Service Commission, the impugned order dated 11-5-1916 was made by the Chief Conservator of Forest reverting the petitioner as Range Forest Officer with immediate effect. The order of promotion fired by the petitioner dearly made provision for such reversion because it was stated that he was "promoted provisionally 'purely on temporary basis' and subject to revision (sic) (the word appears to be a mistake for "reversion") any time without notice, and without any claim to future promotions to M. F. S. Class 11.. .... ". The petitioner belongs to an Adivasi community and his challenge to the order of reversion is that it is a camouflage for an uterior motive, but the petitioner has not stated as to what this ulterior motive was. He further challenges the order of reversion as being passed deliberately to debar the petitioner from further promotions. In fact, there is nothing in the order which would indicate that he is debarred from further promotions. He further challenges the order of reversion as being passed deliberately to debar the petitioner from further promotions. In fact, there is nothing in the order which would indicate that he is debarred from further promotions. His main and substantial challenge is that the reversion amounts to reduction in rank, status and emoluments, and since no departmental inquiry Was held against him, the punishment of reduction in rank meted out to him is in gross violation of the principle of natural justice. After the State Government filed their return justifying reversion on the ground that the Government was constrained to revert the petitioner because of his unsatisfactory confidential records as advised by the Public Service Commission, the petitioner, by an amendment made in the petition, has made an allegation that the case of the petitioner was deliberately referred to the Public Service Commission along with the confidential records though these confidential records were never disclosed to the petitioner nor were communicated to him at any time. According to the petitioner his reversion made on the basis of his unfitness, amounts to a stigma and was, therefore, illegal. The petitioner's further case is that he was reverted exclusively on the basis of the opinion given by the Public Service Commission and hence the reversion was mala fide and liable to be quashed. 2. Mr. Chahande, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently argued that the petitioner was promoted on the basis of a select list already prepared by the State Government and according to him, that would be clear from the subject noted in the order of promotion which reads: "Select List of Range Forest Officers fit for promotion to M. P. S. Class II-Posting of Assistant Conservators of Forests-" According to the learned counsel, once this select list is made, if the petitioner was being reverted because of any adverse entries in his confidential reports which were not produced before this Court, then the order was liable to be quashed. The learned counsel has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Dashrath Khanke v. Director of Social Welfare1 in support of the proposition that the petitioner could not be reverted on the basis of the uncommunicated confidential reports. The learned counsel has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Dashrath Khanke v. Director of Social Welfare1 in support of the proposition that the petitioner could not be reverted on the basis of the uncommunicated confidential reports. Now, it is difficult for the petitioner to dispute that the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests was a purely provisional promotion made expressly on temporary basis and subject to reversion any time without notice. The status of the petitioner in the post of promotion was purely an officiating status. It is now well settled that where a person is appointed to a post of promotion on a purely temporary basis in an officiating capacity, the employee has no right to the post, and if he has no right to the post, he cannot make any grievance of his reversion. This proposition of law is too well settled to need any decision to be cited in support thereof. But if -one is needed it is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Sughar Singh2 on some observations in which the learned counsel has relied in support of his case that his reversion on the ground of unsuitability really amounted to a punishment, with the result that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India were attracted, To this part of the argument we shall refer later. The Supreme Court in Sughar Singh's case has dealt with the question as to when a reversion amounts to reduction in rank as 'Contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 13 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed: "An order of reversion is in its immediate effect bound always to be a reduction in rank. Even a reversion from a higher but temporary or officiating rank to a lower substantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But such orders of reversion are not always reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311……….The real test in all such cases is to ascertain if the officer concerned has a right to the post from which he is reverted. If he bas a right to the post then a reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered except in a compliance with the provisions of Article 311. If he bas a right to the post then a reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered except in a compliance with the provisions of Article 311. If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311:' In that decision, the Supreme Court referred to their earlier decision in Union of India v. Gajendra Singh3 in which the Court had held that "appointment to a post on officiating basis is, from the nature of employment, itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time" and it was held that the Government servant so appointed acquired no right to the post. If that be the legal position in the case of an officiating promotion on a purely provisional and temporary basis, the order of reversion in the instant case, can by no stretch of imagination, be open to challenge on the ground that it amounts to reduction in rank because at the time of promotion the promoting authority had reserved a right to revert the petitioner at any time without any notice. 