A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was a tenant in respect of the land bearing survey No. 128/3 129 and 132/1 of the sim of village Dabhsar Taluka Thasra. The land altogether admeasured 2 acres and 14 gunthas. It is not in dispute that on the appointed date i. e. between June 15 1955 and March 3 1973 the petitioner was in possession of the land in question. However the case of the respondent-landlord is that the petitioner tenant had surrendered the possession of the land to the landlord. According to him the surrender was valid inasmuch as it was surrendered during the proceedings under Section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the compromise arrived at between the parties was produced before the Mamlatdar and the Mamlatdar has passed order there on. ( 2 ) ON coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amendment Act 5 of 1973 Section 32 (1b) has been added under the provisions of the said Act. As per this provision a tenant who has lost his possession during the time between June 15 1955 and March 3 1973 can apply to the Mamlatdar for restoration of possession. In the instant case the petitioner-tenant applied to the Mamlatdar on July 11 1976 and prayed that the possesion of the land in question be restored to him. After following the requisite procedure and after hearing the respondent-landlord the Mamlatdar came to the conclusion that the possession of the land us required to be restored to the petitioner-tenant and hence granted the application. This order was passed by the ALT and Mamlatdar Thasra on September 15 1976 (Annexure A. Being aggrieved by the said order the respondent- landlord prepared an appeal before the Deputy Collector Anand. The Deputy Collector Anand held that the surrender of the land by the petitioner-tenant was not legal and valid and therefore he confirmed the order passed by the ALT and Mamlatdar Thasra and ordered to dismiss the appeal preferred by the landlord. The Deputy Collector passed this order in appeal on August 31 1977 ( 3 ) THE respondent-landlord preferred revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. On a hyper technical consideration of the provisions of Section 32 of the Mt the Tribunal held that the Mamlatdar could have exercised power under Section 32 (1b) suo motu at any time. The Deputy Collector passed this order in appeal on August 31 1977 ( 3 ) THE respondent-landlord preferred revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. On a hyper technical consideration of the provisions of Section 32 of the Mt the Tribunal held that the Mamlatdar could have exercised power under Section 32 (1b) suo motu at any time. But he could have exercised the power under the said provision if the application us given by a tenant beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the provisions of Rule 15 of Bombay Anand and agricultural Lands Rules 1956 The Tribunal held that the amended provision of the Act came into force on March 3 1973 As per the provisions of Section 32 (1b) of the Act the tenant should haw applied to the Mamlatdar within prescribed period and the prescribed period being one year under the provisions of Rule 15 the application should haw been made on or before March 3 1974 Admittedly the application before the ALT and Mamlatdar has been submitted the petitioner-tenant on July 11 1976 i. e. after a period of more than two years. ( 4 ) BE it noted that this point was not taken up in the respondent-and-lord before either of the lower authorities. The point was allowed to be raised for the first time before the Tribunal and the Tribunal upheld the same. In the conflict between the Satan of technicality and the God of substantial justice the substantial justice was sacrificed. However as or as this High Court is concerned technicality has ken pushed aside and the substantial justice restored. An identical question arose in the case of Rasulmiya v. Lalbhai reported in 24 (1) GLR 714 (= 1983 GLH 655 In that case the application for restoration of possession was made by the tenant after the prescribed period of limitation. The Mamlatdar proceeded on the footing that his suo motu jurisdiction was in invoked by an application. When the point of limitation was raised this court (Coram: S. B. Majmudar J.) in para 6 of the judgment has held as follows:"if a competent officer under Tenancy Act decides the matter on merit an though the said decision may not be supportable by a given provision of law it can still be sustained under any other provision of the Tenancy Act. In the present case also the Mamlatdar has been advisably entrusted with suo motu power by the legislature to entertain any appropriate case under Section 32 (1b) even if the aggrieved tenant might not haw applied within time for redress of his grievance. It is pertinent to note that Section 32 (1b) is a beneficial provision enacted with a via to protect the rights of il-literate and ignorant tenants who might have been duped by their crafty landlords into giving up possession of their lands contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Such tenants might skip the period of one years limitation as provided by the statutory rules. How-ever they are given a locus paenitentia in the form of invocation of suo motu powers of Mamlatdar for getting justice. Their time-barred applications seek to do nothing else but to inform the Mamlatdar about the injustice done to them. Once convinced of the justness of the grievance put forward by such a tenant if the Mamlatdar proceeds to deal with the case under Section 32 (1b) on merits only inference that can follow from such a course adopted by the Mamlatdar is that he has thought it fit to invoke his suo motu powers which are not subject to any period of limitation. . . . . . . . "it is further pertinent to note that legislature in its wisdom has not put any time limit to the exercise of suo motu powers by the Mamlatdar under Section 32 (1b ). By no process of judicial interpretation such a time limit can be engrafted in the Section. Only safety valve can be that such powers should be exercised within reasonable time. Whether exercise of suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar is within reasonable time or not will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. As shown above Section itself demonstrates how by change of circumsstances with passage of time the said exercise would become unreasonable and or futile. ( 5 ) IN view of this settled legal position the approach adopted by the Tribunal is patently erroneous and illegal. The Tribunal should have reminded itself of the fact that the thrust of the constitutional provision is to see that the socially and economically backward class of people be protected from being exploited. ( 5 ) IN view of this settled legal position the approach adopted by the Tribunal is patently erroneous and illegal. The Tribunal should have reminded itself of the fact that the thrust of the constitutional provision is to see that the socially and economically backward class of people be protected from being exploited. The Bombay Tenancy Act is a beneficial provision enacted with a view to