JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The Petitioner is a Sub Inspector of Police in the Kerala Police Subordinate Service. He was enlisted as a temporary Class IV Constable in the Police Force in 1951. He was promoted as Head Constable in the year 1959, and was confirmed in that post with effect from 28th July 1965. Promotions were being made provisionally from time, to time to ' the post of Sub Inspector of Police from the provisional list of Head Constables by Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The Petitioner had been so promoted provisionally. While so in 1965 as per G.O. MS. No. 227/Home, dated 24th June 1965 the Government ordered, that appointment to the post of Sub Inspector by promotion will be made from a select list of Head Constables prepared by a Special Departmental Promotion Committee. That Committee met in 1965 and 1966, for reviewing the provisional promotions. The Petitioner's case was also considered. But the Committee did not recommend the name of the Petitioner for inclusion in any of the select list from 1961 to 1966. The Petitioner has no grievance in regard to non-inclusion in the list up to and inclusive of 1965. According to him, in the list for 1966 his name should have found a place considering his seniority and also his merit and ability. In other words, in the list of the year 1966, juniors of the Petitioner who were not in any way superior to the Petitioner in merit and ability were found included. The Petitioner should have been selected at that time. The matter was being pursued by the Petitioner ever since then and finding that relief could not be obtained from Government he approached this Court. In the Petition it is mentioned that there were adverse remarks against the Petitioner reported by the Circle Inspector of Police during the years 1965-66 and these adverse remarks were communicated to the Petitioner, though the same is said to have been used against the Petitioner. He would aver that against such remarks he had presented an appeal to the Superintendent of Police, Quilon, and the appeal was pending for a longtime. The adverse remarks were expunged by the Superintendent of Police on 5th July 1969 by Ext. P-3. He would aver that against such remarks he had presented an appeal to the Superintendent of Police, Quilon, and the appeal was pending for a longtime. The adverse remarks were expunged by the Superintendent of Police on 5th July 1969 by Ext. P-3. According to the Petitioner, he made a representation to the second Respondent-Inspector-General of Police, Trivandrum on 7th November 1969 claiming promotion to the post of Sub Inspector with retrospective effect, fixing his seniority over Respondents 3 and 4 and four others, and he got a reply from the second Respondent on 20th September 1969. Evidently, soon after the adverse remarks were expunged the Petitioner made a representation and that was dismissed by Ext. P-2 order on 20th September 1969. According to him, on receipt of Ext. P-2 communication he filed a detailed representation on 21st January 1970, Ext. P-4 being its copy. To this he is said to have received reply Ext. P-5, dated 29th June 1972 from the second Respondent. In the meanwhile the gradation list of Sub Inspector of Police had been published by the Inspector-General of Police in his proceedings dated 29th August 1973 and in this the Petitioner's name was not included. The Petitioner is said to have represented on 19th January 1974 against the non-inclusion of his name in the list by Ext. P-7 representation. This was rejected by Ext. P-9 order dated 16th December 1974. Against this the Petitioner made a representation to the State of Kerala on 27th December 1974, Ext. P-10 being its copy, and that was rejected by Ext. P-11 dated 18th February 1975. 2. Counsel for the State raises a preliminary objection. It is said that this Court should reject the case of the Petitioner for the reason that the resort to this Court is quite belated. It is true that it was in 1966 that the committee met to select provisionally promoted Sub Inspectors of Police for regular promotion. The complaint of the Petitioner is that he should have been one among those selected in the year 1966. Evidently it was because of the adverse remarks against him that his name was-not included in the select list and on coming to know of this he filed an appeal to get the adverse remarks expunged. He succeeded in getting this expunged in 1969 only. Thereafter he had filed a representation to the Inspector General of Police. Evidently it was because of the adverse remarks against him that his name was-not included in the select list and on coming to know of this he filed an appeal to get the adverse remarks expunged. He succeeded in getting this expunged in 1969 only. Thereafter he had filed a representation to the Inspector General of Police. It appears that the list was prepared on the basis of the selection made in the year 1969. That list challenged in this Court though not at the Petitioner's instance. O.P. No. 1161 of 1971 was a Petition in which it was so challenged. That Petition was allowed By this Court and the list was quashed by the judgment of this Court on 1st November 1972. It is natural that the Petitioner treated it as if there was no list alive and hence he did not challenge it. Whatever that be, when the list was challenged and it was quashed, it cannot be said that the Petitioner has- been sleeping over his rights; he has been prosecuting his complaint about the non-inclusion of his name before the appropriate authorities. We do not think that we should deny relief to the Petitioner on the ground that he is guilty of laches if otherwise he is entitled to it. 3. Evidently the reason which weighed with the Selection Committee in superseding- the Petitioner was that there were certain adverse remarks in the confidential records relating to the Petitioner. In paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit of the first Respondent it is stated that the Departmental Promotion Committee made the following observations in the case of the Petitioner: " Passed eligibility test. Withholding of increment in 1961. Integrity adversely reported on. Record below average. Not included in the list." In paragraph 3 it is said that the case of the Petitioner was considered taking into account his personal records up to 1966. Adverse remarks for the years 1965 and 1966 are not mentioned in that paragraph though adverse remarks of the earlier years is seen made mention of. It is seen from Ext. P-3 that the Petitioner had filed an appeal against the entry of adverse remarks for the years 1965-1966- But these adverse remarks were expunged by order dated 5th July. 1969 subsequent to the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the selection by the said Committee. It is seen from Ext. P-3 that the Petitioner had filed an appeal against the entry of adverse remarks for the years 1965-1966- But these adverse remarks were expunged by order dated 5th July. 1969 subsequent to the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the selection by the said Committee. Evidently therefore: the Committee had taken into account the adverse remarks for the years 1965-1966 which had been expunged, the committee, taking note of irrelevant materials. Reference is made in paragraph 3 to the adverse remarks for the year 1960 to 1964. According to the Petitioner's; counsel, adverse remarks for the said three years ought not to have been looked into. We are not referred to any order of Government which limited the scope of reference to confidential records for a period of three years, prior to the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee or prior to the relevant year. There is, no doubt, an order which obliged taking note of the service records of at least three years prior to the relevant year. Clause 5 of G.O. (P) No. 420, dated 29th December 1967 provides that the confidential reports of officers for at least three years should be made available to the Departmental Promotion Committee. It is difficult to say that only adverse remarks recorded in the confidential records for a period of three years should be taken into account. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the Departmental Promotion Committee for taking note of the adverse remarks for the earlier years. But, of course, there is another objection urged by the Petitioner's counsel to the approach by the Committee. In the year 1960 it was noted that the conduct and character of the Petitioner were not above suspicion and that he was not thorough with law and procedure. For the year 1961 it was noted that his integrity was riot above suspicion and for the year 1963 it was noted that he was yet to learn investigation, and that there was no much liking by villagers and that his investigation of cases was yet to improve/Counsel for the State after taking time agrees now that these remarks was not seen to have been communicated to the Petitioner. It goes without saying that these remarks, therefore, ought not to have been relied upon by the Committee to find adversely. It goes without saying that these remarks, therefore, ought not to have been relied upon by the Committee to find adversely. Communication is a necessary requirement, a requirement compliance with which must be insisted upon. Clause 5 of G.O. (P) No. 420, dated 29th December 1967 provides that where the adverse remarks recorded in the confidential records of the Government Servant are not communicated to the officer concerned such remarks should be ignored by the Departmental Promotion Committee. When considering his promotion, this is really an embodiment of a principle of natural justice. On that this Court has spoken in the decision reported in Karunakaran v. Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics 1966 K.L.T. 372 : 1966 (II) L.L.J. 221.; This has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 87. The decision indicating a contrary view taken in Venkatarao v. State of Orissa 1974 (2) S.L.R. 899 does not appeal to us. In paragraph 25 of the judgment the Orissa High Court referred to an earlier decision of that court reported in I.L.R. 1971 Cutt 313. In that case the court had held that the requirement in the rule of the obligation to communicate adverse remarks to a Government Servant also embodies rules of natural justice, The court had also held that where adverse remarks have been entered in the character roll of an officer and the same have not been communicated or where such adverse remarks have been communicated and a representation on the same is pending consideration of the Government, such remarks should not be acted upon for any purpose whatsoever. The Full Bench of the Orissa High Court overruled its earlier decision. What we find in justification of its conclusion is seen in paragraph 25 of the judgment. The court observes that the Government servant is not entitled to establish his case in the representation by giving evidence and the Government as a benevolent master is to act bona fide in testing ex parte the correctness of the statements made in the representation. Evidently the question there was one of the nature of consideration of the representation but the court seems to assume that the observation that the character roll cannot be acted upon until communicated or until the representation, if any, is disposed of is contrary to law. Evidently the question there was one of the nature of consideration of the representation but the court seems to assume that the observation that the character roll cannot be acted upon until communicated or until the representation, if any, is disposed of is contrary to law. We are not called upon to go into this further in view of the decision of this Court which had approval of the Supreme Court in the decision cited. 4. Failure to communicate the adverse remarks of the years 1961 to 1964 justifies the complaint of the Petitioner that reliance upon these remarks by the Departmental Promotion Committee would vitiate the decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee. Reliance upon the adverse remarks of the years 1965 and 1966 could also not be acted upon because subsequent to the meeting of the Committee the adverse remarks were expunged. It would appear therefore that the case of the State would be indefensible. But, to support the conclusion reached by the Departmental Promotion Committee reliance is placed by learned Counsel for the State Sri C.S. Rajan on the further fact that the Departmental Promotion Committee also took not of the fact that increment of the Petitioner was barred for the year 1961. This, it is said, is a relevant factor and if this persuaded the Committee to prefer others who are juniors to the Petitioner, it cannot be said to be an irrelevant consideration. We must remember that this is not a case of trying to support an order based on both good and bad reasons on the plea that the order will be sustained if the court is satisfied that the authority could have passed the order on the basis of good reasons, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 232. That was a case where an order was sought to be supported by reasons, some of which were relevant and existent and some irrelevant and non-extent. If the court is satisfied that there are good reasons sufficient to sustain an order a court is not called upon to interfere with the order. The question here is different. That was a case where an order was sought to be supported by reasons, some of which were relevant and existent and some irrelevant and non-extent. If the court is satisfied that there are good reasons sufficient to sustain an order a court is not called upon to interfere with the order. The question here is different. When a Departmental Promotion Committee meets to select persons, on the bais of merit and ability, what the Departmental Promotion Committee is called upon to do is, to make a comparative assessment of merit of the candidates considered as eligible for selection. A comparative assessment involves considering the points of merit and demerit of each one of the candidates and that is mainly on the basis of the entries in the records. Evaluation of these, with a view to choose the best person may be necessary. In such a comparative evaluation if besides the adverse impression caused by the punishment of bar of increment there are other entries in the records adverse to a person, he stands at a disadvantage as against a person who has only a punishment of bar of increment against him. In other words when comparative merit is to be the determining factor the reckoning of some material which ought not to have been reckoned reduce the chances of the person concerned. Adverse remarks in successive years goes to increase the point of demerit. Therefore if the case is one of comparative assessment he goes lower down in the ranking on merits. This would naturally affect him. We are not possessed of any material as to what his position would have been in case the only disqualification against him had been that he had suffered a punishment, a bar of increment, in 1961. How this would have stood against him in such a situation is a matter of conjecture. There is absolutely no basis or data available in the file to determine What would have happened had that been the case. Therefore that matter calls for reconsideration. 5. The Supreme Court indicated the scope of comparative assessment when considering the question of selection of persons in service to a post for which the basis of selection is merit and ability. Therefore that matter calls for reconsideration. 5. The Supreme Court indicated the scope of comparative assessment when considering the question of selection of persons in service to a post for which the basis of selection is merit and ability. It was indicated in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 87 that reasons must be recorded by the selecting authority holding the selection as to why preference has been made of those selected. A learned judge of this Court in a decision in O.P. No. 2910 of 1972 explained this as a requirement of the particular rule with which the Supreme Court was concerned in the case. Rule 5 (5) of the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service Regulations, 1955 requires that if in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession. The case before the Supreme Court was one which arose in connection with the application of Indian Administrative Service/ Indian Police Service Regulations, 1955. The observations of the Supreme Court in the decision adverted to were taken as limited to such a situation. In other words the rule required reasons to be recorded. The learned Judge took the view that it was not proper to hold the order as bad if reasons are not recorded for preference of a junior over a senior. We are not, though the correctness of this decision is not admitted before us, called upon to consider this question in the case, for, apart from the question whether reasons have to be recorded there is requirement of a proper comparative assessment to be made by the authority concerning the selection of candidates. That such comparative assessment should have been made must appear on the record. In this context we may quote a passage from the decision in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 87 paragraph 28, Beg. That such comparative assessment should have been made must appear on the record. In this context we may quote a passage from the decision in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 87 paragraph 28, Beg. J. as he then was said: "In the context of the effect upon the rights of aggrieved persons, as members of a public service who are entitled to just and reasonable treatment, by reason of protections conferred upon them by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which are available to them through, out their service, it was incumbent on the Selection Committee to have stated reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each officer superseded stood in relation to records of others who were to be preferred, particularly as this is practically the only remaining visible safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness in making selections. IF that had been done, facts on service records of officers considered by the Selection Committee would have been correlated to the conclusions reached. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision "whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only on this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable-We think that it is not enough to say that preference should be given because a certain kind of process was gone through by the Selection Committee. This is all that the supposed statement of reasons amounts to. We, therefore, think that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5 (5) were not complied with. We think that reliance was rightly placed by Respondents on two decisions of this Court relating to the effect of non-compliance with such mandatory provisions. These were: Associated Electrical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 284 and Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka: (1963) I S.C.R. 98 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1694." As we have already indicated reliance upon the confidential reports entered in the service register of the Petitioner for the years 1961 to 1966 have hot been properly rioted and assessed by the Departmental Promotion Committee. In the circumstances, the selection by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the non-inclusion of the Petitioner's name in the list for the year 1966 cannot be sustained. This calls for a reassessment of the claim of the Petitioner for inclusion in the list of 1966 taking into account only material that is relevant. If, on a reassessment the Petitioner is entitled to any benefit that will be given to him. That shall be done' expeditiously. Allowed as above. No costs.