3. It is probably realising this difficulty that the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order of reversion which, as it now transpires, is made on the basis of the recommendation of the Public Service Commission on the ground that the petitioner is unsuitable must amount to an order of punishment, inasmuch as he has not been given any opportunity to make any representation against an adverse remark, if there be any in his confidential reports and the order of reversion must, therefore, be considered to be penal, relying on the decision in Sughar Singh's case. In our view, this contention is based on a misapprehension of the legal position with regard to the power of appointing authority or the authority which has to decide the suitability of a candidate for promotion on the basis of the performance of the Government servant concerned which has to be judged with the assistance of his confidential reports. In our view, this contention is based on a misapprehension of the legal position with regard to the power of appointing authority or the authority which has to decide the suitability of a candidate for promotion on the basis of the performance of the Government servant concerned which has to be judged with the assistance of his confidential reports. The confidential reports which are made by superior officers are a subjective assessment of the performance of the Government servant and the only purpose of communicating any adverse entry in the confidential reports to the Government servant concerned is to give him an opportunity to bring about an improvement in his performance which was found to be lacking in quality by the superior officers. We have not been able to find any rule or a statutory obligation on the State Government to consider any representation which normally comes to be made by a Government servant when adverse remarks are communicated to him. On the other hand the Government instructions as they appear in the Hand-Book of General Circulars highlight the impropriety of making any such representations. General- Circular No.5, in Part II, at page 141 or the Hand-Book dealing with "writing and maintenance of Confidential reports in respect of Government servant” states in instruction No. (15) in paragraph 4, as follows: "A Government servant should at no time be kept ignorant for the reporting officer's opinion when his service is not considered satisfactory. Service fu this context should be' construed narrowly and should not be taken to include the character of the Government servant unless the defects in his character have become too bad as to interfere with his efficiency or his capacity for being moderate and fair. Adverse remarks in respect of relations with non-officials and public reputation' should, however invariably be communicated' to Government" servants.” Then paragraph 5 reads as follows: "According to instruction (15) in paragraph 4 above, adverse remark made against Government servants in their annual confidential reports are required to be communicated to them. Adverse remarks in respect of relations with non-officials and public reputation' should, however invariably be communicated' to Government" servants.” Then paragraph 5 reads as follows: "According to instruction (15) in paragraph 4 above, adverse remark made against Government servants in their annual confidential reports are required to be communicated to them. The object of communicating die adverse remarks to the Government servants concerned is to give them a chance to improve their work, conduct, etc., so that they should be able to remove the defects pointed out to them; It has been noticed, however, that some persons have misunderstood this object and that whenever any' adverse remarks, are communicated to them, they forward them representations in- order to make out that the remarks are unjustified and that they should therefore be deleted. This is not proper; It has, therefore, been decided that as a rule representations submitted against adverse remarks in the annual confidential reports should not be-entertained' and that the persons who submit such representations should be asked to desist from such on course.” There is, therefore, no right as such in a Government servant to make a representation against an adverse remark made in his confidential reports. While considering the question of suitability of a Government servant for promotion, the suitability or otherwise does not depend merely an the absence of any ad'9'el'se remark and' the authority which is entrusted with the duty of considering whether a Government servant is fit for promotion or not, is bound to looks into his confidential reports irrespective of the fact whether adverse entries, if there be any, were or were not communicated to' the Government servant concerned. The absence of Communication of adverse entries to the Government servant concerned does not prevent the authority concerned from taking ~hose confidential reports into consideration while determining the suitability of the Government servant for promotion. 4. What is the effect of absence of communication of an adverse entry in the confidential reports carne to be considered by the Supreme Court in Prakash Chand v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission4. 4. What is the effect of absence of communication of an adverse entry in the confidential reports carne to be considered by the Supreme Court in Prakash Chand v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission4. Dealing with the question as to whether uncommunicated remarks in the confidential reports could be permitted to come in the way of the promotion of a Government servant, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Strong reliance was placed on the various letters containing representations made by the petitioner from July 1963 where he had stated categorically that he had always received testimonials from his higher officers and that his confidential reports were without any blemish. It was only when the affidavit in opposition was filed that he came to know that he had not been given promotion in June 1963 because of these remarks. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, there was a clear violation of the instructions regarding confidential remarks and the petitioner had been discriminated against on the basis of remarks which should never have been made or should never have been allowed to remain in the confidential reports or stand in the way of his promotions if an opportunity had been given to him to explain the same way. 9. It was not disputed that the instructions as to confidential reports have not been properly observed in this case. It is not suggested that the departmental promotion Committee acted mala fide. If the adverse remarks were there in the confidential reports it was the duty of the departmental promotion Committee to take note of them and come to a decision on a consideration of them. The Committee could not be expected to make investigation about the confidential reports. It appears to us that in this case there was no discrimination, purposeful of otherwise, and at the best, the Committee's taking into consideration confidential reports with respect to which the petitioner had been given no chance to make a representation was merely fortuitous." (Italics by us.) 5. We have already pointed out that so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, we have not been shown any rule or regulation which would enable a Government servant to make any representation against an adverse confidential remark. We have already pointed out that so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, we have not been shown any rule or regulation which would enable a Government servant to make any representation against an adverse confidential remark. The decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Chand's case, in our view, is clear authority for the proportion that the authority entrusted with the duty of finding out the suitability or otherwise of a Government servant for promotion is bound to look into the confidential reports irrespective of whether any entries in those reports have or have not been communicated to the Government servant concerned. 6. There are at least two other decisions of this Court (to which one of us Chandurkar J., was a party) which have taken the view that non-communication of confidential reports does not prevent a superior authority from considering them in the matter of promotion or other benefit in the matter of employment. In Smt. Padmavati Kelkar v. Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra5, the question was whether uncommunicated confidential reports could be taken into consideration for the purpose of withholding the annual increment and in permitting the petitioner to cross the efficiency bar. While negativing the contention of the petitioner, it was observed in that judgment as follows: "The argument appears to be that unless the confidential reports were communicated to the petitioner, those confidential reports could not have been taken into consideration for the purposes of withholding the annual increment and not permitting the petitioner to cross the efficiency bar. Now, while the advisability of communicating the confidential reports to a Government employee cannot be disputed, it is difficult to accept the contention that such confidential reports cannot be considered by the appropriate authorities merely on the ground that they have not been communicated. There does not seem to be any bar to take into account uncommunicated confidential reports in order to decide whether the Government servant should be allowed to cross the efficiency bar or not." 7. A similar contention was raised on behalf of an employee of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board in Nilkanth v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board6 (to which one of us Chandurkal J. was a party). In that case, an order of reversion was challenged also on the ground that uncommunicated confidential reports could not be considered by the Selection Board. A similar contention was raised on behalf of an employee of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board in Nilkanth v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board6 (to which one of us Chandurkal J. was a party). In that case, an order of reversion was challenged also on the ground that uncommunicated confidential reports could not be considered by the Selection Board. After having found on consideration of the relevant Regulations and Circulars that an employee of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board whose case for promotion was to be considered by the Selection Committee had no right to make any representation against the overall assessment made by the officer who wrote out the confidential report and that the Selection Committee was bound to take note of the confidential report, it was observed: "We have already found that it was exclusively within the competence of the authority entrusted with the work of the petitioner to make that assessment and that the petitioner had no right to be heard in respect of making of such an assessment of the work. If the communication of any adverse remark in the confidential report was intended only to enable an employee to improve his performance, the fact that the confidential reports were taken into consideration without communicating these adverse remarks did not, in our view, violate any principle of natural justice." 8. It must be remembered that the petitioner was promoted to a selection post and the criterion for such selection was seriority-cum-merit. This meant that seniority by itself did not entitle the petitioner to earn his promotion and his entire performance was liable to be judged. The appropriate authority which has to ascertain the suitability or otherwise of the petitioner for promotion is the State Government, and it is difficult to see how we can entertain an argument on behalf of the petitioner that we should have sent for the confidential reports and should have ourselves found whether there was any adverse remark in the confidential reports which would disentitle the petitioner from earing his promotion. Mere absence of an adverse remark is not the sole criterion of the suitability of a public servant for being appointed to a post of promotion. Mere absence of an adverse remark is not the sole criterion of the suitability of a public servant for being appointed to a post of promotion. We may usefully refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Hussan v. Union of India7 where the Supreme Court pointed out that it was completely misconceived to suggest that since there was nothing against the petitioners, they were entitled to be selected. It was further pointed out that promotion of an officer was not made on the basis of absence of complaint but on the basis of positive merit and absence of adverse remarks was no criterion of the quality of the officer. The kind of approach which the learned counsel for the petitioner has been canvassing vehemently before us that we must ourselves go through the confidential reports, has been strongly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Jai Narain v. State of Bihar8 where in paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "So far as the question of suitability is concerned the decision entirely rested with the Government. In other words the Government is the sole judge to decide as to who is the most suitable candidate for being appointed as the Director of Agriculture. For discharging that responsibility it was open to the Government to seek the assistance of the Public Service Commission. In our judgment the High Court was not justified in calling for the records of the Public Service Commission and going through the notings made by various officers in the Commission as well as the correspondence that passed between the Commission and the Government. The High Court overlooked the fact that the Government sought the assistance of the Commission and not that of the High Court for finding out the most suitable candidate. In this case there was no complaint of mala fide either on the part of the Government or the Commission. The High Court overlooked the fact that the Government sought the assistance of the Commission and not that of the High Court for finding out the most suitable candidate. In this case there was no complaint of mala fide either on the part of the Government or the Commission. That being so the interference of the High Court in the matter of selection made by the Government was not called for." It is no doubt true that these observations were made in the matter of selection, but they would apply with full force even in a case where a person has been provisionally promoted subject to obtaining the opinion of the Public Service Commission and then on a proper scrutiny he has been found to be unfit and the order of reversion was passed. If the order of reversion of the petitioner has been made on the basis of his confidential report it must be presumed, unless it is shown to have been made mala fide that the order of reversion has been passed in due course and was not arbitrary. 9. Dealing with the terminate on simpliciter of the services of an employee consequent On the assessment of his work at the end of each year, a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ram Chander v. Delhi Administration observed: “Writing of confidential reports is an administration routine. The assessment of the work of an employess has to be made at the end of the each year. If as a result of such assessment, his services are simply terminated then such termination must be regarded as being in the course of routine administration as distinguished from some incident outside the routine of administration which could be the cause for the termination. The same Position, in our view, would hold good in the case of a reversion of a person who is temporarily promoted to hold a post in an officiating capacity pending his final assessment having regard to his Suitability for the post of promotion. 10. The decision on which the learned counsel for the petitioner relied heavily in Dashrath Khanke's (cit. 10. The decision on which the learned counsel for the petitioner relied heavily in Dashrath Khanke's (cit. supra) appears to ns to have been arrived at partly on the facts of that case, and if the ratio of that decision is What the learned counsel for the petitioner says, we may by with respect that it will run counter to the observations of the Supreme Court in Jai Narain v. State of Bihar. The petitioner Dashrath in that case challenged the promotion of six other junior clerks as senior clerk on the ground that he had been Wrongfully superseded and that his case was not considered at the time of promoting the other junior clerks as senior clerks. As during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner was already promoted as a senior clerk, the only grievance which survived in the petition was Whether he should be held promoted retrospectively from the date his juuior Was promoted. The supersession of the petitioner was sought to be justified on behalf of the State of the ground that though at the material time the Petitioner's case was considered, he was not found fit for promotion due to his unsatisfactory confidential reports. The person who was nest junior to the petitioner, though was promoted on 1-4-1965, was given 15-4-1963 as a provisional deemed date of promotion. While considering the question as to whether the petitioner was wrongfully superseded, the Division Bench found that though it was asserted in the return that the adverse confidential report Was communicated to the petitioner, no such material was made available at the time of bearing though time was granted to produce such material at the request of the counsel for the State. The Confidential reports which were read out to court were found not to support the case that the petitioner was unsuitable. It was then observed: "Apart from the fact that when it was asserted that there were adverse confidential reports ad they were communicated to the petitioner and when it is seen that no such adverse confidential report was communicated to the petitioner, we presume that there was no adverse confidential report against the petitioner. It was then observed: "Apart from the fact that when it was asserted that there were adverse confidential reports ad they were communicated to the petitioner and when it is seen that no such adverse confidential report was communicated to the petitioner, we presume that there was no adverse confidential report against the petitioner. In that view, we see no reason to hold that he was not only senior but suitable.” It was further pointed out that the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficiency bar and the fact that he was asked to hold charge of duties of senior clerk in addition to his own duties as junior clerk and the fact that he was paid additional allowance for ten months for holding the additional charge would go to show that the respondents themselves considered him suitable for holding the higher post in the year 1963. In view of this fact, the Division Bench rejected the assertion in the return that the petitioner was not found suitable and, therefore, was not considered, and a direction was given that the petitioner should be given a deemed date after considering his seniority and after considering the date of promotion of his next junior. It is difficult for us to spell out a ratio from this decision that if an order of reversion is made on the basis of an uncommunicated entry in the confidential reports, then the order was liable to be struck down as being penal. As we have pointed out, the Division Bench seems to have drawn an adverse inference in view of the failure of the State Government to produce the necessary confidential reports, and the question whether the Court could take upon itself the task of finding out the suitability of the candidate for promotion at a particular point of time does not seem to have been canvassed before the Division Bench. 11. The position with regard to an order which ex facie does not show that it is by way of punishment or does not cast any stigma was extensively reconsidered by the Supreme Court in S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Hmyana10. 11. The position with regard to an order which ex facie does not show that it is by way of punishment or does not cast any stigma was extensively reconsidered by the Supreme Court in S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Hmyana10. In the light of the different views that were being taken from time to time with regard to the powers of the Court to go behind an order which on the face of it was an order of termination simpliciter or reversion simpliciter, very instructive observations have been made by the Supreme Court in S.P. Vasudeva's case. In paragraph 5 the Supreme Court observed: "We may in this connection point out that where an order of reversion as in the present case, of a person who had no right to the post, does not show ex facie that he was being reverted as a measure of punishment or does not cast any stigma on him, the Courts will not normally go behind that order to see if there were any motivating factors behind that order. Certain cases of this Court have taken that view. Certain other cases have taken the view that it is open to the Court to go behind the order and find out if it was to intended as a measure of punishment and if so whether the formalities necessary have not been followed. In cases where enquiries have been held before orders of reversion of a probationer to his former lower post or discharge of a probationer or discharge from service of a temporary servant were passed, certain decisions have taken the view that where the enquiry was held in order to find out the suitability of the official concerned the order would not be vitiated. In certain other cases it has been held that the enquiry was held with a view to punish and as the enquiry did not satisfy the requirements of Article 311 the punishment was bad. It appears to us that this theory as to whether the reversion to a lower post of a probationer in a higher post, or the discharge of a probationer, or the discharge from service of a temporary servant was meant as a punishment leads to a very peculiar situation. It appears to us that this theory as to whether the reversion to a lower post of a probationer in a higher post, or the discharge of a probationer, or the discharge from service of a temporary servant was meant as a punishment leads to a very peculiar situation. After all, if such an order gives no reasons the Court will not normally interfere because ex facie there is nothing to show that the order was intended as a punishment. But if the superior official dealing with that case, in order to satisfy himself whether the official concerned could be continued in service, makes enquiries or holds enquiries there is the risk of its being held that the enquiry was really intended for the purpose of punishment. Thus a bona fide attempt to decide whether the official concerned should be continued leads to this risk. There could be no greater punishment than discharge from service and it makes little difference to the Government servant whether he is simply discharged or discharged after an enquiry to find out his suitability. Therefore, if a simple discharge from service is upheld but a discharge after the superior official concerned satisfies himself about the official's fitness to the continued further in service is not upheld on the ground that the order was intended as a punishment it is a curious situation. After all no Government servant, a probationer or temporary, will be discharged of reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reasons. If the -reason is to 'be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be difficult to distinguish as to which action 'is discharge or reversion simpliciter and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law is rather confusing. If the -reason is to 'be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be difficult to distinguish as to which action 'is discharge or reversion simpliciter and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law is rather confusing. We think it is-time that the whole question was considered de novo and it would be better for all-concerned and avoid a lot of avoidable litigation if it should be held that the reversion of probationer from a higher to a lower post, or the discharge of a probationer or the discharge from service of a 'temporary servant cannot be questioned except on the basis of mala fides in the making of the order," (Italics by as.) These observations, in our view, are dear authority for the proposition then that in the case -of reversion of a probationer from a higher to a lower post or the discharge from service of a temporary servant, the order cannot be questioned except on the ground of mala fides in the making of that order. Thus, where ex facie the order of reversion does not show that it is penal especially in a cease where the State Government has reserved to itself the right to revert a person who had been temporarily promoted in an officiating capacity, in our view, it would be difficult to entertain a challenge to the order of reversion except on the ground of mala fides a Challenge which is not made in the petition except for merely stating that the order is mala fide. 12. The matter was reconsidered again in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandran, where it was pointed out after a consideration of the several decided cases that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. That decision arose out of a suit filed by a Government servant who held a temporary appointment and whose services were terminated by giving one month's notice. The trial Court and the appellate Court rejected the contention of the Government servant that the order was passed by way of punishment and attracted Article 311 of the Constitution of India. That decision arose out of a suit filed by a Government servant who held a temporary appointment and whose services were terminated by giving one month's notice. The trial Court and the appellate Court rejected the contention of the Government servant that the order was passed by way of punishment and attracted Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Both the Courts found that the impugned order was valid in law as it was a simple order of termination of services, and not having been passed by way of punishment, it did not attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were set aside and the learned single Judge of the High Court went through the official correspondence preceding the passing of the impugned order and observed that a close scrutiny of the facts on record showed that the order was passed by way of punishment on the basis of the enquiry proceedings and as result of the recommendation made by the Executive Engineer followed by the direction issued by the Chief Engineer that the respondent should be suitably punished. This judgment of the High Court was challenged by the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Supreme Court. Reversing the decision of the High Court after reviewing the entire case law including Sughar Singh's case the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraphs 23 and 24: "23. Keeping in view the principles extracted above, the respondent's suit could not be decreed in his favour. He was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. It is also not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice. The older to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stimga on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 24. It does not cast any stimga on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 24. We, therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court Was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned' order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superior of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh12 that when there are no express Words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma On the Government servant, the Court would not delve into secretariat files to discover whether Some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research." 13. The position appears to have been now settled in view of the latest decision that the law declared by the Supreme Court in I. N. Saksena's case that the Court must take the impugned order as it is, and if there are no express words in the order which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court cannot go behind the order, has been reiterated. If the ratio of the decision in S. P. Vasudeva's case and Ramchandra's case (cit. supra) is applied in the instant case, in our view, the argument that since in the return the reversion of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the ground that his suitability was determined on the basis of the entries in the confidential reports the order should be classified as a penal order, is liable to be rejected. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar13. The decision in that case will again show that on facts the Supreme Court In that case had come to the conclusion that the order was more vindictive than just and fair. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar13. The decision in that case will again show that on facts the Supreme Court In that case had come to the conclusion that the order was more vindictive than just and fair. This will be clear from the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 17 where, after referring to the charge of misconduct made against the employee, the Supreme Court observed: "To allege such misconduct against him and then to stigmatise the respondent as 'not fit' for working in the higher post could appear, on the facts and circumstances of the particular case to be more vindictive than just and fair." The decision must, therefore, be said to be based on the peculiar facts of that case and we may point out that this case was also considered by the Supreme Court in the decision in Ramchandra's case, It is important to point out that in Ramchandra's case the final conclusions with regard to the scope of challenge to an order which on the face of it does not disclose any stigma was laid down as a proposition of law after referring in paragraph 21 to the decision in Pawankumar's case. When the Supreme Court in paragraph 22 in Ramchandra's case observed that "thus on a conspectus of the decisions of this Court referred to above, it is obvious that there is no real conflict in their ratio decedendi and it is no longer open to anyone to urge with any show of force that the constitutional position emerging from the decisions of the Court in regard to cases of the present nature is not clear," it shows that in case of termination simpliciter the Supreme Court had reiterated the view taken in the decision in I. N. Saksena's case. Ramchandra's case must, therefore, be said to be at the moment the last word with regard to the scope of the powers of the Court in a case where a challenge to an order of reversion of the kind which is impugned in this petition is made. Ramchandra's case must, therefore, be said to be at the moment the last word with regard to the scope of the powers of the Court in a case where a challenge to an order of reversion of the kind which is impugned in this petition is made. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that since the order of reversion is based on the overall assessment of the performance of the petitioner and the petitioner was found unfit for being included in the select list, the order must be treated as a penal order and the requirements of Article 311 should, therefore, have been complied with. 15. The next contention of the petitioner is that the State Government has abdicated its function and has merely mechanically accepted the advice of the Public Service Commission and, therefore, the order is bad. Reliance is placed by the petitioner on a decision of the Orissa High Court in Iswar Chandra v. State14 where a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court, following a decision of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court pointed out that where the Government passes an order of reversion exclusively on the basis of the opinion given to it by the Public Service Commission, Without applying its own independent mind to the merit of the case, that order can be validly challenged as vitiated by mala fides and not binding in law. Now, there could be no dispute that under Article 323 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the State Public Service Commission is an advisory jurisdiction and the State Government is entitled to take in to account such advice as the Public Service Commission may tender on a question referred to it in the matter of appointment or promotion. The facts of the instant case show that the select list was itself submitted to the Public Service Commission and it appears to us that even before the opinion of the Public Service Commission was obtained with regard to the select list the Conservator of Forests had already made promotions on the basis of that select list. The facts of the instant case show that the select list was itself submitted to the Public Service Commission and it appears to us that even before the opinion of the Public Service Commission was obtained with regard to the select list the Conservator of Forests had already made promotions on the basis of that select list. Now, so far as the return of the State Government is concerned, it is stated on an affidavit sworn by the Desk Officer of the Revenue and Forests Department, Sachivalaya, Bombay, in paragraph 10: "As submitted above, his case was considered with maximum sympathy and the promotions given to him was out of that consideration. However, it is because of the unsatisfactory confidential record of the petitioner that the Government was constrained to revert the petitioner as advised by the Public Service Commission." 16. It is not possible for us to read this averment as meaning that the Government has mechanically accepted the advice of the Public Service Commission and has mechanically acted on that advice. The averment clearly gives out the reason for reversion being the unsatisfactory confidential reports of the petitioner. It is on this ground that the Public Service Commission had tendered the necessary advice to the State Government. If this advice was accepted by the State Government, it cannot be said that the State Government had acted mechanically on the advice of the Public Service Commission. The petitioner has not been able to substantiate his averment made by way of amendment that his case was deliberately referred to the Public Service Commission. It is not shown that the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests is a post which is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. If that was not so, the State Government was entitled to obtain the advice of the Public Service Commission and its approval to the select list. That is why it appears that a conditional order including the contingency of reversion was deliberately made while the petitioner was promoted. We must assume that the advice given by the Public Service Commission was impartial advice and such advice would be entitled to greatest respect as being that of an independent body. That is why it appears that a conditional order including the contingency of reversion was deliberately made while the petitioner was promoted. We must assume that the advice given by the Public Service Commission was impartial advice and such advice would be entitled to greatest respect as being that of an independent body. We may usefully thereto certain observations made by the Punjab and Haryana High Court with regard to the nature of the advice of the Public Service Commission and the respect to which it is normally entitled to in J. L. Maj. v. State of Punjab15. In paragraph 1 the Division such observed: “No doubt the advice of an advisory body as a Public Service Commission is not bindind and no doubt further that it is settled that the absence of such an advice does not invalidate the action taken where such advice is expected-to be bad before action is taken, but according to Article 320 (3) (b) of the constitution a State Public Service commission has to be consulted in making appointments and on the suitability of candidates promoted. It is a constitutional duty which a Public Service Commission performs. Even if its advice is not binding and the absence or its advice does not invalidate an order where it is expected, to be consulted, its advice is not utterly meaningless and besides the consideration relevant in the matter of appointments or promotions. Even if it is considered at a provision not enforceable in a Court, but advice given- under it is entitled to due respect and it is an eminently relevant consideration for the State Government in promoting or continuing the promotion of an officer. It is at least one of the very relevant considerations in that respect. If after considering the advice and the other relevant materials, the State Government takes a decision, it cannot be said that the decision is mala fide." These observation have our respectful concurrence. As we have pointed out earlier, the averments in the return cannot be read as meaning that the State Government had wondered its decision to revert the petitioner to be Public service Commission. The State Government cannot, therefore be said to have acted mechanically on the advice of the Public Service Commission. The decision of the Orissa High Court cannot, therefore, he of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. The State Government cannot, therefore be said to have acted mechanically on the advice of the Public Service Commission. The decision of the Orissa High Court cannot, therefore, he of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. The last point which has been urged on behalf of the petitioner has merely to be mentioned to be rejected. The learned counsel contended that the petitioner belonged to a backward community, being a member of the Adivasi community for which reservation in employment in the branch of employment is 7 per cent but in fact is 0.34 per cent and, therefore, the case of the petitioner must he sympathetically considered. To say the least, the petitioner is urging this argument in a wrong forum where we are concerned strictly with our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in finding out whether the order is in breach of any law, order or any provision of the Constitution. The argument cannot, therefore, be entertained. In our view, there is no substance in this petition. The petition must, therefore fail and is rejected. However, we make no order as to costs. Petition rejected.