see that the economically weaker sections of the society get advantag of such provision and the illiterate and downtrodden people are not deprived of their right. Judicial craftsmanship and/or excellence does not lie in achieving some logically correct results through the hyper technical process of reasoning and mechanical approach. The rule of law is not an abstract doctrine to be religiously adhered to as per the letter of law. Rule of law has got to be akin to or has to run with the rule of life as per the accepted national philosophy of the country. The socially and economically backward class of citizens are required to be protected from being exploited by the stronger one. This is the mandate of the Constitution. It must be realised that Judiciary commands respect of the people not because of its capability to achieve high degree of excellence in logic and technicality. Judiciary will be respected by the people only if it subserves the cause of sub-stantial justice. In the instant case the cause of substantial justice has suffered a lethal blow at the altar of technicality and the most unfortunate part of the case is that the technicality subverted the cause of substantial and social justice at the tribunal level. To say the least such an approach being against the spirit and mandate of the Constitution is highly deplorable. ( 6 ) THE counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that since the revision application has been decided by the Tribunal only on the ground of limitation the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the same in accordance with law. The request cannot be granted in view of the fact that the scope of revision under Section 76 of the Act itself is very limited. The request cannot be granted in view of the fact that the scope of revision under Section 76 of the Act itself is very limited. The Tribunal can interfere in the revision only on the following grounds: (A) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; (B) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law or (C) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. In the instant case there is no mis-carriage of justice. There is concurrent finding by the Mamlatdar as well as the Deputy Collector. Both the lower authorities have held on appreciation of evidence that there is no valid surrender as provided under the provisions of the Act. Therefore the surrender of possession by the tenant was unlawful and the same cannot be taken into consideration. Hence the request for remand is rejected. ( 7 ) COUNSEL for the respondent-land lord submitted that the petitioner-tenant had surrendered the possession in a proceeding instituted under Section 31 of the Act. An application for possession was filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 31 of the Act contending that he required the land for cultivating the same personally. The application was disposed of by the Mamlatdar by order dated June 10 1965 A copy of the order has been shown to me. The order is passed persuant to the compromise pursis filed by the parties. Section 31 of the Act requires that the landlord can be given possession if the landlord bonafidely required the land for the purpose of cultivating the same personally or for non-agricultural purposes. In the instant case the possession was prayed for on the ground of bona fide requirement of personal cultivation. The order passed by the ALT and Mamlatdar does not indicate that he himself had satisfied about the personal bona fide requirement of the landlord. He has not even stated in the order that he was satisfied about the genuineness of the compromise and that there was valid and free consent given by the petitioner-tenant. The order passed by the ALT and Mamlatdar does not indicate that he himself had satisfied about the personal bona fide requirement of the landlord. He has not even stated in the order that he was satisfied about the genuineness of the compromise and that there was valid and free consent given by the petitioner-tenant. The relevant part of the order which in Gujarati when translated reads follows:"during the course of the proceedings of the suit as compromise has been arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendant a purshis dated June 9 1956 has been produced. According to that purshis the possession of the suit land has been given to the plaintiff. Therefore the suit is not to be proceeded further. Hence the plaintiff should get the possession of the suit land for the purpose of personal cultivation as the possession of the suit land is handed over to the plaintiff". Nowhere in the order it is indicated that the Mamlatdar had come to the satisfaction that the land was required by the landlord for bona fide personal cultivation and that the consent given by the petitioner-tenant was a free and genuine consent. Therefore the aforesaid order passed on the basis of the so-called compromise would not come in the way of the petitioner-tenant in getting the relief. ( 8 ) MOREOVER Section 31-B of the Act requires that tenancy can be terminated under Section 31 of the Act only when certain conditions are fulfilled. The Section reads as follows:" 31 In no case a tenancy shall be terminated under Section 31-B (1) in such manner as will result in leaving with a tenant after termination less than half the area of the land leased to him or (2) in such a manner as will result in a Contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act 1947 or in making any part of the land leased a fragment within the meaning of that Act or (3) if the tenant has become a member of a co-operative farming society and so long as he continues to be such member or (4) if the tenant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In the instant case it is not shown as to whether the very first condition which requires that as a result of termination of tenancy the tenant should not be left with land less than half the area of the land leased to him is satisfied or not. It is not necessary to consider as to whether other conditions have been fulfilled or not. It is not shown that after the termination of the tenancy and after surrender of the land the tenant is left with any part of the land whatsoever. Therefore in this view of the matter the contention that the tenant had surrendered possession of the land in accordance with any other provisions of this Act also cannot be sustained. This is quite clear because it is not shown that the provisions of Section 31b have been complied with when the Mamlatdar passed order in the proceeding under Section 31 of the Act. ( 9 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 10 ) THE petition is therefore allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (Annexure C to the petition) is quashed and set aside. The orders passed by the lower authorities i. e. ALT and Mamlatdar Thasra in Tenancy Case No. 6 of 1976 decided on September 13 1976 and confirmed by the Deputy Collector in Tenancy appeal No TNC 256/76 decided on August 31 1977 are restored. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent only with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .