ORDER D.N. Jha, J. - Petitioner Indra Narain has filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing of the order and decree passed by the Addl. Judge Small Cause Court Lucknow dated 22-1-1974 and same relief has been sought against the order passed by IVth Addl. District & Sessions Judge Lucknow dated 26-8-1974. These orders are Annexures 3 and 4 respectively to the writ petition. 2. In brief, the facts are that opposite party No. 3 Sita Ram Tewari filed a suit in the court of Munsif North Lucknow on 22-9-1971 for arrears of rent and damages and mesne profits. On coming into force of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the case was transferred to the court of Judge Small Cause Court Lucknow and subsequently to the court of Addl. Judge Small Cause Court Lucknow, opposite party No. 2. After a frantic effort of publication of the notice, service was effected on the petitioner, who appeared on 9-7-1973 and moved an application praying for permission to file written statement and supply of copy of the plaint along with a prayer to provide him one month's time to avail of the opportunity of Section 39 of the Act, by depositing the rent etc. The prayer was allowed and case was listed for filing of written statement on 9-8-1973 and final hearing was fixed for 11-9-1973. The written statement was not filed on the due date and since on the date of final hearing the Presiding Officer was not present, the case was adjourned to 26-11-1973. The petitioner on that date filed his written statement and filed several applications. The record of proceedings of 26-11-1973 is Annexure C-1 to the counter-affidavit. The statement of the landlord was recorded and the case was adjourned to 27-11-1973 for the statement of the petitioner and his witnesses. In the meantime there was a stay from the revisional court and hence the case could not proceed and ultimately it came up for hearing on 14-1-1974. The Presiding Officer fixed the case for recording of the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses on 21-1-1974. In the meantime there was a stay from the revisional court and hence the case could not proceed and ultimately it came up for hearing on 14-1-1974. The Presiding Officer fixed the case for recording of the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses on 21-1-1974. On that date an application was moved on behalf of the opposite party No. 3 for striking off the defence of the petitioner for non-compliance of Rule 5 Order 15 C. P. C. On this it appears that, the court framed Issue No. 8 to the effect "whether the defendant has made compliance of O. 15 R. 5 C. P. C. If so, its effect on either side." 3. It appears that the Addl. Judge Small Cause Court Lucknow after rejecting certain applications, moved by the petitioner for examination of his witnesses on commission, proceeded to decide the case. He heard the parties with respect to Issue No. 8 and after recording a finding that even the admitted rent had not been deposited by the petitioner, decided the issue against the petitioner. He also recorded a finding that the service of `notice was proved and it was valid, He, however, did not record any finding on issues Nos. 3, 4, 5 & 6 and thereafter decreed the suit vide order dated 22-1-1974 This order is Annexure-4. 4. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order went up in revision which was heard and disposed of by IV Addl. Distt. Judge Lucknow on 26-8-1974. The revision was dismissed and the order passed by the learned Judge Small Cause Court Lucknow was upheld. This order is Annexure-5 to the writ petition. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the impugned orders passed by Opp. Party Nos. 1 & 2, has come up before this Court by means of the present petition. 5. The petition has been contested on behalf of opposite party No. 3, Sita Ram Tewari and a counter affidavit has also been filed. An effort has been made to support the impugned orders being legal, just and proper and it is asserted that this is not a fit case for interference in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length. 7. An effort has been made to support the impugned orders being legal, just and proper and it is asserted that this is not a fit case for interference in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length. 7. The controversy raised on behalf of the petitioner centres round the fact that the opposite party No. 2 erred in striking off the defence of the petitioner under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. illegally and thereby committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. He contended that unless and until the arrears of rent was not admitted, the provision of O. 15 R. 5 could not be invoked and the defence of the petitioner could not be struck off. On the other hand, learned counsel for opp. party No. 3, Sita Ram Tewari, vehemently argued that nonpayment of rent was acceptable but what had been claimed by the petitioner was only an adjustment of certain expenditure which he had incurred towards the restoration of water connection and electric connection. He maintained that merely a bald denial of arrears of rent would not entitle petitioner to assert that the rent or damages for use and occupation was not admitted and since he only, was claiming adjustment of certain rents, it was clearly a case of admitted rent not being deposited and was covered by the provision