( 1 ) THIS is a tenant's revision petition, under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961 (shortly called 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE respondent is a Banking Institution, hereinafter called 'the landlord' On 11-9-1967, the landlord purchased a building inclusive of block No 2 a portion of which is being occupied by the petitioner as a, tenant. After determining the tenancy of the petitioner, action for his eviction was brought on the ground that the landlord requires the premises for its business purpose, and also for the immediate purpose of demolition and erecting a new building. The action was thus brought under S. 21 (1) (h), and (j) of the Act. The tenant denied the alleged need of the landlord. The learned Munsiff who tried the case, however, upheld the plea of the landlord and made a decree for eviction. The said decree has been affirmed by the learned: district Judge in the appeal of the tenant. ( 3 ) MR Savanur learned Counsel for the petitioner urged three contentions. Firstly, he urged that S. 11 of the Act is a bar to the maintainability of the application -for eviction. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to set out Section 11. It reads :"11. Conversion of residential building,-Save as otherwise provided in this case, no residential building shall be converted into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the controller. (2) If the Controller does not within sixty days from the date of receipt of an application for permission under sub-sec (1), pass any order on the application, he shall be deemed to have granted the permission applied for. (3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-sec (1), shall on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees". The section altogether does not prevent the landlord from converting the residential premises to non-residential use. It only provides that the permission in writing of the Controller, is necessary for such conversion. The object behind the section, as appears to me, is to preserve as far as possible the residential premises as these are not sufficient to meet the growing needs of the developing towns and cities. The section, however, does not preclude the Court from passing a decree for eviction, if it is proved that the landlord requires the residential premises for non-residential purpose. The section, however, does not preclude the Court from passing a decree for eviction, if it is proved that the landlord requires the residential premises for non-residential purpose. But by such decree simpliciter, the landlord gets no authority to occupy the premises and use it for non-residential purpose, without written permission from the Controller. This was also the obsesvation in the decision of this Court in Peera Saheb v. K. Balachandra Rao ( (1971) 2 Myslj. 113 ) in which it was observed :" Where the landlord wants to use for his non-residential purpose his premises occupied by the tenant for his residence, it is not a condition precedent for granting a decree for eviction that the landlord should obtain the permission of the Controller for conversion to non- residential use under S. 11 of the Act. If the landlord obtains such permission after the decree for eviction before he occupies the premises, there will be sufficient compliance of Section 11 ". Mr. Savanur, however, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in bapubhai Mohanbhai v. Mahila Sahakari Udyog Mardir (AIR. 1975 SC. 2128 ). In that case, the Supreme Court considered the scope of S. 13 (1) (g) and S. 25 of the bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act as applicable to Gujarat. If we compare these provisions, it is seen that S. 25 of the said act is not analogous to S. 11 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The language of S. 25 is peremptory, which does not permit the conversion of residential premises to non-residential use. There is no question of the controller permitting such conversion under S. 25. In view of this distinction, the principles stated in the said decision of the Supreme Court cannot be extended to the facts of the present case. I, therefore, reject the first contention. ( 4 ) THE second contention urged by Sri Savanur was that the decree for eviction made by the Courts below is not in conformity with S. 26 of the Act. S. 26 provides the conditions with which a decree for eviction under S. 21 (1) (j) could be passed by the Court. The Court has to specify the period within which the landlord has to commence the work of demolishing the premises. S. 26 provides the conditions with which a decree for eviction under S. 21 (1) (j) could be passed by the Court. The Court has to specify the period within which the landlord has to commence the work of demolishing the premises. But, in my view, no such direction need be given if the decree for eviction falls both under S. 21 (1) (h) and (j) of the Act. In the present case, it is found that the landlord requires the premises not only for its personal use and occupation, but also for demolishing the same so as to erect a new building. It is, therefore, unnecessary to specify the period in the decree within which to commence the work of demolishing the premises. The second contention is also rejected. ( 5 ) THE third and the last contention urged by Sri Savanur was based on the following facts and circumstances. There were two quit notices issued by the landlord. Ext. Pll dt. 28-2-1968 was the first one. It deter- mined the tenancy of the petitioner in stating that the landlord required the building for its bona fide use and occupation and also for the purpose of constructing a new building for the use of the Bank. The second notice to quit was Ext. R1 dt. 17-8-1968. It did not specify or reiterate the need stated under Ext. Pll. It only stated that the tenant became a defaulter. Both the notices have properly determined the tenancy. In the application for eviction, the landlord has not complained about the default committed by the tenant. The eviction was sought on the ground that the landlord required the premises for use and occupation and also for demolishing the existing building so as to erect a new building in its place. The landlord has further slated that the cause of action for eviction arose on 1-4-1968 which was the date of determining the tenancy as per Ext. Pll. On these facts, Mr. Savanur, urged that Ext. Pll was waived by the landlord and the determination of the tenancy under Ext. Rl was not the cause of action for evicting the tenant. He also urged that the landlord in the circumstances, could not have brought the action on the grounds stated under Ext. P11. ( 6 ) IT must be pointed out that the tenant has given up this contention in the appellate Court. Rl was not the cause of action for evicting the tenant. He also urged that the landlord in the circumstances, could not have brought the action on the grounds stated under Ext. P11. ( 6 ) IT must be pointed out that the tenant has given up this contention in the appellate Court. He has therefore, no right to raise it before me. However, out of deference to the Counsel for the petitioner, I may briefly state my reasons. ( 7 ) IT is not at all obligatory for the landlord to state in the notice to quit, the ground or the reason which entitles him to a decree for eviction. The law requires that he has to determine the tenancy before seeking delivery of possession of his premises. The determination of the tenancy is by issuing a notice to quit as per S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The application for eviction could be filed only on the grounds set out under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The valid determination of the tenancy, of course, gives rise to a cause of action for seeking eviction, but the law does not require that the grounds upon which the eviction is sought should be set out in the notice to quit. Therefore, the landlord cannot be non-suited merely on the grounds that the reason for determining the tenancy has not been stated in the notice to quit, or the reasons given thereunder are quite different from the one pleaded and proved before the Court. At best, such discrepancy, if any, may be a factor to judge the bona fides of the landlord, and cannot operate as an estoppel against him. On the second aspect of the contention, that the landord has waived" his first notice to quit, I do not think that there is any merit in the submission. There is no evidence that the landlord has expressly or impliedly assented to the continuance of the tenancy by accepting rent or otherwise after issuing the first notice to quit. It is for the tenant to establish that the notice to quit has been waived and he has been allowed to continue in the premises as tenant. The mere fact that the landlord has issued one more notice, is no ground to hold that he has waived his earlier notice to quit. It is for the tenant to establish that the notice to quit has been waived and he has been allowed to continue in the premises as tenant. The mere fact that the landlord has issued one more notice, is no ground to hold that he has waived his earlier notice to quit. The tenant has not proved in the instant case, that subsequent to ext. P11, the landlord expressly or impliedly assented to the continuance of his tenancy. Therefore, I reject the third contention also. ( 8 ) ON the merits of the matter, I do not find any substtance. The landlord is a Banking institution. It wants to have its own building for bona, fide use and occupation. It has got means to construct a new building as per the plan approved by the local authority. The concurrent findings on this question and also on the question of comparative hardship are not shown to have been vitiated by any error of law or fact. ( 9 ) IN the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. The tentnt is given five months time to deliver vacant possession of the premises. No costs. --- *** --- .