JUDGEMENT The applicant prays for a certificate of fitness under Art. 134 (c) of the Constitution of India enabling him to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. 2. The applicant has been convicted by the Special Judge, Panaji, under S. 120-B (1) read with Ss.420, 468 and 471 I. P. C. and S. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to 2 years R.I. and Rs. 500/- of fine or in default to further one month's R. I. He was further convicted under Ss.420, 468, 109 read with Ss.468 and 471 I. P. C, and sentenced to 2 years R. I. and Rs. 500/- of fine for each offence or in default further one month's R. I. and also under S. 5 (2) read with S. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to 2 years R. I. and Rs. 2,00,000/- of fine or in default 18 months R. I., having regard to the provisions of S. 5 (2-A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and S. 65 of the I. P. C. His appeal to this Court against that order of conviction and sentence was dismissed by this Court in appeal on 19-3-1977.*He now makes this application. Reported in 1977 Cri. L. J. 1835. 3. It appears to me that none of the grounds mentioned in the application entitles me to grant the certificate prayed for. Before I consider the grounds in detail, I shall set out the law as it is laid down by the Supreme Court and some other High Courts in India. 4. Article 134 (1) of the Constitution reads as under :- "Article 134 (1):- An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court- (a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death; or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death; or (c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court: Provided that an appeal under sub-cl, (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under Cl. (1) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require." The first two grounds restrict the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant a certificate under Sub-clause (1) of Art. 134 to the imposition of sentence of death. This restriction gives a clear indication of the limited scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 134 (1). It is in this background that the scope of sub-cl. (c) of Cl. (1) of Art. 134 must be considered The broad principle, that the Constitution intends that the High Court is normally and ordinarily the final Court of Appeal is also indicative of the narrow compass within which the High Court has to act whilst exercising its powers under Sub-clause (c). 5. There is a school of thought which believes that the High Court should, whilst exercising its jurisdiction under Clause (c), be guided by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 136. Even though this school of thought is not followed by many High Courts in India, the fact remains that a certificate of fitness under clause (c) should not be granted by a High Court unless exceptional and special circumstances exist. The High Court should not overlook the fact that there is a further remedy by way of special leave which may be invoked when the certificate is refused. The High Court may be guided by the principles relating to the grant of certificate of fitness for appeal under Art. 133 (1) (c) before its amendment of 27-2-1973 and of S. 109(c)of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that the case involves a substantial question of general importance would be a good ground for granting a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court under sub-clause (c). The power has to be exercised after considering what difficult questions of law or principle are involved in the case which should require the further consideration of the Supreme Court. I am supported in this proposition by the decision in 'State of Assam v. Abdul Noor', AIR 1970 SC 1365 : (1970 Cri LJ 1264) and "Thakore T. B. v. State of Maharashtra'. (1969) 1 SCA 668. I am supported in this proposition by the decision in 'State of Assam v. Abdul Noor', AIR 1970 SC 1365 : (1970 Cri LJ 1264) and "Thakore T. B. v. State of Maharashtra'. (1969) 1 SCA 668. Where the question of principles involved in a case has been settled by the Supreme Court, the mere application of that principle to the facts of a particular case does not make it a fit case for the grant of a certificate under sub-clause (a). 6. The first question on the basis of which leave to appeal is sought is:- "The prosecution case has centered around the most important issue as to what is understood and meant by the concept of execution of work departmentally under R. 141 of the General Financial Rules. The learned Judicial Commissioner, however, has not deemed it worth considering except just making a passing reference to it in the judgment. If due reliance and emphasis were placed on this aspect and if the contentions raised in this behalf by the petitioner were properly considered, the conclusions and findings would have been undoubtedly different In the appeal decided by the learned Judicial Commissioner." A reference is made to the question as to whether R. 141 of the General Financial Rules authorised a Government Officer to enter into a contract whilst he was executing the work departmentally, under that rule. My finding is based not on whether the rule enables a person to give the execution of the work on a contract but on the fact that actually the work was not given on a contract. The accused No. 1 himself has admitted that the accused No. 2 was only a supplier of labour to Government for the purpose of doing the work of excavation of the Kumbarjua canal which was done by Government. 7. The second question is:- "In spite of various contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner in respect of the meaning and scope of R. 141 of the General Financial Rules the learned Judicial Commissioner failed to deal with the same and in absence of their consideration and drew inference to the effect that the present petitioner dishonestly and fraudulently signed the declaration on the bills that the work was carried out depart-mentally. In view of the above it becomes of prime importance to refer to R. 141 of the G. F. R. which reads as follows:-"When works allotted to a civil department, other than the Public Works Department, are executed departmentally, whether direct or through contractors the form and procedure relating to expedite such work shall be prescribed by departmental regulation framed in consultation with the audit officer and for the Accounts Officer as the case may be." The R. 141 of G. F. R. visualises work allotted to a department other than P. W. D. to be executed departmentally, direct, as well as,in alternative, through a contractor. The learned Judicial Commissioner ought to have considered R. 141 and its proper meaning and interpretation." No point of law is involved in this question. 8. The third point is:- "The plain reading of R. 141 of G. F. R. would clearly show that it contemplates an execution of work departmentally even if the work is executed by and through a contractor. Once this meaning is taken into account, the prosecution contention that the Petitioner made dishonest and fraudulent declaration in the bills loses all its force. It is in the light of the, above facts, it is contended that the learned Judicial Commissioner has drawn unwarranted inferences from the circumstances which are not in existence at all end had the learned Judicial Commissioner considered this aspect of the matter and given it due weight and importance that it deserves, the conclusions would have been altogether different and the Petitioner's appeal was bound to be allowed setting aside his conviction on all counts." The inferences alleged to have been drawn are drawn on questions of fact. The grounds raised In Cls. (ff), (gg) and (qq) of para. 6 of his application do not merit any consideration. 9. In the circumstances the Criminal Miscellaneous Application is dismissed. Application dismissed.