Bapusingh v. Additional Collector, Indore — 1977 DIGILAW 89 (MP)

ORDER Kondaiah J. 1. Bapusingh, the petitioner, Chhogalal - Respondent No.2. Hemsingb-Respondent No.3 and Kesharsingh-Respondent No.4 were candidates for the election of a member to the Market Committee of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Laxmibai Nagar, Indore which was scheduled to take place on December 30. 1975. The nomination of Chhogalal, Respondent No. 2 was rejected by the Returning Officer on December 30, 1975 on the ground that he was not an agriculturist. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 withdrew their nominations on December 16, 1975. when the petitioner Bapusingh was declared elected unopposed by the Returning Officer under sub-rule (2) of rule 20 of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gathan) Niyam, 1973 (hereinafter called the Rules). The appeal preferred by Chhogalal respondent No.2 against the rejection of his nomination by the Returning Officer was summarily rejected by the appellate authority under sub-rule (5) of rule 17 of the Rules. Thereafter Chhogalal respondent No.2 preferred an election petition under rule 43 accompanied by a deposit of Rs.250/- towards the security for costs before the District Collector. Indore questioning the validity of the orders passed by the Returning Officer and the appellate authority rejecting his nomination on December 30, 1975. The Collector in exercise of his powers under sub-rule (8) of rule 43 of the Rules transferred the election petition to the Additional Collector respondent No.1 herein, for enquiry and disposal according to law. The election petition was adjourned from time to time by the Additional Collector-respondent No.1 who fixed the case for evidence of some witnesses to 15-6-1976. As the witnesses Siddhu, Kanhaiyalal and Narayan were not present although notices had been served upon them the case was ordered to be fixed for evidence on July 2, 1976 at 11A.M. Chhogalal-respondent No.2 was not present at 11-30 A.M. on 2.7.1976 when the case was taken. At the instance of the counsel for the petitioner herein, the election petition was dismissed for default. However Chhogalal, respondent No.2 and his counsel appeared before the first respondent at 3 P.M. on 2.7.1976 with the witnesses and applied for restoration of the election petition. At the instance of the counsel for the petitioner herein, the election petition was dismissed for default. However Chhogalal, respondent No.2 and his counsel appeared before the first respondent at 3 P.M. on 2.7.1976 with the witnesses and applied for restoration of the election petition. The notice of the restoration application was served on the petitioner Bapusingh on 22.7.1976 and the same was restored by the Additional Collector on 23.7.1976 holding that the witnesses for the petitioner therein were not present at 11:30 A.M. on 2.7.1976 when the case was taken up and they were present only in the afternoon and that no prejudice or loss was caused to the petitioner and restored the case rejecting the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that evidence should be taken before the case was restored. Hence this petition by the petitioner is flied under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or India to quash the orders of the Additional Collector-respondent No. 1, restoring the election petition flied by Chhogalal respondent No.2 against the order passed by the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper which was affirmed by the appellate authority. 2. Shri G.S. Solanki. the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Additional Collector respondent No.1, has no jurisdiction to restore the election petition, which was dismissed for default and in any event the election petition cannot be disposed of as the six months period prescribed therefore under rule 43 (10) or the Rules has expired on 29-6-1976. Shri D.R. Parihar, counsel for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 supported the stand taken by the writ petitioner on an additional ground that the orders passed by the appellate authority under rule 17 (5) has become final and conclusive and the election petition itself is not maintainable under rule 43 of the Rules. The learned Deputy Government Advocate Shri G.S. Solanki. appearing for respondents 1 and 5 opposed the writ petition contending inter alia that the election petition is maintainable and the respondent No. 1 has ample power and jurisdiction to restore the election petition of respondent No. 2 which was dismissed for default and the restoration is just, proper and valid and the period of six months provided in rule 43 (10) is only directory but not mandatory and there is no merit in this writ petition. Shri R.C. Chandel. Shri R.C. Chandel. learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 reiterated the stand taken by respondents Nos. 1 and 5 and further raised a preliminary objection that the plea based upon rule 17 (5) cannot be raised without amending the writ petition, that rule 43 is not controlled by rule 17 (5) and his right to have the election petition disposed of in accordance with law on merits cannot be denied or taken away for no fault of his and such construction would not only be oppressive but would lead to anomalies and injustice to the detriment of the applicant in the election petition. 3. Upon respective contentions of the parties, the following questions arise for our decision:- (1) Whether the passing of an order by the appellate authority under rule 17 (5) of the Rules against an order of rejection of nomination by a Returning officer would bar him from filing an election petitioner under rule 43 ? (2) Whether the order of restoration of the election petition of respondent No.2 by the respondent No.1 is just, proper and valid? (3) Whether the Collector or anyone authorised by him is competent or has jurisdiction to dispose of the election petition beyond the period of six months prescribed therefore under rule 43 (10) of the Rules? (4) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the issuance of the writ as prayed for? 4. We shall first take up question No. 1. The answer to this question depends upon sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 17 and rules 43 and 44 of the Rule. The Rules prescribed by the State Government in exercise of its powers under section 79 (1) and (2) of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are divided into 14 Chapters. Chapter VIII consisting of rules 15 to 19 deals with nomination of candidates. Rule 15 provides for nomination paper and deposit, whereas rule 16 requires publication of list of nominations. Rule 17 provides for scrutiny of nominations. The election authority after examining the nomination papers shall decide all objections raised by the parties after due and proper enquiry and If the nomination is found to be in order, it will be declared accordingly. Rule 15 provides for nomination paper and deposit, whereas rule 16 requires publication of list of nominations. Rule 17 provides for scrutiny of nominations. The election authority after examining the nomination papers shall decide all objections raised by the parties after due and proper enquiry and If the nomination is found to be in order, it will be declared accordingly. If it is defective on any of the grounds specified in clauses (i) to (v) indicated in sub-rule (2) of rule 19 the election authority may after such summary enquiry, if any as it thinks necessary, reject any nomination. Sub-rule (4) of rule 17 provides for an appeal to the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer, as the case may be, against the order of election authority rejecting the nomination paper. The appellate authority is required under sub-rule (5) there of to pass orders on the same day and if the nomination is declared to be valid a certified copy of the order shall be sent to the election authority in the quickest possible manner. The latter part of sub-rule (5) of Rule 17 reads thus: “......The decision of the appellate authority on appeal under this sub-rule and subject only to such decision, the decision or' the election authority accepting or rejecting the nomination of the candidate, shall be final and conclusive.” On the basis of the aforesaid sub-rule, it is contended that the decision of the appellate authority in so far as the acceptance or rejection of the nomination of the candidate is concerned, shall be final and conclusive and, therefore, no election petition is permissible under rule 43. The mere use of the words "final and conclusive" in sub-rule (5) of rule 17 cannot be held to debar the aggrieved party from agitating his right by preferring an election petition under rule 43 as both the: forums are distinct and independent. In our opinion, the finality and conclusiveness indicated in rule 17 (5) must be construed to be only in respect of a decision of the election authority in accepting or rejecting the nomination of the election candidate. In other words, the decision of the appellate authority is final and conclusive in so far as the election authority is concerned. The use of the words "and subject only to such decision" used in rule 17 (5) would support our view. In other words, the decision of the appellate authority is final and conclusive in so far as the election authority is concerned. The use of the words "and subject only to such decision" used in rule 17 (5) would support our view. The rule making authority appears to have employed the use of the expression "the decision shall be final" wherever possible. We may notice in this regard the later part of sub-rule (8) of rule 43 which provides such usage, "The decision of the Collector or his subordinate officer, as the case may be shall be final” The decision of the Collector or his subordinate officer may be final in so far as the statutory authorities are concerned. The correctness or otherwise of the same may be questioned in a writ petition. We, opine that this sub-rule 5 of rule 17 has not been drafted properly as it is clumsy and ambiguous. It may also mean that the decision of the election authority accepting or rejecting the nomination of the, candidate shall be final and canclusive. There is nothing in the language in sub-rule (5) of rule 17 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Collector from entertaining an election petition from a candidate whose appeal against the order of rejection of a nomination paper by the election authority is dismissed. 5. Rule 44 (2) indicates the grounds for declaring election to be void by the Collector or his subordinate officer, as the case may be, Rule 44 (2) (c) of the Rules may be noticed thus:"(2) Grounds for declaring election to be void- (a) ** ** ** (b) ** ** ** (c) That any nomination has been improperly rejected", Therefore, admittedly one of the permissible grounds specified in sub-rule (2) of rule 44 for declaring an election to be void is improper rejection of a nomination paper The word "improper' is wide enough to take in any factual, as well as legal, aspect concerning the rejection of the nomination. Nowhere it is stated that rule 17 (5) controls rule 43 read with rule 44 (2) (c). The statutory authority has in its wisdom provided the right of appeal under rule 17 (4) and (5) and also the remedy of an election petition under rule 43 read with rule 44 (2) (c) in so far as rejection of a nomination paper is concerned. The statutory authority has in its wisdom provided the right of appeal under rule 17 (4) and (5) and also the remedy of an election petition under rule 43 read with rule 44 (2) (c) in so far as rejection of a nomination paper is concerned. Where more than one remedies are provided by a statute or statutory rule in respect of an election dispute or any other matter it cannot be said that only one remedy is permissible to be availed of by an aggrieved party, unless such restriction is imposed by the very statute by any express specific provision or by necessary implication. This remedy of election petition is an independent one. A candidate, who failed in his appeal under rule 11 (4) and (5) is certainly competent to prefer an election petition, if he can bring his case within any one of the grounds specified in rule 44 (2) for declaring the election to be void. 6. Where the statute or statutory rules provide for more than one remedy to an aggrieved party, it is open to the concerned party to avail himself of the remedies provided therefore under law, unless the very statute restricts or bars anyone of the remedies, if he happened to choose the other Rule 17 (4) and (5) and Rules 43 and 44 can be harmoniously and beneficially construed with regard to the right of a candidate to file an election petition as provided in rules 43 and 44 in Chapter 11, which deals with election petitions. On the application of the principle of harmonious and beneficial construction of statutes, we are of the view that the candidate whose nomination has been rejected by the election authority can prefer an appeal under rule 17 (4) and if he is aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority he can avail of the remedy of election petition provided under rule 43 read with 44 with rule (2)(c) as there is no bar for him from agitating the same point in an the election petition. For all the reasons stated, we answer question No.1 in the negative and against the writ petitioner and in favour of the contesting respondents. 7. We shall now turn to the correctness or otherwise of the order of restoration of the election petition of respondent No.2 by the additional Collector. For all the reasons stated, we answer question No.1 in the negative and against the writ petitioner and in favour of the contesting respondents. 7. We shall now turn to the correctness or otherwise of the order of restoration of the election petition of respondent No.2 by the additional Collector. The submission of the writ petitioner that there is no jurisdiction for the Collector to set aside the order of dismissal for default of an election petition cannot be acceded to. On a close and careful reading of the provisions of Rules 43 and 44 we are of the view that the Collector or his subordinate officer while functioning a presiding officer for the purpose of enquiry and disposal of the election petition under the Act cannot be held to be a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure such authority must be considered to be only a quasi judicial authority created under the special enactment & whose powers functions and duties are circumscribed by the Act and the rules made there under. Hence such presiding authority cannot be held to have been conferred with inherent powers like civil Court functioning under the Civil Procedure Code. We have to, therefore, examine as to whether rules 43 and 44 invest the presiding officer with a power to dismiss the election petition. We may notice the fact that there is no specific rule empowering the Collector or his subordinate officer authorised to enquire and dispose of an election petition to dismiss the election petition for default. Unless the authority empowered to enquire and dispose of an election petition in respect of the membership of the market committee or any other committee is specifically authorised to dismiss such petition for default, he is not competent to do so. 8. The intendment and object of the Act was to provide for better regulation of the buying and selling of the agricultural produce and the establishment and proper administration of markets of agricultural produce In the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Constitution and establishment of the market committee to administer the markets of Agricultural produce are essential. Where there is a dispute with regard to the election of a member of the Committee, it has to be decided by the statutory authority in accordance with law. The Constitution and establishment of the market committee to administer the markets of Agricultural produce are essential. Where there is a dispute with regard to the election of a member of the Committee, it has to be decided by the statutory authority in accordance with law. The Collector or his subordinate officer exercising this power has a statutory duty and obligation to determine the election petition on merits, unless it is withdrawn or not pressed by the applicant. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Collector or his subordinate, as the case may be is competent to dismiss an election petition for default, it must be presumed that he would also have the power to restore the same for valid and proper reasons and after affording reasonable opportunity to the contesting party. In the present case admittedly notice of the restoration petition has been served on the writ petitioner herein. The counsel for the petitioner appeared and opposed the application and requested for time to lead evidence. From the order sheet of the Additional Collector, it is evident that the Second respondent and his counsel appeared at 3 O'clock on the same day i.e. 2-7-1976 with witnesses & the witnesses of the writ petitioner also did not turn up at 11.30 A.M. when the case was called but they came only at 3P.M & the Additional Collector was satisfied that it was a fit case for exercising his discretion to retore the election petition of respondent No.2, which was dismissed in default in the morning. For all the reasons stated, we have no hesitation to hold that the Collector is not only competent to restore the petition but also justified in exercising his discretion in favour of the second respondent which is just, proper and valid. Hence, there is no merit in this objection of the writ petitioner for the restoration of the election petition. 9. This brings us to examine the third question relating to the jurisdiction of the Collector to dispose of an election petition beyond the period of six months from the date of its presentation. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of the provision of rule 43 (10) which read as follows:- (10) The election petition shall be disposed off within six months from the date of presentation thereof. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of the provision of rule 43 (10) which read as follows:- (10) The election petition shall be disposed off within six months from the date of presentation thereof. According to the writ-petitioner, the period or six months provided for the disposal of an election petition under sub-rule (10) of rule 43 is mandatory and, therefore the Collector is not competent to dispose of the e1etion petition instituted by the second respondent on December 30, 1975 as the period of six months expired by June 29, 1975. True as contended by the writ-petitioner, the period of six months provided for the disposal of an election petition under rule 43 (10) expired on 29-6-1976. We have to therefore, examine the point whether this fixation of six months period for the disposal of the election petition is mandatory as submitted by the writ petitioner or only directory as urged by the learned Deputy Government Advocate and the Second Respondent. 10. The broad test laid down for determining the nature and character of a particular provision in a statute or statutory rules is whether it is imperative (mandatory) or directory (permissive). It is now well settled that there is no rule of thumb of universal or general application for determining the question whether a provision in a statute or statutory rule is mandatory or is only directory and it is the duty of the Court in each case to get at the real intendment and object of such a provision by carefully looking into the same. According to the learned Cluthor Maxwel on 'Interpretation of Statutes' (12th edition) at page 315, "the Court cannot safely go further than that in each case it must look to the subject matter, consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory." 11. The aforesaid rule of construction has been accepted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Suffice it to refer to the decision of Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v, The Municipal Board. The aforesaid rule of construction has been accepted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Suffice it to refer to the decision of Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v, The Municipal Board. Rampur [ AIR 1965 SC 895 ] wherein the learned Judge Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority, at page 399 observed:- "The Question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word 'shall' as in the present case or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the Legislature in making the provision the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provisions have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory." (Para 7) 12. Applying the aforesaid principles of construction, Jet us consider rule 43 and the intendment and object of the rule making authority in fixing the time limit of six months for the disposal of an election petition. On a careful consideration of the rules 43 and 44, which provide and prescribe the procedure for institution and disposal of the election petition we are of the firm view that the rule making authority only intended the speedy disposal of the election petitions in view of the importance and urgency of final settlement of ejection disputes under the Act, The use of the word "shall" in the circumstances would not indicate the mandatory nature and character of the provision in so far as the fixation of the period of six months for the disposal of the election petition. The object and purpose of this provision was to see that the election petitions are disposed of as expeditiously as possible and normally within six months from the date of their presentation. The object and purpose of this provision was to see that the election petitions are disposed of as expeditiously as possible and normally within six months from the date of their presentation. The Collector or his subordinate officer has a statutory obligation to dispose of the election petition as far as possible within the period of six months prescribed therefore the candid at", who filed the election petition should not be punished for any delay caused in the disposal of his petition either on account of the dialatory tactics of the contesting respondents or due to the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer being the Collector or his subordinate has to discharge this function of disposal of the election petitions as one of the duties and functions assigned to them. They may have very urgent and important duties to be attended to on the days to which the election petitions are posted for enquiry and they genuinely could not attend to the enquiry of the election petition and dispose of the same within the' period of six months. In the present case, the second respondent who is the applicant in the election petition did not ask for any adjournments and for no fault of his election petition disposed of in accordance with law on merits cannot be defeated for no fault of his but on account of the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Presiding Officer or the delay caused by the contesting respondents on some ground or the other. The pertinent question, therefore, is whether the time of six months for the performance of the official act by the Presiding Officer in disposing of the election petition from which rights and duties of others namely the applicant and the contesting respondents in the election petition flow is mandatory or only directory. 13. The rule of construction with regard to such specification of time in a statute or statutory rule is stated in Corpus Juris Vol. 13. The rule of construction with regard to such specification of time in a statute or statutory rule is stated in Corpus Juris Vol. 59, pages 1078-79 thus:- "A statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others and made with a view to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of business is usually directory, unless the phraseology of the statute, or the nature of the act to be performed and the consequence of doing or failing to do it at such time is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation on the power of the officer so statute requiring a public body, merely for the orderly transaction of business to fix the time for the performance of certain acts which may as effectually be done at any other time is usually regarded as directory." 14. The Judicial committee in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin [AIR 1917 PC 143], held that the detailed provisions provided for preparing the list of jurors to be revised by the Sheriff in the Revised statutes of Quebec was only directory but not imperative and consequently the non-observance of those provisions would not make the trial and the verdict of all the juries taken from the other list ipso facto null and void. While considering the principles that governed the construction of statutes, it was ruled at page 154 thus:- "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done." 15. If the rule making authority bad intended the period of six months, provided under rule 43 (10) to be imperative and mandatory, it would have certainly indicated what follows or what should follow, if the petition is not disposed of irrespective of the reason therefore within the prescribed period of six months. If the rule making authority bad intended the period of six months, provided under rule 43 (10) to be imperative and mandatory, it would have certainly indicated what follows or what should follow, if the petition is not disposed of irrespective of the reason therefore within the prescribed period of six months. There is no provision under the Act or the rules made thereunder, with regard to the consequence that should follow in case of the election petition not being disposed of within the prescribed period of six months. There is no provision under the Act or the rules made thereunder with regard to the consequence that should follow in case of the election petition not being disposed of within the prescribed period for six months. The period of six months must be considered in the circumstances to have been specified for the purpose of enabling the Presiding Officer to perform his official act to determine the claim of the election petitioner and consequence thereof. Further it may be noted that the requirement of the enquiry and disposal of election petition within six months - period is not couched in negative which is normally used to indicate the intendment to be imperative and absolute. The period of six months was considered by the 'rule making authority to be adequate proper and orderly, provided the Presiding Officer had promptly and deligently conducted his business or function pertaining to the enquiry or disposal of the election petition. If the consequences of the performance or failure to do the duty by the Presiding Officer within the time of six months prescribed therefore are not specified or designed, it must in all fairness be considered to be a normal period of limitation provided for the disposal of the application by the Presiding Officer: That apart, the provision of six months period if construed strictly would destroy the right of the appellant to have his petition disposed of in accordance with law and consequently cause irreparable loss, damage and inconvenience to him for no fault of his. The Government would not have intended to punish the applicants, if the petitions are not disposed of for some reason or the-other within the period of six months. Such would not have been the intendment an object of the rule making authority. The Government would not have intended to punish the applicants, if the petitions are not disposed of for some reason or the-other within the period of six months. Such would not have been the intendment an object of the rule making authority. It cannot be said that the election petition would stand dismissed automatically after the period of six months as there is no such express provision, nor can such intendment and object be inferred from the admitted facts and circumstances and the provision of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. We are of the view that the election petition must be given a disposal. The first part of rule 43 (10) which provides for the disposal of the election petition, is really mandatory and imperative. The election petition shall be disposed of. Normally such disposal shall be within six months from the date of the application; Even otherwise such application shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. We are unable to accede to the submission of the writ-petitioner that the provision is mandatory and imperative. The Legislature or the rule making authority did not intend the consequence of disposal of the election petitions if they are not disposed of within six months and the provision is only directory. The desire and anxiety of the Rule making authority, State Government, in providing for a period of six months for the enquiry and disposal of election petition is to have a speedy and effective disposal and settlement of the election petition under the Act. If the case continues for longer periods, they would be more expensive to the concerned parties on account of the delay. The State Government also intended genuinely to administer justice in election matters with speed and less cost. They thought that six months would be normally sufficient and adequate for the disposal of the election petition. The very object and purpose of indicating six months period is not only pragmatic and laudable, but is also consistent with the times of the progressive nature of the law and to enable the parties to have speedy justice with less costs. They thought that six months would be normally sufficient and adequate for the disposal of the election petition. The very object and purpose of indicating six months period is not only pragmatic and laudable, but is also consistent with the times of the progressive nature of the law and to enable the parties to have speedy justice with less costs. The concerned Presiding Officer, be it the Collector or his subordinate, must think it his duty and function to expeditiously and diligently complete the enquiry and dispose of the election petition within the prescribed period of six months and implement the purpose, policy and object of the Government without giving rise to public criticism and complications and inconvenience and hardship to the applicants in such proceedings. We are constrained to observe that they should be not only diligent and vigilant but also discharge their duties as Presiding Officer of a Quasi. Judicial Tribunal, fairly, judiciously, independently and impartially and with speed consistent with dignity of the office held by them. 16. This view of ours gains support from the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bir Govind Singh v. Chief Municipal Officer [ 1968 JLJ 1100 = 1968 MPLJ 776]. Therein a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the nature and character or the provision under section 43 (2) (b) of the M.P. Municipalities Act. 1961 for convening a meeting for the election of President and Vice• President within one month after the expiry of the term of the office of the President & Vice-President elected under section 43 (2) (a). The learned Judge, Pandey J. speaking for the Court, observed at page 1105 as follows: "In this case, we do not find anything in the phraseology of the statute or the nature of the act to he performed as indicating an intention of the Legislature to require exact or literal fulfillment in regard to time. The legislative command is not couched in negative words which are usually regarded as a device to make a statute imperative M. Pentitiah v. Neeramallappa, nor does the statute provide that the omission to observe the time specified therein will either be punishable or result in nullification of act done. The legislative command is not couched in negative words which are usually regarded as a device to make a statute imperative M. Pentitiah v. Neeramallappa, nor does the statute provide that the omission to observe the time specified therein will either be punishable or result in nullification of act done. On the other hand this is an official act involving a public duty, over which the general public has no control and it is not shown to us if any injurious consequences would flow from not invalidating the act done for failing to observe the time for doing as specified in the statute." 17. We shall now advert to the decisions cited by the petitioner's counsel. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the Full Bench case of the Court in Damodar v. Nandram, [ 1960 JLJ 473 = 1960 MPLJ 925 ]. Venugopal Vs. Vijayawada Municipality [ AIR 1957 AP 833 ], State Government, M.P. v. Hifzul Rahman [AIR 1952 Nag 12], K. Venkat Ramaiah v. C. Sitharamiah [ AIR 1961 AP 208 ], and Deolal Panna v. Lohare and others [ 1960 JLJ 246 =1960 MPLJ 73], in support of his contention that the Court should look to the plain language of the statute and consideration of reasonableness of the consequences are irrelevant, As ruled by the learned Judge Das J. in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mandal [ AIR 1950 SC 265 ], hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature, if such meaning is clear on the face of the rules. While interpreting the provisions of section 4 (h) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, the learned Judge Pandey J. speaking for the Majority, observed in Damodar's case (Supra) at page 354 thus:- "It is well established that, where the language of a statute is plain and clear, the words must be given their ordinary and natural meaning without considering the reasonableness of the consequences. It is also not permissible to put undue strain on the clear language employed in a statute in order to place upon it a construction favourable to any class of persons." The aforesaid principle of law relating to construction of a statute or statutory rule is of a general character. That principle can be applied only where the language is very clear, unambiguous and in express terms. That principle can be applied only where the language is very clear, unambiguous and in express terms. The language must be such that it is susceptible of only one plausible meaning, but, however, where the language is such that it is capable of two plausible meanings, one which is consistent with intendment and object of the Legislature or the rule making authority must be given effect to. Where the language of a statute leads to absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the provisions of a statute, the constructions of that would avoid such absurdity and inconsistency must be preferred by the Courts. The following passage in the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Venkat Ramiah's case (supra) at page 211 must be noticed:- "When the language of the statute is clear, unambiguous and in express terms, then all that is required is to expound these words in their natural and ordinary sense, unless in doing so some absurdity or some repugnance or some inconsistency with the rest of the provisions of a statute would result, in which case it will be permissible to modify the construction for avoiding that absurdity and nothing more." While considering the provisions of the Second Proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes the crucial date for determining the rights of the contending parties about the factum of actual possession of the subject of dispute without reference to the merits or claims of any such parties to a right to possess, it was held that the two months period must be reckoned with prior to the date of the preliminary order to the date of the petition under subsection (1) of section 145. The language of the Second Proviso to subsection (4) of section 145 is clear, unambiguous and in express terms with regard to the crucial date to be taken into account for determining the rights of the parties in question. Hence the decisions in Junzarsingh v. Gangabai [1961 JLJ SN 491], and K. D. Kohli v. K.K. Sondhi [AIR 1973 Delhi 231], arising under section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code are distinguishable on facts and hence not applicable to the case in hand. Hence the decisions in Junzarsingh v. Gangabai [1961 JLJ SN 491], and K. D. Kohli v. K.K. Sondhi [AIR 1973 Delhi 231], arising under section 145 (4) Criminal Procedure Code are distinguishable on facts and hence not applicable to the case in hand. None of the cases cited and relied upon by the petitioner's counsel deal with a case where the Court or the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal has to discharge his official duty or function pertaining to an enquiry or disposal of case or matter within a particular prescribed time. The mere use of the word 'shall' in rule 43 (10) would not make the provision relating to the period within which the petition is expected or contemplated to be disposed of, imperative and mandatory. 18. In the present case. taking into account the intendment, object and purpose of the rule-making authority in prescribing the time limit of six months for enquiry and disposal of an election petition must be held to be only directory as the Legislature or the Government did not intend the ipso facto dismissal of election petitions under the Act, if they are not disposed of for reasons beyond the control of the parties within the time limits specified therefore. The language of section 43 (10) is not so clear and unambiguous as is susceptible to only one meaning. The use of the word 'shall' therein is not conclusive. Each case must be judged from its own facts and the context in which the time limit for the discharge of the official duties of a statutory authority is provided for. 19. We may notice the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. B.E.S.T. Workers' Union [ AIR 1973 SC 883 ], wherein the Supreme Court had to consider the scope, effect and the nature of the provisions of six months time indicated in section 78 (1) (d) (i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1947. The question that fell for consideration was whether the orders of dismissal of the workmen by the employer the Municipality are illegal on the ground that they have been passed after six months after the date of notice of the misconduct. The Labour Court held that the provisions of section 78 (1) (d) are mandatory and that time limit of six months specified therein cannot be enlarged by the Labour Court. The Labour Court held that the provisions of section 78 (1) (d) are mandatory and that time limit of six months specified therein cannot be enlarged by the Labour Court. The civil appeal was dismissed. The learned Judge Vaidialingam. J. speaking for the Court relied at page 891 thus:- "We are of the opinion that the provisions contained in section 8 (1) (d) (i) are not mandatory but only directory. The Labour Court will certainly have power to give relief to an employee if an order of dismissal etc is passed by the employer after the expiry of six months from the date when the misconduct came to the notice of the employer provided the employer has not been diligent in initiating disciplinary proceedings and if he is not able to offer satisfactory and adequate reasons for the delay in passing the orders imposing punishment. The provision only emphasises that an employer should be vigilant in taking disciplinary action against an employee for misconduct. Once the said misconduct has come to his notice and that, as far as possible, the proceeding including the final orders imposing punishment must all be completed within a period of six months. This will be the normal rule. Such an interpretation does not impinge upon either the rights of an employer to initiate disciplinary action or the rights of an employee to have a proper and fair enquiry conducted against him......" This decision of the Supreme Court supports our view. As pointed out earlier each case has to be judged on the facts and in the circumstances, the language the intendment, purpose and object of the Legislature for providing such time limit, the nature and character of the enquiry and the consequences that follows in case of delay must be taken into account. 20. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that there is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner for the grant of the writ prayed for. 20. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that there is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner for the grant of the writ prayed for. For all the reasons stated, our answer to question No.3 is in the affirmative and in favour of the contesting respondent holding that the provision is only directory and permissive but not mandatory and imperative and it only indicates that the election petition should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and normally within six months from the date of the application, and the Collector or his subordinate Officer has jurisdiction and is competent to dispose of the election petition of the second respondent even after the period of six months as early as possible and after affording reasonable opportunities to all the concerned parties in accordance with law. 21. In the result, the writ petition must be and is hereby dismissed with costs payable by the petitioner to respondents No. 1, 2 and 5 only. The remaining respondents shall bear their own Costs. Counsel's fee Rs.250 if certified.