of O. 15 R. 5 C. P. C. Both the parties referred to their respective avermnts in the writ petition and counter affidavit in assertion of their claims and the various annexures filed along with them. I have carefully examined the averments and the counter averments. It may be mentioned that in para 7 of the plaint which has been attached as Annexure-2, it was asserted that a sum of Rs. 296.12 paise being the arrears of rent for the period from 12th March 1971 to 9th August 1971 plus a further sum of Rs. 84.63 paise being the damages for use and occupation for the period from 10th August 1971 to the date of suit had not been paid in spite of repeated demands. This suit, after giving a notice, was filed on 22-9-1971. In reply to this in para 7 of the written statement, which is Annexure-1, it is mentioned "Denied as alleged. 84.63 paise being the damages for use and occupation for the period from 10th August 1971 to the date of suit had not been paid in spite of repeated demands. This suit, after giving a notice, was filed on 22-9-1971. In reply to this in para 7 of the written statement, which is Annexure-1, it is mentioned "Denied as alleged. No amount is due to the plff. either on account of rent or on account of damages." It may be mentioned that except this nothing else has been stated except that the petitioner had applied for fresh water connection and spent a sum of Rs. 400/- on that account and further that he had been denied the amenity of electricity on account of its disconnection and was in Dare 15 stated that he had spent Rs. 180/- on account of annual white washing and general repairs. It may be mentioned that it is not disputed that the petitioner was tenant of the promises of which opposite party No.3 was the landlord and that the monthly rent was Rs. 60/-. I have also looked into the statement of opposite party No. 3. who had entered the witness box and had been examined as P. W. 1. This statement is Annexure C-6. It is pertinent to note that, no cross-examination was directed by the petitioner in assertion of his claim that no rent was payable by the defdt. Even the amount mentioned in the written statement, which had been spent by the defdt., was not suggested in the cross-examination. On a scrutiny of the statement, there is no shadow of doubt left in the mind that the petitioner was at all entitled to any adjustments or that no rent was due to be paid. It is in the light of these facts that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be scrutinised. The provision of O. 15 R. 5 C. P. C., was brought about by an amendment provided by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972) and it reads as under : "Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc. The provision of O. 15 R. 5 C. P. C., was brought about by an amendment provided by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972) and it reads as under : "Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc. In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act 1972, the defdt. shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement, deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation admitted by him to be due, thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the court may unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike off his defence." It would be clear from the perusal of the above provision that this rule is to be invoked on non-deposit of admitted rent. The question of admitted rent is purely a question of fact and not a question of law which has to be decided on the basis of the averments. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no admitted rent due and hence, the petitioner was within his right not to deposit the same cannot, in my opinion, hold good. In the instant case. admittedly no dispute had come into existence, according to the own averments of the petitioner, before June 1971. That being so, the rent from 12-3-1971 till the month of June was payable. The controversy only arose from the month of June. Whatever might have been the controversy, the fact remains that the petitioner was in use and occupation of the premises belonging to opposite party No. 3. That being so, the rent from 12-3-1971 till the month of June was payable. The controversy only arose from the month of June. Whatever might have been the controversy, the fact remains that the petitioner was in use and occupation of the premises belonging to opposite party No. 3. The rent was also agreed between the parties. There is no dispute about this agreed quantum of rent. If the petitioner had spent any amount for restoration of the amenities that had been discontinued it was open to the petitioner to seek his remedy by recourse to law and that did not permit the petitioner to suspend the payment of rent to which opp. party No. 3 was entitled. It is in this light that the plea of denial, as set out in para 7 of the written statement, is only a recourse to avoid the mischief of O. 15 R. 5 CPC. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that it was a case of non-admission of rent and hence it was to be deposited. If the law is to be stretched and interpreted in that aspect then there would hardly be a case where the provision of O. 15 R. 5 C. P. C. can be invoked by the courts. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a case Janki Prasad Saxena v. Tara Krishna Chaturvedi (1975-1 All LR 354) in which a learned single Judge of this Court observed: "For the purpose of making a deft. liable to pay the amount under this clause, it is absolutely essential to establish that the rent was due. But if the liability of payment of rent is denied the defence of such a defdt. cannot be struck off. The ground on which the defdt. is asserting that the rent is not payable by him to the landlord is, however, immaterial. What is material for the purpose of attracting the aforesaid clause is that the rent must have been admitted by the defdt. to be due, only then it becomes payable to the person entitled to get it. As the power to strike off defence brings about serious consequences the same has to be resorted to only when the requirements of the said provision have been strictly proved. to be due, only then it becomes payable to the person entitled to get it. As the power to strike off defence brings about serious consequences the same has to be resorted to only when the requirements of the said provision have been strictly proved. The legislature cannot be imputed with the intention of providing that the defence of a tenant can be struck off despite the fact that he is disputing the claim of a landlord made for the recovery of rent." It may be mentioned that in that case the defdt. had spent a huge sum in repairs of the house and as per agreement between the tenant and landlord he was entitled to adjust the amount spent by him on the repairs. In the instant case there is nothing on record to suggest or show that the amount which was being sought to be adjusted by the petitioner had been agreed by the landlord opp. party No. 3. It is in the light of the facts and circumstances of each and every case that the law has to be applied. In the instant case, there is ample evidence to show that admittedly the rent was payable @ Rs. 60/- per month by the petitioner to the opposite party No. 3. The lower revisional court has discussed the entire aspect of the matter after giving due weight and consideration to the pleadings of the parties that the petitioner had prayed for four weeks' time to comply with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC although in the application it was not specifically stated and it was mentioned that he wanted to deposit the rent in accordance with S. 39 of the Act. On a consideration of facts and circumstances there is hardly any doubt or room left to hold that the court below committed any error in striking off the defence under O. 15 R. 5 CPC. 9. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Ladly Pd. v. Ram Shah Billa (1976 All LJ 494): ( AIR 1976 All 261 ), in this case a Division Bench of this Court observed that "it is not obligatory on the court to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off the defence in a case default is committed by the defdt. v. Ram Shah Billa (1976 All LJ 494): ( AIR 1976 All 261 ), in this case a Division Bench of this Court observed that "it is not obligatory on the court to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off the defence in a case default is committed by the defdt. in making the requisite deposits." In that case time had been granted by the trial court for depositing money. If the discretion in the instant case has not been exercised in favour of the petitioner no grouse can be raised. It cannot be said that discretion exercised by the trial court was manifestly erroneous, illegal or was without jurisdiction. The case of Ladly Prasad v. Ram Shah Billa (supra) also does not, in my opinion, support the case of the petitioner. I, therefore, do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. The contention of learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 is that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India which in itself is discretionary in nature. The law undoubtedly provides remedy and that remedy having been invoked and there being a concurrent finding of fact, there remains now no controversy as a matter of fact to be decided by this Court. It is well-settled that even if the order could be demonstrated to be erroneous, it is not necessary for this Court to interfere with every finding of fact or every slight error of law in exercise of discretion. I do not think that it is a fit case for interference in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court. 11. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner is a very old man he will have to make serious efforts to search out an accommodation and hence some time may be granted to him. In the city of Lucknow there is undoubtedly a great paucity of accommodation and looking to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I allow him six months' time to stay in the premises on the condition that he shall leave the same and hand over its peaceful possession to opposite party No. 3. The period of six months shall commence to run from the date of this order. 12. The period of six months shall commence to run from the date of this order. 12. The result is that the writ petition, in the light of observations mentioned above, fails and is accordingly dismissed. 13. I however, direct that the petitioner shall continue to stay on in the premises for a period of six months as observed above and continue to pay the rent of the premises @ Rs. 60/-per month to opposite party No. 3. In the event of default, it will he open to the opposite party No. 3 to put the decree into execution.