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1977 DIGILAW 84 (GUJ)

PATEL PARSHOTTAMDAS CHHELDAS v. STATE

1977-08-25

B.K.MEHTA

body1977
B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are the trustees of a public trust known as PATEL LALJI LAXMIDAS SADAVRAT SANSTHA have challenged the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal of April 12 1973 confirming the order of the Deputy Collector Patan holding that the aforesaid trust was not entitled to exemption under sec. 88-B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act ). The Charity Commissioner Gujarat has by his order of April 27 1962 sanctioned the scheme while permitting the amalgamation of the two trusts viz. Patel Lalji Laxmidas Nava Ramji Mandir Public Trust and Swami Muktanand Sadavrat Public Trust. The objects of the said trust were according to Clause 2 of the said scheme (1) maintenance and upkeep of the temple (2) performance of Dev Seva Puja of the temple (3) Sadavrat (4) education and medical relief and (5) general acts of public ultility. Clauses 5 of the said scheme enjoins the trustees to apply the balance of the income after defraying all charges costs expenses rates and taxes to the various objects in the proportion Specified in sub-clause (b) thereof. The trustees were under obligation to apply 15% of the balance income towards education and medical relief each; 25% to Dev Seva Puja and Sadavrat each and 20% to general acts of public utility. It is in this context of the scheme that the Deputy Collector Patan by his order of October 16 1972 refused to grant certificate under sec. 88-B of the Tenancy Act. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal also in revision preferred by the petitioner-trustees confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector Patan as the trust was a composite trust. ( 2 ) MR. Patel learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner-trustees assailed the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by urging that the Tribunal was clearly in error in refusing the certificate under sec. 88-B of the Tenancy Act as the learned Member of the Tribunal was impressed by a consideration which was entirely erroneous. The learned Member of the Tribunal was of the opinion that since under sec. 88-B of the Tenancy Act as the learned Member of the Tribunal was impressed by a consideration which was entirely erroneous. The learned Member of the Tribunal was of the opinion that since under sec. 88-B of the Tenancy Act which was introduced as a result of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 the certificate issued under the said section to a religious trust stood revoked and the lands of such trust being Devasthan lands the provisions of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 would apply. In submission of Mr. Patel this is entirely an extraneous consideration which has prevailed with the learned Member of the Tribunal. He also criticised the view of the learned Member of the Tribunal that the trust in question being a composite trust was not entitled to the certificate under sec. 88-B of the Tenancy Act. The only relevant considerations according to Mr. Patel for granting such certificate are those which are prescribed under sec. 88-B. The prescribed relevant considerations are that a trust applying for certificate under sec. 88-B should be for educational purpose or for a hospital Panjrapole or Gaushala and it must be a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950 and whose entire income out of the lands is appropriated for the purpose of such trust. Since the trust in question before me is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950 inter alia with the object of education as well as medical relief it satisfies all the relevant considerations prescribed under sec. 88-B and therefore entitled to the certificate. In so far as the Tribunal was influenced by extraneous considerations its order confirming the order of the Deputy Collector Patan is vitiated and must be quashed and set aside. ( 3 ) I am afraid I cannot agree with this broad submission of Mr. Patel for the petitioners. The legislative intent as evinced in sec. 88-B is to exempt lands of certain institutions like university or public trusts with certain objects specified in the section or where the lands are assignod or donated for the purpose of rendering the specified community services. There are further conditions imposed by the proviso in case of a public trust. Since I am concerned with a question of a public trust the provision contained in sec. 88-B- (1) (b) together with the proviso would apply. There are further conditions imposed by the proviso in case of a public trust. Since I am concerned with a question of a public trust the provision contained in sec. 88-B- (1) (b) together with the proviso would apply. The material part of sec. 88-B which is relevant for the purpose of this petition reads as under:88 Nothing in the foregoing provisions except secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 and the provisions of Chapters VI and VIII in so far as the provisions of the said Chapters are applicable to any of the matters referred to in the sections mentioned above shall apply- : (a) x x x x x (b) to lands which are the property of a trust for an educational purpose a hos pital Panjrapole or Gaushala: (c) x x x x x provided it as (i) such trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and - (ii) The entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. The section; therefore enjoins that before a trust can claim exemption under sec. 88-B it must be a public trust either for an educational purpose or for a hospital Panjrapole or Gaushala registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and its entire income out of the lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. There would be no difficulty in applying the section to a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act with any one of the objects specified in clause (b) which may be broadly described as an exempted object. The difficulty arises only when in a given case a trust has more than one object and these objects include certain exempted objects and non-exempted objects. In such cases would it be sufficient for purposes of claiming exemption under sec. 88-B that a part of the income is applied to any one of the exempted objects ? The interpretation which has been canvassed by Mr. Patel-proceeds on this footing that if the part of the income is applied to one of the exempted objects it would be sufficient for qualifying that trust for exemption under the said section. This interpretation of Mr. The interpretation which has been canvassed by Mr. Patel-proceeds on this footing that if the part of the income is applied to one of the exempted objects it would be sufficient for qualifying that trust for exemption under the said section. This interpretation of Mr. Patel if accepted I am afraid would defeat the legislative intent of restricting the exemption from the provisions of the Tenancy Act to certain kinds of trusts with the definite objects specified in the section. The interpretation canvassed by Mr. Patel overlooks the condition which has been prescribed in Clause (ii) of the proviso which enjoins that the entire income out of the lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. If the interpretation canvassed by Mr. Patel is accepted it may enable the settlers to direct that an insignificant part of the income be applied to an exempted object and a substantial income be diverted to non-exempted object and then claim exemption from the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The contention of Mr. Patel in effect is that it would be sufficient if the entire income arising out of the lands of the trust is appropriated for the purposes directed in the settlement and that the income is not used for any other purpose or object not permitted under the settlement. This interpretation as stated above would not only be self-defeating but does not give full effect to Clause (ii) of the proviso. In that view of the matter therefore in the present case before me sub-clause (2) of Clause 5 of the Scheme enjoins that only 15% of the net income of the trust is to be utilised for the exempted object viz. education Mr. Patel made an attempt to persuade me that the medical relief being the object of the trust is also one of the exempted objects under sec. 88-B. I do not think that such a contention is permissible because the exempted object according to clause (b) of sec. 88-B (1) is hospital and not medical relief. The object of medical relief and the purpose of hospital are two different objects. Even assuming what Mr. Patel says to be a possible view of the matter even then only 30% of the income is to be utilised for the socalled exempted objects under the said section. 88-B (1) is hospital and not medical relief. The object of medical relief and the purpose of hospital are two different objects. Even assuming what Mr. Patel says to be a possible view of the matter even then only 30% of the income is to be utilised for the socalled exempted objects under the said section. in that state of the scheme since the entire income of the lands is not to be appropriated for the exempted objects I do not think that there are any reasons for me to interfere with the order of the Revenue Tribunal. ( 4 ) THE result is that this petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .