Order.- This petition under section 48? of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Davanagere, in a case under section 145 wherein he made the preliminary order under sub section (1) of section 145 and besides that also ordered for an attachment under section 146. 2. The dispute related to a shop premises bearing old No. 788 and new No. 39 situate at Ashoka road opposite to Moti Talkies in Davanagere town. The landlord is one C. R. Vishwanath and there appears to be a long standing dispute between him and the tenant K. Amaranath the present petitioner, inasmuch as, proceedings for fixation of rent started between the parties in 1973 onwards. As a counterblast to these proceedings started by the tenant,the landlord wanted to commence eviction proceedings. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent-1 was set up by the landlord in proof of an alleged sub-tenancy. Presumably the landlord considered that on the ground of sub-letting the tenant could be evicted from the premises. As a result to this manoeuvre on the part of the landlord, the title of the petitioner came under a cloud and he filed a civil suit O.S. No. 8 of 1977 on 3rd January, 1977 before the Munsiff. The order-sheet of that suit filed by the petitioner indicates that along with the plaint an application was filed under Order 39.rules I and 2 for temporary injunction for safeguarding the possession of the petitioner-plaintiff. The learned Munsiff passed the first interim order on 7th January, 1977 not to disturb the possession of the petitioner -plaintiff. Thereafter, the second order to that effect was passed on 10th January, 1977 which lasted upto the date of the disposal of the main petition under Order 39, rules 1 and 2. During the interim period, the learned Munsiff in the presence of both the parties appointed a commissioner who went to the spot and prepared inventory of the articles contained in the shop. The case of the petitioner all throughout was, that he is running a watch repair shop. The inventory submitted by the Court commissioner of which a copy is filed also proves that fact. The case of the petitioner all throughout was, that he is running a watch repair shop. The inventory submitted by the Court commissioner of which a copy is filed also proves that fact. It is also proved from the report of the Court commissioner, that the respondent-1 was out to disturb the Court proceeding, inasmuch as, he made it difficult for the commissioner to comply with the order of the civil Court, The commissioner had to take some police help and only thereafter he could prepare the inventory of the articles. It is also evident from the report of the Court commissioner that the plaintiff was in possession as he produced the key of the lock with which the shop was opened and the inventory was prepared. While all this was being done in the civil Court, respondent-1 filed some complaint before the Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact the petitioner had forestalled that complaint and that is why he filed a prior application, narrating all the facts and stating about the order passed by the civil Court making a special request that before passing any interim order, the learned Magistrate would take care to hear his objections. After the said application was filed by the petitioner, it appears, respondent-1 preferred his complaint before the Magistrate. The learned Magistrate considered that complaint and also considered that a case of breach of the peace was made out and he passed the preliminary order under sub-section (1) of section 145 on 25th January, 1977. On the very same day he passed another order under section 146in which he considered that attachment of the premises was required to be made. He gave an order for such attachment and at the same time directed that the Sub-Inspector of Police had to take and keep in possession the disputed premises until the question regarding title or possession was decided by a competent civil Court. Being aggrieved by these two orders passed by the learned Magistrate, the petitioner has come up in the present criminal petition. 3. Being aggrieved by these two orders passed by the learned Magistrate, the petitioner has come up in the present criminal petition. 3. Much less to say the objective behind section 145 is to prevent the breach of the peace which is likely to occur as a result of some dispute concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof and the Magistrate before whom the proceeding is initiated is required to make a summary enquiry as to the posscssion of any one of the respective parties. The section also authorises the Magistrate to evolve a legal fiction as regards possession and a party unlawfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the preliminary order is deemed to be in possession and as such entitled to protection by the Court. Therefore, the essential purpose behind section 145 is to retain possession of the party best entitled to, according to the Magistrate. The other party is, of course, prohibited to interfere in that possession and the order of the Magistrate is always subject to determination of title or of possession by a competent civil Court. It is thus evident that the order made under section 145 by its very nature is subservient to the order made in a civil Court. The learned Counsel contended hat, in the instant case, the Magistrate has not adhered to that principle and has really disregarded it inasmuch as the dispute as to the title was already pending in the civil Court and the interim order was passed by the civil Court which sufficiently safeguarded any incident of breach of the peace. If the objective of section 145 could be achieved by the interim order passed by the civil Court, the learned Counsel contended, where was the necessity of initiating proceedings under section 145 and thereby interfering with the order made by the civil Court. With that argument in hand, the learned Counsel contended that the entire proceeding initiated by the learned Magistrate need be set aside. 4. It cannot be laid down as a broad proposition that in no case a proceeding under section 145 can be initiated if a civil proceeding is pending in respect of the very same property. With that argument in hand, the learned Counsel contended that the entire proceeding initiated by the learned Magistrate need be set aside. 4. It cannot be laid down as a broad proposition that in no case a proceeding under section 145 can be initiated if a civil proceeding is pending in respect of the very same property. There may be a case of exceptional nature, in which the Magistrate is required to prevent the breach of the peace even though a dispute as regards that property is pending in the civil Court. But in a case where the civil Court is seized of the matter and is very much aware of the dispute between the parties and even passes some interim order to safeguard either of the party, in my opinion, it would need a stronger reason for a criminal Court to initiate a proceeding under section 145. The present case appears to be of that category and in my opinion the Magistrate should not have interfered with the proceeding pending in the civil Court by passing an order in a manner superseding the order made by that Court. It is abundantly clear that the respondent-1 as well as his Counsel were both present all along the matter was dealt with in the civil Court. In their very presence the interim order was made by the civil Court. The commissioner was appointed and the inventory was prepared. The very conduct of respondent-1 before the commissioner indicated that he was out to disturb the public peace. He was not prepared to permit the commissioner to execute the order of the civil Court. It is also evident that the civil Court while making the interim order expressly held that the petitioner -plaintiff was in posession and that at any rate for the time being his possession was to be protected. The order of the Magistrate if at all could be in consonance with that order of the civil Court. But what has he done is, that he not only entertained the complaint under section 145 and passed the preliminary order but went further to attach the property and in a sense appointed a receiver. Thus, the learned Magistrate obviously disturbed the interim order passed by the civil Court. That was not even necessary to prevent a breach of the peace. Thus, the learned Magistrate obviously disturbed the interim order passed by the civil Court. That was not even necessary to prevent a breach of the peace. The matter was pending before the civil Court and under the orders of that Court one of the parties held competent to remain in possession could get protection and the other party could be restrained from disturbing that possession. That should have been the end of the matter and the proceeding in the criminal Court could not be initiated. 5. The learned Counselin this connection relied on two decisions of this very High Court of which the reports are Multani and another v. Shah Abdu Turab Qudari and others1 and Shankarappa Gurappa Kiranaji v. Ramanna Gouda Saheba Gouda Patil2. In the first case while dealing with the question of possession with reference to section 145 (1), the Court held that even when an interim injunction is granted for the duration of a pending suit for perpetual injunction, the civil Court does come to a prima facie finding that the party in whose favour it grants injunction is in possession of the property, in respect of which the injunction is granted. In other words, it was not difficult for the learned Magistrate to hold as to which party was in possession and so it was entirely wrong on his part to have held that he was unable to decide as to which party was in possession and therefore the premises were to be attached or a receiver was to be appointed. In the second case, a couple of months before the proceedings under section 145 were instituted, one of the parties to the dispute was declared to be in actual possession under a decree passed by the civil Court. It Was held that it would not be proper for the Magistrate to entertain a petition under section 145 to disturb the effect of that decree. If there was likelihood of breach of the peace, the proper course for the Magistrate was to take action under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The ratio of these two cases is decidedly helpful to the petitioner. In these two cases the authenticity of the order passed by the civil Court is retained and given preference to over a proceeding initiated under section 145. The ratio of these two cases is decidedly helpful to the petitioner. In these two cases the authenticity of the order passed by the civil Court is retained and given preference to over a proceeding initiated under section 145. All along the view seems to be that an order passed by a competent civil Court is always to be preferred and the said order is not to be lightly set aside by the Magistrate while acting under section 145. 6. In this view of the matter in my opinion, the proceeding under section 145 need not even be resorted to. The matter should have been left with the civil Court and there was already sufficient safeguard in the order of the civil Court to prevent any breach of the peace. The order of the Magistrate has really led to an abuse of the process of the Court and in order to preserve the ends of justice, interference may be needed under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. 7. The petition is therefore allowed and the proceedings before the learned Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are quashed. In view of this order, if the keys of the disputed premises have been retained by the police, the same shall be handed over to the petitioner.