JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal under Order XLIII rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by Smt. Mohini Devi, is directed against an order of the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, dated 19-2-1977, who while allowing her application under Order XXXIX rule 1 of the Code for grant of a temporary injunction, imposed certain conditions. 2. The facts leading to the appeal, in brief, are as follows:- The respondent, viz., the Rajasthan State Financial Corporation, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to 'the Corporation') made an application under section 31 (1) of the Rajasthan State Financial "Corporation Act, 1951, for the recovery of the mortgage amount of Rs. 4,78,866.66 due under the mortgage deed dated 27.1.1971 executed by the appellant's brother Budhmal. He borrowed three amounts under the mortgaged, deed, viz. Rs. 1,00,000/- on 16.12.64, Rs. 78,000/- on 5-4-1968 and Rs. 1,06,000/- on 19-9-1970 for the construction of a multistoreyed hotel. The Corporation obtained a decree for Rs. 4,78,866.66 on 22.10.1975 from the Court of District Judge, Jodhpur, against the legal representatives of Badhmal, for the recovery of the amount due by sale of the mortgaged property. 3. While the case filed by the Corporation was pending, the appellant on 23-5-1973 applied under Order XXXIII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to file a suit in forma pauperis. In the suit, she claimed a declaration that half the house belongs to her in as much as the property was owned by her lather Radha Kishan, who purchased the house together with the land near Sojatigate for Rs. 8,750/- by a registered sale deed dated 12-6-22. She alleged that though the sale deed was in the name of her father Radha Kishan and brother Budhmal, her brother was mere 'benamidar', as he was only 9 years old at the time of purchase. She, however, admits that the 'patta' in respect thereof was granted by the 'Darbar' on the basis of the sale deed. Radha Kishan died on 26-5-1961 leaving behind him his widow Gavaribai, son Badhmal, and daughter Mohini Devi. Smt. Gavaribai died on 27.1.1968. She, however, admits that the 'patta' in respect thereof was granted by the 'Darbar' on the basis of the sale deed. Radha Kishan died on 26-5-1961 leaving behind him his widow Gavaribai, son Badhmal, and daughter Mohini Devi. Smt. Gavaribai died on 27.1.1968. In the circumstances, the appellant Smt. Mohini Devi alleged that she and her brother Budhmal became owners of the house each having one half share therein under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and therefore her brother Budhmal had no right to mortgage the entire property and consequently, the mortgage decree was not binding on her half share. 4. The sale of the mortgaged property in execution of the decree obtained by the Corporation was fixed for 21.2.1977, 22.2.1977 and 23.2.1977. On 28.1.1977, the appellant applied under Order XXXIX rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the grant of a temporary injection to restrain the respondent from executing the decree. 5. The learned Additional District Judge No. 2, by his order dated 19-2-1977 granted her application under Order XXXIX rule 1 of the Code restraining the respondent from selling the mortgaged property in execution of the decree, on condition that the appellant furnished a surety within two days, i.e., by 21.2.77, the date fixed for the sale for the amount of loss which the respondent Corporation might suffer as a result of the injunction, in the event of her failing in the suit. Admittedly the appellant has failed to furnish any surety. The result of this is that the temporary injunction stands vacated. 6. Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellant complains that by imposing such an impossible condition, the learned Additional District Judge has virtually declined to grant the temporary injunction prayed for, although he holds that the requirements of the Order XXXIX rule 1 of the Code are fulfilled. It is said that the decretal amount is a large one, and It is impossible for the appellant to reduce a surety for an unlimited amount which the respondent may possibly claim as the resultant loss. Farther more, the condition that the surety must be produced within 2 days was, it is said, impossible of compliance. The learned counsel concedes that the Court has the power to grant temporary injunction on conditions. But it is said that the discretion is a judicial one and was not an arbitrary one. Farther more, the condition that the surety must be produced within 2 days was, it is said, impossible of compliance. The learned counsel concedes that the Court has the power to grant temporary injunction on conditions. But it is said that the discretion is a judicial one and was not an arbitrary one. He drew my attention to A. Batcha Saheb v. Nariman K. Irani and others, AIR 1955 Mad 491 . 7. Granting of a temporary injunction on terms was in the discretion of the learned Additional District Judge. It cannot be said he has improperly exercised his discretion in allowing two days time for furnishing security. Virtually, he has refused the injunction and, therefore, the matter must rest at that. 8. In A. Batcha Saheb v. Nariman K. Irani and others (supra), it was observed : "The Court in granting a temporary injunction has undoubtedly powers to impose terms as a condition to the granting of the injunction, but the imposition of such terms must be reasonable and such as not to make it impossible for the plaintiff to comply with the terms thereby virtually denying the relief which he would otherwise be ordinarily entitled to. There is one important fact which does not appear to have been taken into consideration by the court below before directing the plaintiffs to pay that large sum as a condition attaching to the granting of injunction." 9. The Court, in the circumstances of the case, has no power to issue any injunction restrain the respondent, viz., the Corporation i.e. the decree- holder, from executing the decree in its favour. To that extent, the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in granting an injunction. But the time for furnishing of security having elapsed, the injunction stands vacated. Nothing need be done any further. 10. Three alternatives were suggested, namely (i) a receiver be appointed to lease out the property and the receiver should deposit the rent and profits, (ii) half of the property mortgaged should be sold, and the appellant will furnish security for the imprest failing due on half of the decretal amount and (iii) the possession of the property be delivered to the Corporation. I am afraid, the acceptance of any of these suggestions will be clearly against public interest. 11. I am afraid, the acceptance of any of these suggestions will be clearly against public interest. 11. This is a case which falls within the rule laid down in Manohar Lal v. Jagmohanlal, AIR 1957 MB 97 and in Ganpati Chintaman v. Shiv Ram Damodar and others, AIR 1963 MP 209 . These cases are clear authority for the proposition that the court ought not, as a matter of law, grant a temporary injunction where the effect of such grant would be to restrain the decree holder from executing a decree in his favour. That is precisely the case here. 12. This, however, does not imply that the court can in no circumstances grant an injunction. It may be that the court may be satisfied on the facts before it, that the plaintiff was entitled to relief, and there was, therefore, a serious question to be tried. It may for instance, be further admitted that the suit property belongs to plaintiff. 13. The circumstances of the present case are entirely different. It is a moot point whether the appellant is or is not bound by the mortgage decree. That is still a question to be tried between the parties. 14. It is too much to expect that the court would, on the mere filing of an application under Order XXXIX rule 1 of the Code, in the circumstances as here, viz , where there was no suit but merely an application to file a suit in form a pauperis, restrain execution of the decree. The story that the appellant never knew of the mortgage does not appear to be true. It does not stand to reason that she would stand by and permit her brother to pull down the ancestral house and allow him to borrow huge amounts to construct a multi-storeyed hotel The fact that she allowed all that to be done shows that the incurring of the mortgage debts for a family necessity. At any rate the members of the family stood to benefit by the investment of the money in a multi-storeyed building to run a hotel. 15. It would certainly cause manifest injustice to grant any injunction to res rain the respondent from executing the decree. The appellant would also not be put to any irreparable loss if no such injunction was granted. 16. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed summarily.Appeal dismissed. *******